Drug Warfare Could be Part of Europe’s Panorama
Open Drug Warfare Could be Part of Europe’s Panorama in Months to Come
by COHA
Part one of COHA’s ongoing series on Latin American Drug Trafficking
Strong
Euro Lures Drug Traffickers to Ship to EU
Market
While North America continues to represent the
largest single consumer sector for drugs, cocaine seizures
have been declining there since 1995. Meanwhile, the euro
continues to rise against the dollar and is just one more
incentive for drug traffickers to profit from a growing
European drug market. Increased numbers of cocaine
traffickers in particular have discovered an ideal market
for increased profits by attracting a new generation of
clients and generating greater volume. The use of illegal
drugs, especially among prospering European youth, has
increased to unprecedented levels; it is estimated that 10
million Europeans have tried cocaine at least once. In
Europe, a kilogram of cocaine sells for about $50,000,
compared to $30,000 in the U.S. According to a 2006 Europol
report, an estimated 250 tons of cocaine enter the EU
annually by way of sea or air. With an ostensibly saturated
North American drug market, a clearly concerned EU
leadership will want to focus on concrete rather than
theoretical approaches to curbing the burgeoning
availability of illegal drugs in Europe before the problem
becomes unmanageable. As use grows, and profits reach record
levels, Europe could soon be witnessing the same kind of
open warfare between local cartels and police forces that is
now being seen in such Latin American countries as Mexico
and Colombia.
Trade Incentives are Not Enough to Stop
Cocaine Traffickers
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime
calculated that the global production of cocaine in 2004
increased to an estimated 687 tons; 56 percent of which
originated in Colombia, 28 percent in Peru, and 16 percent
in Bolivia. It appears that the promotion of alternative
legal crops under the EU’s preferential trade system,
GSP+, are not sufficient to control drug production and
trafficking within the drug-exporting nations of the Andean
Community (CAN).
The EU prides itself upon having a comprehensive approach as well as a series of tactical plans in the fight against drugs, including anti-drug cooperation provisions in all multilateral trade agreements it has signed with the CAN nations, Mexico and now Chile. In addition, the European Commission (EC) has attempted to fortify relations with Latin America by offering technical assistance in data collection, alternative development strategies and supply and demand reduction programs. Most of the EU support programs, for operational purposes, are located in the Andean region, with these projects adding up to more than € 140 million in 2005-2006.
The EU and the
U.S. are CAN’s two largest trading partners. CAN is
composed of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and now Chile.
In April 2006, President Hugo Chávez took Venezuela out of
CAN, and as recently as June 7, 2007, three Peruvian cabinet
members called for the country to consider resigning from it
as well. President Chávez cited the pending free trade
agreements between Peru and Colombia with the U.S. as one of
the primary reasons for Caracas’ action. Peru’s possible
departure could shake up the body in a very fundamental
manner. The EU has increased its trade with CAN from € 9
billion in 1980 to € 15 billion in 2004, with exports to
the EU countries accounting for around € 9 billion. In the
past, CAN fell under the EU’s General System of
Preferences (GSP), along with special advantages for those
countries engaged in a good faith effort of combating drug
production and trafficking. However, because this
arrangement provided for about 90 percent of all of CAN’s
industrial and some agricultural products to enter the EU
market duty free, it was found to violate the WTO trade
regulations. Therefore, CAN now falls under the EU’s new
trade preferential system, GSP+, which encourages the fight
against drugs and attempts to sustain development in the
region, while maintaining the previous level of
benefits.
The Caribbean is a Perfect
Location
Most of Europe’s imported cocaine arrives
directly from South America, but much of it is also
indirectly routed through Central America, West Africa and
the Caribbean. Albert R. Ramdin, Assistant Secretary General
of the Organization of American States, said in a speech on
March 20, 2007 that, “almost 50 percent of the drugs
transshipped through the Caribbean find their way to
Europe.” In 2006, the U.S. government identified 20
countries as major drug producing or transit areas, with
four in the Caribbean– Haiti, the Dominican Republic,
Jamaica and the Bahamas. The 2007 report issued by the UN
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated that in 2005, about
10 tons of cocaine were transited through Jamaica and 20
tons went through Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In
addition, research has been done on the transfer of drugs by
way of the Caribbean Sea, flowing from South and Central
America to regions with high demand, such as Europe and the
U.S. There is strong evidence that seven Eastern Caribbean,
English-speaking islands–Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados,
Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines– form an Eastern transit zone.
This passage is a popular waterway for drug traffickers en
route to Europe, while Western and Central Caribbean
exporters mainly cater to the North American market.
West
Africa has become a warehouse and intermediary stop in the
trafficking from Latin America to European gateway countries
such as Spain and Portugal. According to UN statistics,
officials in both countries seized a combined 70 tons of
cocaine in 2006, almost the same amount that was apprehended
in all of Europe during 2004. Donald Semesky, chief of
financial operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency,
stated that the seizure of €5.4 billion aboard a Spanish
charter jet was an important contributing factor in leading
to the arrest of drug kingpin Hugo Bernel in March 2007.
Furthermore, West Africa has both geographical appeal for
Latin American cocaine traffickers and accessibility for
dealers selling Asian heroin and Chinese chemicals used as
precursors to produce hard and synthetic
drugs.
Europol and the UN International Narcotics
Control Board Take Action
The Europol Drugs Unit
introduced Project COLA (Europol 2006), in an effort to
identify and target drug traffickers, especially those
operating out of Latin America and who are involved in the
European trade. The project includes live investigations and
innovations which obtain strategic intelligence in the EU
member states. Project COLA includes an Analysis Work File
(AWF), the system used by Europol to collect, analyze, and
disseminate drug-related intelligence. In 1999, Operation
Purple, under the aegis of the United Nations International
Narcotics Control Board (UNCB), began to target the use of
potassium permanganate, one of the main chemical components
used to destroy impurities in the production of cocaine.
In 2004, 1.4 tons of potassium permanganate were apprehended, but since the introduction of Operation Purple, traffickers often find methods to avoid the authorities. The EU is concerned about the role of the Caribbean Islands because there is speculation that traffickers are also diverting potassium permanganate to the sub-Andean region, by means of the islands. In light of these inconsistencies, the UN has encouraged stricter criteria to decipher the source of the chemicals used in cocaine production, the countries involved in transiting the materials and where the chemicals were being inventoried and housed.
The EU
Introduces a Strategy and Action
The EU Drugs
Strategy (2005-2012) was formulated by the European Council
in Brussels in 2004 to combat drug use and trafficking over
the next eight years. The report’s introduction
acknowledges that previous EU legislation has not noticeably
affected drug supply or demand at the national or
supranational level. Therefore, the strategy stresses
improvements in these areas regarding research, evaluation
and international cooperation. In order to reduce demand,
the importance of prevention, early intervention and
rehabilitation are all emphasized in the EU literature. The
EU does not blame Latin America nor specific sources which
are otherwise notorious for their drug trafficking. Rather,
its members accept responsibility for their own transfer of
synthetic drugs to these “third countries.” The strategy
also urges international cooperation and dialogue to further
social and political development in hopes of decreasing the
stream of drugs spreading to the EU market. The border
countries of the EU, the Balkan states, Afghanistan, Latin
America, the Caribbean and Morocco are all seen as potential
drug routes that deserve specific attention.
The Drug
Action Plan 2005-2008 is the first of two scenarios to
specify the actual implementation of the strategy in
accordance with a timetable. The measures taken to reduce
the supply of drugs include joint operation projects
involving Europol, Eurojust as well as EU member states, and
seek to target the money laundering associated with
international drug crime. A study carried out by the
European Commission on drug-related crime prevention in
“third countries” has been completed and its findings
are projected for release in 2008. Furthermore, member state
representatives were sent to producer countries as well as
nations along established trafficking routes to coordinate
cooperative law enforcement procedures in those affected
states. Although this process is described as ongoing, the
Action Plan claims that a number of operations have been
initiated and completed. A review process for the current
cooperative action plans in Latin America and the Caribbean
was carried out in 2006. There is also an initiative to
enhance the exchange of information, research and assessment
of priorities in drug legislation now being drafted which
specifically involves the EU and other
countries.
What Has Been
Accomplished?
Undoubtedly, the Drug Action Plan
2005-2008 improves upon many of the previous plan’s
shortcomings and deficiencies; however, many of the problems
recognized in 2000 remain unresolved. A 2000-2001 report by
the UNODC stated that “Europe has increased its share of
transshipped cocaine from 10 percent in the early 1990’s
to 32 percent, or 80 metric tons, in 2000.” Some 165
metric tons of cocaine pass through the Caribbean on the way
to Europe. The EU has
acknowledged the Caribbean as a major area of cocaine transit now within the scope of the EU/Caribbean/U.S. maritime cooperation office. This facility was established to allow for deeper dialogue and greater cooperation on drug trafficking initiatives by affected maritime nations. Nevertheless, the Caribbean continues to be a critical intermediary zone for drug transit. According to a 2006 Europol report, Colombian authorities had even managed to seize a submarine under construction that potentially would have been able to transport some 15 tons of cocaine through the Caribbean at any one time. About an estimated 30 tons of cocaine is transported by air couriers annually from South America and the Caribbean to airports in Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom. In response air smuggling, authorities in the Netherlands implemented the “100% Control” strategy which involved meticulous searches of passengers arriving in Amsterdam from the Caribbean, Suriname and Venezuela. In 2003, 80 to 100 couriers per day passed through the airport; however, this figure decreased to 10 couriers per month by October, 2005. In 1999, the EU claimed that under the Action Plan 2000-2004, cocaine use was moderately increasing, yet it still was at a relatively low level. The Action Plan 2005-2008 indicates that it was now becoming a genuine problem for member states. If adequate preventative measures had been taken in 1999, there may have been a smaller European market for cocaine today. Such defensive measures could have included more stringent language in bilateral trade agreements, with threats of putting an end to preferential treatment, such as the GSP+, if individual hemispheric countries did not quickly and sufficiently establish that they were combating drug trafficking.
The Economic Worth and Social
Ramifications of Drug Trafficking
The transit of
drugs to the European market through the Caribbean has had
destructive social repercussions for the region and, in
particular, for its youth. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan pinpointed youth unemployment as a key factor that
exacerbates drug abuse and crime. He observed that in 2006,
“Halving the world’s youth jobless rate, bringing it
roughly in line with the adult rate, would add as much as
$3.5 trillion to global GDP. In Latin America and the
Caribbean alone, the projected gain of $298 billion would
equal the combined annual GDP of Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Dominican Republic and Peru.” The cocaine market was worth
about $70 billion in 2003 while the GDP of the entire
Caribbean was $31.5 billion in 2004. Annan addressed youth
employment because it is invariably a preventative method
which can be used to battle illegal drugs. However, the
value of the narcotics flowing through the Caribbean region
may be greater than the value of its legitimate economy.
Cartel money for those in the Caribbean, who perform trade favors for drug traffickers from South and Central America, usually involve only a select few. In 2001, for example, the UNODC cited that “about 12,000 people obtain 75 percent of the total drug income.” These people are mainly from the ruling elite or their servitors, and the governments of Caribbean nations are often too weak to effectively combat the power and the capacity for social destruction that the traffickers are able to bring to any given island. In a 2007 World Bank report, it was stated that Dutch authorities estimated that 75 percent of crime in the Netherlands Antilles is drug-related. Drug trafficking may account for 80 percent of the 800 violent deaths that occur annually in Puerto Rico. This affects the likelihood that outside businesses will invest in the area. In Jamaica, 37 percent of business managers reported that crime negatively impacts the productivity and investments in the region. Caribbean youth are drawn to the drug life through the influential marketing, and the superficial glamour of the lifestyle, of drug lords, or by special provisos. For example, in the Dominican Republic, the youth are immune from prosecution in adult courts, so the comparative cost of their involvement in the drug trade is considerably lower than that of their adult counterparts. Furthermore, the rewards are relatively greater for those youths who remain in the industry, sometimes for a lifetime, further sharpening their prospects for addiction and their utility to the drug-related clientele and service staff.
The
Future
Both the EU Drugs Strategy Plan and the Drug
Action Plan of 2005 focus on preventative and cooperative
efforts in order to construct a united EU front against
drugs. The plan also assists developing regions with
research and drafting of multilateral and bilateral trade
agreements meant to create a constructive path by
discouraging drug trafficking. Two years later, however, the
demand for drugs in the EU is increasing. Furthermore, the
EU market has become progressively more tempting for drug
traffickers due to the rising value of the euro against the
dollar. While more active law enforcement procedures and the
use of trade agreements with the EU are potentially needed
for Latin America and the Caribbean to be able to accurately
address the scope of demand for illegal drugs, it should be
taken into consideration that the region’s already limited
resources are being drained unfairly by economic
transactions and expenditures which are not always in its
interests.
This analysis was prepared by COHA Research
Associate Jacquelyn Godin
June 25th, 2007
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