One Country: Reviewing An Alternative Vision
By Remi Kanazi
For years the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been mired by a series of failed peace negotiation, enmeshing Israeli
Jews and Palestinians in a seemingly intractable struggle. Even 59 years after the creation of the state of Israel the
quest for Jewish security has not been realized, while Palestinians—those dispossessed in 1948, 1967, and the 3.8
million living under Israeli occupation—have not seen a just resolution to a conflict that has marred their history and
shaped their identity. The international community, including many Israeli and Palestinians, still subscribe to the
notion that the two-state solution is the only way to settle the conflict.
Ali Abunimah’s new book, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, exposes the impracticality of partition and presents an alternative vision, one that encompasses both peoples on the
basis of equal rights. The vision Abunimah presents is a one state solution.
One Country begins by revealing the various layers of Israel’s occupation and the grim realities of the proposed two-state
solution. The accepted international and Palestinian call for a two-state solution is based on 22 percent of historic
Palestine—the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Palestinians (entitled under United
Nations Resolution 194) insist on the right of return to their homeland or to be duly compensated for their expulsion.
Yet, no Israeli prime minister or prominent figure to date has endorsed this right, nor has any Israeli government
proposed a full withdrawal from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Abunimah reveals that, during the Camp
David talks of 2000, Israel’s most “generous” offer to the Palestinians included just 76.6 percent of the West Bank
(while Israel would effectively annex East Jerusalem and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea) and demanded that “at
least 80 percent of the settlers remain in place.” Abunimah further states, “Israel…insisted on permanent control of
Palestinian airspace and a long list of onerous ‘security’ arrangements that would rob the Palestinian state of any real
independence from Israel and introduce enormous opportunities for delay and backsliding as had happened with the Oslo
Accords.”
Israel couldn’t simply withdraw from the entire West Bank. Israel’s impetus was predicated on the notion that the
expansion of its borders and the enlargement of the demographic majority were necessary for its survival. Once the
settlements were integrated into the Israeli narrative, successive US administrations acquiesced and declared—privately
and publicly—that Israel was “entitled” to keep “parts” of the settlements in a final two-state solution. The settlement
process, however, sectioned Palestinians off into inaccessible ghettos, dividing Palestinian land in such a way that a
contiguous state became inconceivable. Israel never diverged from its initial plan to annex the settlements into the
greater state. Abunimah correctly asserts, “It is not credible that a society would invest billions of dollars in roads
and housing that it truly intended to give up.”
Whether Camp David 2000 or a host of other proposals, including the supposedly dovish Geneva Initiative (which scarcely
deviated from the Camp David proposal), no plan had envisioned two separate states that would satisfy both Israelis and
Palestinians. An initiative has yet to be produced by the Israeli left or right that resembles anything more than a
continuation of the mistakes of Oslo and the self-serving policies that emerged during its “peace process.” Abunimah
argues that those on the left, such as Yossi Beilin, have advocated plans that, “seek Palestinian endorsement of
Israel’s annexation of territory and its refusal to readmit Palestinian refugees to their country.” Abunimah further
suggests, “The leaders of the mainstream Israeli left came to embrace Palestinian statehood in theory while undermining
it in practice.” The appropriation of Palestinian land and the expansion of settlements accelerated under leftist
governments, debunking the myth that “dovish” administrations were needed to make peace with the Palestinians. What the
Palestinians continue to need is a viable partner willing to engage with their government on the basis of equality and
acceptance exemplified by action rather than words.
A new line of thinking transpired during Ariel Sharon’s administration. The iron-fisted military man, once fixated on
annexing the remainder of occupied Palestine, came to grips with Israel’s demographic reality: Israel could not forever
control the occupied territories without eventually assuming responsibility of its inhabitants. This transition
triggered the shift towards unilateralism, ironically transforming Sharon (in the eyes of the international community)
from a military strongman into a “man of peace.” The views articulated through unilateral “disengagement” and
represented in the platform of Sharon’s new Kadima party were nothing more than Sharon’s attempt to ensure Israel’s
Jewish majority, even if they necessitated militaristic and territorial reshuffling. While Israel “disengaged” from the
Gaza Strip and removed 8,500 settlers (keeping full control of Gaza’s borders, airspace, and ports), it added an
additional 14,000 settlers to the West Bank that same year. Given the demographic reality, separation was deemed vital,
while annexing as much territory with as many settlers as possible remained the fundamental goal. Continued land
appropriation, the further development of the apartheid wall, and the incessant efforts to increase the settler
population only fan the flames of the conflict and sends a direct signal to the Palestinian people that a unilateralist
Israel is disinterested in peace. Abunimah asserts that unilateralism “offers Israel a Jewish-Zionist state at the price
of constant bloodshed and growing Palestinian desperation, which, despite all efforts to wall it out, will deprive
Israelis of the normality they crave. It is not a solution, but a dangerous delusion.”
Extremist elements in Israel are also facing a daunting certainty: the influx of Jews into the state of Israel is not
stably rising and guaranteeing a demographic majority is not possible given that the Palestinian birthrate within Israel
far exceeds the Jewish birthrate. Some extremists have called for the outright expulsion of the Palestinian population
living within Israel to neighboring Arab states, going further than the policy of keeping Arabs out the country and
Palestinians from returning to their homes. Others have called for selective birth control laws for the Arab population,
while one Russian-language newspaper, Abunimah writes, “published an article proposing that Arab men should be
threatened with castration and that Arab families ‘who have more than one child’ be ‘deprived of benefits, lose their
jobs, and [put] under threat of exile.’” Groups calling for the expulsion of Palestinians, such as Yisrael Beytenu and
the National Union, are not fringe factions without power. The leader of Yisrael Beytenu, Avigdor Lieberman, now serves
as Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs and as Deputy Prime Minister, while Yisrael Beytenu has been in the Kadima-led
coalition government since October of 2006. Abunimah notes, “Even if most Israeli politicians do not openly advocate
expulsion, their tolerance of those who do is alarming.” The fears of such extreme policy were heightened after this
summer’s war on Lebanon, which forced hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians to flee their homes. These extremist
attitudes reinforce the failure of the Israeli “peace camp” and further illustrate the infeasibility of the two-state
solution.
Abunimah’s comprehensive criticism of the two-state solution is an insightful, well-founded argument that is essential
for any reader looking for an alternative approach to resolve the conflict. Abunimah proposes that “Creating a single
state for Israeli Jews and Palestinians could in theory resolve the most intractable issues: the fate of Israeli
settlements built since 1967, the rights of Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem.” The alternative:
perpetual conflict, absent of security for Jews or Palestinians, coupled with regional turmoil and the continuation of
biased American foreign policy that stands to benefit no one except a select few in Israel, America, and a handful of
quislings in the Palestinian Authority.
Over time most Israelis and Palestinians have come to the realization that no matter the settlement, the Jews and
Palestinians of Israel will remain living together and the Palestinians of the occupied territories will stay on their
land. Abunimah presents a solution that meets the geographical needs of both peoples. He argues, “The main attraction of
a single-state democracy is that it allows all the people to live in and enjoy the entire country while preserving their
distinctive communities and addressing their particular needs. It offers the potential to deterritorialize the conflict
and neutralize demography and ethnicity as a source of political power and legitimacy.” Abunimah lays out a plan
consisting of eight principles (based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Belfast agreement) for the
one-state solution. Drawing upon such well regarded documents and models gives his argument the credibility that the
two-state solution sincerely lacks. While calls for a two-state solution have come with slogans and promises of peace,
little work has been done outlining what achieving peace entails.
Many Israeli Jews contend that Palestinians do not want to participate in a free and fair society with the Jews of
Israel. Yet, as in most societies, issues such as economics and education bind people together—while conflict and
oppression pull them apart. Abunimah points out that, “Within Israel a significant number of Arab voters have
traditionally supported the Labor Party for economic and social policy reasons despite its alienating Zionist ideology.”
The road to a one-state solution will not be easy, but it is the only practicable solution that ensures the security of
both peoples. Abunimah often cites Belgium’s democratic process, a “modern one-person, one-vote democracy…with modest
safeguards” as a model which Israelis and Palestinians can look to. Belgium continues the process of constitutional
reform which, as Abunimah notes, has led to a decline in separatism in Belgian society. Many of Abunimah’s detractors
fear that the one country proposal may indeed work, which would run counter to the ideals of political dominance and
exclusivity. Abunimah’s insight gives reason to be hopeful, and his approach comes with a deep sincerity that should be
admired and taken seriously.
The primary reason that Abunimah’s vision for a one-country solution can work is that it positions the two peoples
forward based on equality. In a conflict such as this, intention matters as much as action: if two people are
progressing down a positive path, and good faith measures are employed, the fear of the other will slowly subside with
each positive step. One Country is not an insidious outline of what Palestinians must do to gain access to all of
historic Palestine. Abunimah makes a point throughout the book to not only address Palestinian issues such as the right
of return and Palestinian property rights but also discusses the property rights of Jews who were stripped of their
residency in the Arab world after 1948. Moreover, Abunimah understands the personal significance Jews see in having
their Diaspora be able to return to Israel. This was a belief that the late Edward Said advocated: the Palestinian
people cannot be brought forward by marginalizing the Jewish population, but rather the goal is to strengthen the two
communities by embarking on a path together. Abunimah tackles such contentious issues as Israel’s education system, the
disparity of funding within Israeli society regarding Jews and Palestinians and presents “a suggestion for a shared
future for Israelis and Palestinians in a society that is democratic and tolerant, where two peoples who have fought for
decades agree on rules that all can live by.”
Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine how Israeli and Palestinians could do the unthinkable and forge a future together
after so many years of conflict. They both can learn much from the South African model and the fall of apartheid.
Abunimah suggests that peace and reconciliation seemed impossible to the white Afrikaners and the native black
population. After 400 years of white South African rule, with diverging narratives of their respective history, it
appeared virtually inconceivable that a peaceful resolution to the conflict could materialize, but it did.
Abunimah exposes the patent similarities of the Zionist and white Afrikaner narratives, which both were “shaped by
memories of expulsion, persecution, redemption, and rebirth and guided by a single-minded quest for national survival.”
Both groups staked their claim upon the myths that the native populations were uncivilized and that the native rejection
of the newcomer’s dominance was based upon hatred. Zionists and Afrikaners alleged that they brought their respective
uncivilized population a superior way of life, with new technological advances, and argued that the native population
should have been appreciative of their arrival. It is unsurprising that the Israeli government was a critical supporter
of the apartheid government, even after the international community had turned on the apartheid regime and imposed
sanctions. Abunimah notes, “To the ears of Palestinians or Africans, the justifications of Zionists and Afrikaner
pioneers presented a stark choice: Submit or disappear.” The Afrikaner population also presented the theory that if they
were to relinquish control and give rights to the barbaric African population, the black population would use its
new-found power to seek the destruction of the Afrikaner people. Zionists use the same rationale: giving up control to
the Palestinian population would lead to the Jews being driven into the sea. The fall of apartheid and the process of
reconciliation in South Africa shattered the myth that the marginalized and oppressed black population would seek
retribution against the Afrikaner population.
Abunimah asserts that once whites were forced to get over their fear of black supremacy and retribution, the
implementation of a just solution and the process of reconciliation became much easier. He explains that reconciliation
was vastly brought forward by Nelson Mandela, “Mandela urged South Africans to embrace any Afrikaner who abandoned
apartheid, and thus Afrikaners gained a legitimacy in the eyes of other South Africans that they were unable to wrest
through centuries of domination. It is an incredibly simple and powerful maneuver, yet one that so far has been beyond
the ability of most Israelis and Palestinians.” Abunimah insists that Palestinians must look towards Mandela’s African
National Congress (ANC) and its Freedom Charter, a move that could be instrumental in bringing the Palestinians forward
to reach out to the Israeli people. Unfortunately, it is usually the oppressed who must come forward with a vision of
peace and hope, engaging on an internal and global campaign to lift the unjust measures placed upon their people. The
Palestinians have yet to fully realize this model, which Abunimah contends, is due in large part to the freshness of
Palestinian wounds, while black South Africans had been dealing with white dominance for more than 400 years. He argues
that this is why the principle of equality will quell the fears of both peoples, “The moment Israelis and Palestinians
commit themselves to full equality, there is no rationale for separate states.”
A key step Palestinians must take is the further development and utilization of the resistance movement. While the
Palestinian movement has expanded internally, it still has much work to do. Protests, such as the ones against the
apartheid wall in Bil'in (which includes not only Palestinians, but Jews and international activists), are crucial steps
in the right direction, but they haven’t sparked a broader movement in the occupied territories and Israel, which could
significantly affect Israeli society. The global divestment movement has ignited interest and dialogue among several
churches, as well as numerous teacher and labor unions. Arts and culture has served as a model of resistance, including
the Made in Palestine art exhibit in the US, the showcasing of My Name is Rachel Corrie after one theater company canceled the show in New York City, the myriad Palestinian film festivals spanning across the
globe and the Palestinian hip hop movement that has emerged not only in the occupied territories but throughout the
Diaspora. In addition many individuals and groups have used the internet as a tool for documenting and sharing the
Palestinian narrative, including websites such as the Electronic Intifada (which Abunimah co-founded). Engaging and
supporting these forms of resistance and engendering new methods are vital for the Palestinian people and the supporters
of their plight.
Palestinian groups internally continue to keep the moral upper hand through the cessation of suicide bombings that
target civilians, but must continue to embark upon a campaign of resistance. Abunimah argues, “It was only when internal
and external pressure made the monopoly on power too costly to maintain that whites grasped for a way out and listened
seriously to the ANC’s ideas. Hence, continued resistance and struggle to raise the cost of the status quo for the
powerful party is also essential. But a delicate balance requires that resistance exacts a price yet avoids creating so
much new suffering that reconciliation becomes impossible.”
It is easy for those within Israel and America to evade negotiations by proclaiming that they will not engage in
dialogue until Palestinian rocket attacks stop (attacks which have killed fewer than five Israelis in the last five
years). On the other hand, Palestinians argue, how can they stop their attacks when Israel conducts “operations” inside
the occupied territories that often kill more than five civilians in a single day? Nonetheless, negotiations toward a
future together must take place, as was the case in South Africa, proceeding whether or not the conflict comes to calm.
Abunimah explains, “Like Israel, the white government of South Africa always insisted that it would not negotiate as
long as violence continued,” yet Abunimah cites former apartheid President F.W. de Klerk who stated, “South Africa was
burning with violence, but no one allowed himself the luxury of believing that we could wait with the negotiations until
the violence ceased.”
The lessons from South Africa are invaluable to both Israelis and Palestinians. Abunimah contends, “What Palestinians
can learn from South Africa is that the promise of a future of reconciliation rather than revenge can rob an unjust
system of the support it needs to survive because such systems are often built on fear—in the case of Israel and South
Africa, the fear…of being destroyed. The lesson for Israelis is to listen to their enemies rather than demonize them,
which may lead to a secure future free of the burden of ruling others by force.” This is not to suggest that the process
can happen overnight, but through incremental steps, which actuate positive results, this process can gain momentum,
bringing a better future to both peoples.
Palestinian polls consistently show that Palestinians want peace for their people and that they are willing to coexist
with Israelis. The major gripes Palestinians continue to have is the unjustness of occupation, the rejection of the
right of return and the absence of a proposed settlement that includes their narrative and rights. After 39 years of
occupation, Palestinians remain adamant in their calls for democracy and equality within their society. Despite the fact
that Hamas was overwhelmingly elected into power in the January 2006 elections, Palestinians have not called for the
installation of Islamic Law, rather they used their democratic vote to call for reform and oust the thuggish and
self-serving Fatah-led government. While different cultural and community identities would persist in a one-state
solution, they would not necessarily alter the feasibility of the two peoples living together as many other diverse
societies do today (and as is the case with the 1.3 million Palestinians living inside of Israel, albeit under unequal
conditions). Edward Said commented on the possibilities of one state in 1998, “Once the initial acknowledgment of the
other as an equal is made, I believe the way forward becomes not only possible but also attractive.”
Many other great thinkers, including Azmi Bishara, Joesph Massad and George Bisharat have called for a one-sate solution
to end the current conflict. Abunimah asserts, “Those who believe in a two-state solution for years came to realize that
it only offered false promises of peace.” It would be foolish to suggest that a one-state solution will happen
overnight, while an untold number of obstacles must be overcome and surely new obstacles would emerge, but a growing
number of Palestinians and Israelis are coming to the conclusion that a one-state solution is the only reasonable
solution to end the impasse, which makes its realization all the more achievable. Abunimah’s book may not be the key to
a one state solution, as he readily admits, but it is surely a well founded guide to help Palestinians and Israelis
begin to resolve the conflict.
One Country is an inspiring message of hope and reconciliation, and presents an intricate and well-crafted path for two peoples
that deserve not only reconciliation, but also a prosperous future.
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*One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse is available at www.Amazon.com.
Remi Kanazi is the primary writer for the political website www.PoeticInjustice.net He is the editor of the forthcoming book of poetry, Poets for Palestine, for more information go to Poetic Injustice.
He lives can reached via email at remroum @ gmail.com