For Immediate Release
November 14, 2008
Secretary Brunner Launches Post-Election Audits
COLUMBUS, Ohio – Building on a successful pilot project after the March primary, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner has
launched statewide post-election audits for the general election. The post-election audits will assist bipartisan boards
of elections in solidifying public confidence after a very successful general election.
Secretary Brunner’s post-election audit directive is based on feedback from Ohio’s boards of elections, as well as
insight from local, state, and national elections experts.
“After the March primary, 11 Ohio counties took part in a post-election audit pilot and provided invaluable insight into
this national best practice. I am thankful for the hard work and assistance of elections officials and experts in
crafting a detailed statewide process to further document the success of the general election,” secretary Brunner said.
The Secretary of State’s office has spent approximately six months receiving and reviewing feedback on the March
post-election audit pilot projects. Key stakeholders have included members and staff of Ohio’s bipartisan boards of
elections, members of the Secretary of State’s Voting Rights Institute council, and other local, state and national
election experts.
To assist boards with staffing and budget constraints, the statewide post-election audit directive reduces the initial
audit to 5 percent of the votes cast for president – down from 7% in the March pilot project. The directive also
provides greater confidence in the audit results by allowing observers and member of the general public to be present
during the auditing process.
Highlights of the post-election audit directive:
-Boards must audit precincts equal to 5 percent of the county-wide votes cast for president – a reduction from 7 percent
in the March audit.
-Random selection for precincts to be audited is more detailed, relieving boards of the burden of developing a policy
for the selections and providing more statewide consistency.
-The audit process must be completely transparent, while keeping secure any sensitive voter information and ballots.
-There is a “trigger” provision which requires boards to audit additional precinct results if a certain margin of error
is exceeded in the initial audit of 5%. The trigger for additional auditing remains the same as the pilot project, due
to support for that standard expressed by boards of elections.
-The results of the audits will be available to the public.
ENDS