Wikileaks Cable: NZ Foreign Policy Influenced by Dairy Trade?
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Sending combat engineers to Iraq has enabled the giant New Zealand dairy exporter, Fonterra, to bid on lucrative
Iraq-related contracts. New Zealand and U.S. troops in Afghanistan can participate in joint training and exercises that
we have not otherwise allowed since New Zealand pulled out of ANZUS.
1. After the horrific earthquake and tsunami in our region, there are far weightier U.S. foreign policy issues to manage
in Asia than our relationship with New Zealand. But I am writing to request that U.S. Government agencies nevertheless
conduct a quick review of our policies here, specifically with regards to New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation.
Conducting a review at this time could pay off, as I believe that this country's upcoming elections and its desire for a
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States make 2005 the best opportunity we have had in twenty years to convince
New Zealand to reconsider its ban on nuclear-propelled vessels. At the very least, a review would develop a clear,
comprehensive, and consistent message to set the stage for the next four years of the Administration as well as the new
Government of New Zealand.
A review should examine what we want from the relationship
2. The nuclear ban has since its inception colored and limited our relationship with New Zealand. Over time, the United
States has lifted some of its limits on bilateral military and intelligence cooperation we imposed after the ban was
implemented in 198
4. Our sense is that we have gone as far as we can go on our own. A review should determine, first and foremost, whether
we should accept this status quo, and if so, whether we should broaden the relationship in other ways or make it clear
to New Zealand that no deepening of ties are possible if the ban remains in place. And we must decide how best to convey
our message.
3. As of now, New Zealand officials effectively determine the issues for discussion in our bilateral relationship. An
example is their aggressive ""forum shopping"" among USG agencies and Congress to press for a US-New Zealand FTA. At the
same time, these officials argue that the nuclear issue is too sensitive even to discuss; that as the world's only
superpower we should just get over it and stop ""bullying"" this small country. The past is the past, they say. The
problem is, this is not about the past. Were other countries to adopt policies similar to New Zealand's and forbid our
nuclear-powered ships to enter their ports, our efforts to create a more mobile military would be seriously impaired in
Asia and beyond.
4. Other red herring arguments that New Zealand officials use to keep the nuclear issue off the table can be similarly
rebutted. For example, when I recently raised the ban with Foreign Minister Goff, he argued that the New Zealand
government is unable to revisit its nuclear policy because the public ""will know we are only doing it because you asked
us to."" This message makes painfully clear that the government does not consider a U.S. request in itself a reason for
taking action, a stance that both springs from and feeds into deepening anti-Americanism here.
5. A Foreign Ministry staffer later clarified that Mr. Goff really meant that the public would oppose any ""bullying""
from the United States on this issue. Those of us familiar with New Zealand know that in this context ""to bully"" means
""to publicly call for."" But if the government has already said publicly and privately it will not conduct any review
of the ban, what alternative remains for us if not an overt call for them to reconsider?
A review should examine the cost to us and others of New Zealand's Nuclear Ban and its declining willingness/ability to
work with us
6. Other countries in the region, notably Japan and Australia, have invested considerable political capital in their
alliance with the United States and do not bar our nuclear-powered vessels despite formal anti-nuclear policies and
significant domestic opposition. We should not reward our Kiwi friends at the cost of undercutting these important
allies. They and others in the region even tiny Fiji also contribute far more to support our military capabilities
around the world than does New Zealand.
7. New Zealand's nuclear ban is concurrent with a 20-year failure to invest adequately in its military infrastructure.
In just the latest example, both of the New Zealand Air Force C-130 aircraft that the government generously sent to help
carry aid and personnel to tsunami victims broke down and were forced to undergo repairs before resuming operations.
While New Zealand officials point proudly to the large numbers of peacekeeping and other operations in which their
military participate, in most cases these deployments consist of one or two liaison officers. New Zealand benefits from
our deterrence as much as do others in the region, yet has been unwilling to be anything approaching a true partner in
the effort.
8. In fact, the policies that have caused New Zealand to avoid pulling its weight internationally reflect ideological
drift and lack of vision. The government articulates no clear definition of non-economic foreign policy interests other
than a stated commitment to international organizations and peacekeeping, especially in the region. Even on these stated
interests, New Zealand's practical contributions often fall short of the mark.
A review should examine whether and how to raise our desire for a review of the nuclear ban
9. I simply do not consider credible New Zealand officials' insistence that the public will not tolerate any discussion
of a repeal of the ban. It is true that if you asked them today, a majority of New Zealanders probably would oppose a
reversal of the nuclear policy. But I have found many senior citizens and younger Kiwis are actually open to the idea.
To the extent others are not, it is largely because the Government has for its own ideological and political reasons
been unwilling to discuss the issue honestly.
10. After U.S. aircraft carriers were called into assistance after the recent tsunami, readers' letters to a major local
newspaper highlighted the fact that because of the country's nuclear ban similar U.S. assistance would not be possible
here in the wake of a natural disaster. These readers called for the ban to be lifted.
11. In fact, there has been some preliminary debate about the ban here. Two previous reviews one commissioned by the
National Party-led Government in 1992 and one by the National Party in early 1994 found there was no scientific basis on
which to bar nuclear-powered vessels from New Zealand. As Dr. Andrew McEwan, the country's foremost nuclear scientist
has pointed out in a recent book, New Zealand's ""nuclear free"" status is something of a fiction, given that there are
about 2500 importations of nuclear reactor-produced material into New Zealand each year for x-rays, radiation
treatments, and other purposes. (This does not include imports of things such as smoke detectors and certain watches
that also contain radioactive materials.)
12. Although the National Party has been the only party to examine seriously the possibility of ending the country's
nuclear ban, in my view Labour is best placed to reverse the legislation. When in power in the '90s, National failed to
take any action on the ban, preferring not to spend political capital to do so. As an opposition party, they can do even
less. At this time, polls continue to show Labour as the likely victor in the general election that will probably be
held this September. But the real reason we should urge the Labour government to reexamine the ban is that, as the
original authors of the law, it is their party that would be most likely to win a public mandate to change it. Many of
the original players who created the ban in all its inflexible glory are in power today, including Prime Minister Clark.
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13. The Prime Minister has shown that she can push through highly sensitive pieces of legislation. During my time in New
Zealand, she has carried the day on laws as controversial as nationalization of the foreshore and seabed and a Civil
Union Bill. She has called for a review of the country's constitution that could profoundly alter New Zealand's
relationship to the UK. All these issues created heated debates and dominated the front pages, yet the government
prevailed throughout. In short, where this Prime Minister has the will, she finds the way. In the case of the nuclear
ban, she does not have the will because she does not think she needs to reopen this issue. I have begun to include in my
speeches a request that New Zealand reconsider its policy, and I will continue to do so. But only a move by the
government in this direction is likely to gain traction with the public.
14. This election year may be the best time to convince New Zealand officials it is in their interest to reconsider the
ban. Significantly, the Prime Minister and her team have not hesitated to raise the nuclear issue themselves, when
stating publicly in implicit election promises to local businesses that an FTA with the United States is inevitable and
that New Zealand's bans on nuclear arms and propulsion simply don't matter to us anymore. Indeed, PM Clark made this
link at a recent speech to the pro-FTA U.S.-New Zealand Business Council. In this election year, the Prime Minister and
her cabinet doubtless also see a U.S.-New Zealand FTA as a valuable means to counter criticism from both the right and
left that the government is negotiating FTAs primarily with developing countries (such as Thailand) and those who abuse
human rights (notably China).
A review would enable us to consider what New Zealand does contribute, and how long even these small efforts can be
sustained:
5. As noted, I have stressed both in public and in private to New Zealanders that the nuclear ban does still matter to
us. But frankly, messages from Washington to New Zealand officials are not always consistent with this long-term view.
Policymakers have been understandably focused on soliciting New Zealand's cooperation in the war on terrorism, Iraq,
World Trade Organization (WTO) talks, and other issues. While these are all obviously of the greatest importance, our
failure to at the same time honestly tell New Zealand that the nuclear ban remains important to us has enabled New
Zealand officials to claim that the issue is irrelevant in light of their other contributions. Meanwhile, they continue
to lobby heavily for an FTA, including through the New Zealand Caucus that will be launched in the U.S. House of
Representatives next month.
16. In their approaches to the Embassy, to Administration officials, and the Congress, New Zealand Government officials
stress that because of their country's efforts in areas of interest to us, New Zealand should be considered for a trade
agreement. We are likely to soon hear that New Zealand is to extend its contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom, for
example. We are of course grateful for all of New Zealand's contributions. But in my view New Zealand has benefited
already from its actions. For example, New Zealand's own interest in WTO talks is obvious, given the country's
dependence on exports and its low domestic trade barriers. Sending combat engineers to Iraq has enabled the giant New
Zealand dairy exporter, Fonterra, to bid on lucrative Iraq-related contracts. New Zealand and U.S. troops in Afghanistan
can participate in joint training and exercises that we have not otherwise allowed since New Zealand pulled out of
ANZUS.
17. I don't mean to imply that New Zealand has participated in these efforts solely for its own gain. But I believe that
pushing them harder on the nuclear issue would have little impact on New Zealand's already limited willingness to engage
with us around the globe. The cost to us if New Zealand were to pull out from these efforts would be another thing an
interagency review would need to consider.
A review should examine what we could offer in return for a credible review/lifting of New Zealand's nuclear ban:
18. U.S. officials have strenuously avoided linking New Zealand's proposal for an FTA with our desire that the nuclear
ban be ended. And indeed, the two are linked only in the sense that if our countries are truly friends, New Zealand
should not expect it can press hard for an FTA and prevent us from even mentioning the nuclear ban. But in practical
terms I have observed that our preferences for FTA partners are often made along a continuum of countries' economic and
trade potential and our overall foreign policy interests. Certainly, if there were significant economic benefits I would
strongly support a U.S.-New Zealand FTA, and have told this to the government here. An interagency review might consider
whether it would make sense to conduct a feasibility study for an FTA if New Zealand removes its nuclear ban.
19. We could also have a review to determine what changes in language in the New Zealand legislation would be enough to
satisfy our concerns, as well as what possible changes in our ""neither confirm nor deny"" policy we might be willing to
consider were the ban lifted. The interagency group might also consider allowing a non-nuclear naval ship visit to New
Zealand, for example to support our operations in Antarctica, if the government announces a formal review of its nuclear
policy. The Prime Minister has long encouraged such a visit, but we have rightfully resisted the invitation in light of
the ban.
20. We must be realistic. Even if New Zealand lifted its nuclear ban, it will not return any time soon to being the ally
it once was. For example, political officials here fear a loss of popular support if New Zealand returned to ANZUS, and
those at the senior levels worry about the budgetary and personnel requirements needed to rejoin the alliance. But New
Zealand's agreement to take a second look at its nuclear ban would at least open the door to exploring where both sides
want the relationship to go.
Conclusion:
21. These are just some of my ideas of what an interagency review might accomplish, and what we should be aiming to do
here in New Zealand. I would very much like to come to Washington and discuss this idea further, ideally before the
upcoming interagency review of the Administration's FTA negotiating agenda for the next four years. Please let me know
if my staff and I can provide any more information to you in the meantime.
22. New Zealand may be small, but with a little bit of time and teamwork, I think we can steer the bilateral
relationship in a direction that is more positive to U.S interests. Now is the time to try. Swindells",22/02/2005
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Analysis put together by Scoop.co.nz
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