Perils Of New Zealand's Int. Military Assistance

Exclusive To Scoop: The Perils Of International Military Assistance - Security analyst Paul Buchanan writes that New Zealand's politicians and its public ought to debate the merits or otherwise of international military assistance - balanced against the consequencial risks such operations attract.

The car bombing deaths of six UN peacekeeping soldiers in Lebanon and the warnings by German intelligence services that it is at high risk of terrorist attack on its home soil due to its participation in the NATO-led pacification mission in Afghanistan highlight the perils of participating in foreign military missions even if they are multinational in nature and sanctioned by the international community.

Since New Zealand has military personnel serving as peacekeepers and nation-builders in Lebanon, East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Afghanistan (all volatile flashpoints), has military liaison personnel stationed in a host of countries and with a number of foreign security organisations, and may have combat troops detailed to conflict zones under the camouflage of the “neither confirm or deny” policy the government adopts with regards to such missions (especially when performed by the SAS), it is worth pondering the risks posed to this country by its participation in such ventures.

The risks are two-fold.

On one hand there is the distinct possibility, illustrated so graphically in Lebanon, of New Zealanders losing their lives in foreign peacekeeping or nation-building adventures, to say nothing of combat. The soldiers involved accept the risk as the price of their service, and it is a tribute to their professionalism that New Zealand has a well-garnered reputation for effective performance in these so-called “blue helmet” operations (in reference to the blue helmets warn by UN troops, although they retain their national uniforms as a mark of unit distinction). The questions about participating in such missions revolve around their effectiveness in stopping or mediating conflicts (especially when the principals in such conflicts do not want to stop); about the possibility of “mission creep” away from originally intended operations; and of a slide away from neutrality towards siding one way or another in an armed dispute.

The second risk is illustrated by the German conundrum. Service in UN, NATO or other multinational sanctioned military operations not only invites casualties during the conduct of said operations. It also invites retaliation. Non-state, irregular belligerents such as the Taleban or al-Qaeda in Afghanistan do not take kindly to foreign military interference with their ideological projects, however peaceful and oriented towards non-combat, nation-building purposes they may be. Because their scope of operations and reach is global in nature(even if their organizational ties are purposefully loose in order to provide operational security for their guerrilla cadres), this means that New Zealand’s participation in any type of foreign military venture may invite a violent response against New Zealand interests or homeland. It might be a stretch to think that al-Qaeda or Taleban would target New Zealand because of its school and bridge-building efforts in Afghanistan, but it is not outside the realm of possibility. After all, Australia has already been publicly targeted by al-Qaeda because of its participation in the occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, so it is not to hard to conceive that if the extent of New Zealand’s military involvement in conflict zones is publicized abroad (especially if New Zealand forces were to be discovered engaging foreign combatants on their soil), it might raise the target profile of New Zealand in the sights of the jihadi movement or other groups unhappy about its military involvement in what they consider to be their internal affairs (pro-Indonesian Timorese militias and Melanesian paramilitary organizations come to mind).

The “neither confirm or deny” policy is therefore an excellent way to deflect such unwanted attention. This is aided by the fact that most New Zealand units serving in peacekeeping missions abroad are detailed to other larger military allies such as the UK or Australia, where they can blend into the larger force. Special operations troops like the SAS rely on stealth and deception as stocks in trade, so they have a double layer of cover when serving with other special operations forces abroad (in Afghanistan a number of NATO countries and NATO partner countries have special operations forces undertaking missions, since that country unfortunately provides an excellent live fire testing ground in which to hone their combat skills). But however intelligent the neither confirm or deny policy is, or how well disguised New Zealand troops might be by their secondment to larger foreign military units, these are just tactical responses.

The larger question is worth parliamentary and public debate: what constitutes a proper international mission for a small democracy such as New Zealand?

This country’s commitment in principle to international community service and multinational military operations in pursuance of that service is commendable, but in practice it invites the risks described above.

Peacekeeping and law enforcement operations in New Zealand’s regional sphere of influence might be generally accepted, since the potential risks of regional conflict spillovers present a clear and present danger to New Zealand’s national security. But what about military ventures further afield?

If New Zealand were to suffer a terrorist attack because of its participation in multinational operations in a place like Lebanon, can it be guaranteed UN or other foreign cooperation in hunting down the perpetrators as a priority given the state of world affairs?

Can it be assured that its foreign military service in humanitarian causes that may be only tangential to its national security will be rewarded with tangible benefits from those who have a direct interest in those causes?

If not, where is the line drawn between unrewarded commitment to principle and foolishness?

The job of a security analyst is to pose such questions before offering an opinion about the deployment of troops to conflict zones. However, in a democracy the ultimate responsibility for defining the ground rules for foreign military engagement - including a calculation of costs, benefits and a range of eventualities that may result from the deployment of troops abroad - lies with the elected representatives of the polity. That requires the electorate to consider the issue as a matter of national interest and to demand that its elected representatives do likewise, in as robust a manner as possible.

Until that happens, the benefits of foreign military assistance operations will be defined by the government of the day, although the potentially deadly costs of involvement will be borne by the soldiers and citizens whose opinions are not considered during the decision-making process.

In a country where political headlines are grabbed by child-smacking and school meal debates, perhaps it is time for all of us to raise our game and argue about things relevant to the common defense and New Zealand’s international military role rather than our parochial interests.

Paul G. Buchanan is the Director of the Working Group on Alternative Security Perspectives at the University of Auckland.

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