The Keys to the Gaza Strip
By Shmuel Even
August 25, 2014
INSS Insight No. 597
The blockade of the Gaza Strip, labeled by the Palestinians as a “siege,” is ostensibly one of the fundamental reasons
behind Hamas’ barrage of rockets that led to Operation Protective Edge. Yet while the Palestinians claim that Israel’s
purpose in imposing the “siege” is to overpower Gaza economically, this charge has no basis in reality. Rather, the
terrorism emanating from the Gaza Strip is the root cause of Gaza’s abject economic state, and until it is eradicated
from the area, the prospects for economic growth and development are slim. Insofar as the situation in Gaza returns to
what it was or improves, it will become increasingly difficult to realize the notion of “reconstruction for
demilitarization,” a vested interest of Israel, the PA, Egypt, and other Arab states, and also supported by the United
States and EU member nations. Hamas’ continued rule of the Gaza Strip reduces the possibility of restoring the PA to
full control there.
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The blockade of the Gaza Strip, labeled by the Palestinians as a “siege,” is ostensibly one of the fundamental reasons
behind Hamas’ barrage of rockets that led to Operation Protective Edge. Yet while the Palestinians claim that Israel’s
purpose in imposing the “siege” is to overpower Gaza economically, this charge has no basis in reality. Rather, the
terrorism emanating from the Gaza Strip is the root cause of Gaza’s abject economic state, and until it is eradicated
from the area, the prospects for economic growth and development are slim.
Palestinian employees, members of the former Hamas government, outside the Bank of Palestine during a protest in Gaza
City, June 8, 2014; AFP/Getty Images
The economic prosperity of the Gaza Strip is a clear Israeli interest. Even after the disengagement in 2005, Israel
tried to allow normal economic relations between the Gaza Strip with its neighbors. This was manifested both in a
government decision and in the Agreement on Movement and Access of November 2005. However, the upsurge of terrorism in
Gaza, including attacks on the border crossings, required heightened security measures, which in turn led to a reduction
in the transport of goods to and from the Gaza Strip. Moreover, Hamas – for which anti-Israel terrorism is part and
parcel of its existence – forged military and political alliances with Israel’s enemies, including Iran and Hizbollah,
both of which, like Hamas, publicly declare their intention to destroy Israel. These circumstances necessarily preclude
normal trade relations Israel and Gaza.
Since the implementation of the 1994 “Gaza and Jericho first” agreement, the Palestinians have violated every condition
necessary for a proper economy in the Gaza Strip, including security (during its control of the Gaza Strip, the
Palestinian Authority did not disarm either Hamas or Islamic Jihad), political stability, and proper governance. The
economic situation deteriorated under Hamas’ rule, and the organization’s terrorist activities harmed foreign investment
and damaged Gaza’s relations with Egypt. Hamas, like the PA before it, failed to manage the Gazan economy because of its
focus on the confrontation with Israel and due to the rampant cronyism, which gave short shrift to the welfare of the
population at large.
A Security Blockade is not a Siege
While the security blockade Israel imposes on the Gaza Strip has obvious economic implications, it is not an economic
siege. Its purpose is security-defense, and it is not designed to overpower Hamas. At the same time, political factors
also underlie the blockade. In 2007 Hamas canceled the agreements with Israel, expelled PA personnel from the border
crossings, and maintained relations with hostile political and military elements; other practical factors are likewise
involved. In all, it is hard to maintain viable commerce when a terrorist organization governs the area.
Despite the terrorism from Gaza, Israel still allows the movement of a range of goods and materials, while preventing or
limiting the transit of dual-use goods, such as construction materials (which were, in fact, used to build the attack
tunnels). Figures from the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories indicate that in the week preceding
Operation Protective Edge, 1,366 trucks carrying 32,740 tons of goods – fruits and vegetables, beef and chicken, wheat
and flour, rice, dairy products, construction materials, clothing, cooking gas, animal feed, and more – entered Gaza
from Israel. From January 2014 to the start of the operation, some 536,000 tons of goods were ferried from Israel to
Gaza via 22,700 truckloads. In addition, Israel is the Gaza Strip’s major provider of electricity and also supplies it
with water. Furthermore, Israel actually eased the shipping of goods to the Gaza Strip since the Marmara affair in 2010.
For security reasons, exports from the Gaza Strip to Israel are minima, while most movement of people routinely occurs
through the Rafah crossing to Egypt.
Israel does not encircle Gaza on all sides; the Gaza Strip shares a border with Egypt. However, Hamas is embroiled in a
conflict with the Cairo regime because of the spillover of terrorist activity into Egypt. Indeed, the latest
deterioration in the Gaza Strip’s dire economic straits is mainly the result of Egyptian measures. Egypt closed the
Rafah crossing and blocked most of the tunnels underneath its border, which led to a sharp reduction in the influx of
building materials into the Gaza Strip, which in turn left thousands of Palestinian construction laborers unemployed.
For its part, the PA refused to transfer salaries to Hamas in the framework of the Palestinian unity government as long
as the governing institutions remained in Hamas hands.
A legal analysis based on international law carried out by the IDF Military Advocacy also supports the claim that Israel
does not maintain an economic siege of the Gaza Strip, rather a blockade motivated by security concerns. The human
rights group Gisha – the Legal Center for Freedom of Movement – has also expressed reservations about the use of the
word “siege” and defines Israel’s activity as a blockade, although it does call the limits on free movement created by
the blockade a violation of Palestinian rights.
The Hamas Interest
The organization is keen on maintaining its control of the Gaza Strip as a base for its military and political struggle
against Israel. While it is interested in the welfare of the population, it does not necessarily seek economic
prosperity. Hamas is highly interested in perpetuating Palestinian refugeehood, which is supported by UNRWA, as a basis
for future population transfers to Israel as part of its mission to establish an Islamic state in place of the Jewish
state. Hamas’ interest in the Palestinian unity government derived mostly from its own urgent needs – to finance the
salaries of its operatives in the Gaza Strip and to continue developing the military wing.
Political Significance
Expanding the movement of goods from Israel and paying the salaries of Hamas activists are conditions that will allow
the continued Hamas rule in the short and mid terms. Insofar as the situation in Gaza returns to what it was or
improves, it will become increasingly difficult to realize the notion of “reconstruction for demilitarization,” a vested
interest of Israel, the PA, Egypt, and other Arab states, and also supported by the United States and EU member nations.
Hamas’ continued rule of the Gaza Strip reduces the possibility of restoring the PA to full control there.
Recourse to the PA as a mediator between Israel and Hamas, particularly at the border crossings, will not solve Israel’s
security and political problems, and may even heighten them. It is in Israel’s supreme interest to dismantle the refugee
camps in the Gaza Strip and rehabilitate the Palestinians currently there, and to endorse any international program
toward economic prosperity. In the future, Israel will have an interest in a seaport in Gaza that is subject to security
regulations in order to decrease Gaza’s dependence on Israel. Finally, in any agreement, Israel must insist that the
border crossings be considered Israeli sovereign territory and that movement through them be conditional on their not
being used to compromise Israel’s security.