Update on Iraq
Ambassador David Satterfield, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq
Foreign Press Center briefing
Washington, DC
October 26, 2006
MODERATOR: Good afternoon and welcome to the Foreign Press Center. This afternoon Ambassador David Satterfield, the
Special Coordinator on Iraq, will be giving you an update on the situation in Iraq and our policy there. So without
further ado, Ambassador Satterfield, thank you for coming.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thank you very much. The President has just spoken at length on U.S. policy towards Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld spoke earlier in the day. In order to maximize the use of your time, I would be happy to go directly
to questions rather than to reiterate what I think you have already heard in great detail from more senior officials
than I. So with that --
MODERATOR: If you could wait for the mike and identify yourself.
QUESTION: Shyam Bhatia. I'm the foreign editor of a newspaper called Deccan Herald from Bangalore in India. My
question's about the remnants of the Iraqi nuclear program. A large number of Iraqi scientists have since been disbanded
with the U.S. encouragement have disappeared from sight. Can you tell us what's happened to them? Are you keeping track
of them? Do you know if any of them have gone to Iran or to Korea or to any other countries?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Quite frankly, I have absolutely nothing for you on that. It's a question we'd be happy to take.
QUESTION: Talha Musa from Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. Actually I have two questions (inaudible). Is Washington still
giving full support to al-Maliki's government in Iraq? And my second question: How do you evaluate the Mecca declaration
between Sunni and Shiite in Iraq? Thank you.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Your first question, yes, we do strongly support Prime Minister Maliki and his national unity
government. We look to that government; we look to Prime Minister Maliki, as the President made clear yesterday, to
lead. We understand fully the very difficult circumstances that attain in Iraq today and we understand fully just how
difficult the decisions are which the Iraqi leadership, which the Iraqi Government has to take. Difficult decisions on
security, difficult decisions on political reconciliation, but these are critical decisions and they must in fact be
confronted. They must be decided. Now, these decisions are all for the Iraqi Government, the sovereign Iraqi Government
to make. We respect their sovereignty as the President made clear. But they're decisions that cannot be deferred without
cost to the Iraqi people and the interest of a stable peaceful democratic Iraq.
Our role as the United States, our role as a lead member of the coalition, is to support the Iraqi government, support
that Government's security forces to ensure that they have all of the tools that we can help provide for them to lead
their country forward. But the decisions on the future of Iraq, on the political process, on security must be taken
ultimately by Iraqis themselves. We do look to Prime Minister Maliki to take these decisions. We do have confidence in
his leadership.
On the issue of the Mecca declaration, we think that the gathering together in Mecca under OIC sponsorship was an
extremely important step. And we are very appreciative both to Saudi Government officials and to the Organization of the
Islamic Conference leadership for helping make this possible. It's important that as many messages of reconciliation as
possible be sent to the Iraqi people; that it be made as clear as possible that there is no legitimate violence against
innocent Iraqis; that there is no excuse or justification for the killings of innocents, no matter from what source. And
this was an important step in that process and we see it as a part of process, both on the political and on the
religious side of addressing the question of how do you get to a peaceful Iraq. How do you bring sectarian violence to
an end? How do you bring about ultimately an end to the presence of armed groups, militias, armed gangs that are
responsible for so much of this violence?
MODERATOR: Umit.
QUESTION: Umit Enginsoy with Turkish NTV television. Nice to see you again.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thank you.
QUESTION: Two things: Recently a number of prominent former diplomats, including Richard Holbrooke and Peter Galbraith,
have urged the U.S. Government to redeploy U.S. troops in Iraq in the Iraqi Kurdish control not in Iraq. Do you have any
such plans? Would you comment on that? And secondly, are you happy with the position of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership in
efforts to counter the PKK?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: With respect to your first question, a great many pundits have made a great many
recommendations, some of them contradictory, on what the best course should be for the U.S. in Iraq and we appreciate
very much their suggestions. But at the end of the day, we will move forward on a course which reflects our own best
thinking as well as our consultations with our other coalition partners and, of course, with the Iraqi Government.
With respect to your second question on the PKK, we do take very seriously the need to contain, confront the PKK and its
engagement in violence and in terror. Too many Turks have suffered from PKK violence particularly over the last year.
This needs to come to a halt. General Ralston, retired Lieutenant General Ralston's mission, is to work on how best to
address this problem. Now, General Ralston is working with the Turkish Government. He is working with the Iraqi
Government. He is working with officials of the Kurdish regional government with an aim to finding a way forward that
brings this problem to a resolution, to a close. And the most important first step is an end to the terror, an end to
the violence. And it does mean that the PKK must cease its involvement in violent activities. It must lay down its arms.
There are other steps that can be taken and must be taken by the Kurdish leadership: closure of PKK offices; other steps
with constrain the ability of the PKK to function. Those are all extremely important measures. They are measures which
General Ralston is working on with all of the authorities concerned, but we take this very seriously.
MODERATOR: Right here.
QUESTION: Hi. Natalie Ahn with the Asahi Shimbun Japanese newspaper. In the past few days we've been hearing about
discussions between coalition and Iraqi leaders to lay down benchmarks, but we're getting some different messages. First
of all, I'm wondering if representatives of the Department of State have been involved and if you could help clarify the
characterization of these discussions. Is this supposed to be a plan that comes together, a comprehensive set of
benchmarks that we get by the end of the year or are these just ongoing identifying benchmarks as you go and are there a
few that have already been agreed on? Is there anything that has been agreed on so far?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Over the course of the last two years, Iraq has had important goals, objective benchmarks laid
out for its constitutional and electoral process. It was those benchmarks which led to the successful holding of
elections, drafting the constitution, ratification of a constitution over the course of the last 18 months. We believe,
the Iraqi Government believes -- this Iraqi Government believes that it is important to have benchmarks, goals and
objectives on the political process and on the security process. These are benchmarks which all sides agree are
important, which all sides agree are useful as tools to show to their public that there is a process forward, there is a
set of things which the Iraqi Government wishes to do, intends to do.
On the economic side there is a similar set of benchmarks which will be embodied in the international compact for Iraq.
So on all of these issues -- security, political and economic -- there is a need for guidelines, benchmarks, objectives
and goals.
Now, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi presidency on the 16th of October, made public a set of benchmarks on the political
process. That's not an issue in debate. Those benchmarks exist. They have been put forward by the Iraqi Government.
There is a process underway, I believe Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld spoke to this earlier today, to formulate similar
benchmarks on the security track. And as I said earlier, on economic issues there is a very, very detailed set of
benchmarks that will emerge in the form of the contract, or rather the compact, for Iraq.
In terms of the other part of the benchmark issue, timelines; clearly progress needs to be made on all of these tracks:
security, political, economic, together and as rapidly as possible. There needs to be a sense in Iraqi minds, there
needs to be a sense frankly in the minds of all those engaged in Iraq that this is what needs to be done, these are the
goals, and they need to be done as urgently as possible. Is there a specific dictated or, in the words of some comment,
imposed timeline? No. These are benchmarks that reflect the desire, the understanding, the intentions of the Iraqi
Government.
QUESTION: My name is Tammam Al-Barazi from Alwatan Alarabi magazine. Since you still repeat sovereign Iraq, so are you
still in denial that there is no occupation? How can you define sovereignty with the occupation of 140,000-plus American
troops? Secondly, before you left to Iraq and (inaudible) and you told me that the (inaudible) party in (inaudible) are
not stooges of Iran. Did you change your mind or are you still with this position they are not -- they don't follow the
orders of Tehran?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: The occupation of Iraq ceased by the recognition of the international community and the United
Nation Security Council some years ago. What is going on now is the strengthening, the stabilization of Iraq under a
sovereign Iraqi government. And if your question is addressed to the basis for the presence of international forces,
coalition forces in Iraq, that basis can be found in Resolution 1546 and 1637. It's extensions that were undertaken by
the Security Council at the expressed will and request of the Iraqi Government, an Iraqi Government which in the case of
Prime Minister Maliki is a government chosen by the Iraqi people under a sovereign Iraqi constitution.
With regard to the status of Iraqi political parties, whether SCIRI, the Dawa Parties or anyone else, the question of
their political affiliation, desires, relationships with external parties are issues best addressed to those parties and
their leadership themselves. We respect all of those Iraqi political parties as representing Iraqi interests. We do not
believe that Iraqi senior political figures are puppets of Tehran or any other foreign government. Whatever their views
may be, whether in accordance or disagreement or in between with the United States, we respect them as Iraqi leaders.
QUESTION: Dmitri Kirsanov, Russian News Agency, TASS. Getting back to the issue of benchmarks and timelines, sir, you
make it sound as if the benchmarks and timelines that Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey spoke earlier in Baghdad
were agreed upon in advance. Help me understand, then, why Prime Minister Maliki basically rejected them then and quoted
this as an issue of election campaign here in the United States.
And second one, sir, a little off topic, a number of Russian diplomats were killed in Baghdad several months ago, as you
know. And there has been some efforts between U.S., Russian and Iraqi Government to investigate. Is there any progress?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Your first question. The benchmarks of which Ambassador Khalilzad and Commanding General Casey
spoke, on the political side have long been -- were long in discussions amongst Iraqis, between Iraqis and us, and
between Iraqis and other parties. They are, at the end of the day, Iraqi political benchmarks, and they were articulated
by the Iraqi Presidency in that sense. Do they reflect input? Do they reflect consideration from other sources including
us? They do, but they are primarily agreed to amongst Iraqi parties.
Similarly, the process that will lead to the articulation, we hope, of security benchmarks is a process which, at the
end of the day, has to be Iraqi. There must be internal Iraqi agreement on this because they will come from Iraqi
sources. They will not be issued by us. It's an Iraqi (inaudible). It's a set of Iraqi goals and objectives. The same
holds true for economic benchmarks, though in that case they will reflect primarily the product of understandings,
agreements, discussion between Iraq and the United Nations as represented primarily through the World Bank.
With regard to Prime Minister Maliki's remarks yesterday, I think if you read through the full transcript of what the
Prime Minister said rather than take the very few selective quotes that have been made, you will find that there is not
a significant degree of disagreement at all between what the President, Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey have said
and what the Prime Minister is saying. No one is imposing benchmarks or ordering timelines, and the Prime Minister
acknowledges this. As the value of benchmarks, that is something which Prime Minister Maliki, President Talabani, the
Iraqi Government as a whole has recognized, has spoken to and in the case of the political process has actually acted
upon in terms of putting such benchmarks out.
On the Russian diplomats, obviously this was a terrible tragedy and it is something that we feel very deeply. We, the
U.S. mission in Iraq, both military and civilian, have been engaged with the Russian Embassy, with the Russian
Government in Moscow to do all that we can of both in terms of sharing of information bur also developments upon
information received to try to see what can be done to resolve the fate of these individuals. I have nothing beyond that
for you.
QUESTION: Giampiero Gramaglia, Italian News Agency, ANSA. I have two questions. The first one is on the benchmarks
again. What happens if the Iraqi Government and the American authorities don't agree on the same benchmarks? And what
happens if one of the benchmarks agreed is not respected in time or in the goals?
The second question. We are used to speak about the lack of satisfaction for the military -- for the security progresses
in Iraq. Did you take in account of the military, political and economic side there is one satisfactory side.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I'm not sure I understood your second question.
QUESTION: Is one of the three sides, the political, the security and the economic satisfactory for Americans?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: The whole concept of goals, objectives, benchmarks, achievements to be made as a useful shaping
tool is very much an Iraqi product. It is an Iraqi tool. It is something that is reached mainly in internal consultation
amongst Iraqis, secondarily in consultation with us, either with us in a civilian sense or us with MNFI on security
issues. But at the end it is Iraq. And the question of if there are disagreements the only benchmarks that are going to
be articulated are benchmarks that the Iraqi themselves agree are goals that they wish to see achieved.
With respect to what happens if benchmarks are not met, the consequences of not meeting benchmarks are first and
foremost consequences for the Iraqi people. The impact is on them in terms of security, political and economic
developments that are not achieved and negative developments that do take place in the absence of progress in a positive
sense. The consequences are primarily for them.
With respect to your second question on the three tracks, we do see progress being made on the economic track,
significant progress. The Iraqi Government has undertaken a number of actions both in the form of legislation on
privatization, on an investment bill, on liberalization of private sector fuel importation, but we've also seen
execution of legislative changes and executive order changes. Fuel subsidies have been reduced by some 60 percent over
the course of the last 10 months in Iraq, a very, very, important step. And further reductions will take place.
We do see Iraq moving on the economic track and moving very well, and that is the same judgment I believe of
international financial institutions, including the IMF. On the political track, there are many difficulties confronting
progress on some very naughty issues including questions involving amnesty, reform of de-Baathification procedures, how
you move forward through a reconciliation agreement on a demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process that ends
the existence of armed groups of militias and brings them back into society, back into the state.
But we have seen progress on the political track as well. Cross-sectarian alliances were formed with the active support
of the Iraqi Government that produced what we think are very good resolutions in the Council of Representatives on how
one is to go forward with the possibility of creating federal regions, and the timeframe for consideration of possible
revisions or amendments to the constitution. These were important steps. We expect other progress on the political track
will come.
On security. The security situation, as the President noted yesterday quite graphically, is not satisfactory, not
satisfactory in Baghdad, not satisfactory elsewhere. We are doing what we can in terms of adapting our tactics and
strategy, in terms of the work that we do in support of Iraqi security forces, our engagement with the Prime Minister
and his government, civilian leadership of Iraq to address this problem. But again, I would echo the remarks of
Ambassador Khalilzad, General Casey and the President in noting that if you wish to take any one of these tracks,
security, political, economic, in isolation, you have to move forward on all collectively for each to reinforce the
other. You will not get adequate progress on economics, on politics if you don't have security. You will not get
sufficient sustainable progress on security unless you have an active political and economic track moving ahead. All
reinforce the other. They all need to be moved forward at the same time.
QUESTION: Good afternoon, Ambassador. Viviana Hurtado from Al Jazeera International. I wanted to ask about the visit
that the Secretary General of NATO will have tomorrow here in Washington. Specifically I wanted to ask you if you can
talk about the challenges that the U.S. and NATO is facing in Afghanistan with the increase of the violence certainly
and also with the fact that one of the U.S.'s commitments seem to be shifting. That connects to my second question about
Iraq.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Well, before you pose your second question, I'm delighted to be able to tell you I bear no
responsibility whatsoever for Afghanistan. It's right up there with the peace process issues I don't handle and am happy
for it.
QUESTION: Can you speak about maybe any possibility of the U.S. asking NATO partners to assume more of an active role in
Iraq?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Well, there is a NATO training mission, which is in fact active and has been active, in Iraq.
And the head of our military transition training mission, Lieutenant General Marty Dempsey is co-hatted as head of the
NATO mission in Iraq at the same time.
With respect to any possible contemplation of augmentation or increases a NATO role, you have to direct that question to
NATO itself. No comment.
QUESTION: Umit Enginsoy, Mr. Ambassador, I'd like actually -- I'd like to get some clearer answers to my earlier
questions. Basically, is redeployment to northern Iraq among your options? Could you say yes or no? And secondly, what I
asked was thank you for your comments about countering the PKK, but are you happy with the Iraqi-Kurdish stance on that?
Could you directly respond to these, please.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Your first question, I'm not going to comment further on what ultimate decision we, working with
the government of Iraq, may reach in terms of military posture or footprint. Those are issues for the future for
discussion. I'm simply not going to go in speculation on that.
No, we are not satisfied with progress on the PKK. There are more steps that need to be taken to ensure that the PKK
does not return to violence. And that's General Ralston's mission to pursue those steps. I can't give you more specifics
than that other than to say it is very important that there be no return to violence.
QUESTION: You are not happy with the Kurdish threat towards (inaudible?)
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: What it means is that more steps need to be taken with respect to the PKK.
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: My name is Rusen Cakir. I'm from Turkey, too, for Vatan Newspaper. I have some few very short questions. First
of all, is there a civil war in Iraq? So many people are (inaudible?) And secondly, after the killing of Zarqawi there
were so many expectations. But as I see, there's a kind of -- things are getting worse? Is it true? What do you think
about it? Thanks.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: With respect to your first question, look, we could to date hear for the rest of today different
academic models and definitions of civil war and it would be a largely sterile discussion. The fact is there is
sectarian violence, sectarian killing and sectarian conflict in Iraq. And if it is not addressed and if it is not
brought to a close and brought to a close rapidly, it threatens more than any other security challenge in Iraq, it
threatens the fabric of Iraqi society, it threatens the ability of Iraq to move forward on security, on political track
and with respect to economic growth and development. And that's the issue that people should be addressing, not the
endless pursuit of definitions of civil war, civil conflict. There is sectarian violence. People are being murdered,
innocents in this name and this has to come to a halt.
Your second question, Zarqawi's killing, we made very clear immediately after the elimination of Zarqawi that everyone
should be circumspect in what the results of this would be, that the organization that he had led, that movement
remained very vital, very active, very threatening, very lethal and that remains the case.
QUESTION: A follow-up on your -- you mentioned amnesty, the resistance or the insurgent, the insurgency order that
(inaudible) whatever you call them, they refuse to communicate except to the Americans to negotiate except the American
regarding this amnesty. So is the American negotiating with the insurgency or the resistance? That's first. Secondly,
since you mention about the civil war and since in your answer you told me you are not occupier of Iraq. You are
authorized by United Nations to do it. So is it not your responsibility to stop the civil war in Iraq as occupier or as
United Nations authorize you to occupy Iraq?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Well, I find your remarks very interesting. I'll attempt to answer whatever questions I find in
them. On the first question that you posed, we are in contact, as we have stated, with those who purport to speak for or
represent the insurgency, insurgents, those involved in the insurgency. We are in touch with them for the purpose of
seeing whether or not in fact they are credibly able to deliver an end to violence whether or not in fact, they are
credibly able to deliver an end to violence, whether in fact they are able and willing and interested in ending the
violence and coming into a political process. I do not accept your premise that only we speak to these individuals. In
fact, there are a great number of interlocutors other than the United States speaking with these individuals. But the
goal here is to see if a way to end the violence can be achieved nothing more nothing less.
On your second question, obviously we are gravely concerned as the President made clear yesterday, as I've made clear
today about sectarian violence, sectarian killings, about the rise of militias of armed groups, of gangs involved in
this kind of violence. It's enormously destructive of the fabric of Iraqi life. It has to be brought to the close. We
are doing all we can to help the Iraqi Government in addressing this problem. But this is an Iraqi phenomenon. At the
end of the day, it is Iraqi leadership and Iraqi decisions which will be responsible for helping to bring it to a close
in forming a new basis for coexistence within that country.
MODERATOR: Time for one last one.
QUESTION: Dmitry Kirsanov from TASS again. Let me follow (inaudible) and try to get a yes or no answer from you. Has
Prime Minister Maliki been in advance notified of General Casey's intention to give a year or a year and half timeline
in the security area? Did he know about that?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: We discussed with the Iraqi political and military leadership one a continuous basis how we and
they intend, hope, plan, to progress together to progressively transition, command, control responsibility at a civilian
level, at a national level, at a military level, at a provincial level authorities to Iraqis. That is part of what we do
every single day with the Iraqi Government.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much.
Released on October 27, 2006
ENDS