The Brazilian Military Is Back, As It Fleshes Out Its Weaponry And Strategies
New grandiose plan: a nuclear-powered submarine
Russia and France vie to be the Brazilian military’s new best friend and supplier
The legacy of the 1964-1985 military dictatorship sits as a portentous cloud over Brazil’s democratic future
Recent military and intelligence scandals range from coping with homosexuality within the ranks to wire tapping of
government officials
Debate continues on what role the military deserves to play, if any
In recent years, the Brazilian military has embarked on a mission to re-invent itself by means of a combination of
purchases of new military equipment, grandiose plans for constructing a nuclear submarine, and the leadership offered by
a pronouncedly pro-military president, as Lula Da Silva has turned out to be. In addition to these factors, a growing
number of alliances have been formed with key extra-hemispheric and other regional actors, with Brazil demonstrating its
interest in becoming something more than simply a regional military power.
Brazil’s Armed Forces: A Brief History
The Brazilian military has a history composed of both high and low points, the latter being its tendency to intervene in
governmental affairs, reaching its apogee in the 1964 military coup that set up the military junta which ruled the
country harshly until 1985. Brazil’s current global military ambitions are rooted in the major operations in which the
country’s military was involved during World War II in Italy, as well as its current domination of the UN’s peacekeeping
force in Haiti. Interestingly, the Brazilian armed forces have not been engaged in combat on its own continent in one
way or another since the latter part of the 19th century, when Brazil participated in the War of the Triple Alliance
from 1864-1870 against Paraguay.
When it comes to its dark eras, the Brazilian military has been involved in a series of coups, the last of which
occurred on March 31, 1964, when it overthrew the constitutional presidency of Joao Goulart and proceeded to retain
power until 1985. During that period, five military presidents were “elected” by their fellow senior commanders to lead
the military junta ruling the country. The regime finally stepped down that year amid nationwide demonstrations calling
for a return to civilian rule. For many years and based on sound evidence, sober allegations have been made that
Washington backed that military coup, which it has always framed in Cold War terms.
Brazil’s military is also known for having developed a strong industrial base for much of its weapons output,
particularly during the height of military rule in the 1960s-1980s. Brazil’s weapons arsenal includes the well-known
Tucano fighter aircraft, which is still widely used by other countries in and outside the region, including Peru, not to
mention different types of tanks and armored personal carriers (APCs).
The Brazilian military has also had to deal with homegrown insurgencies. In 1974, around 10,000 Brazilian troops were
assigned to attack leftist encampments in the Amazon, where guerrillas were said to have been planning an organized
uprising against the military regime. At least 60 civilians were killed, with others later disappearing from the jails
in which they were being detained. In 2007, Brazil’s Supreme Court ordered the military to open its secret files
regarding the “disappeared” insurgents.
About 400 Brazilian dissidents are thought to have been detained and abused throughout the period of the military
regime’s rule, with many of them still missing, presumed to have been murdered. In 2006, Maria Amelia de Almeida Teles
filed a lawsuit against Col. Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, who headed the Sao Paulo secret police from 1970-1974,
accusing him of torturing her and four family members when they were imprisoned for 11 months between 1972 and 1973.
These developments are not apocryphal neither do they distort the pathological anti-societal creedal beliefs held by the
Brazilian military at the time. Most recently, the remains of Miguel Nuet, a Spanish citizen who disappeared during the
Brazilian dictatorship, were found in an unmarked grave in the outskirts of Sao Paulo. According to reports, Nuet had
been arrested on October 9, 1973, under suspicion of being a terrorist; the police said he committed suicide while in
custody, one month after his arrest.
The Brazilian Military: the Gay issue and other Scandals
At present, Brazil defense expenditures continue to overshadow those of all South American nations. The Brazilian
military is a comparatively large force, currently fielding around 200,000 personnel. The Brazilian armed forces have
had a somewhat troubled history in a number of areas, including how they have dealt with homosexual conscripts. In June
2008, Army Sergeant Laci Marinho de Araujo was arrested on live television because he discussed his personal
relationship with another soldier. The army had filed desertion charges against him, saying he had been missing since
April; Marinho adamantly insists that he and his partner are victims of sexual discrimination.
Another growing scandal has been the alleged wiretapping of several top government officials including Gilmar Mendes,
president of the Supreme Court. General Jorge Felix of Brazil’s Institutional Security Ministry accused rogue elements
within ABIN of the wiretapping, arguing that “ABIN, as an institution, has never done and does not do these things.”
Other scandals include the so-called “Massacre of the Baixada Fluminense,” in which 29 were killed by an armed gang, in
a northern region of the state of Rio de Janeiro. A military policeman named Carlos Jorge Caravalho was found guilty in
2006 of arming and training the gang, and was sentenced to 543 years in prison. In June 2008, eleven soldiers were
arrested for handing over three men to a Rio de Janeiro gang. The three, two students and a laborer, were subsequently
murdered. These are just a few of the disturbingly large number of daily incidents involving uniformed personnel
implicated in a range of illicit activities with street gangs.
Budget, Weaponry and the Uses of the Military
Since before the 1990s, Brazil had capped annual military spending at about $3 billion, or 1.78 percent of the country’s
gross domestic product, as compared to the region’s average of 1.98 percent of GDP. This budget was allocated to
equipment acquisition programs as well as to salaries, maintenance, training and infrastructure development of the three
military branches. However, starting in 2004, Brazil’s military expenditures started to climb rapidly.
In 2007, Brazil’s military budget bordered $3.5 billion; this year, the budget has reached $5 billion. This is a
relatively, an astounding figure, which would be difficult for any other power to match, with the probable exception of
Venezuela’s armed forces, which is presently involved in a large weapons’ procurement program with Russian, Spanish and
likely Chinese suppliers, to be for by “petro-dollars.”
Brazil also possesses significant weaponry, though its recent military purchases from foreign companies have been more a
part of a regular maintenance process rather than an effort to stress any preponderance of military strength in the
region. However, this attitude began to change in 2006, as part of a replacement schedule, when Brazil purchased four
C-295 military transport planes from EADS CASA, a Spanish weapons manufacturer.
To demonstrate its growing military prowess, a massive 10-day military exercise code-named Albacora was carried out by
the Brazilian armed forces at Rio de Janeiro’s Macaé Port in September 2007. This included the deployment of over 8,500
troops, along with 250 military vehicles, 19 warships, and 50 aircraft. Half of the aircraft were helicopters – among
them navy Eurocopter HU-14 Super Pumas and UH-12/13 Fennecs/Esquilos, AgustaWestland AH-11A Super Lynx AH 11A, and
Sikorsky Aircraft SH-3A/B Sea Kings, army HA1 Fennecs/Esquilo, Eurocopter HM1 Panthers, and air force H-34 Super Pumas
and H-50 Esquilos.
This is not to say that the Brazilian military is focusing only on weaponry, the question of the new goal and objectives
of the military are being discussed in strategic terms. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, minister of the Strategic Affairs
Secretariat of the Presidency has declared that “one of the main reasons for devising a national defense strategy is to
have a shield not only against aggressions, but also against intimidations. If Brazil wants to explore its own path it
cannot be subject to intimidations.” An inter-ministerial commission headed by Minister Jobim has been charged to define
how the military should act “in times of peace or war.”
The Brazilian military is once again taking on a greater role in internal security initiatives, specifically, combating
the drug trafficking cartels that recently have been emboldened to more openly operate in the country. In March 2008,
the Brazilian army burnt as many as 7,000 coca crops in Tabatinga, Amazonas state. Also found on site was a laboratory
capable of processing cocaine. There have long been fears that Colombian drug cartels were formally outsourcing the
cultivation of coca and cocaine-processing to neighboring countries, such as Brazil.
Another possible use for the military, resulting from an idea attributed to Carlos Minc, Brazil’s minister for the
environment, is that the armed forces should patrol the questionable use of nature reserves in the Amazon. “I am going
to propose the creation of patrols or movements by army regiments to watch over the big parks and reserves,” he was
quoted as saying. Since Brazil has around 300 nature parks and reserves, this would be a sizeable task for any military
establishment to take on, particularly since corruption routinely has encouraged payoffs to be paid to senior military
commanders for providing protection and looking the other way when cattle-ranchers were being illegally allotted the use
of public lands, at an under-the-table price, often involving the destruction of rain forests. In August 2008, amidst
growing tensions between Indian tribes and landowners, an AP story reported that “top military generals warn that too
much land in Indian hands, especially along Brazil’s borders, threatens national security and could lead to tribes
unilaterally declaring themselves independent nations.”
Military Control of Civil Aviation
The military already controls important aspects of Brazil’s aviation industry, which frequently has been criticized in
light of the high number of plane crashes and other accidents, including incidents involving facilities across the
country in recent years. For example, in 2007, a TAM Airlines Airbus crashed at Congonhas, killing 199 people. This
tragic event in particular prompted a massive re-evaluation of the military’s management of the civilian aviation
industry and raised the possibility for having the industry revert to civilian control.
Patrolling Haiti
On the regional and international scene, the Brazilian military was the founder and remains a leading contributor to the
United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH). The Brazilian-led mission, in which its military has played a
somewhat controversial role, was deployed there beginning in June 2004, a few months after constitutionally-elected
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was pressured out of office by a coup allegedly orchestrated by the U.S., France and
the UN. Brazil’s military involvement in this mission has been riddled with problems and its resulting image has been
blemished, particularly by its soldiers’ trigger-happy tendency, their disrespect for ordinary Haitians and, at times, a
lack of professionalism. In January 2006, Lieutenant General Urano, the Brazilian Commander of MINUSTAH, committed
suicide.
In June 2008, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced that Brazil would send an additional 300 troops to
Haiti, 100 of them from the Engineer’s Battalion. According to MINUSTAH’s official UN webpage, the force’s current
strength (as of July 31, 2008) totaled 9,040 “uniformed personnel, including 7,105 troops and 1,935 police, supported by
474 international civilian personnel, 1,166 local civilian staff and 192 United Nations Volunteers.” The force remains
headed by a Brazilian military officer, Major-General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz.
The Brazilian minister declared that “the problem is that we have to be in Haiti. It is Brazil’s duty to be in Haiti
because Brazil is a major power. And as a major power, we have a responsibility towards the Latin American countries.
The country does not need money, because there are already big international donors. The problem is: the money is there,
but there are no projects.” Such a comment, redolent of neo-Manifest Destiny rhetoric famed by early 19th century U.S.
leaders, lends the belief that Jobim and his senior colleagues may now explicitly view their country as the Western
Hemisphere’s new “city on the hill.”
President Lula Enters the Picture
Lula has been keen to remain on the right side of the military and has made some firm declarations professing his desire
to build a revitalized, more powerful military. This is somewhat ironic of Lula, taking into consideration that as a
union leader in the 1980s he was very critical of the armed forces, but today he caters to their every expansion plan,
including, outlandishly enough, entertaining the construction of a nuclear submarine, scheduled to cost hundreds of
millions of dollars. It will be interesting to learn more about Lula’s commitment to the matter of investigating the
military regime’s dark past and what Lula might do should he discover that some high ranking military officials, as is
likely, were involved in human rights abuses and disappearances of enemies of the regime. He declared in August 2007
that “we should set a deadline and plan what strategy to use so we can definitively know and recover,” and then added
“one of the wounds that remains open is finding the remains of many adversaries.” He has stopped short, however, of
actually delivering justice to the victims’ families. The members of the military dictatorship are protected by a 1979
amnesty that even the vociferous Lula has been unwilling to challenge even at his most ebullient moment.
Brazil’s Military Industry
During the 1970s the Brazilian military industry was highly respected, with its Tucano air fighter as its hub
contribution to tactical weaponry at the time, with the aircraft still in use today. Brazil’s military industrial
companies, Embraer, Engesa and Avibras have built other type of weaponry, specially from the 1960s to 1980s, besides the
Tucano. Among these we can find EE-17 Sucuri tank destroyer, the EE-9 Cascavel armored reconnaissance vehicle, the EE-3
Jararaca scout car, as well as the MB-3 Tamoyo tan. The EE-T1 Osorio main battle tank was Engesa’s flagship tank. With
the end of the Cold War and major conventional warfare operations, Brazil’s military industry ran out of clients,
forcing Engesa and Avibras to file for bankruptcy in the mid-1990s.
Lula made clear his intention to exhume Brazil’s military industry during a September 2007 trip to Spain. In an
interview with Spanish daily El Pais, the Brazilian leader declared that “in the 1970s, we had modern factories that
built tanks […] But they have been dismantled. Brazil must return to what it had. To rebuild our weaponry factories, we
must buy.”
In 2007, Empresa Brasileiras de Aeronautica SA, or Embraer, said it was studying the development of a military transport
plane that could compete with the Lockheed C-130. If the plane is manufactured, the Embraer C-390, could transport up to
19 metric tons (21 tons). This would be the heaviest aircraft ever produced by the company, the world’s No. 4 aircraft
manufacturer. If manufactured, it would be available by 2011 or 2012.
Embraer’s leading military aircraft is currently the Super Tucano turbo-prop model, which mainly has been used to train
air force pilots. In 2006, Brazil sold 25 of these aircraft to Colombia, in a deal worth $235 million. In June 2008, EP
Aviation announced that it purchased a 314-B1 Super Tucano fighter (without the two .50-caliber machine guns normally
attached to the wings) from Embraer, for the price of $4.5 million. EP Aviation is a subsidiary of Blackwater Worldwide,
an exceedingly controversial U.S. private security contractor that has been heavily involved in operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. A June 2008 Associated Press article reported that preliminary negotiations are now being carried out
between Embraer and U.S. authorities to sell eight Super Tucanos to Iraq. The Tucano is a light aircraft normally used
for pilot-training but it can also be used for light attack missions or for air patrols. In August 2008, Chile announced
that it had contracted Embraer to construct 12 Super Tucano for the Chilean Air Force. Also, during the LAADS 2007
weaponry exhibition, the Brazilian Flight Solutions company unveiled its FS-01 Watchdog, a new medium tactical unmanned
air vehicle.
In February 2007, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Co. (EADS) announced that it had sold its 2.12 percent stake in
Embraer for a profit of $163 million (before taxes and bank fees). EADS CEOs Tom Enders and Louis Gallois said in a
statement, at the same time, “we remain fully committed to our partnership with Embraer, which has matured over many
years. Brazil and Latin America are important markets and we will continue to strengthen our industrial presence in the
region.”
Until Embraer regains its lost eminence as a designer/manufacturer of military aircraft, Brazil’s armed forces are
relying on foreign companies to re-invigorate their inventory. The U.S. Boeing Co. has joined other manufacturers of
military technology (like Russia’s Sukhoi, Sweden’s Saab and France’s Dessault Aviation) in making a bid to sell
specific military models to Brazil. The corporation’s representatives visited Brazil in March 2008 and were keen on
marketing Boeing’s F/A-18 Hornet twin engine, tactical aircraft. It is expected that Brazil will purchase anywhere from
24 to 36 planes in this category from whatever company wins the bid.
At the same time, Russia’s Rosoboronexport and Italy’s Agusta Aerospace are vying for a $500 million contract to supply
Brazil with 12 helicopters. Rosoboronexport is offering its MI35 helicopters while Agusta is offering the AW-109. Other
competitors are the American Bell Helicopter and the French-manufactured Eurocopter.
Integration, Deals and Projects
Perhaps one of the most ambitious projects for Brazil’s military is that of its proposed nuclear submarine. For decades,
Brazil has attempted to build a nuclear sub without much success. Last year, Lula declared a new attempt for the country
to construct a locally-built vessel. On the face of it, the project seemed far-fetched if not slightly ludicrous, since
Brazil has no perceived external enemy threat (Venezuela being an extreme long shot), and because the project would be
immensely expensive and could only be produced by 2020, if everything went according to plan. In February 2008, an
interesting development occurred. Lula visited Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in Buenos Aires, and
the two leaders agreed to jointly build nuclear-powered submarines, since both countries have had a nuclear history.
Even more intriguing was a declaration by French President Nicolas Sarkozy that France would be contributing to the
project. In fact, it is believed that the French Scorpene-class submarine (a diesel-powered attacked sub) will serve as
the model for Brazil’s nuclear vessel.
In December 2006, then-Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Brasilia where he met with his Brazilian
counterpart, Celso Amorim. Russia’s state-run arms exporting company Rosoboronexport demonstrated the performance
attributes of the BuK-M2 antiaircraft missile system at the LAADS 2007 exhibition of defense technology in Rio de
Janeiro. While it is unclear whether Brazilian officials showed any interest in the weapons system, it is worth
highlighting that Russia’s well-known weapons manufacturer specifically chose the Brazilian exhibition for BuK’s debut.
In early February 2008, Jobim traveled to Russia where he met with Lavrov as well as Defense Minister Anatoly Sedyukov.
In April 2008, the London security publication Jane’s Defence Weekly revealed that Brazil and Russia had reached an
agreement on joint ventures involving military technology, including the “Veiculo Lancador de Satellites” launch
vehicle.
In February 2008, there was a noteworthy meeting between Lula and French President Sarkozy, in the town of Saint-Gorges
de Oyapock, on the border between French Guyana (a French overseas territory) and Brazil. Reports say that Sarkozy was
pushing to sell military technology to Brazil and arrange for Brazilian companies to be licensed to build French
weaponry like the Rafale fighter plane and the Scorpene class submarine. In the past decade, the South American giant
has become France’s most important ally in the region. Hence it was no surprise that Sarkozy stated that “there is no
taboo. Brazil is a democratic power and a friend of France. We, the French, are transparent with friends, and the two
countries are willing to work for world peace.”
IBSA Front and Center
In May 2008, Brazil sent several warships to South Africa to participate in military exercises, as did India. Hence,
there is mounting talk about the growing depth and strength of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) alliance. It is
noteworthy that there is a, albeit modest, security aspect to the arrangement, as the three countries are all regional
military powers. Brazil’s navy had sent the Liberal and the Independencia, both of which are guided missile frigates of
the Neteroi class, to participate in these IBSA military exercises.
Other exercises to promote regional integration included joint military exercises in June 2007 involving nearly 200
pilots of the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) and the Argentine Air Force (FAA). The pilots used 18 fighter planes for
training operations, which include intercepting suspicious air traffic, reconnaissance and search and rescue operations.
Most recently, in August 2008, Brazil and Venezuela carried out Operation VENBRA 5, involving 260 soldiers from the FAB
and 140 from the Venezuelan Air Force (ANV). This VENBRA operation was a joint training and simulation exercise to
improve cooperation between both air forces in order to combat illicit airline flights. The exercises took place in the
Venezuelan Bolivar and Brazilian Roraima border regions.
Brazil in a Militarized Region
A May 2008 article in Rotor & Wing summarizes Brazil’s security woes, observing that “with no quarrels along its16,885-km borderline with 10
adjoining countries, Brazil’s contemporary threats, if any, would arise not from any recognizable state and military
entity but from non-state groups, transnational criminal organizations, proxies, and other bodies operating in more
complex, ambiguous, and multidimensional terms. The risks could come from sabotage, terrorism, piracy, and the staging
and stockpiling of illicit drugs and weaponry.” Thus, a more vigorous Brazilian military must be put in the context of
military and non-military events taking place in the region.
With regards to examples of a regional arms race being staged, Venezuela, Colombia and Chile could be theoretical
security factors to Brazil. Not the least, even Peru is making strides when it comes to military deployment. In 2007
Brazilian Senator Jose Sarney, a former president who is now a key ally of President Lula, declared that Venezuela posed
a “threat” to Brazil and Latin America. In response, Venezuelan General Alberto Mueller Rojas told the Brazilian daily
Folha de Sao Paulo, “that’s simply ridiculous … Venezuela is not in any sort of arms race. Ex-president Sarney must be
crazy or simply joking around.” He then added that Sarney “knows perfectly well … what is the size of Brazil’s (armed)
forces and what is the size of Venezuela’s forces. It’s an abysmal difference.”
An interesting development in regional military matters has been the feisty decision by Ecuador’s President Rafael
Correa not to renew the lease of the military base in Manta to the U.S., which is set to expire in 2009. After President
Martin Torrijos, who is presently militarizing Panama’s security capabilities, ended all speculation about his country
being Washington’s prospective landlord for a new military base for U.S. forces in his country, speculation switched to
either Colombia or Peru, since the other option, Paraguay, recently elected a fairly left-leaning president, who has no
intention of handing out an airport to the Americans.
Another development that has attracted international media attention, though it may not necessarily amount to anything
significant, has been the creation of the Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa (CSD – South American Defense Council), an
organ of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR/UNASOL). Some South American countries, including, as of now, an
initially ambivalent Colombia, as well as Guyana and Suriname, have voiced their support for the project, spearheaded by
Brazil. In spite of all the hype, it is unclear how much of an effective organ CSD could be, for any number of reasons.
First, there is a growing proliferation of pan-American organizations in the region, making it somewhat unclear which
organization is actually in charge. There is the Andean Pact, MERCOSUR, the Venezuelan-led ALBA, IBA which includes
Brazil, the Rio Group, the Ibero-American Secretariat and now UNASUR. Similarly there is already a hemispheric-wide
security entity, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and College, both of them based in Washington D.C. The elephant
not in the room is of course that the CSD, unlike the IADB, would not have the U.S. as its most influential member. Some
analysts would argue that this could lead to greater security and cooperation among a group of autonomous Latin American
countries feeling enthusiastic and free, because of Washington’s absence. An interesting note is that Mexico was not
even considered being invited to join UNASUR. It is true that Mexico is not part of South America, however, seeing that
Suriname and Guyana, which traditionally orient their foreign relations towards the English-speaking Caribbean, were
invited, it would have made some sense to at least have proposed to the Mexicans to join the new bloc in-formation, in
the name of Latin American unity.
This touches on a second point, which is whether or not a Brazilian-led South American NATO-style security organization,
could achieve integration, security or demilitarization. South America continues to be plagued with security issues that
have yet to be resolved and which are likely to create distrust between militaries. Examples of these are:
• Tensions among Peru, Bolivia and Chile
• Argentine distrust towards Chile due to Santiago’s aid to the British during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War
• Friction between Colombia and Venezuela and Colombia and Ecuador over the recent infiltration of Colombian forces into
Ecuador to attack a secret FARC jungle base
• Concerns last year about a possible infiltration of Venezuelan troops into Guyana
• Historical differences on which country is the leading military powerhouse in the region, Brazil or Argentina, both of
which have prideful military high commands which may not be keen on following the lead of the military command of
another country (as in the case of cooperation in United Nations peacekeeping missions). The Venezuelan military and the
problem-prone Chilean armed forces do not markedly differ in this assessment as well.
An important event that will arguably boost Brazil’s view of its strategy to maintain a strong military comes from the
discovery of ultra-deep oil and gas fields in the Santos Basin off the coast of Sao Paulo state, which are likely to
catapult Brazil to the ranks of the world’s major hydrocarbon producers. The aforementioned Rotor & Wing article explained that “the Tupi and Jupiter fields also promise to elevate the state-owned oil company Petrobras
from the world’s 11th to sixth biggest energy company, by some rankings.”
Brazilian Relations with the U.S.
The U.S. and Brazil traditionally have at times had strained relations, and always complex ones, Brazil sees itself as
South America’s hegemon and does not like to have to share its influence with that of the U.S. A general parallel could
be made to Russo-Turkish relations over influence regarding the Black Sea. In both cases there exists a global power and
a regional power (with global aspirations) fighting for control over their respective spheres of influence. With the
rise of leftist governments across the Western Hemisphere, as well as the “Venezuela-effect” in terms of a new
leftist-alliances undercutting Washington, as well as a new generation of military power and political leadership, it
will be interesting to see how Brasilia-Washington relations progress, particularly in regard to how both governments
approach Caracas.
The Military Coup of 1964 and U.S. Complicity
In addition, Brazil-U.S. relations have been particularly cautious and uneasy ever since the aforementioned 1964
military coup. According to a November 2006 Associated Press article, Carlos Fico, a professor at Rio de Janeiro’s
Federal University, declared to the press that a seven-page document entitled “A Contingency Plan for Brazil,”
co-written by then-U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon in the mid 1960s, discussed fears of a possible communist takeover in
Brazil and how Goulart might be replaced by the speaker of Brazil’s lower house of Congress. The document was dated
January 6, 1964. In addition, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) has, for years, supported the belief that the
U.S. was involved in planning the coup against Goulart. This charge by COHA was made known in the 1970s, in a COHA
report which was later referred to by a number of Brazilian publications, detailing the presence of an American aircraft
carrier off the coast of the state of Sao Paulo, as part of a battle fleet. This information was conveyed during an
Amtrak train ride from Washington to New York, in a chance meeting between COHA director Larry Birns and a former U.S.
Navy carrier pilot, who was stationed aboard that carrier, who explained that he and his U.S. naval colleagues were
under orders to come to the aid of their Brazilian counterparts with their naval assets, if need be, if the coup that
was being carried out had failed that day.
This is not to say that military cooperation between the two hemispheric giants does not exist today. Quite to the
contrary, Washington appears keen on bringing Brazilian officials and military academics to the U.S. to study and attend
specialized conferences and workshops. For example, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), part of the
National Defense University (NDU), located in Washington D.C., has two Brazilian nationals on its faculty: Dr. Thomaz
Guedes Da Costa is Professor of National Security Affairs and formerly of the University of Brasilia. Also on staff at
CHDS is Colonel Rui C. Mesquita, a 1983 graduate of the Brazilian Air Force Academy. Mesquita also an executive
assistant to President Lula for four years.
More recently, a press release issued by the U.S. embassy in Brazil reported that, “for the first time in its existence,
U.S. Army South has a foreign officer on its staff. Lt. Col. Raul Rodrigues de Oliveira, a Brazilian cavalry officer and
UH-60 pilot, [who] began work as a Foreign Liaison Officer at U.S. Army South, the Army component of U.S. Southern
Command.”
Furthermore, according to Just The Facts, a research database administered by the Center for International Policy that
monitors U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, there has been significant military
link between both countries. Between 1999 and 2006, there were 1,454 Brazilian military and police trainees in U.S.
programs like the CHDS, the Army Logistics Management College and the Naval Post-Graduate School. Interestingly there
have not been any Brazilian trainees at the former School of the Americas (now called the Western Hemisphere Institute
for Security Cooperation, WHINSEC) in Fort Benning, Georgia, but that may be due to the fact that most courses there are
taught in Spanish.
What’s Next for the Brazilian Military?
Brazil’s military is at a crossroads. It today faces no external security challenge, no matter what doomsayers may say
about the putative intentions of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, yet the country does have a dark past in internal
security matters. However, the average Brazilian believes and implicitly trusts in the military, and it can be assumed
that the country’s present-day military wants to live up to these expectations.
The Brazilian military is an example of an armed forces which, at least in its own belief, must be prepared to defend
its own borders and safeguard its immense treasure trove of natural resources (including recent discoveries of oil and
natural gas), while projecting its civic strengths to the world, be it through peacekeeping missions in Haiti, military
exercises in South Africa, or the acquisition of a nuclear submarine. There is a lot of potential for the expanding role
of the Brazilian military in global affairs, but the type of legacy it will want to create is more than just a matter of
possessing strong leadership and clearly defined goals – it must also have the means and the agreed-upon military
doctrine to carry out its self-perceived mission in a democratic ambience and total submission to representative
civilian rule.
ENDS