Will the Black Sea Blow Up?
July 4, 2013
The urgency with which Russian President, Vladimir Putin ordered his Black Sea fleet out from the harbour to conduct
naval manoeuvres early morning, on 28 March 2013, sent a shudder down the spines of neighbours’ militaries.
The questions were numerous but the answers few. Did he mean to test the battle worthiness of his aging naval fleet
harboured at Sevastopol? Why precisely, he felt the need to mobilise the fleet on arrival from South Africa? Were the
manoeuvres aimed at sending message to Black Sea littorals and distant actors to know that Black Sea was crucial to
Russian security with little margin for expanding intrusion? Was the zero-notice to other Black Sea navies was a curt
reminder that Russia enjoyed the privilege of a dominant Black Sea power? Was it a politico-military facet of diplomacy
to mark Russian disapproval about the US-Ukrainian naval exercises, conducted a week ago?
Whatever the interpretations, an impression was abundant that morning as if the Black Sea faced a repeat hysteria of
being ‘blown up’. It occurred at least once during the last century when huge fire wall, about 500 m high and 2.4 km
long, was observed on its surface by Russian navy on 11 September 1927, just after a massive earthquake struck Crimea.
The phenomenon was amply covered in secret dispatches by Russian navy anchored at Sevastopol. A Russian scholar’s
article of 1983 kicked of worrisome debate when he reported that huge fires were of exploding hydrogen sulphide (not
true) that sits layered on Black Sea bed in massive quantities (true).
Black Sea Paradigm: Dimensions and Dichotomy
Russian fleet sallying out on the President’s order made amply manifest that Black Sea powers and some others beside are
not on the same page of harmony and cooperation. Not only the Black Sea bed sizzles with possible volcanic eruptions but
the littorals’ geopolitics of Black Sea is also primed with enormous latent tension that could blow up if not handled
prudently. It would be pertinent to have a look at the dynamics and the pitfalls of the Black Sea obtaining narrative.
Black Sea has surface area of about 423,000 km2 and with the Sea of Azov to its North, if included; its total area is
about 460,000 km2. Bosporus and Dardanelles straits connect it with Marmara Sea and Aegean Sea. Russia, Turkey, Georgia,
Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria are the direct littorals that share Black Sea coastal line.
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The region has come to receive an added focus when some crucial developments are enveloping it. An analyst commented,
“The driving force for cooperation in the post-Cold War era has been the need to move away from the disruptive
influences of global ideological and military confrontation to the attractions of economic cooperation…” From all
consideration, a historical arena, the expanding EU influence, dawn of Balkans stability, NATO thrust with ability to
embrace added area of responsibility to the SE, simmering conflicts-like situation among the littorals and their
neighbours have made it the subject of stressful diplomacy. Though opinions expressed by the leaders and states’
functionaries portray polite tones on the surface but behind every word, there is a deep mesh of snares, suspicions and
dichotomous perceptions. When opening symposium proceedings, the first tell-all sentence Dr. Horst Mahr spoke, “The
Black Sea region comes only into the spotlight of attendency if there is any crisis developing.”
Attempt by a distant patron, US, from the NATO platform in support of post-Soviets states’ privilege to pursue sovereign
foreign policies turns Black Sea waters even murkier. Russia, a staunch exponent of regional cooperation categorically
denounces any measure that would complicate the Black Sea geo-politics. As Russia sees Black Sea region in its exclusive
geographical interpretation, US and EU tend to focus on wider Black Sea region to include Greece, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Moldova, and in fact connect it to Mediterranean. In the wake of new discoveries, energy politics in Eastern
Mediterranean could lead to new twists, even reshaping or catapulting some traditional alliances. “The discovery in late
2010...revealed that the entire eastern Mediterranean is swimming in huge untapped oil and gas reserves. That discovery
is having enormous political, geopolitical as well as economic consequences. It well may have potential military
consequences too.”
Turkey, because of its geo-strategic advantage, by implications, and Russia because of its military power potentials are
the two actors who predominate the scene immediately. While Turkey’s support for NATO expansion is mandatory, being an
ally, its achieving sync with EU’s policy of wider regional cooperation for added peace and security also resonates with
the EU’s charter, being its potential member-on-long-wait. However, Turkey is in comfortable position to deal with
Russia amicably whose perception for regional cooperation in narrow sense and of others seeking wider roles make Black
Sea an area of significant contention.
In broad sense the arguments hinge on the necessity to cooperate in Black Sea for ensuring breathing space for Balkans,
Eastern Europe and ultimately for Central Europe against such threats like terrorism, drugs and human trafficking. Alive
to the haunting history of empires, the proponents, mainly EU, possibly contend that thriving cooperation in Black Sea
region would usher in an era of prosperity, subduing the historic sting of barbs which remain but no one acknowledges.
US is emboldened by the legitimacy of its approach on the merit of international laws that permit sovereign states to
traverse through international waters for extensive socio-economic and politico-military relations if mutually
convenient to the parties. However, such an increased focus at the moment at least appears to impede the pace of
regional cooperation. An observer opines, “The Black Sea area is characterized by the projection of power politics by
major stakeholders such as the United States, Russia and the EU.”
Conflicting Elements
Russia perceives non-littorals meddling in Black Sea as unwarranted and beyond the measures of any economic cooperation.
Above all, Russian concept of defence of Russian Federation begins from the territories of post-Soviet space from the
West to the East/SE which she would grudgingly deny. Russia has relinquished territorial claims over its erstwhile
satellites but seems provoked if any encroachment on its security paradigm is made. In other words, if Russia is denied
recognition of such privilege by the West, it could resort to means necessary to re-assert its stance. Russo-Georgian
conflict and persisting tension among Russia versus Moldova and Ukraine are small reminders to the international
community. Some sources take the Russian obduracy back to the history. US Army Colonel asserts, “The BSF (Black Sea
Fleet), headquartered in Sevastopol, Ukraine, on the Crimea, is Russia’s Sword of Damocles in the often volatile areas
of southeast Europe and the Caucasus region. As Russia’s only year-round warm-water fleet, it is steeped in military
history, tracing its roots to 1783, when Russia annexed the Crimea and established the port of Sevastopol.” But then,
singling out an event in isolation when Ottoman, Hapsburg and Russian Empires had been going through expansion and
shrinkage phase concurrently would be unfair and test the journalistic neutrality of any opinion maker.
Several frozen conflicts in the region lend an edge to Russia in the pivots’ number to conduct power manoeuvres for
denying space to others that Russia has clung to for centuries. Romania and Bulgaria, conspicuously lean to the West but
have been cautious in showing any red rag to Russia that encourages the post-Soviets space countries to gravitate on the
power hub, called Russia. In the given matrix of potential conflicts, Georgian and Ukrainian efforts to seek NATO’s
security umbrella only adds some more layers to the regional fracturing dynamics. Russia would thus not miss any chance
to establish that Black Sea is about to become NATO garrison, clinching Russian coast by the collars. An analyst also
makes interesting comments, “The paradox of the situation is that in the West, Russia, in spite of being one of six
Black Sea littoral states, is predominantly perceived of as an outside power. In truth, Russia has not only its finger
but its whole arm in this regional “cake.” She further goes on to quote an old Soviet Cult Classic. “One’s own among
strangers – a stranger among one’s own”. By no means, such perception would help any successful dialogue unless the
actors’ ‘status’ is placed in correct perspective.
Hectic bilateral or multilateral diplomatic efforts by the actors are ample indications that they are well versed with
the impending consequences if the security parameters remain vulnerable. From regional cooperation to the geopolitics of
force-posturing, there are varied interpretations of several forms of regionalism that ultimately supplement the
individual actors’ national interests. EU does not harbour such intention except the promotion of regional peace and
stability but there are reasons to assume that Russia would not trust EU about the pretexts to advance into its security
space.
However if EU pursues claimed neutrality that is ostensibly devoid of any political agenda despite the fact that its
territories now hug the Black Sea with Romania and Bulgaria on its inventory, it stands better chance to make plausible
breakthrough or at least keep Russia engaged as a part of solution and not as a part of the problem. In comparative
terms, EU has hand on wheel (of crises) experience about the regions that too presented enormous challenges. It
initiated the Northern Dimension, 1999, the Barcelona Process, 1995 and the Balkan Stability Pact, 1999, which
substantiate EU’s track record for diluting, if not wiping off entirely post-WW-II trauma among the parties. However,
some sceptics rule out emergence of such euphoria when they hypothesise not-so-secret energy agenda of the actors,
particularly the ones which are non-littorals. When enormous volumes of hydro carbon reserves lie in Russia, Caucasus
and Caspian, only sly observer would find the spectre of race to new found love for the Black Sea beaches as intriguing
because of them. Next year Sochi Winter Olympics may be a symbolic coincidence.
The West finds Russian stance in Black Sea region from glitch-prone to inflexible. Perhaps to achieve added legitimacy,
US have successfully linked the interests of entire Trans-Atlantic Community that Russia finds nothing more than
coercive diplomacy as well as the lingering legacy of Cold War era. Russian intelligentsia frequently questions its role
as a ‘myth or reality’. For Russia, talk of human rights, strengthening of democracies and enhancing regional security
of Black Sea littorals by US are mere ploys, linked with wider array of global objectives. Russian strategists are not
likely to fail the refuting logic that if Black Sea region had been relatively calm in absence of these slogans, the
Community’s themes stir more fractured approaches than contributing anyway towards evolving a consensus Black Sea
institutionalised solution model.
Some geo-political wizards also see Trans-Atlantic Community phenomenon creeping towards Black Sea as an attempt to
dilute Russian fixation for ‘Near Abroad’ and ‘Back Yard’ that Russia caters for while charting out its course of
strategic defence. A policy report suggests, “After 11 September 2001 the transatlantic security focus shifted from
central and Eastern Europe to what has been dubbed the “Greater Middle East” and “Wider Black Sea” regions. The US
reassessed its geostrategic interest in the area and added a military dimension to its strategy by enhancing the role of
NATO.” Therefore, the community approach to the Black Sea region is based on military rollers and that is precisely the
ingredient Black Sea would find hard to put up with.
Another question that Russia has for US is that Black Sea never needed over-kill capability among littorals, why is US
keen to shift its forces pivot from Central Europe to Bulgaria and Romania while she has second powerful actor, Turkey,
already on NATO’s page. It would be hard to find an answer particularly when US relocation of strategic pivots
(Asia-Pacific is another) after withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, have become the subject of serious as well as
scary debate. Traditionally as it is, all conflicts draw scrutiny from different angles but US has clear advantage over
Russia and other dissenters because of larger reservoir of intellectual support, she maintains. Alexandros Petersen,
backing US, does have fear from within but omits to applaud some members’ principled stand to the contrary. He comments
“However, given the divergent world views of the US and states such as France, it is entirely possible, albeit highly
undesirable, that there will be an impasse in NATO consensus on whatever endeavour the US proposes....”
Weighing the magnitude of approach variants that Russia has with US and EU, the diplomatic chronology of events during
the last decade suggests that Russia is at ease with Turkey, somewhat suspicious but approachable by EU and less
reconciled with US. EU’s persistent stance to seek regional cooperation, even in wider context is less frustrating for
Russia and Turkey but when the coaxing comes from US, Russia appears least amenable just because US has not been able to
maintain regional deception while Russia has carefully measured her intent. EU, though without military power potential,
improved its index of credibility in the region when it brokered peace between Georgia and Russia successfully in 2008.
Does Russia realise that EU, by brokering fragile peace, not only removed a dilemma for Georgia but also for Russia as
it came under scathing attacks for launching offensive against a weaker neighbour though some maintain that Georgia had
asked for it? Perhaps answer is affirmative.
Analysis/Recommendations
The dynamic of actors’ desire to achieve harmony of views and cooperation are essentially important but has remained
plagued by power politics to materialise. The Black Sea is a recognised entity with perceived navigation rights for all
littorals. However the varied interpretation of the Black Sea region by the non-littoral actors makes it an issue, ripe
for dissent. If the emphasis of majority of actors is on regional cooperation, how US conduct of naval exercises in
concert with Ukraine navy, last March could bolster the chances of reconciliation. Russia views such manoeuvres as dire
risk to her security. Joshua Kucera elaborated Russian perception, “The Monterey is equipped with the Aegis radar
system, and as such would be part of the European missile defense shield that the U.S. wants to build around Russia. And so the visit, Russia says, is a wolf in sheep's clothing.” Thus any
attempt to consolidate peace led by show of military arsenal, even followed by enormous trade troves would render those
actors as the dancing porcupines.
When Russia and Turkey have maintained low profile and avoided projecting themselves as powerful actors unless provoked,
the tradition must go on. Attempt by any of the powers, party to the dispute to police Black Sea affairs exclusively
would mean it would blow up sooner than later. Russian proclivity to seek and allow naval space in the region to others
is time tested when it has never demonstrated naval power preponderance even in Caspian Sea despite having a fleet at
Astra Khan. If at all there have been some hostile naval episodes randomly, they were between Iran and Azerbaijan as
Caspian Sea legal regime issue is yet to be resolved.
For the Black Sea, charting out of ‘Naval Protocol’ is a dire need. When the comprehensive initiative formulation is in
progress, ground rules for all littorals’ navies must be laid down or updated in the light of existing provisions at
priority to pre-empt any possibility of hostile manoeuvres which could lead to naval duels. In fact, a platform,
BLACKSEAFOR, already exists that was institutionalised at Turkey’s initiative on 2 April 2001 and signed by all Black
Sea coastal states’ representatives. On this occasion the “Special Representatives affirmed their conviction that
cooperative action in the Black Sea aimed at preventing and eliminating the threat of terrorism, including illicit
trafficking in the weapons of mass destruction should be undertaken with urgency”. In order to allow more oxygen to
Black Sea, BLACKSEAFOR needs buffing further so that other than littorals’ navies and commercial ships, non-littorals’
naval forces components must be discouraged to operate in Black Sea for sustaining peace. Precedence exists when,
“Turkey stopped the extension of NATO’s naval operation ‘Active Endeavor’ from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, based
on the Montreux Convention of 1936 provisions.”
Achieving Black Sea synergy from Trans-Atlantic platform suits US but none other. EU with its ability to show clean
slate of any political agenda is potentially well poised than US to lead from the front in engaging Russia and Turkey
for delineating an instrument of cooperation. It is also in comfortable position to take care of Bulgarian, Romanian and
Ukrainian reservations about Russia. Those if removed, would mean added diplomatic grace for them including Russia
because that much political baggage would also go off their backs.
US attempt to relocate its military power potentials in Eastern Europe would scare even some of its NATO allies. Behind
the scene, a Mediterranean power is being groomed to play an added role in Eastern Mediterranean, possibly with US
backing. When the two strategic adjustments are ‘war gamed’, US designs no longer remain secret that embrace wider Black
Sea region and Europe. On the other hand, Russia is not likely to ignore implicit as well as explicit thrust of these
developments. Therefore, it may be unwise to expect that Russia and US are about to hit dialogue table any time soon to
straighten out the Black Sea cooperation modalities.
If US genuinely want to see Black Sea prosperous and peaceful, it should at best trail EU which is in comfortable
position, not only to engage Russia and Turkey but also to reach some plausible resolution strategy. The
initiative/instrument thus maturing should be to the satisfaction of all littorals. However, there is considerable
volume of Western scholarship which impresses upon US/EU to assert their status in Black Sea and eliminate the strategic
imbalance that is in favour of Russia. Ronald HATTO and Odette TOMESCU afford such glimpse, “For Romania WBSR (Wider
Black Sea Region) provides an opportunity to participate on the side of big Western powers and take revenge for years of
isolation and Soviets submission.” In other words, psyche of revenge and turf war with dangerous consequences is likely
to keep Black Sea embroiled for times to come.
Russia may well consider launching diplomatic offensive to allay Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Turkeys’ fears even if it
has to make some concessions. Parallel exists when Russia is comfortable with its Central Asian neighbours even though,
at time they sound rebellious but yet cooperate with Russia. Diversification of their foreign policies has rendered
Russia an added score, by letting the world know that ‘big brother’ or ‘bully’ titles are for anyone but Russia. On the
other hand, Turkey and EU must evolve result oriented strategy to see that Black Sea dialogues, even from some existing
forum make needed headway. If Black Sea does not support the weight of global powers rivalries, it must be delinked and
focused upon in absolute terms. Mega issues like reduction of WMDs, Middle East nuclear tangle, planting of Strategic
Defence Initiative (Missile Shield Defence/Star War) and now Syrian crisis should be tackled separately step by step.
Finally it relates that while EU, Russia and Turkey are the crucial dialogue-actors, capable of achieving breakthrough,
Russia and US have critical role for rendering the trio a level playing ground to obviate Black Sea drifting to the
conflict. There are credible voices that both powers need to heed. Opening chapter of one such well argued ‘Working
Paper’ asserts, “The positive changes achieved during the reset in Russian American relations, for all the emerging
problems, made it possible to consider a transition to a new model for strategic interaction between Moscow and
Washington in the 21st century. This approach to Russian-American relations should provide for the transition from
“mutual assured destruction” to a positive system of security based on “mutual assured stability”. Thus, smooth
transition from ‘MAD’ to ‘MAS’ is of vital importance among the two leading powers. In the Black Sea context, calculated
haste to achieve the kind of contemplated transition would certainly make no waste as the world community would
appreciate the urgency with which the issue is addressed.
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Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi is a retired Brig Gen from Pakistan Army. An author of a book and defence and conflicts
analyst, he holds PhD degree in IR. Is prolific writer with research, evaluation and participatory experience.