Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions: Worrisome?
On Thursday, July 31, Brazilian authorities gave the final go ahead to the civilian nuclear power company,
Electronuclear, to continue construction of the country's third nuclear power plant. Though the decision to revitalize
the 22-year-old nuclear reactor, Angra 3, came late last year, plans were finalized in July by the government's
environmental regulatory agency. Electronuclear, a subsidiary of the state-owned energy firm Electrobras, plans to begin
construction in February.
Brazilian officials must constantly address the country's still inadequate supply of energy if they hope to see Brazil
continue on the path to becoming a superpower. For this reason, together with several major new discoveries of oil
deposits off Brazil's coastline, a confident President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva hails the developing nuclear initiative
as one that could ensure an increased supply of energy to the population. However, there are grave political and
economic implications of any turn to nuclear energy that he is taking, that should not be overlooked or minimized.
Electronuclear representatives pledge to strictly comply with the 60 conditions put forth by the Brazilian government to
ensure the safety of the plant now under construction. Environmental activists warn, however, that reviving the
construction of the Angra 3 plant, which was aborted in 1986, is neither environmentally safe nor is it fiscally or
politically sound. Greenpeace activists held a demonstration in late July outside the Ministry of the Environment's
headquarters in Brasília to protest the decision of Roberto Messiah, president of the Brazilian Institute for the
Environment and Renewable Resources, which granted the permit for the further construction of Angra 3. Its detractors
cite the health risks posed by potential leaks, such as the ones discovered at French power plants in July that resulted
in contaminated drinking water, and Brazil's flawed radioactive waste disposal program that allows for an insufficient
number of repositories for hazardous waste material. Radioactive waste is currently being stored at the plants
themselves, while Brazilian officials determine a more concrete long-term plan of action.
Brazilians take the mention of potential environmental and health repercussions very seriously, remembering the four
lives that were lost and the thousands of citizens currently with health problems resulting from the mishandling of
radioactive material in Goiania, Brazil, in 1987. Environmentalists also contend that there are less risky energy
ventures that Brazilian authorities should consider pursuing. Greenpeace argued that the same funds used to revive Angra
3 (approximately $8 billion), could be used to install a wind power plant that would be able to double the energy
capacity, take only one third the construction time, and would create 32 times more jobs than Angra 3.
So why nuclear energy?
Brazil currently uses nuclear energy for approximately only 4 percent of its nation-wide energy supply, but contains the
world's sixth largest uranium reserves. The South American country launched its enrichment program in 2006, but outlined
a proposal to enrich uranium only to levels below 5 percent - much less than the approximate 93 percent enrichment level
required to build weapons. It is still worth noting that it would be relatively easy for Brazilian technology to quickly
increase enrichment to those levels. Brazil is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as other
regional and multilateral agreements on the peaceful use of nuclear development. Should the international community be
concerned about Brazil's renewed commitment to nuclear energy?
Currently boasting the world's ninth largest economy, Brazil will no doubt join the ranks of major world powers this
century. With this in mind, it behooves the international community to be aware of the country's growing economic
presence in South America, given Lula's continued defense of what he sees as Iran's similar non-weapons-linked nuclear
energy program. In September 2005, Lula stated, "If Iran wants to enrich uranium, if it wants to handle the nuclear
issue in a peaceful way like Brazil does, that is Iran's right." Lula went on to comment that Iran should not be
punished because of Western suspicions that Tehran wants to create an atomic bomb. This direct comparison between Iran
and Brazil's nuclear plans has definite implications for how the international community views comparative developments
in nuclear capabilities. Despite Iran's less than spotless record regarding IAEA protocols and UN inspections - Brazil
also denied entry to IAEA inspectors in 2004, and revealed plans to sell surplus uranium to China in 2006 - why does
Brazil's renewed nuclear program fail to receive the same cluster of criticisms as Iran's?
Will Paraguay Benefit?
Yet another consideration brought about by Brazil's nuclear program is its implications for the country's energy
agreement with Paraguay. The renewed interest in nuclear energy might give neighboring Paraguayans hope that Brazilian
officials will renegotiate the terms of the energy contract regarding the shared Itaipu hydroelectric plant. Though the
two countries split the energy evenly, Paraguay's insufficient infrastructure allows it to utilize only 5 percent of its
50 percent share. Brazil buys the rest of the energy at a flat rate - as per the 1973 agreement - inhibiting Paraguay's
ability to achieve a higher income by selling the surplus energy at current market prices to Brazil or some other
energy-deprived nation in the region. If Paraguayans could markedly benefit from increased earnings, and Brazil could
rely more on other forms of energy - in this case nuclear - then perhaps this revival of Angra 3 could have positive
regional implications. Given Brazil's mammoth demand for energy, however, this outcome seems unlikely, as nuclear power
may only help to fill the growing Brazilian population's basic need for electricity.
The White House's Inattention to the Region
With most of Washington's attention focused on the Middle East, U.S. regional officials have not had the necessary
authorization to adequately evaluate the regional implications of Brazil's nuclear energy policies. Though Brasilia
ostensibly continues to be a U.S. political ally, the South American country with the largest economy could potentially
challenge the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere in the near future.
If Washington persists in paying less than ample attention to the emerging superpower, it may soon be shocked by
Brazil's potential to have a China-like, booming economy, increased nuclear capabilities, a growing self-confidence in
its own power and an ability to make its own way.
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This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Elizabeth Reavey
August 12th, 2008
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