Are we feeling the country is in such capable hands, that we can afford to take a longer break between elections? Outside the parliamentary bubble and a few corporate boardrooms, surely there are not very many people who think that voters have too much power over politicians, and exert it far too often.

Yet in the complete absence of a groundswell of public calls to hold elections less often, we’re being given that “choice” regardless. When we cast our ballots at next year’s election, we will also be voting in a binding referendum on whether governments should be given the option of extending the period between elections from three years to four years. If a majority of voters approve, the change would take effect after the 2029 election.

Note: we don’t have a fixed three year term now – that’s why Helen Clark was able to call an ealy election in 2002 – and we wouldn’t have a fixed four year term if the referendum passed. What we’re talking about is giving governments more “flexibility” to pick an election date that improves their chances of being re-elected. That self-interest sits right alongside the rhetoric about how having a longer term in office would result in better political decision-making – a claim that (see below) has little or no research evidence to back it up.

The Three Year Cycle

In 1879, New Zealand reduced the parliamentary term from 5 years to 3 years. Apart from three crisis situations (e.g. WWII) New Zealand’s electoral cycle has stayed at three years ever since. In 1967, a referendum proposal to extend the parliamentary term to four years was defeated by a whopping 68-32% margin.

In 1986, the pros and cons of extending the parliamentary term were considered in depth by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System. The competing claims and concerns were weighed by the Royal Commission before it finally came down in favour of making no change to the three year term.

Those calling for change – then and now – argue that three years is too short a time (a) for governments to implement policy and (b) for voters to judge whether those policies are working effectively. The result of this situation – allegedly - is short term planning of poor quality, with the fear of a voter backlash being compounded by governments being tempted to prime the electoral pump too readily, and too often.

That reasoning begs any number of questions. Why should giving governments more power to postpone when voters can pass judgement on their competence necessarily improve the quality of their decision making? As the Royal Commission duly noted back in 1986, “The disruptive effect [of elections] is of much more concern to those in places of confidence and power, than to the average citizen.”

Rather than being a brake on effective decision-making, it could be argued that the three year term should act as a spur to efficiency. It should be placing a useful onus on the central government to communicate its policy programme more clearly, and to deliver at least some fruits of that programme within a reasonable time frame. After all, the public is very capable of grasping a well-made case for medium and long term socio-economic investment.

No doubt, four years may allow good policy the time to bloom – but it could just as easily buy time for bad policy to bed in and inflict more damage. For example: in the case of the radical Douglas/Lange government of the mid 1980s, much of the campaign rhetoric in 1987 was framed around 1987 marked only “half-time” in the reform process, and more time would then allow the reforms to generate that promised economic tide that would “lift all the boats.”

The electorate bought the “give us more time” argument in 1987, and lived to regret it. New Zealand is still living with the social and economic damage done by the asset sales that ensued during that second term. More time may not always (or often) be benign. More time can equal more damage.

Here and Now

As things stand, there is no sign that a three year term is inhibiting governments unduly. Last year, the coalition government chose to make significant decisions about funding and staffing levels in public health, the nature of the Treaty partnership, tax cuts, relaxed gun controls, abolition of anti-smoking measures, scrapping the Cook Strait ferries contract, slashing jobs across the public etc etc. As the Reserve Bank told the Royal Commission back in 1986, no research evidence exists either here or overseas, to show that economic decision-making has ever been materially affected by the electoral term. Claims that a three year term has negative economic effects, the Royal Commision concluded, are “unproven.”

Besides, the three year term is something of an illusion. New Zealand governments are rarely turfed out after only one term in office, so there is already a de facto six year term – or more – in operation, punctuated only by the periodic need to gain a fresh, course-correcting mandate from voters. This mandade has almost invariably been given.

As the 1986 Royal Commission also noted, frequent elections give New Zealand voters a degree of voter control over central government. This is an important factor, it added, in a country with no written Constitution, only one chamber of Parliament, and relatively few of the constitutional safeguards commonly found elsewhere. Despite the lack of evidence, the Royal Commission accepted the argument that a longer term might lead to better decisions – but not, in its view, to an extent that to be sufficient to outweigh the lessening of democratic accountability.

Doubtless, we will be hearing more on this issue between now and the 2026 election. For obvious reasons, senior politicians in both major parties, e,g. Christopher Luxon, Chris Hipkins, Jacinda Ardern and Judith Collins have spoken out in recent times in favour of a four year term of government. The voters may be less inclined to surrender more of the already limited control that many people feel they have over central government.

That said, there is a natural human tendency to want the parties one supports to govern for longer, while keeping a tight electoral leash on the governments that one doesn’t like. Centre-right voters may like the cut of the current government’s jib. Yet would they want the likes of the recent Ardern/Hipkins administration – hysterically painted in some quarters as a jackbooted tyranny that has “wrecked” the New Zealand economy – to enjoy a longer period in office, before needing to face the voters again? Probably not.

In reality, the binding referendum in 2026 will probably turn into a referendum on the popularity of the current government. “Give us more time” worked for a radical government in 1987. No doubt we will be hearing new versions of the same plea once again, during the run-up to Election 2026.

Sean Baker’s (Other) Big Night

Yesterday’s Oscar triumph by Sean Baker and his film Anora was gratifying for several reasons. From Tangerine to The Florida Project to Red Rocket to Anora as well, Baker has written narratives about how wealth, work and gender affect the choices available to his characters. That may seem obvious – and it is – but the lack of social mobility (and the effect that hitting the gender/class ceilings have on his characters) seem to be fairly rare concerns at the cinema these days. Movie culture tends to be wedded to superhero fantasies, rom com versions of the American Dream, or to the search for personal escape routes from dystopian nightmares.

Anora uses the thriller/screwball comedy tropes but-in its final scene – it portrays the heartbreak of realising the different realities inhabited by (a) those blessed with inherited wealth and (b) those forced to endure the rigours of everyday work. Anora herself gains an entree to that other realm and briefly, has hopes for a lasting place within it.

Each of Baker’s past five films has had sex work as a recurring part of the narrative. In December, Baker told Jason Di Rosso (host of the ABC’s excellent Screen Show) about the ways he has continued to chip away at the stigma still attached to sex work, and to try and humanise it. (The interview also has some interesting stuff about Baker’s negotiation of the male gaze.)

Winning the Palme D’Or at Cannes. Baker also said, had been a dream of his 30 years as a low budget film-maker. Not that he expected Anora to be the one, since it contains moments of overt comedy, something rarely recognised with the big prize at Cannes [or at the Oscars]:

Ok, what now. That was my dream come true, no doubt about it. Its sort of an existential crisis [as to]what’s the new dream, what do I do now?...People ask me, am I getting calls from the studios, and this and that. Not really. I think it's because I’ve actually made it clear over the last few films that have gotten attention in the press [that] I’m not interested in going the studio route....

Part of that is because Baker feels he doesn’t make the sort of films that fit with studio methods and expectations:

Lets just say I don’t think my subject matter can pass the basic Script Notes stage from any studio or even mini-studio. These have to be done pretty much independently. And what the Palme D’Or has allowed me to do is stay in my lane without hearing the noise anymore. You almost get seduced. It's almost impossible to avoid the seduction. But I think I can now make these movies I want to make, and continue to be able to make them in this way.

Winning big at the Oscars will now throw even more resources his way. If they haven’t done so already, everyone and their dog will now probably go out of their way to see Anora, if only to find out what the fuss is about. I hope that as many people who missed it the first time around will seek out The Florida Project. IMO, this has been Sean Baker’s masterpiece to date:

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