Chile & the Andean Community Quest for Free Trade
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Monday, May 14th, 2007
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Juntos Podemos? Together We CAN: Chile and the Andean Community’s Quest for Free Trade
Another communiqué in COHA’s series of memos on free trade
Is It a
Question of “What’s in it for Santiago?”
After
a 30 year hiatus from participation in the South American
trading bloc it once helped to establish, Chile rejoined the
Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones
– CAN by its Spanish acronym) as an associate member,
on June 8, 2007. Chile, South America’s perpetual
“Rising Star,” promises to bring back its economic
prowess to the organization, whose full members include
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. A number of months ago,
CAN lost Venezuela as a member because President Chavez
found the organization too dependent on Washington’s
influence. Now, Chile promises to pump up the group’s
economic partnership, especially by exploring new
initiatives regarding Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
There is no question that Chile will bring genuine assets and skills to CAN as well as sterling connections that will help its regional neighbors to expand their ties to the European and Asia-Pacific regions. But a number of regional figures have told COHA that Chile has a long history of servicing its own national interests, liberally defined, and that Santiago will see to it that under no circumstances will it be one of the losers when it comes to exacting benefits upon joining the free trade group. Critics will recall the manner in which Brazil and Argentina are today bitterly viewed by MERCOSUR’s smaller members as the prime beneficiaries of that trade bloc.
Chilean President Michelle Bachelet’s attendance at the June 11-14 CAN summit in Tarija, Bolivia, along with other area heads of state hoped to demonstrate her nation’s commitment to renewed involvement in promoting CAN’s activities to promote intra-community trade, cooperative economic integration and common foreign trade agreements. Statements by various members of the Chilean government suggest that Santiago is optimistic that it will be able to enhance the importance of CAN through its participation, especially with its already broadly established economic ties to the region and beyond. According to Pablo Arriaran, First Secretary of Political Affairs at the Chilean embassy in the U.S., “Chile’s participation in CAN is consistent with our foreign policy objectives in commercial matters and for regional integration.”
Chile’s revived membership in CAN may be just the catalyst for invigorating the organization’s capability to promote free trade not only in the Andean region and throughout South America, but also across the Pacific, a prime field of its interest. This is of particular significance at a time when the Andean Community faces uncertainty due to a lack of cooperation among some of its members as well as heated competition with other South American economic conglomerates (like the MERCOSUR bloc).
Aimless Andean Community Members Come
and Go
Originally established in 1969 as the Andean
Pact (with Chile as a founding member), the organization
promotes a neo-liberal economic agenda that advocates free
trade and open markets. Chile withdrew from CAN in 1976 when
the country was under the military dictatorship of General
Augusto Pinochet, who cited the group’s economic
incompatibility with the direction of his own self-imposed
economic reforms for Chile, as the rationale for its
withdrawal. After recovering from Pinochet’s brutal
military dictatorship and reverting to its democratic roots
in 1990, Chile’s liberal open market and free
trade-oriented economy has prospered, allowing it to have
one of the most vibrant and stable economies in South
America. In order to perpetuate its economic viability,
current Chilean President Michelle Bachelet has committed
her country to strengthening regional trade pacts. The
nation’s reintegration into CAN is evidence of the
proactive approach by Chile’s ruling coalition, the
Concertación Alliance, and its prudent “open
regionalism” foreign policy which will be sustained as
long as Bachelet is president.
Today, Chile is a major sub-regional power and is as much highly nationalistic as anything else. President Bachelet has a conciliatory personality and is much admired by regional leaders. But their feelings for Chile’s likely future president, Jose Miguel Insulza, are slightly more guarded. Hopefully, Bachelet can set a solid precedent for her predecessor to follow in the area of regional economic integration and Chile’s role in it, if he, in fact, rises to be the country’s chief executive. Insulza, the current Secretary General of the Organization of American States, while Chile’s foreign minister, aggressively, and even sneeringly asserted Chile’s rights to the point of offending some of his then-counterparts, who dismissed this attitude as being “high handed” and “unhelpful.”
Prior to Chile’s re-entry into CAN, Venezuela was the bloc’s political and economic fulcrum, but its withdrawal in April 2006 severely jolted the internal dynamics and symmetry of the group until Chile’s potentially revitalizing return. Venezuela abruptly had departed from the trading bloc as a result of President Hugo Chavez’s negative reaction to Colombia and Peru’s announced intentions of signing free trade agreements with the U.S. Even though Chavez has rejected calls from the Bolivian and Colombian governments to resume Venezuela’s membership in CAN, the group’s leaders continue to urge CAN Secretary General Freddy Elhers to make renewed overtures to Chavez to change his mind. Following its exit from CAN, Venezuela has become a member of MERCOSUR (a rival South American trading bloc). However, Chavez has managed to estrange himself from several fellow MERCOSUR heads of state in recent months, and particularly the legislative bodies of Brazil and Peru. Additionally, Chavez is now promoting on the side his own alternative to continental economic integration — the Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas (Alba) — and may be trying to lure his allies, Bolivia and Ecuador, away from MERCOSUR and CAN.
Recent calls from three Peruvian cabinet ministers that Lima should consider withdrawing from CAN have also raised questions regarding the vitality of the institution. On June 7, Agriculture Minister Ismael Benavides, Foreign Trade and Tourism Minister Mercedes Aráoz, and Production Minister Rafael Rey voiced their opposition to continued membership in CAN, declaring that Peru was not receiving any returns from years of investment in the organization. To date, President Alan Garcia has not responded to these strong words from his cabinet colleagues, yet this internal discontent with CAN appears to be one more instance of the destabilizing uncertainty among its members, and raises questions concerning their commitment to the organization. However, analysts now believe that Chile’s renewed membership may help strengthen Andean economic ties and its extended reach abroad, so long as CAN is able to stay intact long enough to see results. But the one thing everyone remembers is that Chile sees itself as not having permanent friends or associations, but mainly permanent interests, and that just as it left MERCOSUR and CAN and later returned, Santiago’s bonds are constructed of paste and not tenacious glue.
Chile (Re)Joins the Club
Upon
the prodding of newly inaugurated Peruvian President Alan
Garcia, the CAN members sent a formal invitation to Chile on
August 7, 2006 to rejoin the organization. Two weeks later,
President Bachelet confirmed her nation’s interest,
initiating the negotiations that led to its associate-member
status being granted 11 months later. Since Chile already
had signed Bilateral Economic Cooperation Agreements with
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (thereby paving the way
for more extensive areas of economic cooperation, or free
trade zones), it was relatively easy for Santiago to be
reintegrated into CAN since it already qualified for the
organization’s conditions for membership.
With her attendance (the first time for a Chilean head of state in over 30 years) at the recent CAN summit in Tarija, Bolivia, President Bachelet has made it very clear that under her administration, Chile intends to repair its broken ties with the organization in hopes of renewing the Andean community brotherhood. As part of Bachelet’s commitment to renew regional trade pacts and with a bow to the Concertación’s foreign policy of “open regionalism,” which promotes free trade agreements as a mechanism for the expansion of commerce and investment, she professed Chile’s solidarity with CAN members. At the CAN summit on June 14, President Bachelet reiterated Santiago’s dedication to active membership in the organization, stating that “this is more than a presidential summit, it’s a meeting of great significance. The Andean Presidential Council has met to embrace Chile as an associate member of the Andean Community; we say, Chile returns to where they should have never left.” Outlining the importance of Chile’s reincorporation into CAN, Bachelet observed: “it signifies the re-encounter of my country with one of the most important processes of integration of Latin America . . . [this is] an instrument that permits us to bring together our countries and our people. With pride we say: Chile is an Andean country.” Bachelet also noted that Chile’s CAN membership aims to strengthen Andean political and economic ties, and that she hoped that her nation would help provide the organization with the face-lift it patently needed to unify its members and achieve its goals.
Chile’s
Geopolitical Reach
Since rejoining, Bachelet has
pledged support for CAN’s future projects – including
completion of on-going negotiations with the European Union
(EU) and expanding trade relations with the Asia-Pacific
region. With its unique geopolitical position as a nation
aligned with almost all of its Latin American neighbors in
addition to its significant ties to Europe and the
Asia-Pacific region, as well as the U.S., through previously
formulated trade agreements (such as a free trade pact with
the European Union and membership in the Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation negotiating bloc), Chile could serve as
a gateway to expanded economic opportunities for other
Andean nations. Chile already has established free trade
pacts with the U.S., numerous Latin American nations, and
several nations in the Asia-Pacific region (most notably
with China); this pioneering could help the other Andean
Community members to gain preferential trade agreements with
the economic super-giant that is the EU, and the potentially
lucrative and heavily populated Asia-Pacific region.
According to a 2006 MercoPress analysis, as “the
continent’s star economy, Chile wants to become a gateway
nation between South America and Asia-Pacific countries and
is working to establish ties on both sides of the oceanic
divide.”
Expanding Horizons
Chilean government
officials and other CAN members are hoping that the
organization can reap sizeable benefits from using Chile’s
already established connections to expand the geopolitical
reach of the CAN trading bloc. As Bachelet has reflected:
“the Asia-Pacific zone is probably the most dynamic
economy today . . . Countries that look towards Asia can
make individual treaties, but we can also collectively unite
and offer a greater strengthened market.” With its
recently negotiated trade deal with China, and its free
trade agreements with more than fifty other nations
worldwide, Chile sees itself as an important portal in
shaping economic links between the Asia-Pacific region and
South America. As Chile began the process for CAN re-entry,
Alfredo Fuentes, a Colombian and former Acting Secretary
General of the Andean Community stated in August 2006,
“Chile’s association means that the Andean Community can
further its focus on the Pacific region. But most
importantly, it allows for the continued integration of our
economic, political and social affairs. The relationship
with Chile is important, allowing us to envision a common
future on the way towards a Community of South American
Nations [now known as UNASUR].” Clearly, the ramifications
of Chile’s participation in CAN will generate widespread
appeal in short and long-term growth towards the economic
and political integration of South American countries and
their relationship with other regions of the
world.
Bachelet’s “open regionalism” foreign policy has placed the fostering of better political and economic relations with Chile’s fellow Latin American states at the forefront of her agenda, but her administration’s foreign policy goals also include obtaining a greater presence in the Asia-Pacific area. Chile’s membership in CAN may serve as a bridge for increased political and economic ties within their backyard and the deep blue sea beyond. Chilean trade with Asia has increased dramatically in recent years. In 2006, Santiago signed a free trade agreement with China, making that nation with its market of 1.3 billion people, Chile’s second largest trading partner after the U.S. Chile’s Foreign Minister Alejandro Foxley has stated that the free trade agreement with China “is especially important for Chile, as it is a decisive step towards establishing its position in the Asia-Pacific region, a highly dynamic region with great commercial and economic power; and it also gives further backing to our idea of making Chile the bridge that will unite Asia and South America.”
CAN Negotiations with the European
Union
Chile hopes that its participation in CAN will
help reenergize the group’s stalled negotiations with the
EU. CAN began negotiations on a bloc-to-bloc free trade
agreement with the EU in 2003, but divisions among CAN
members on economic policies have riddled the process with
setbacks. After months of disagreement on the logistics of
the prospective EU-CAN free trade deal, CAN members finally
decided to approach the negotiations on a country-by-country
basis, with Colombia and Peru working at a faster pace than
their neighbors, Bolivia and Ecuador. Since Chile
established a free trade agreement with the EU in 2006, its
government believes that it can help the rest of the Andean
Community advance pending trade deals with the EU. As Foxley
has noted, “we have a certain advantage in the opening of
markets, with Asia, the United States and Europe. Therefore,
we can render technical collaboration in the CAN
negotiations with the European Union, and other fields.”
At the recent CAN summit in Tarija, Bolivia, it was
announced that negotiations for a comprehensive Association
Agreement between both regions officially had been launched.
The first round of negotiations is expected to begin in
earnest in September of this year and, as stated in a joint
EU-CAN press release on June 14, the objective of the
Association Agreement is “to enhance the political
dialogue between both regions, to intensify and improve
their cooperation in a vast variety of areas and to enhance
and facilitate bi-regional trade and investments.” Yet it
remains to be seen whether Chile’s involvement will really
make much difference, aside from mood and setting, in the
crafting of the proposed EU-CAN trade deal.
Regional
Trade Blocs – Helping or Hindering?
At a time when
the vitality of regional trade blocs in South America and
their overall effectiveness are being questioned, especially
as nations consider swapping membership proposals between
the two major groups, CAN and MERCOSUR, Chile is hoping to
play the role of mediator and expeditor. As an associate
member of both organizations, Chile clearly has been
fence-sitting up to now, yet still receives the benefits of
membership in both MERCOSUR, and now CAN. Each of the bodies
has its own distinct political and economic agenda as well
as a distinct style of in-fighting that could threaten the
overall likelihood of successfully improving their level of
cooperation. However, Chile has called for increased
cooperation between these two rival forces. President
Bachelet implored her fellow hermanidad andina at the
recent CAN summit to “continue the convergence between CAN
and MERCOSUR, and advance open and flexible global
integration.” The process is already underway, since the
two trading blocs signed a free trade agreement in December
2003. Unfortunately, further substantial progress on
cooperative efforts has not been made since then due to
internal conflict involving their preferred economic
directions and goals. Adding new dynamics to the cooperative
process, some analysts, like former Peruvian ambassador to
Venezuela, Carlos Urrutia, see a future of regional
relations and alliances being guided by scenarios “in
which trade flows are stronger than political
convergences.” Clearly, Chile sees itself riding the wave
of the future, while other nearby nations seem to be on the
verge of experiencing a shipwreck. But an ebullient Chile is
not necessarily a welcome sight to the rest of CAN, since
Santiago is not beloved by all.
South American nations seem more likely to be advancing their own individual strategies for their own benefits, without necessarily taking into consideration the regional ramifications that accompany a lack of true unity. Since global markets such as the European Union and the Asia-Pacific region have explicitly demonstrated the benefits of transnational economic cooperation, Chile appears to be attempting to bridge the divide and lure its neighbors back into planning a more unified South American response to the promotion of free trade. With its dual participation in the region’s major economic groups, Chile is wisely protecting its own interests while simultaneously promoting intra-regional cooperation that is important to Latin America’s economic vitality. Nevertheless, the verdict has yet to be delivered on Santiago’s bona fides in this respect. There is too much historic bitterness to allow ancient misgivings to simply burn off in a moment.
Greater Chilean involvement in the Andean Community may also soften its difficult record of strained bilateral relations with its neighbors Bolivia and Peru. And, as Chile’s foreign minister Alejandro Foxley has asserted, “there are people who think that we are isolated, but our country is present in all the instances of integration in South America and Latin America.” Not only is Chile merely present in regional economic forums, it is also one of the major players in paving the way for what it hopes to someday help to unveil as a successfully-implemented Latin American integrationist project. This originally was conceived centuries ago by the region’s political liberators, and has evolved to its present form known as the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), with the dream of spreading economic liberation and fraternity to all the nations on the continent.
Return the Huáscar: Enkindle
CAN
Good feelings towards Chile from the
international community as well as the Andean grouping
conceivably would more readily flow if Santiago improved its
often testy relations with its neighboring countries. An
example of this would be better relations with Peru, which
have been particularly tense ever since the 19th century War
of the Pacific and have been strained lately due to an
ongoing border dispute that has existed ever since that
aforementioned conflict in the 1870s. A good way for such
relations to be improved would be if Bachelet carries out
some kind of stunning gesture of goodwill, like returning
the Peruvian warship “Huáscar,” which was captured at
the Battle of Angamos on October 8, 1879. During the battle,
most of the Huáscar’s crew was killed, including Rear
Admiral Miguel Grau, who now has achieved iconic status in
his nation.
As suggested in a recent essay by COHA Research Fellow, Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, if Chile is so concerned to project a new, more humble and less arrogant image in Latin America as well as play a new and more honorable role as a liegeman for Bachelet’s “hermandad andina,” that would be underwritten by the support of the Chilean political sector as well as the nation’s armed forces, she might consider the return of the Huáscar to Peru. Currently the Huáscar is a museum at the Chilean military port of Talcahuano, in the Bay of Concepción, in front of the headquarters of the country’s second naval zone. Unfortunately, such a move is highly unlikely. Shortly before the 1973 coup by General Pinochet, which overthrew the Salvador Allende government, COHA Director Larry Birns, then an official with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America in Santiago, proposed such an idea to President Allende at a private gathering. The constitutionally-elected leader laughed off the idea by insisting that the Chilean navy would have him castrated for such a move. Luckily, Bachelet is a woman and does not have to worry about that fate if she had the temerity to return the Huáscar to its rightful owner, indicating that a true and more charitable change in its natural profile had occurred in that country. As a result of this action, in addition to its renewed participation in CAN, Chile may garner better relations with its Andean neighbors.
This
analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Eva
Silkwood
July 17th, 2007
Word Count:
3400
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