Noam Chomsky + Robert Trivers
Discussion with Noam Chomsky and Robert Trivers
September 6, 2006
In the 1970s, a Harvard class taught by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers ignited a controversy that would escalate
into the "sociobiology wars." His papers provided a Darwinian basis for understanding complex human activities and
relationships. Across town at MIT, revolutionary linguist Noam Chomsky had earned a reputation as a leading opponent of
the Vietnam War. Throughout those pivotal years, and in the following decades, the two explored similar ideas from
different perspectives. Long aware of each other's work, they had never met until a couple of months ago, when they sat
down to compare notes on some common interests: deceit and self-deception.
Noam Chomsky: One of the most important comments on deceit, I think, was made by Adam Smith. He pointed out that a major
goal of business is to deceive and oppress the public.
And one of the striking features of the modern period is the institutionalization of that process, so that we now have
huge industries deceiving the public—and they're very conscious about it, the public relations industry. Interestingly,
this developed in the freest countries—in Britain and the US—roughly around time of WWI, when it was recognized that
enough freedom had been won that people could no longer be controlled by force. So modes of deception and manipulation
had to be developed in order to keep them under control.
And by now these are huge industries. They not only dominate marketing of commodities, but they also control the
political system. As anyone who watches a US election knows, it's marketing. It's the same techniques that are used to
And, of course, there are power systems in place to facilitate this. Throughout history it's been mostly the property
holders or the educated classes who've tended to support power systems. And that's a large part of what I think
education is—it's a form of indoctrination. You have to reconstruct a picture of the world in order to be conducive to
the interests and concerns of the educated classes, and this involves a lot of self-deceit.
Robert Trivers: So you're talking about self-deception in at least two contexts. One is intellectuals who, in a sense,
go through a process of education which results in a self-deceived organism who is really working to serve the interests
of the privileged few without necessarily being conscious of it at all. The other thing is these massive industries of
persuasion and deception, which, one can conceptualize, are also inducing a form of either ignorance or self-deception
in listeners, where they come to believe that they know the truth when in fact they're just being manipulated.
So let me ask you, when you think about the leaders—let's say the present set of organisms that launched this dreadful
Iraq misadventure—how important is their level of self-deception? We know they launched the whole thing in a swarm of
lies, the evidence for which is too overwhelming to even need to be referred to now. My view is that their deception
leads to self-deception very easily.
NC: I agree, though I'm not sure they launched it with lies, and it's perfectly possible they believed it.
NC: I mean, they had a goal—we don't have a detailed record, but from the record we have, it's as if they sort of
cherry-picked and coerced intelligence to yield evidence that would contribute to that goal.
NC: And anything that conflicted with it was just tossed out. In fact people were tossed out—like the head of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
RT: Right, indeed.
NC: I mean, I think we all know from personal life, if there's something you want to do, it's really easy to convince
yourself it's right and just. You put away evidence that shows that's not true.
So it's self-deception but it's automatic, and it requires significant effort and energy to try to see yourself from a
distance. It's hard to do.
RT: Oh, it is. I think in everyday life we're aware of the fact that when we're watching something on stage, so to
speak, we have a better view than the actors on the stage have. If you can see events laterally, you can say, my god,
they're doing this and they're doing that. But if you're embedded in that network it's much harder.
NC: In fact, you can see it very clearly by just comparing historical events that are similar They're never identical,
Take the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and the US invasion of Iraq—just take those three.
From the point of view of the people who perpetrated these acts, they were each a noble effort and done for the benefit
of everyone—in fact the self-justifications are kind of similar. It almost translates. But we can't see it in ourselves;
we can only see it in them, you know. Nobody doubts that the Russians committed aggression, that Saddam Hussein
committed aggression, but with regard to ourselves it's impossible.
I've reviewed a lot of the literature on this, and it's close to universal. We just cannot adopt toward ourselves the
same attitudes that we adopt easily and in fact, reflexively, when others commit crimes. No matter how strong the
RT: Not the overall crime.
NC: In fact, here's another case like Afghanistan and Kuwait. Dick Cheney was recently somewhere in Central
Asia—Kazakhstan, I believe. He was getting them to make sure to direct their pipelines to the West, so the US can
control them. And he said, control over pipelines is a means—these are tools for intimidation and blackmail. He was
talking about if somebody else controlled them. Like if China controlled the pipelines, it's a tool of intimidation and
blackmail. But if the US controls the pipelines, it's just benevolent and free and wonderful.
NC: And I was interested to see if anybody is going to comment on that. I mean, as long as he's talking about somebody
else's control, then it's intimidation and blackmail. The very moment he's trying to get them to give us control, that's
liberation and freedom. To be able to live with those contradictions in your mind, really does take a good education.
And it's true in case after case.
RT: It's the psychology of deceit and self-deception. When you start talking about groups, there are some very
interesting analogies. Psychologists have shown that people make these verbal switches when they're in a we/they
situation, in a your-group-versus-another situation.
NC: Groups that are simply set up for the experiment, you mean?
RT: It can be. You can also do it experimentally, or you can be talking about them and their group versus someone that's
not a member of their group.
But you have the following kinds of verbal things that people do, apparently quite unconsciously. If you're a member of
my group and you do something good, I make a general statement: "Noam Chomsky is an excellent person." Now if you do
something bad, I give a particular statement, "Noam Chomsky stepped on my toe."
But it's exactly reversed if you're not a member of my group. If you're not a member of my group and you do something
good I say, "Noam Chomsky gave me directions to MIT." But if he steps on my toe I say, "He's a lousy organism," or "He's
an inconsiderate person."
So we generalize positively to ourselves, particularize negative and reverse it when we're talking about other people.
NC: Sounds like normal propaganda. Islamic people are all fascists. The Irish are all crooks.
RT: Yes, exactly. Generalize a negative characteristic in the other. Another thing that comes to mind with respect to
the Iraq case: There's evidence suggesting that when you're contemplating something—whether or marry Suzy, for
instance—you're in a deliberative stage. And you are considering options more or less rationally.
Now, once you decide to go with Suzy, you're in the instrumental phase; you don't want to hear about the negative side.
Your mood goes up, and you delete all the negative stuff and you're just, "Suzy's the one."
One thing that's very striking about this Iraq disaster is there was no deliberative stage, unless you—
NC: —go back a few years.
RT: Yes, unless you refer to the 90s, when there were a couple of position papers by these same groups that said, "Let's
not go to war."
But once 9/11 occurred, we know that within days, within hours, they were settling on Iraq and they went into the
instrumental phase in a very major way. They didn't want to hear anything of the downside.
NC: That was dismissed.
RT: It was dismissed entirely. And these firewalls were set up so there was no communication. And if someone came into
Rumsfeld's office and said, "Well, gee..." Well, [General] Shinseki got an early retirement plan.
And Wolfowitz comes in the very next day and says, "Hard to imagine that we'd need more troops to occupy than to knock
over." But that was established military doctrine; we'd known that for more than 50 years.
NC: Just didn't want to hear it.
RT: Didn't want to hear it. So, I'm trying to understand these phenomena at the individual level and also put them
together in groups, since at times institutions act like individuals in the way they practice internal self-deception.
This was Feynman's famous analysis of NASA and the Challenger disaster. I don't know if you ever read the analysis—it
was beautiful. He said that, when we decided to go to the moon in the 60s, there was no disagreement in the society, for
better or worse. Everybody said, "Let's beat the Soviets to the moon." And the thing was built rationally from the
ground up, and by god, before the decade was out we were on the moon and back safely.
Now, they had a $5 billion bureaucracy with nothing to do. So they had to come up with rationales for what they did. So
they decided on manned flight because it's more expensive, and they decided on the reusable shuttle, which turned out to
be more expensive than if you just used a new shuttle every time. But they always had to sell this thing as making
So, Feynman argued that the NASA higher-ups were busy selling this pile of you-know-what to the general public. They
didn't want to hear anything negative from the people down below. This was his analysis for how they came up with this
They had a safety unit that was supposed to be involved in safety, but ended up being subverted in function, to
rationalize non-safety. And the classic example is, there were 24 flights, I think it was 24, prior to the disaster. And
of those, seven suffered O-ring damage—
RT: Detected, yes. In one of them the O-ring had been burned through—a third of the way through. Now, how did they
handle this? It was statistically significant. They said, "17 flights had no damage, so they're irrelevant"—and they
excluded them. Seven had damage, sometimes at high temperature, therefore temperature was irrelvant.
Then they came up with real absurdities. They said we built in a three-fold safety factor. That's to say, it only burned
a third of the way through. But that, as you know, is a perversion of language. By law you are required to build
elevators with an 11-fold safety factor, which means you pack it full of people, run it up and down, there is no damage
to your equipment. Now you make it 11 times as strong.
NC: And all of this data was available.
RT: All of it was available.
RT: There's an analogy here to individual self-deception. Information is often somewhere in the organism; it's just
well-hidden. It's well down in the unconscious. And it's often inaccessible because you build up firewalls against it.
NC: Are there any animal analogs to this?
RT: Well, I don't know. I believe that self-deception has evolved in two situations at least in other creatures, and
that it can be studied. I've suggested a way to do it, but so far nobody's done it.
For example, when you make an evaluation of another animal in a combat situation—let's say male/male conflict—the other
organism's sense of self-confidence is a relevant factor in your evaluation.
NC: And that's shown by its behavior.
RT: Exactly—through its suppressing signs of fear and not giving anything away, and so forth. So you can imagine
selection for overconfidence—
NC: —for showing overconfidence, even if it's not real.
RT: Yes. Likewise in situations of courtship, where females are evaluating males. Again, the organism's sense of self is
relevant. We all know that low self-esteem is a sexual romantic turn-off.
So again, you can have selection—without language it seems to me—for biased kinds of information flow within the
organism in order to keep up a false front.
NC: And it may be that the animal that's putting up a false front knows it's a false front.
RT: Yes, but it may benefit from not knowing—
NC: —because it's easier.
RT: Easier to do it and perhaps more convincing because you're not giving away evidence.
NC: Secondary signs.
NC: Is there any evidence about that, or is it just speculation?
RT: What you heard is rank speculation.
NC: Can it be investigated?
RT: I do not know of anybody who is doing it on self-deception. There is excellent work being done on deception in other
To give you just one line of work that's of some interest: We find repeatedly now—in wasps, in birds and in monkeys—that
when organisms realize they're being deceived, they get pissed off. And they often attack the deceiver. Especially if
the deceiver is over-representing him or herself. If you're under-representing and showing yourself as having less
dominance than you really have, you're not attacked. And the ones that do attack you are precisely those whose dominance
status you are attempting to expropriate or mimic.
It's very interesting and it suggests some of the dynamic in which fear of being detected while deceiving can be a
secondary signal, precisely because if you are detected, you may get your butt kicked or get chased out.
NC: There's a name for that in the international affairs literature; its called maintaining credibility. You have to
carry out violent acts to maintain credibility, even if the issue is insignificant.
NC: It's kind of like the Mafia.
RT: Yes, I know, I've heard that rationale used for odious stuff—we're maintaining credibility, maintaining street cred.
NC: That's a common theme. It's usually masked in some sense, so it's the credibility of the West, or the Free World, or
something or other.
NC: Are there ways of studying self-deception?
RT: Yes, there was a brilliant study by [Ruben] Gur and [Harold] Sackeim, about 20 years ago—which was a very difficult
one to do then, you could do it much more easily now—based on the fact that we respond to hearing our own voice with
greater arousal than we do to hearing another human's voice. In both cases we show physiological arousal—galvanic skin
response is one such measure. There's twice as big a jump if you hear your own voice.
Now, what you can do is have people matched for age and sex, read the same boring paragraph from Thomas Kuhn's
"Structure of Scientific Revolution," chop it up into two, four, six and 12 second segments, and create a master tape
where some of the time they're hearing their own voice, but a lot of the time they're not.
Then they've got to press a button indicating if they think it's their own and a second button to indicate how sure they
are. But meanwhile they have the galvanic skin response.
Now they discovered two interesting things. First of all, some people denied their own voice some of the time but the
skin always had it right. Some projected their own voice some of the time, the skin always had it right.
The deniers denied the denial, but half the time, the projectors were willing to admit afterwards that they thought
they'd made the mistake of projection.
NC: What do you think the reason for that is?
RT: The difference between the projectors and the deniers? Well, I don't have a good way of putting it, Noam, but to me
when you want to deny reality, you've got to act quickly and get it out of sight. The deniers also showed the highest
levels of galvanic skin response to all stimuli. It's like they were primed to do it. And inventing reality is a little
bit more of a relaxed enterprise I suppose.
NC: It's not as threatening.
RT: Yes, something like that. The final thing Gur and Sackeim showed was that they could manipulate it. Psychologists
have lots of devices for making you feel bad about yourself, and one of them is just to give you an exam. They did this
with university students. Then they told half of them, you did lousy, and half of them, you did well.
And what they found was that those who were made to feel badly about themselves started to deny their own voice more,
while those who were feeling good started hearing themselves talking when they weren't. Now since we didn't evolve to
hear our voice on a tape recorder, we have to interpret here. But it's like self-presentation is contracting on your
failure and expanding on your success.
But back to your question, among animals, birds in particular have been shown to have the same physiological arousal
that humans do—arousal to their own species song, and more arousal to their particular voice.
NC: So higher for their species and still higher for themselves?
NC: Is there any kin effect?
RT: That's a good question, and I don't know the answer. In general, kin relations in birds are poorly developed—they
often don't even nest next to their relatives. But in principle I thought you could run a Gur and Sackeim experiment on
birds, where pecking could substitute for pushing the button on the computer. You would train them in a reward system to
peck when they recognize their own song.
NC: So how do you get to self-deceit from this?
RT: Well, you would manipulate them once again by, for example, subjecting some birds to negative experiences like
losing fights, which you could rig by matching them with animals that are somewhat larger than them. And similarly,
others would get to win fights. And then you could see if there's a tendency to deny self.
NC: You might be interested in a book that's coming out by a very smart guy, James Peck, a Sinologist, who has a book
coming out called Washington's China, in which he does a very in-depth analysis of the National Security culture. It's
about the imagery of China that was constructed in Washington.
He went through the National Security Council literature, background literature and so on, and he does both an analysis
of content and a psychological analysis. I was reminded of it the whole time you were talking.
What he says is that there are elaborate techniques of self-deception to try to build a framework in which we can
justify things like, say, invading or overthrowing the government of Guatemala, on the basis of some new objective. And
it's done by making everything simple. You have to make it clearer than the truth.
NC: And as this picture gets created internally and built up by each group of National Security staffers, it becomes
like a real fundamentalist religion, showing extraordinary self-deceit. And then you end up with the Cheneys and the
RT: I've been appalled lately when I pass a newsstand and there's some article, "China, the Next Threat," saying, "Now
we've got to mobilize all our energy against China"—and they're talking military.
NC: That's interesting, because the threat of China is not military.
NC: The threat of China is they can't be intimidated—in fact it's very similar to what you've described. Europe you can
intimidate. When the US tries to get people to stop investing in Iran, European companies pull out, China disregards it.
NC: You look at history and understand why—China's been around for 4,000 years and just doesn't give a damn. So the West
screams, and they just go ahead and take over a big piece of Saudi or Iranian oil. You can't intimidate them—it's
driving people in Washington berserk.
But, you know, of all the major powers, they've been the least aggressive militarily.
RT: No, the obvious threat—I mean, the obvious "threat"—is economic.
NC: And I think they plan it carefully. Like when President Hu Jintao was in Washington. When he left, he was going on a
world trip. The next stop was Saudi Arabia. And that's a slap in the face to the US. It's just saying, "We don't care
what you say."
NC: I'm sure it was planned. That's the kind of thing that intimidates. It's a little bit like a gorilla pounding at its
RT: Yeah, exactly. More power to them.