10 reasons why trade agreements undermine our health and environment.
It's a week of action for those opposing the TPPA - but across the world citizens on all continents are opposing other
trade agreements structured similarly to the TPPA, for example the TTIP, an agreement between the US and Europe. These
international trade agreements with ISDS provisions act the same way in every country that signs - they act to impose a
'regulatory chill' - and the frequently challenge government regulation that has been enacted in the best interest of
the general public - not the multinational corporation.
As a result - it is not just Kiwis who have reason to be concerned.
10 reasons why trade ‘agreements’ & ISDS tribunals undermine public interest regulation, threatening our health and the environment - all over the world.
1. ISDS tribunals have rejected requests to defer to government regulations when these have been enacted in good faith
with no intent to harm corporate profits.
2. ISDS tribunals' decisions have historically required scientific “proof”. However regulatory bodies/ governments have
a duty of care. Acting in the public interest often requires them to employ the precautionary principle (aka prudent
avoidance), a valuable tool in public policy-making. Establishing the toxicity or safety of chemicals is a slow and
difficult process and often takes much time and resources. (Many are eventually proven, with scientific certainty, to be
carcinogens, endocrine disruptors, mutagens, environmental toxins etc.)
3. Investor rights can trump public interest rights. A trade agreement may contain provisions that appear to ensure a
government’s ability to protect the environment and public health, may be trumped by other agreement provisions that
protect investor rights.
4. ISDS Tribunals undermine democracy, public discussion and dissent:
a. Early settlement avoids big payouts but may result in undemocratic regulation. Settlement prior to ISDS arbitration
may still result in environmental or health based settlement decisions or ‘agreed principles’ that, with due
consultation in the public sphere, may have not been taken.
b. The tribunals choose if public can participate or contribute. Public participation in ISDS disputes are decided by a
panel of 3 lawyers (only 1 of whom is independent).
c. Trade agreements may create environments hostile to journalists and whistleblowers and may compromise internet
freedom. Online action targeting corporate wrongdoing may be prohibited.
5. ISDS claims frequently target environmental and health policy measures. Analysts noted that “the provisions designed
to ensure security and predictability for the investors have now created uncertainty and unpredictability for
environmental (and other) regulators.”
6. It’s simply not democratic. Frankly, our judicial system looks after us better. ISDS arbitration mechanisms can
undermine domestic public interest regulation - providing the public with greatly limited ability to engage in these
disputes. It’s cloaked in secrecy and public participation, when allowed, lacks key aspects of basic procedural
fairness. This compares to the sophisticated procedural tools available to the public within the modern judicial system.
Here, specific regulatory by-laws can be developed and become the subject of legal challenges - due process is provided
under more transparent legislative and judicial systems.
7. It’s based on estimated future profits – and only multinational corporations can engage. ISDS arbitration is only for
multinational, and not domestic corporations.
8. Corporate lawyers lack public policy experience. Tribunal members appointed to adjudicate disputes frequently have a
commercial law background. Arbitrators may lack the necessary expertise to consider broader public policy implications.
9. Local government regulations and by-laws are vulnerable. Local regulations may regulate to benefit local health & local economies. However they can be overridden by a government anxious to reach a less costly settlement.
10. Tribunals are not bound by rules of precedent. This creates even more uncertainty over ISDS outcomes and a “chilling
effect” on government regulation.
Further reading.
(Much of the information used to identify the above 10 reasons has been extracted from): Kathleen Cooper, Kyra
Bell-Pasht, Ramani Nadarajah, and Theresa McClenaghan, Seeking a Regulatory Chill in Canada: The Dow Agrosciences NAFTA
Chapter 11 Challenge to the Quebec Pesticides Management Code, 7 Golden Gate U. Envtl. L.J. 5 (2014).
ends