Saudi Arabia Stoking Sectarian Conflict As Battle To Succeed king Salman Intensifies; By Zayd Alisa
Saudi Arabia, one year after king Salman acceded to the throne and 9-months after appointing his favourite - young and
inexperienced - son, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) Deputy Crown Prince (DCP), is grappling with not merely an increasingly
relentless power struggle, compounded by an unprecedented devastating plunge in oil prices, but far more ominously the
ruinous implications of a highly aggressive foreign policy that has ultimately led to a full-blown costly yet futile war
against the Houthi-rebels in Yemen, and has increasingly fuelled proxy sectarian wars in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. The
Saudi regime has made no secret that the overarching goal of its newly adopted muscular foreign policy, which is
aggressively spearheaded by MbS, is to counter what it perceives as Iran’s growing yet highly perilous influence.
Surprisingly, however, the German Foreign Intelligence BND publically acknowledged, on Dec 2, that Saudi Arabia at the
behest of MbS - who is striving to become the next King - is increasingly shifting to an impulsive and interventionist
foreign policy, swiftly turning Riyadh into a major destabilising force in the Middle East. Amid the mounting fear of
further terrorist atrocities in European cities by ISIL, following the Nov 13 Paris terrorist attacks, the German
Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, on Dec 6, scathingly scolded the Saudi regime for funding extremists in the West and
around the world by building and funding radical Wahhabi Mosques. The Head of the SPD group in the German Parliament
Thomas Oppermann, went even further, forcefully emphasizing that Wahhabism the formal religion of Saudi Arabia has
offered a comprehensive ideology for ISIL and Al Qiada. Although the German Government rapidly scrambled to distance
itself from the report, however, the BND’s assessment has unquestionably gained added weight by MbS’s highly impulsive
declaration, on Dec 15, of forming a 34-nation anti-terror Islamic military coalition - which strikingly resembles the
Saudi-led Arab coalition in Yemen in terms of its starkly anti-Shia sectarian nature and the way it was introduced by
MbS in March 2015 - without consulting the overwhelming majority of countries mentioned. MbS’s highly controversial
declaration came, a day after Obama’s call - at the U.S. National Security Council - on Saudi Arabia to focus more on
confronting ISIL rather than on Yemen.
Saudi Arabia ushered out 2015 with 157 executions, breaking all records since 1995. It herald the beginning of 2016 by
executing a record number of 47 people, sending out a chillingly barbarous message to the people of Saudi Arabia: All
those who dare to defy, oppose or merely demand an end to Riyadh’s medieval dictatorship, whether through terrorism like
Al Qaida and ISIL or via peaceful nonviolent protests like Shiekh Nimr Baqir Al-Nimr - who was undeniably the driving
force behind the 2011 popular uprising, clamouring for democracy and an end to virulently sectarian discrimination
against the Shia - would beyond doubt have their heads chopped off and their dead bodies crucified as they would at the
hands of ISIL. But, even more menacingly is the inescapable reality that such monstrous punishments are issued, in both
Saudi Arabia and under ISIL rule, by religious courts adhering to the extremist hard-line Wahhabi Salafi idiology,
propagated and exported by Saudi Arabia’s government-funded Wahhabi Salafi Religious Establishment.
The Saudi regime’s highly unusual step of executing a prominent religious leader like Al-Nimr was deliberately intended
to spark spontaneous outrage and thereby provoke an uncalculated retaliation, from above all Iran. Hence, effectively
turning Riyadh into the main victim of the crisis. As such, the storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran was music to the
Saudi ears, prompting it, on Jan 3, to cut off not only diplomatic and economic ties, but more significantly to the
Saudi regime, preventing its Shia citizens from travelling to Iran.
As Salman acceded to the throne, on Jan 23, after the death of his half-brother King Abdullah, he swiftly scrambled to
shore up his position by: First, ripping the power base of Abdullah’s son - Metab - apart by dismissing his father’s
chief of the Royal Court and his two brothers. Second, elevating Muqrin from DCP to Crown Prince (CP), despite his
knowledge that Muqrin was specifically appointed DCP by Abdullah to ensure that he returns the throne to Metab. In
essence, Salman’s decision was driven by fear that ousting Muqrin would rock the boat. Third, securing the internal
front while also appeasing the U.S. by determining that Mohammed bin Nayef ( MbN ), who is the Interior Minister and
also considered U.S.’s most trusted ally, should be the first among the Grandsons of Abdulaziz - usually called Ibn Saud
- in line to the throne. Fourth, bolstering his young son’s MbS power, by appointing him as Defence Minister and Head of
the Economic and Development Council. But as It became increasingly evident that the war unleashed by MbS, in Mar 2015,
in Yemen, which was partly aimed at rapidly propelling him to prominence, was a spectacular failure, and amid MbS’s
profound worries that his father’s - who is in poor health - death would terminate his ambitions. Consequently, on Apr
29, Salman ousted Muqrin, while promoting MbN to become CP and defiantly promoting MbS to DCP. Yet, paradoxically,
Salman’s move has not only irrefutably amplified MbS’s vulnerability by practically demonstrating that a new king does
not have to stick with his predecessor’s choice of DCP, but far more critically, deepening the distrust between MbS and
MbN and thereby injecting new urgency to MbS’s strenuous drive to dislodge MbN. And although Salman’s highly divisive
declaration infuriated the royal family, it was however incontestably, his first formal visit, in early Sept 2015, to
the U.S. accompanied by his son MbS - who was fervently welcomed by Obama and top U.S. officials - that pushed the
long-simmering power struggle to perilously destabilising levels, prompting senior members of the royal family, on Sept
28, to uncharacteristically throw caution to the wind, forcefully calling for a palace coup to depose Salman, MbN and
MbS. To make matters worse, this coincided with a double disaster at Mecca, essentially exacerbating an increasingly
pervading atmosphere of an inherently incompetent leadership that is conspicuously incapable of adequately managing the
hajj pilgrimage, from which it draws its ultimate legitimacy in leading the Islamic world.
Riyadh’s decision to push the sectarian tension to boiling point was internally intended to: First, stave off an
internal uprising in the Sunni heartland by trumpeting the patently deceitful myth that Saudi Arabia is still the
guardian of Sunni Islam and above all, is heavily engaged in combating an existential threat posed by the Shia, namely
Iran. Second, with tumbling oil prices and an unimaginable budget deficit, compelling Riyadh to raise taxes and also to
compensate for its inability to rely heavily - as both King Abdullah during the Arab Spring and King Salman when
acceding to the throne - on its most potent weapon to head off and curb popular dissent: vast oil revenue. Third,
lending credence to its claims of facing an immensely serious national security threat, enabling Salman and MbS to call
into question the very patriotism of those challenging their authority and therefore severely undermine the growing
campaign, spearheaded by senior members of the younger generation of the royal family, to replace Salman with his full
Sudairi brother, 73-years-old Ahmed.
While externally Riyadh aimed to: First, sabotage, or at the very least, discredit the Nuclear deal signed, on Jul 14,
between Iran and the P 5+1, - which Riyadh has tenaciously resisted every inch of the way, insisting that the U.S.’s
overriding priority should persistently be isolating and containing Iran - by practically highlighting to the U.S. and
its allies that Iran is utterly unreliable. Indeed, the lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran, on Jan 16, was by far the
most devastating blow to the Saudi regime. But, to add insult to injury, even Riyadh’s staunchest allies in the GCC
-except Bahrain which was invaded and still occupied by Saudi Arabia since the Arab Spring - and among Arab countries -
except Sudan and Djibouti - have fiercely resisted severing diplomatic ties. Second, resurrect MbS’s 34-nation Islamic
alliance - which has so far failed to materialise - and also reviving MbS’s faltering Arab alliance in Yemen, by
employing the highly incendiary sectarian confrontation as the perfect pretext to rally sectarian support for such
emphatically anti-Shia coalitions. Third, critically undermine the painstakingly negotiated Russian-U.S. roadmap,
unanimously endorsed, on Dec 18, by UN-Security Council resolution number 2254, explicitly stressing that Syria’s
president Bashar Al Assad’s future must be exclusively decided by the Syrian people. In the eyes of Riyadh this clearly
marked a severe blow to its implacable campaign to topple Assad. Riyadh’s invitation to Syrian opposition groups, on Dec
8, was designed to thwart resolution 2254, by signalling that it is the one calling the shots by forming, monopolising
and incorporating representatives of terrorist organisations within the opposition’s negotiating team. Indeed, Riyadh
has consistently been blaming Obama’s administration for its indecisive leadership while also furiously lashing out
against the highly effective Russian air-campaign backed up by unflinching Iranian support, which has decisively turned
the tide against terrorist organisations like ISIL, Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) , Ahrar Al-Sham and Jaish Al-Islam, all of
which have shamelessly been armed and financed by Saudi Arabia, according to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s assertion,
in Oct 2014.
As ISIL dramatically broadens its strategy, from being a regional to an increasingly international threat, targeting
U.S. and European citizens around the world, it is high time for the American people to cast their decisive vote on
whether the best way of promoting U.S.’s interests is by covering up Saudi Arabia’s abhorrent record of escalating human
rights violations, of exporting its extremist Wahhabi Salafi ideology and bloodthirsty jihadists, of promoting radical
preachers of death giving religious legitimacy to grotesque atrocities against Shias, Christians, Jews and moderate
Sunnis, of arming and funding ISIS, JN, and Taliban and of spreading tyranny and dictatorship in the Middle East.