Airstrikes Weakening ISIL But Keeping It As A Viable Threat

Iraq more than three years after the U.S. withdrawal and more than one year since ISIL or ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, which initially called itself Al Qaida in Iraq AQI - seized Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, is grappling with an increasingly menacing existential threat by a heavily armed and increasingly barbarous ISIL, which on Jun 10, last year surged towards Baghdad, seizing large swathes of territory, including Tikrit and Iraq’s second largest city Mosul.

Buoyed by the recent resounding victory in wresting control of the highly strategic province of Diyala, the Iraqi government launched, on Mar 1, a full-scale offensive to drive ISIL out of its vital stronghold of Tikrit, which undoubtedly has not only an immensely symbolic significance as the hometown of toppled dictator Saddam Hussein, but also crucially controls the highway linking Baghdad to Mosul. The Pro-Government Force (PGF) consists of army units, Sunni tribesmen and the increasingly powerful Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) – which includes Shia Militias and volunteers – making up the bulk the anti-ISIL alliance.

Indeed, the Pentagon’s highly unusual statement, explicitly emphasizing that the U.S. was not providing any air power in support of the Tikrit operation left no doubt that the U.S. has not only been fiercely against it, but trying its utmost to publicly distance itself from it. This came hard on the heels of another highly damaging public rift: when, alarmingly, on Feb 19, a senior Central Command (CentCom) official explicitly advertised that Iraqi forces backed by U.S. air support intends to stage an all-out assault on Mosul in April or May. But, within few hours CentCom declared that it would be able to train enough men in time. It has become increasingly apparent that the U.S. deliberately made the two announcements, aiming to thwart the Tikrit offensive by sending out the following unmistakable messages: First, the U.S. adamantly refused to provide air support to an Iraqi force that it has not directly trained, let alone one spearheaded by PMF. Second, it was vehemently opposed to any attempt to drive ISIL out of the Sunni heartland by a force that is, not merely overwhelmingly dominated and spearheaded by Iranian-backed Shia Militias, but far more alarmingly is guided by Gen. Qassem Suleimanni the commander of the elite Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. And third, it was far too early to launch any major offensive in the Sunni-dominated provinces, such as Anbar, Ninevah and Salahuddin – whose capital is Tikrit. These unambiguous messages were principally designed to appease, not only the increasingly outspoken critics – from the Republican party, such as John McCain and Lindsey Graham – of Obama’s administration strategy on Iraq and Syria, demanding a more robust U.S. involvement to forestall the mounting Iranian influence, but an even more vehement opposition to any U.S. air support which in Saudi Arabia’s eyes would pave the way to what, the Saudi Foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal, on Mar 5, forcefully described as Iran’s take over of Iraq. Saudi Arabia joined the U.S.-led coalition against ISIL, in Sept 2014, primarily seeking to cover its tracks in pumping a torrent of funding, arming, logistical support and salaries – which was acknowledged in Oct 2014 by the U.S. Vice president Joe Biden – to extremist Wahhabi Salafi groups, such as Jabhat Al Nusra and ISIL.

Gen Lloyd Austin, head of CentCom, explicitly confirmed, on Mar 26, that the U.S. has indeed adamantly refused to provide any air support unless Iraq meets its preconditions: First, pulling back the PMF from the battlefield and even more essentially, routing it from leading the Tikrit operation. Second, establishing an Iraqi command. And third, implementing a new U.S. plan. Clearly the U.S. has all along been disingenuous, claiming that it held off launching airstrikes until, Mar 26, because the Iraqi government did not request assistance.

Although previous attempts by the Iraqi government to recapture Tikrit spectacularly failed, however it is abundantly clear that this offensive by PGF has made seismic headway in dislodging ISIL from, not merely its chief strongholds surrounding Tikrit, such as AL Dour village – hometown of Izzat Al Douri, Saddam’s right hand man –, Abu Ajeel village and Al Alam district, but more significantly advancing into Tikrit city, effectively confining ISIL to the city centre. And with ISIL’s back up against the wall, it is hardly surprising that it is tenaciously holding its ground. Therefore, it was highly premature for Gen. Austin to contend, on Mar 26, that the Tikrit operation has irrevocably stalled. After all, it is undeniable that it took the U.S. in 2004, two strenuous attempts and far longer to oust AQI from Fallujah.

Ever since the end of the US occupation of Iraq in 2011, it has been steadfastly determined to shore up its waning influence by ensuring that Iraqi security forces remain inadequately equipped and thereby heavily reliant on U.S. support and air cover. Even when ISIL seriously threatened Bagdad, in Jun 2014, the U.S. showed absolutely no signs of urgency. Instead, Obama’s first response, on Jun 19, was insisting that any U.S. assistance is contingent on forging a new broad-based inclusive government. Despite U.S. groundless claims that It’s airstrikes halted ISIL’s advance, it was, however, beyond doubt the shia volunteers and militias, who enthusiastically answered the Shias top religious cleric, Grand Aytollah Ali Al Sistani’s, call to arms, that ultimately stopped ISIL in its tracks. And while the U.S. stood idly by as ISlL swept towards Baghdad, it swiftly scrambled, on Aug 8, to launch airstrikes to halt its unexpected advance towards Irbil – capital of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The U.S. Air Force has worked hand in glove with the Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) to dislodge ISIL from Kurdish areas, such as Zumar, Sinjar and Kobani, in both Iraq and Syria. While, in stark contrast, even with the appointment of Haider Al Abadi, as new Prime Minister and the formation of a new inclusive government, the U.S. airstrikes over areas outside the Kurdish region – which began, on Sept 15 – has neither intensified nor gathered momentum, practically remaining mere window-dressing. All along, the U.S. Air Force has deliberately stayed on the sidelines as the PMF clawed back control of strategic areas, such as Amerly, Jurf Al Sakar, and Diyala province. But the Tikrit offensive has undoubtedly laid bare: that the U.S. has consistently been aiming to weaken ISIL, while keeping it as a viable threat to accomplish the following: First, utilising it as a perfect pretext to ramp up and entrench its presence. Second, overhauling, if not utterly replacing the current Iraqi army – which it perceives as heavily infiltrated by the PMF. Third, fulfilling Saudi Arabia’s overarching goal for joining the U.S.-led coalition: practically preventing the PMF from clearing ISIL from the Sunni-dominated provinces, especially Anbar, by formulating a purely Sunni force called the National Guard. This force would be ostensibly under the overall supervision of Abadi, who is Iraq’s commander-in-chief, but in reality – as Ahmed Al Mesari the head of the Sunni bloc in Parliament, the Union of Iraqi forces, forcefully stressed – Abadi’s role would be restricted to financing and arming, while the provincial councils would effectively oversee, not just selecting the fighters, but far more crucially direct control. Hence, preparing the ground for a new purely Sunni Regional Government – identical to the KRG, which is indisputably an independent region in all but name – with not only its own army perilously threatening Baghdad, but above all a highly hostile foreign policy toeing the Saudi line.

As part of the U.S. frantic efforts to reassure Saudi Arabia, it dispatched, on Mar 9, Martin Dempsey chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Iraq. He ominously warned that Sunni Arab countries – led by Saudi Arabia – were profoundly outraged by Abadi’s government glacial pace in empowering Sunnis. Adding, that unless Sunni alienation is swiftly addressed, the sustainability of the U.S.-led coalition would be critically undermined. Yet, more strikingly, he brazenly asserted, on Mar 7, that Abadi’s key task must be balancing Iran’s role in empowering Shia militias with Iraq’s partnership with the U.S. .Thereby, making no secret that Abadi had no option but to theatrically pretend to be requesting U.S. assistance while in reality the U.S. had already decided to intervene in the Tikrit offensive for the following reasons: First, wresting control of the leadership of the operation from Iran’s allies in the PMF. Second, bolstering its influence on the ground by ensuring that U.S.-trained Iraqi units are leading the operation. Third, snatching credit for any victory from the PMF. Fourth, soothing the frayed nerves of its staunchest ally Saudi Arabia. Fifth, shoring up the standing of increasingly U.S.-leaning Shia political leaders, such as Abadi, Amar Al Hakim leader of the Islamic Supreme Council and even the once arch U.S. enemy Muqtada Al Sadr, all of whom feel increasingly threatened by the mounting popularity of their respective rivals: Nouri Al Maliki previous prime minister, Hadi Al Amiri leader of the powerful Badr organisation and Qais Al Khazaly leader of the formidable Asaib Ahl Al Haq. Sixth, Safeguarding its newly-established, yet vulnerable influence and military presence. Surely, the PMF’s unequivocal decision, on Mar 26, flatly refusing to take part in any U.S.-led offensive while also firmly holding their ground puts the U.S. under relentless pressure to escalate its airstrikes as it strives to outperform their substantial accomplishments. But, given the intensifying internal uproar and a desperate need for highly motivated fighters, Abadi, on Mar 29, was forced to discretely back down, setting the stage for the final offensive, which has successfully cleansed Tikrit. It is high-time for the U.S. to learn from its ill-conceived campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq: Utilising Al Qaida and relying on Saudi Arabia to prop up its interests would spectacularly backfire, inevitably leading to terror outrages in New York, London, Paris, Brussels, Sydney, Baghdad and Damascus.

Zayd Alisa is a political analyst and commentator on Middle East Affairs who has had numerous appearances on various TV channels (including BBC, France 24, RT TV, etc.). The writer of numerous articles relating to the most recent developments in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab spring, a number of Alisa's articles have been used as references in Wikipedia. A human rights activist who has actively promoted democracy and freedom of expression in the Middle East and Iraq, Alisa was born in New York, USA, is British, and based in London.

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