Free Trade and Immigration: Cause and Effect
MONITORING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC
ISSUES AFFECTING THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Thursday, June 7th, 2007
Colombia, Reports, Front Page
Free Trade and Immigration: Cause and Effect
- • The Democrats rhetoric against enacting the free trade pact entered into by the Bush administration with Colombia represents a striking setback against President Alvaro Uribe and the U.S. president. Nevertheless, it is a victory for probity, a blow against Bogotá’s scandal-ridden government, and a denouncement of Uribe’s indifference to human rights.
- • Although discussion of free trade and immigration issues has recently stalled in Congress, supporters on both sides of the aisle are attempting to revive the debate as perspectives continue to polarize.
- • The combination of free trade and heavy U.S. subsidies has crippled the Mexican agricultural sector, causing impoverished former subsistence farmers to immigrate to the U.S. by any means necessary.
- • Immigration is not the demon it is often portrayed as—nor is it devoid of any profound dangers to the well-being of the U.S., as pro-immigration forces insist.
- • Conservative policies of supporting free trade while restricting immigration are inherently incompatible.
In recent months, the U.S. Congress has circumvented the will of President George Bush by delaying any action on free trade agreements with Peru and Panama. Moreover, the Democratic leadership has recently criticized the Colombian free trade agreement, damning one of President Alvaro Uribe’s most prized economic initiatives. Now, these issues, much like the immigration debate, will most likely not be revived until after the 2008 elections, if at all. In the meantime, it is vital that all parties involved examine the inextricable link between these two failed policies—immigration reform and expansion of free trade. As U.S. concern over both immigration and free trade issues were reaching a fever pitch, the reality of how the latter impacts the former has not been adequately addressed. It is likely that the group most directly affected by these issues has been the rural, agrarian population of Mexico. Since 1994, the year in which the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect, immigration from Mexico to the U.S. has more than doubled, due, in large part, to the trade pact.
Why
Immigration Has Spiked
In recent years, subsidies
received by U.S. corn farmers have resulted in
overproduction—flooding the market and causing large dips
in the price of the crop. Under Washington’s agricultural
subsidy program, in 2000, U.S. corn producers alone received
$10.1 billion in payments from the U.S. government—ten
times the Mexican government’s annual agricultural budget.
Subsidies are determined by a farm’s land area and
historical output; thus, due to these factors, the vast
majority of the aid goes to large agribusinesses. In the
U.S., the top ten percent of agricultural subsidy recipients
(most of whom earn, on average, over a quarter million
dollars per year) receive over 70 percent of the subsidy
dollars. There are also provisions for “counter cyclical
payments,” which are subsidies given to U.S. farmers for
the sole purpose of protecting their produce from price
fluctuations within the global market.
The U.S. has established a pattern in which it seeks to open its borders by means of free trade deals, bringing supply and demand capitalism to a developing world, hoping, at best, to create mutually beneficial trade arrangements, which, in many instances, do not work out that way. Meanwhile, Washington protects its own farmers against the self-correcting mechanisms inherent in the capitalist model by rewarding overproduction at home, economically penalizing small farmers in other parts of the world.
NAFTA has caused unemployment within the agricultural sector of Mexico to skyrocket. According to the Economic Policy Institute, at the end of 2004 there were 6.8 million unemployed agricultural workers in Mexico. Corn producers were perhaps the hardest hit by the free trade agreement: over one million of the crop’s cultivators have lost their jobs since the end of 1993, with many of them being forced to sell off their land at artificially low prices. Overall, paid wages to Mexicans working on corn farms have fallen 70 percent and, according to Witness for Peace, rural poverty rates in Mexico have risen to 81 percent. Between 1991 and 2004, the percentage of the Mexican population involved in the agricultural sector fell by over 10 percent.
Although NAFTA has certainly sharpened Mexico’s agricultural problems, it alone is not wholly to blame for the country’s now struggling economic sectors. According to the Latin American Regional Report, subsidies to support Mexican farmers do exist, but, much like those in the U.S., they are usually given to large-scale operations. Mexico’s richest farmers and agribusinesses pay neither income tax nor irrigation costs, actually resulting in their receiving more aid than the average U.S. farmer enjoys. By contrast, the poorest and smallest Mexican farming operations receive only insignificant amounts of support, consisting exclusively of subsidized fertilizer and awards from the Procampo program—a modest initiative instituted by the Mexican government to curb migration resulting from NAFTA. But, according to Quentin Wodon of the World Bank and Gabriel Gonzalez-Konig of Universidad de Guanajuato, Procampo has only been marginally successful (at the five percent level). Moreover, the subsidy payouts can actually be used by impoverished families to cover migration costs, intensifying the very immigration problem the program seeks to curb. With Procampo expiring in 2008, the Mexican government favoring wealthy farmers through subsidies and with NAFTA as an ongoing fact of life, it can be expected that immigration to the U.S. will continue to increase in the coming years.
Immigration to the U.S.
Some
argue that, even with the weakening of Mexico’s
agricultural sector in NAFTA’s wake, there is no
compelling excuse for illegal immigration to the U.S.,
citing alternatives available in both countries. However,
because of the damage NAFTA has done to other, non-agrarian
sectors of the Mexican economy, workers are being left with
minimal options. Since 2001, over 850,000 jobs have been
lost in the Mexican manufacturing industry, real wages have
fallen by 20 percent, and the marginalized informal market
has grown to encompass more than half of the Mexican
economy, with impoverished earnings being its usual reward.
As a result, workers flee Mexico in favor of the U.S.,
where, through myth or reality, they have come to believe
that ample opportunities exist to improve their lives. Their
hope is often warranted: the estimated prevailing wage
difference between California and the Mexican state of
Guanajuato was 13:1 in 2000. In 2005, over $20 billion were
sent to Mexico by Mexicans living in the U.S., a 17 percent
increase from the previous year, with future increases being
justifiably anticipated. Because of this vast disparity in
income potential, the demand for passage to the U.S. has
radically escalated. According to the Center for Immigration
Studies (CIS), the influx of Mexican immigration to the U.S.
is a relatively recent phenomenon: in 1970, the Mexican
immigrant population in the U.S. was only 800,000, but today
that figure has jumped to around 12 million. According to
Witness for Peace, the influx is so significant, and the
value of the prize—successful immigration with a
relatively high minimum wage—is so irresistible, that the
cost of an illegal crossing guide has risen from $300 to
$2,000 over the last several years.
According to the Pew Hispanic Center’s report Rise, Peak, and Decline: Trends in U.S. Immigration 1992-2004, post-NAFTA annual immigration peaked at over 1,500,000 Hispanic migrants per year, with over 650,000 moving here illegally (Figure 1a). In 2000, over 530,000 Mexicans immigrated to the U.S. In a COHA interview, Jeffery Rassel, Senior Research Associate at the Center, said that the numbers from the report are “actually a bit low,” revealing that the most recent figures estimate that 80 percent of all immigration from Mexico is illegal. Those choosing to make the illegal trek into the U.S. must endure extreme natural and physical conditions. Deaths are disturbingly common along the U.S.-Mexican border. In 2005, over 460 Mexicans died attempting to cross into the U.S. In 1993, the year prior to NAFTA’s enactment, there were only 205 immigrant deaths. A Witness for Peace study revealed that in 1998, weather-related deaths (hyper- and hypothermia) among immigrants were three times higher than they were in the 1980s.
According to a report by the University of California, Davis’ Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Mexican-born persons represented 77 percent of the U.S. farm workforce in 1997-98, a 20 percent spike from a 1990 pre-NAFTA survey of farm workers. Of these laborers, 52 percent were unauthorized, with an overwhelming majority of them hailing from the rural areas of Mexico most impacted by the negative agricultural consequences of NAFTA. Although supporters of NAFTA claimed that the pact would curtail immigration to the U.S. from Mexico by significantly improving the Mexican economy, it is evident that the agricultural sector has experienced the opposite effect, with the UC Davis report stating that, “econometric results suggest that… NAFTA increased the U.S. farm labor supply.”
The Economics of Immigration
Although
immigration from Mexico to the U.S., legal and otherwise, is
increasing, anti-immigration pundits should not immediately
rush to use such findings as an excuse to call for closed
borders. The influx of laborers has actually brought with it
various economic benefits. According to Steven A. Camarota,
Director of Research at the Center for Immigration Studies,
since the vast majority of native-born U.S. citizens have
completed high school and are employed in higher-skilled
occupations, they do not face significant job competition
from Mexican immigrants. President Bush’s Council of
Economic Advisers reported that immigrants enhance the
productivity of native-born workers and increase their
earnings by an estimated $37 billion per year. Considering
the aforementioned income disparities between Mexican sender
states and the U.S., coupled with the economic benefits
native-born Americans enjoy as a result of immigration,
anecdotally, it actually seems to be a reciprocally
beneficial relationship for those directly affected, despite
what is often portrayed. This, of course, does not mean that
Mexico, as a nation, is more helped than harmed.
Confused Policies
Ultimately, free trade and
immigration are not only inextricably linked, but their
supporters and opponents are also entangled by incompatible
policies. On one hand, conservatives generally support free
trade measures and oppose more open immigration policies,
which somewhat confounds issues, considering that NAFTA
actually has generated immigration on a macro scale due to
the agro-economic disaster it caused within Mexico. On the
other hand, liberals most often oppose unchecked free trade
measures and support open immigration. Ideally, the U.S.
would enact policy initiatives that would allow for Mexican
farmers to simultaneously thrive in their homeland by
strengthening the domestic economy and reduce food costs in
the U.S. through the application of far-sighted trade pacts,
stimulating both economies. In the meantime, U.S. officials
would be wise to judiciously treat the incoming immigrant
population and the assets and liabilities it brings for the
well being of this country, Mexico, and the entire
region.
This analysis was
prepared by COHA Research Associate Jacob Hill
July
18th, 2007
Word Count: 1800
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