FAQs - Hand-Counted Paper Ballots
Hand-Counted Paper Ballots: Frequently Asked Questions
May 11, 2007
By Roy Lipscomb and Sheila Parks
NOTE: This is a work in progress. Please send any suggestions to either or both of the authors, listed below. View the original version at the link below for the latest version.
From: http://electionfraudnews.com/Articles/HCPB.Now.htm
Roy Lipscomb lipscombr@REMOVETHISBIThotmail.com
Sheila Parks, Ed.D. sheila.parks@REMOVETHISBITverizon.net
Glossary
What are some useful
terms to know?
HCPB
fundamentals
What are HCPB?
What are the
essential elements of HCPB?
What are the benefits of
HCPB?
Why choose HCPB against the recommendation of so
many computer experts?
Aren't HCPB simply a nostalgic
throwback to some idyllic "good old days"?
Aren't HCPB
systems obsolete?
Aren't HCPB advocates merely afraid of
electronic voting machines?
What are the details of the
HCPB process?
What are the possible problems unique to
HCPB?
How trustworthy are HCPB systems?
How
accessible are HCPB systems? Are they HAVA compliant?
How
practical are HCPB?
How can I help get HCPB adopted in
my locale?
Other voting
systems
Why not vote by mail, like
Oregon?
Why not vote via the Internet?
Why not
continue to use lever machines?
Why not use punch card
ballots?
Aren't electronic voting machines designed to be
secure?
Why should we be concerned by electronic
voting?
Shouldn't certification of electronic voting
machines remove concern?
Aren't electronic voting
machines more reliable than other voting systems?
Isn't
"chain of custody" easier to observe with voting machines
than with HCPB?
Isn't an electronic voting machine safe
if it's not connected to another computer?
Should we be
concerned about the partisanship of some electronic voting
machine manufacturers?
Won't all the problems with
electronic voting machines eventually be fixed?
Do HCPB
advocates totally rule out the use of electronic voting
machines?
What are
some useful terms to know?
HCPB
Hand-Counted Paper
Ballots
Electronic voting machine
A computer
used for collecting and counting votes in the polling
place.
DRE
Direct Recording Electronic (aka
touch-screen) voting machine.
Optical scanner voting
machine
(Opscan or optiscan): A computer that counts
votes by detecting the choices marked on a paper ballot by
the voter.
Security
Protection against mistakes,
accidents, and fraud.
HAVA
Help America Vote
Act, passed by Congress in 2002, intended to upgrade and
regulate the voting systems used in the United States.
TOP
HCPB fundamentals
What are
HCPB?
Hand-counted
Tallied by citizens
without the aid of tools other than paper and pen (or
pencils).
Paper
A durable medium which allows
data to be clearly and permanently
inscribed.
Ballot
A list of contests and the
corresponding candidates and initiatives (if any) in an
election.
What are the essential elements of
HCPB?
• The paper ballot, marked with the
voter's choices, is the official record of the voter's
choices and is the record used in the official vote
counting.
• The citizens who do the hand-counting
include representatives from the different parties on the
ballot. This provides essential checks and balances on the
counting.
• The counting takes place in the polling
place immediately after the polls close.
What
are the benefits of
HCPB?
Reliable
Other systems
rely on HCPB for confirmation of their
results
Simple
It's less prone to
equipment breakdown, poll worker confusion than other
systems
Easy to use
People without
disabilities need only a pen or pencil. People with
disabilities can be provided with other appropriate
accessories.
Authoritative
It employs the
actual document prepared by the voter; not a
reproduction.
Secure
Once placed in the
ballot box, the ballot is inaccessible before the
counting.
Why choose HCPB against the recommendation
of so many computer experts?
• Many, perhaps
most, computer experts prefer HCPB.
• Some computer
experts say, "Don't rely on computer experts--not even us!"
In other words, evaluate the various systems and see which
meets the standards required by a democracy.
Aren't
HCPB simply a nostalgic throwback to some idyllic "good old
days"?
Not at all. Longing to return to the
"old days" before computers existed would be as misguided as
longing for some idyllic, electronic paradise where
computers are trusted to control every aspect of our lives.
Computers are essential to maintaining and improving life
and liberty in today's complex world.
Aren't HCPB
systems obsolete?
• Our interest is the
best way to conduct elections, regardless of how old or new
the system is.
• Computers are newer technology than
pencils but people still find pencils to be the more
appropriate technology for some tasks. The same is true of
paper money.
Aren't HCPB advocates merely afraid of
electronic voting machines?
We are not afraid
of computers. We are afraid of unchecked and uncheckable
computers.
What are the details of the HCPB
process?
Creating the ballots
Can
be preprinted and delivered to the polling place.
Can be
printed as a blank ballot at the polling place.
Can be
printed as a completed ballot, with the voter's
choices.
Storing the ballots
In a public ballot
box, accessible only for inserting ballots, until the
counting starts.
Marking the ballots
By pen or
pencil
By electronic printing machine
By
disabled-assistance devices.
Verifying the
ballots
By the voter before casting the
ballot.
Casting the ballots
The ballot gets
inserted into a ballot box by the voter.
Isolating the
ballots
The ballots are kept in a ballot box that is
viewable by the public and inaccessible except to deposit
ballots, until the poll officials open it to count the
votes.
Counting the ballots
The ballots are
removed from the ballot box, shuffled randomly, and counted,
with each vote announced loudly to the
public.
Reporting the results
The resulting
tallies are posted in the polling place and reported to the
central authority.
Transporting the
ballots
Accompanied by poll workers and possibly by
other representatives of opposing political
interests.
Archiving the ballots
Warehoused
securely in a vault until the expiration date.
What
are the possible problems unique to HCPB?
•
Running out of paper ballots.
• Running out of pens or
pencils.
• Problems other than the above are not unique
to HCPB systems.
________________________________________
How
trustworthy are HCPB systems?
(Questions like the following might be addressed.)
* Don't HCPB reopen our elections to fraud and vote rigging?
* Don't HCPB allows voters or poll workers to deposit extra ballots?
* Don't HCPB allow voters to more easily sell their votes? (This can be done in a process called "vote chaining," here-in defined.)
* Aren't HCPB more error prone than electronic voting machines?
* Aren't HCPB inaccurate?
* Isn't chain of custody a serious problem with HCPB?
* Who would select the people that do the hand-counting?
* What criteria would be used to select the hand-counters?
* How would the hand-counters be selected?
* Why do you think HCPB will produce a totally accurate result?
* Would audits ever be needed after an initial HCPB count?
* How should HCBP audits be conducted?
* How can we trust the people doing the hand-counting?
* Can't all our concerns about possible malfunctions and/or rigging of voting machines be allayed by one or more of the following?
* "Open source" software?
* The paper record of the voter's choices which is produced by some electronic voting machines?
(This
paper record is also sometimes called--
* "Voter Verified
Paper Audit Trail" (VVPAT)
* "Voter Verified Audit Trail"
[VVAT]
* "Voter Verified Paper Ballot." (This term is a
misnomer. Since this paper record is not physically used for
the official count, it's by definition not a ballot.)
* Random audits of the paper record?
* Other statistical techniques for detecting errors?
* Paper Ballots, machine counted?
* Encryption of the computerized ballots?
* Wouldn't the Holt bill resolve all concerns about electronic voting machines?
How accessible are HCPB systems?
(HAVA compliance)
• Will HCPB be a help or
a hindrance to voters whose right to vote has at times been
violated and suppressed--for instance, people of color,
low-income people, college students?
• Will HCPB result in long lines at the polls?
How practical are
HCPB?
* Aren't HCPB less accurate than
electronic voting machines?
* Aren't HCPB easier to "misplace" or "damage" than the paper trail printed by touch-screen voting machines?
* Don't HCPB cost more than electronic voting machines?
* Don't some jurisdictions have ballots that are too complicated for HCPB?
* Won't HCPB create a need for additional poll workers?
* Won't HCPB demand too much time and effort from already tired poll workers?
* Won't HCPB take too much time?
* Are there "abbreviated" or "partial" versions of HCPB?
* Won't HCPB require more poll workers?
* Will it be difficult to recruit more poll workers?
* Won't HCPB require poll officials to be more highly trained than if they are using an electronic voting machine.
* Won't HCPB require voters to be more highly trained than if they are using an electronic voting machine?
* Won't HCPB required poll officials to be more alert and observant than if they are using an electronic voting machine?
What can I do
to get HCPB adopted in my state and my
locale?
• How do I find out whether a HCPB
procedure is approved in my State?
• How do I find out
whether a HCPB procedure is actually used anywhere in my
State?
• How do I persuade our State and/or local
officials to adopt HCPB?
Why
not vote by mail, like Oregon?
• Ballots may
get lost in the mail.
• Ballots may be altered or
discarded by any number of people who handle the ballots
before they get counted.
Why not vote via the
Internet?
• Ballots can easily be hacked,
either on the voting machine itself, or in transit to the
central collection point.
• The receiving we bsite may
be hacked.
• Internet service may be disrupted,
intentionally or unintentionally.
Why not continue
to use lever machines?
• They can be hacked
without being noticed.
• Like computers, they can break
down.
• They are bulky and expensive to store,
transport, and maintain.
Why not use punch card
ballots?
• Their data is not verifiable by
the voter.
• Punching the holes is an unreliable
process.
• Counting is done by machines that can make
mistakes that go unnoticed.
Aren't electronic
voting machines designed to be secure?
•
Manufacturers and testing companies don't allow security
experts to assess the strength of the security built into
the voting machines.
• Software experts have
demonstrated the hackability of various systems, even
without having full knowledge of those systems.
•
Complicated security procedures are sometimes skipped by
poll workers.
• Votes and programs are stored on
credit-card-sized computer memories that are easily
misplaced.or substituted.
• Electronic voting systems
can easily be damaged or otherwise rendered inoperable.
Why should we be concerned about electronic
voting?
• The contents of the machine, and
how the machine processes the ballots, is kept a secret from
the public. Consequently, election outcomes are susceptible
to being changed by undetectable errors,accidental or
otherwise, and/or fraud.
• The machines have a history
of continuing hardware and software breakdowns during actual
elections.
Shouldn't certification of electronic
voting machines remove concern?
Ideally, yes.
But In practice,
• Certification is often little more
than "rubber-stamp approval," based mostly on vendor
assurances that problems will be fixed in the future.
•
Machines are always susceptible to bugs, breakdowns, and
other malfunctions.
Aren't electronic voting
machines more reliable than other voting
systems?
HCPB are relied upon to confirm
results of other voting systems, including electronic voting
machines. That means HCPB are considered more reliable than
other voting systems, including electronic voting systems.
Isn't "chain of custody" easier to observe with voting machines than with HCPB?
HCPB has the clearest and most reliable chain of custody between the time the ballot is cast and the time the ballot's votes are tallied.
Isn't an electronic voting machine safe if
it's not connected to another
computer?
Electronic voting machines can be
hacked by anyone who has access to the machine. They do not
need to be knowledgeable; hacking can be accomplished by
simply inserting and then removing a memory card. This can
take less than one minute.
Should we be concerned
about the partisanship of some electronic voting machine
manufacturers?
Partisanship itself is not a
concern. But exclusive and secret access to voting systems
by one group of partisans is a serious concern.
Won't all the problems with electronic voting machines eventually be fixed?
• Systems
that currently have serious problems should not in be use in
critical situations. Such systems are considered by
technical specialists to be in the "test" or "shakeout"
phase.
• Computer experts say that all major computer
software has undetected bugs¬-undetected and unsuspected
even by the developers who created the software.
• Some
computer experts promise that all such problems will be
fixed some day, but their proposals are merely speculative.
No foolproof strategy for protecting against all bugs and
hacks has yet been put forth, and most computer experts are
inclined to believe that no such strategy is possible.
Do HCPB advocates totally
rule out the use of electronic voting
machines?
HCPB advocates are opposed to the
use of electronic voting machines in our elections,
including the storing and counting of votes,
ENDS