Implications of the Ongoing War in Syria

INSS Insight No. 877, December 15, 2016

The battle for control of Aleppo, the second most important city in Syria, has ended in a victory for Assad’s forces, supported by the pro-Assad coalition – Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and Shiite forces commanded by Iran. In the context of the battle, the forces opposing Assad felt that they were betrayed, having suffered siege and hunger, destroyed residential neighborhoods, hundreds of civilian casualties, and the use of chlorine bombs against population centers, while the world was silent. None of the parties who promised a change in Syria delivered on their promises. The United States, which committed itself to achieve a political solution that would end Assad’s tyrannical rule, did not lift a finger. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the leading Sunni forces in the region, which promised Sunni majority rule in Syria, have given up their efforts against the war waged by Russia and Iran to save the Alawite regime headed by Assad. The international community has abandoned the Syrian people, and has failed in both halting the bloodbath that to date has claimed nearly half a million victims and preventing a humanitarian disaster.

Above all, the stark failure of United States policy in Syria is clear. While US Secretary of State John Kerry talks with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov in an attempt to formulate a solution, Russian warplanes and Assad’s artillery bombard the besieged area and attack civilians indiscriminately. The United States chose to limit its involvement in Syria because it did not want to become entangled in another military venture in the Middle East that would require American ground forces, and gave up when the “moderate” rebels proved unable to unite. The fall of Aleppo to Assad also constitutes a failure for the regional Sunni powers. Due to President Erdogan’s whimsical nature, Turkey lacks a consistent policy, other than preventing the Syrian Kurds from extending the area under their control and creating what amounts to an autonomous region. Turkey has abandoned the other Sunni rebel organizations fighting for Aleppo, especially those belonging to the Free Syrian Army. As for Saudi Arabia, it has not managed to create a safe passage for the transfer of aid and weapons to the rebels. It is also a painful failure for the Syrian opposition, which has not managed to foster leadership, unite those fighting against the regime, and mobilize the world to save the suffering Syrian people.

Furthermore, Aleppo’s downfall only exacerbates the differences within the rebel groups, and between them and the opposition political leadership. The rebel forces have been unable to form a joint command and control post in the fighting. The question therefore is what goals the opposition and the rebels have set for themselves. Have they adopted the Afghan model of decentralized insurgency forces that will disrupt any chance of introducing stability and a proper regime in Syria? There are signs on the ground that the rebels are indeed preparing for another stage in the prolonged uprising.

On the other side, Assad does not regard victory in Aleppo as the end of his struggle for survival. In an interview with Syrian newspaper al-Watan, Assad said that the conquest of Aleppo amounts to robbing the rebels and their supporters of their cards, but is not the end of the war against the terrorists. Rather, the rebels are hanging on to eastern Aleppo after failing in Damascus and Homs, where they received Turkish aid because they were near the border. The liberation of Aleppo consolidates Assad’s control of the Syrian backbone from Aleppo through Hama and Homs to Damascus, including the Alawite heartland in the coastal area. He believes the rebel forces belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood (according to Assad, all his opponents are of the Muslim Brotherhood, even though many of them do not belong to that organization) will not abandon terrorism.

For its part, Russia has utilized the tactics characterizing its operations in Syria since September 2015: the merciless use of massive and brutal military force, including against civilians, while establishing as many facts on the ground as possible before coming to the negotiating table from a position of strength. In order to increase the pressure on the rebels, Russia has neutralized the UN Security Council decision on a ceasefire in Aleppo for humanitarian purposes. In parallel with the battles, Russia is holding secret talks with the rebels’ representatives in Istanbul in order to impose terms on them. One of the material issues is the severing of any ties between the rebels and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated with al-Qaeda). Russia has also promised that it will allow rebel groups not connected with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham safe passage to the Idlib area. It is likely, however, that the rebels realize that the fate of the Idlib enclave is no different than the Aleppo enclave, and that the pro-Syrian coalition will also crush them there. In its contacts with the rebels, Russia is already addressing the next stage, and the question of how to allow hundreds of local communities to function without undermining the central government. A dialogue is underway with local leaders for this purpose. At the same time, Russia aims to reach understandings with rebels in southern Syria on the principle that they will not be harmed if they lay down their weapons.

Russian President Vladimir Putin made every effort to finish the campaign in Aleppo before President-elect Donald Trump enters the White House, and to present the consolidation of Assad’s rule in the areas crucial for Russia as a fait accompli. Yet whether or not the battle in Aleppo was decided before Trump entered the White House, from a broader perspective, the United States has already missed the boat, and the incoming US president must therefore decide whether to continue the current policy of doing nothing, or to change direction:

a. To aim at an alliance with Russia with the idea of fighting against the Islamic State and terrorism. It appears that Trump is leaning in this direction, since he has hinted that he is willing to give Putin the “Syrian file.”

b. To support the Assad regime and its forces, and to declare it the winner of the war against Salafi jihadist groups. This is possible if Assad promises to refrain from eliminating his opponents after the rebellion ends and subordinate the Free Syrian Army to the Syrian armed forces.

c. Where military support is concerned, Trump will have to decide whether to stop aiding the 80 rebel groups that have been trained by the CIA (about 50,000 soldiers) and received weapons, but who have not achieved the hoped-for results. If he decides to halt or significantly cut back on support, what will happen to those organizations and soldiers; will they return to their homes? They will certainly not surrender their weapons, and Turkey and Saudi Arabia will likely continue to support them.

d. In the Turkish-Kurdish context, if Trump and Erdogan find a common language, he will probably not oppose a Turkish buffer zone along the Syrian-Turkish border west of the Euphrates River.

e. As for northeastern Syria, the US army generals will certainly recommend fighting against the Islamic State and helping the Kurds control the strip of territory around Hasakah, where the US Central Command can maintain forces and airbases essential to the war against the Islamic State. The Islamic State has shown that it is still very much alive, taking advantage of the focus by all forces on Aleppo to reconquer territory in and around the historic city of Palmyra.

An immediate test for President Trump will be the battle for al-Raqqa, the Islamic State’s capital in Syria. He will have to decide whether the United States should urge the Kurdish forces and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) set up by the Americans to take control of the city before Assad’s forces do so, or to allow Assad’s forces to take over al-Raqqa (assuming that they wish to do so at this stage), thereby consolidating Assad’s image as the liberator of Syria from the Islamic State and the victor over Salafi jihadist terrorism. The strategic directions of the Trump administration’s policy are thus far unclear, although it appears he will give military strategy a high priority.

As for Israel, it is likely that following the fall of Aleppo, Assad’s forces, with the encouragement of Iran and Hezbollah, will try to repeat their success in southern Syria in order to conquer rebel-controlled territory in the area. In this event, fighting would occur close to the border in the Golan Heights, with the participation of Iranian and Hezbollah forces, with a high risk that the events will spill over to Israeli territory. Israel regards the events in Syria in the broad Iranian context as the main threatening element against Israel (in intentions and capabilities). Iran is not deterred against sending its forces and those of its proxies, i.e., Shiite militias subject to its authority, to fight at Assad’s side, and has even conducted ethnic cleansing of Sunnis in certain areas in Syria in order to strengthen the Shiite bridge from Tehran to Beirut by way of Syria. Israel must therefore consider policy of non-intervention in the fighting in Syria, because it will find it difficult to accept an Iranian presence or that of its proxies in the Golan Heights. Israel must set and enforce clear red lines, as it has in the past, because without enforcement, it will not be possible to influence the rules of the game in such an unstable environment.

At the same time, Israel should continue its civilian aid – medicine, food, fuel, and so on – to the local Syrian communities in the Golan Heights, provided that this does not enable terrorist groups to take action against Israel. In view of the absence of a comprehensive solution to the civil war in Syria, it is necessary to build grassroots support, as Russia has done in its contacts with local community leaders. Israel should do the same beyond the border in southern Syria, especially in the Golan Heights – in other words, support local areas of stability, even if what will happen in the overall situation is unknown.

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