Interview With Japanese Press
Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Tokyo, Japan
October 19, 2006
SECRETARY RICE: Good morning. I don't have a statement. I'd be happy just to start with your questions, which I think
leaves the maximum time for what's on your mind.
QUESTION: Dr. Rice, there's a bunch of newspapers saying that there might be a six-party foreign ministerial meeting in
Beijing. Can you confirm or deny this?
SECRETARY RICE: No, it's not my expectation that there will be. The invitation, of course, remains open for a six-party
ministerial at any time, but I don't have any expectations that one is about to take place.
QUESTION: And there's some reports also that top Chinese diplomats are now in Pyongyang to discuss with North Korean
officials on the nuclear issue. Now, what is your understanding? And if you can confirm the report, what is your
expectation from the Chinese diplomats' visit?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I have also heard the reports. I have not myself confirmed them. It would not be surprising.
China, of course, has a close relationship with North Korea and it's in large part the reason that it's so important
that China be an active member of the coalition of states that is trying to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear
weapons program. China has both ways to bring incentives and disincentives to North Korea for its current behavior.
I will say that China has come a very long way in this regard. I think it would have been unthinkable for China to have
a Chapter 7 -- to support a Chapter 7 resolution against North Korea with sanctions, when China in general does not like
the imposition of sanctions.
And I think it just shows the level of concern that China and other states have about North Korea's behavior. So I'm
here to talk to all of the parties, first with the allies, Japan and South Korea, to make absolutely clear the U.S.
defense commitment and the solidity of those defense commitments and our capability and will to carry them out.
Secondly, to talk about how to fully implement Resolution 1718. And we are going to have, as we have had here in Japan,
working level talks, high-level working talks about how to have effective enforcement of 1718.
I want everyone to know that there remains a path open for diplomacy and that we hope that the North will return to the
talks but this time return really willing and ready to dismantle its weapons program. The denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula is the purpose of those talks.
QUESTION: Just a question. But to what are you confident that North Korea will come back to the negotiations? Even --
I'm afraid that just Kim Jong-il has crossed the river and never come back?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I can't judge North Korean motives or behavior. I do know that what we've done as the other five
parties and as the Security Council and international community is to set up the situation in which the North, if it
wishes to have access to the international community at all, really has no choice but to return to talks and
denuclearize because it's getting more and more isolated. We, I think, will have an effect on their ability to even
carry out the elements of their program because with efforts to block financing for it, to block knowledge for it, to
block parts and access to technologies for it will start to have an effect.
But there is a very much better way, which is the six-party statement of September 19th, 2005, which was a very
comprehensive way for denuclearization to take place. And I hope now facing the will of not just the United States and
Japan but also of South Korea and China that the North will take a hard look at its options and decide to return.
QUESTION: Dr. Rice, there's reports about another test, a North Korean test. Japan is going to go for another UN
resolution possibly with more sanctions against North Koreans. Would the United States be ready to co-sponsor the
resolution? What would the United States do of the concrete measure if there is another test?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I don't want to speculate because I think we would want to have very close consultations with all
the parties. But clearly another test would be just another indication that the North has not yet come to the
determination that the best road ahead is one that is cooperative. And then there are, as you well -- as you noted,
further measures that could be taken. The resolution itself, 1718, says that it would return to consider further
measures.
So I think that if the North does -- not or if the North does test, then we have to consider further measures. Now I
wouldn't want to get out ahead and try to say what those might be. I want to be very clear. The United States is not
trying to, and we have no desire to escalate this crisis.
In fact, we think that all the parties have very real ways to de-escalate this crisis, but a lot depends on when the
North finally comes to a conclusion that there really isn't a path ahead that will get what -- get them what they want.
They want greater security. They're not getting greater security under this situation. They want economic assistance.
They're very much putting at risk economic assistance. They want energy assistance. They're putting at risk any thought
of energy assistance. And so this path is not paying off for North Korea, and I think sooner or later North Korea will
come to that conclusion.
I should mention that there are for the United States further measures that will go into place automatically because
once a test is considered or is judged by the intelligence community to be nuclear, there are sanctions that are
automatic under U.S. law. And so since our intelligence community has recently judged this test to be nuclear, there
will be some further steps that the United States will take.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, we understand, of course, the United States doesn't have any intention to attack or invade
North Korea at this moment. But if it continues its missile nuclear tests despite the will of the international
community, then will you think it appropriate at some point for the United States to consider a regime change of the
current administration?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think that we believe that there is a lot of -- a lot left still on a diplomatic front. The
President of the United States isn't ever going to take any of his options away. You don't want the President of the
United States to do that. But we've been very clear, because the North has tried to make this an issue between the
United States and North Korea -- the United States is threatening the North, the United States wants to attack Korea --
the United States has no intent to do any such thing. We, in fact, want a peaceful Korean peninsula. Our forces on the
Korean peninsula are there for deterrent against North Korean aggression, and we have no intention of escalating the
tensions on the Korean peninsula.
I think what the Security Council resolution says is that the North's behavior is a threat to international peace and
security, that you can't have a Korean peninsula that is both stable and nuclear. And that is fully agreed to by all the
members of the six-party talks. And so I think if we just stay on our diplomatic course, if we bring enough pressure on
the North to recognize that they cannot gain any benefit by pursuing nuclear weapons, by testing nuclear weapons, by
trying to blackmail the international community, if they recognize that this is getting nowhere, that it is a dead end
policy, then I think they will have to change course. And we are committed to the diplomatic course that we're on.
QUESTION: Could you tell us the midterm U.S. strategy to make North Korea give up their nuclear ambitions if the
sanctions against North Korea turn out to be not so effective. What will be its concrete measure in the midterms?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, the sanctions are one part of a more comprehensive strategy in any case for dealing with the North
Korean nuclear issue. First of all, we have very strong alliances in the region that give us confidence that we can deal
with any North Korean threat. That's why it's extremely important for the United States to reaffirm its commitment to
the defense of Japan. And that could not be a stronger commitment and it's -- we would use our full range of will and
capability to -- for that purpose. We have commitments as well to South Korea and a defense alliance there. And so the
balance of forces, if you will, in this region is one that favors peace because it favors the alliances that we have
built over the last almost 50 years. So that's the first point.
The second point is that we have a number of defensive measures that we were taking even prior to the Security Council
resolution through, for instance, the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was cooperative -- is a cooperative
effort of states to use intelligence sharing, to block the transit of North Korean materials, goods that relate to
weapons of mass destruction in particular to nuclear weapons. And that's a program now that includes I think it's about
90 states that are involved in this, and it is a very effective tool for sharing information. We've made agreements with
a number of flag states, states that flag vessels for consensual boarding. We've made a number of efforts with states to
make clear that when we get information that something is happening that they should hold the ship in port or denial
overfly rights. So we've had in place.
We're improving and working on detection capability which can detect radiological signals which will help us to know if
the North Koreans are trying to move something. And so that's another aspect.
Now, then, on top of that with the Security Council resolution it puts more states in the mix and that makes the
obligation to prevent the transit in these materials. We have yet another layer of an important defense. We also, of
course, with our allies, are talking about matters like missile defense to make it more difficult for the North Koreans
to even believe that they would gain anything from their weapons systems. So the Security Council resolution is
extremely important, and it's particularly important because it signals China's deeper participation. But it's important
to recognize that it's not the only element of our need to deter North Korean behavior and to make it really not
fruitful for the North to pursue nuclear weapons.
QUESTION: There are two key (inaudible) going on in North Korea. One is tourism programs that (inaudible) the other is
(inaudible) and it seems that South Korea is reluctant to stop those programs. How do you feel about it?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, South Korea will to make a determination of how the current increase in the North Korean threat
will affect the integral Korean dialogue. I fully understand the desire of the South Koreans to bring about a peaceful
Korean peninsula and to diminish tensions. South Korea lives next door to North Korea and we all understand.
We were told by the President of South Korea when he was in the United States that a nuclear test would mean a
re-evaluation of all of South Korea's relations with the North. And I assume that re-evaluation is going on. I don't
want to speak to any one aspect of it, but it is very clear that everyone ought to be holding at risk things that North
Korea cares about in order to show North Korea that there is going to be no benefit from pursuing a nuclear weapon and,
in fact, that there is going to be a strong downside, in fact, strong penalty for pursuing nuclear weapons.
And so I think that's how we have to think about this. We have to think about how countries use their relationships with
the North to provide the North very clear disincentives to continue on the road that they are on, in other words holding
at risk things that they care about. And I'm sure that the South understands that and we can have further discussions,
but I can't comment on any specific action item I've taken.
QUESTION: Hi Dr. Rice. There is some resentment of (inaudible) in Tokyo and Seoul that there must be something on in
North Korea and Kim Jong-il (inaudible). And I'm wondering whether you could shed the light on it in this regard and how
he's losing his power or if there's something going on eventually or if there's something (inaudible) there. And also my
second question is about Japanese nuclear options and how you see still kind of (inaudible) Japan should think about
nuclear option because it doesn't work anymore nuclear kind of approach and we could better pursue the India-Pakistan
region of nuclear model. And since you are Russian expert, back in Cold War, they in European countries (inaudible)
missile. And then causing to deploy then they got their option deal with Russia and they are something should be
(inaudible) in this region. What kind of discussion is being spread out among Japanese region. So I wonder whether you
could respond to those points.
SECRETARY RICE: Sure. On the first, there is probably no more closed and difficult to read place than for North Korea.
So I would just tend to discount or tend to put aside any discussions of what might be going on inside of North Korea. I
am, you're right, an old Soviet specialist and we didn't even know what was going on inside the Soviet Union let alone
what was going on in North Korea. So I think it's probably not likely that we know very much.
I think what we do have to do is to put considerable pressure on the regime is to let it know that the things that it
values in terms of what it can get from the international system is not going to be available to it if it continues down
this road and to see then what responses that brings from the North Korean regime.
As to the Japanese nuclear option, I think the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have already spoken to that, that
that is not the route that Japan will pursue. I believe that the U.S. commitment -- defense commitment, umbrella if you
will, is a very powerful commitment to Japan, and it is one that we fundamentally will carry out.
The United States has had a defense commitment to Japan. We have been working on modernizing our defense capabilities,
particularly over the last several years. I have myself sat in now on our so called 2+2 talks where Don Rumsfeld and I
joined the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister of Japan. We've worked hard on all aspects of our defense relationship,
and I do not think it could be stronger. It is a very, very strong relationship. And because this region cannot be
stable -- if North Korea believes it can take advantage of our allies, and because an unstable Northeast Asia would be a
threat to the security of the United States, the United States has every reason for its own security to be firm in its
commitment to Japan and to South Korea. And I think if you understand it in that way, it's not just a U.S. commitment to
the defense of Japan, it is that the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan is essential for American security. That's
how we see it. And so I think Japan can feel secure in America's commitment.
We would like to do more work on missile defense. We would like to do more work on sensor technologies, on intelligence
sharing. These are all ways that we can make our alliance stronger. But absolutely no one should have any reason to
doubt the very firm commitment of the United States has to the defense of Japan.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, following up on his question, last night you said that United States would meet (inaudible)
and you underscored (inaudible). Could you kindly be more specific about that so that the Japanese layman can
understand? And my second question is the Chinese Government stated that it will not interdict cargo ships. When you
meet with Chinese officials in Beijing, are you going to -- are you prepared to downgrade your demands or are you
prepared to further demand the Chinese cooperation in that regard?
SECRETARY RICE: Let me take the issue of declaratory policy first. And I'm an old nuclear hand and what is very
important is that the Japanese people understand that what is meant by that statement is that we consider an attack on
Japan or a threat to attack Japan as a direct threat to the United States itself. And so it's the firmest of
commitments.
What is important for North Korea to understand is that the United States has a full range of capabilities that can
respond to a full range of North Korean activities. And I think that it's best left at that. Now, I think the North is
not confused about what that means. But the key here is that no one in North Korea should doubt that the United States
will defend Japan, and no one in Japan should doubt that the United States will defend Japan, because the Mutual Defense
Treaty, in effect, means that our security
and that of Japan are interlinked.
As to the Chinese, the obligation under 1718 is to do everything possible to prevent the North Koreans from transiting
in, shipping, trafficking in materials, weapons, technologies that would relate to a nuclear program, and to prevent
financing for those activities. It does not prescribe precisely how this will be done, although obviously one important
method is to inspect cargo, particularly suspect cargo, that may be moving between a North Korean port or land border
and someplace else, or from someplace to North Korea.
I think the Chinese clearly understand that they have an obligation to carry out 1718, and so I think the important
discussion that we should have with China is how can we have an effective regime for enforcing 1718, how can we make
certain that North Korean cargo is getting the kind of scrutiny that it needs, the kind of oversight that it needs to
make sure that nothing is being transited.
I think in part what happened was that the resolution passed very quickly, in record time for the United Nations
frankly, in just a few days, and some of the issues about the implementation of 1718 I think still need work because
there was an immediate assumption that we were talking about a blockade or some kind of quarantine. I heard people
talking about the Cuban missile crisis. This was not ever anticipated and I think it may have made some nervous that
this might in fact escalate tensions and cause by
nature a military confrontation.
And so part of the goal here is to begin to look at what realistically we want to do to have a comprehensive and
effective means by which to deal with the enforcement of 1718, and I have every reason to believe that the Chinese want
to enforce 1718. I fully understand that nobody wants there to be an escalation of the crisis because of the enforcement
mechanisms.
There are many things that can be done. One of the things that we are talking with people about is we have a number of
port security initiatives -- the United States has. There's an initiative for radiological detection at ports where
containers can be inspected before they leave port. There is the use of sensors for inspection. There is the sharing of
intelligence so that you are targeting specific cargoes where something looks like it might
be amiss and you can get a flagging country to allow that ship to be consensually boarded.
So there's a whole range of things here and I am -- I fully believe that together with China we can come to some
conclusions on how to have effective enforcement. In fact, last night Bob Joseph, who is the Under Secretary for
Security Affairs at the Department of State, had a working group meeting here with his Japanese counterparts to talk
about enforcement. People will have different ideas. We are not going out and making a
proposal to people that you do this, this, this and this. China has a lot more experience with the land border than we
do, and we would like to hear from them how this enforcement should take place.
QUESTION: To what extent do you think the North Koreans' capability to weaponize their nuclear material? And to what
extent do you think it's serious threat in the context of the Japan defense or South Korean defense at this point?
SECRETARY RICE: I don't think anyone has a very good estimate on weaponization. Weaponization, of course, is not easy
but the North Koreans have been at this for quite a long time. We have to realize that this is a decade's old program
for North Korea and I'm probably going back as far as 1960, certainly going back to the late 1970s.
Obviously, a -- the weaponization, given both their capabilities to build a nuclear weapon and if they have
capabilities to build a nuclear weapon and their tests of everything from short-range to medium-range to long-range
missile technology constitutes a changed environment in Asia which is why I think we've got such powerful resolutions
basically. First 1695 on the missile defense and now even more so with 1718. And I was asked the other day, "Well, you
said it's unacceptable. Are you now prepared to accept it?" No, of course not.
But there are several ways that you have to deal with it. The first is, again, reaffirming defense commitments because
the North should know that whatever level it reaches, it will never be able to take advantage of our allies and of our
interests. Secondly, to be very clear that we will use active defensive measures to prevent its transfer. The President
has said that North Korea will be held accountable for the transfer of materials of nuclear weapons to other states or
to non-state actors. And other states would probably want to think about their relationships with the North if they're
contemplating any such thing.
And then finally, we fully believe this is reversible. When a state decides it is not in its interest to pursue nuclear
weapons -- there are examples of countries that have turned to another course, the most recent was Libya which decided
that it couldn't have the kind of integration into the international system that it sought and pursue weapons of mass
destruction and turned around. So that option is still there for the North. But of course this is a major challenge for
the region. It's a major challenge for global partners. And it's a major challenge to the non-proliferation regime as
well.
QUESTION: Can I just follow up?
SECRETARY RICE: Sure.
QUESTION: Since you have mentioned Libya, that means that in your opinion Kim Jong-il can remain in power if he will
decide to give up any nuclear mission?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, it's not for me to know what's going to happen to Kim Jong-il over the long-term. I do know that
our hope at this point, and I think we've been very clear, is to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. And we've also been
clear that we're not going to invade or attack North Korea. That and the fact that the September 19th statement
contemplates a new role for North Korea in the international system if it is willing to denuclearize suggests that there
are ways for all of us to ultimately deal with this regime, but it's got to take a different course than it is on now.
Now that said, we have to be wary of other aspects of this regime too. This is a regime, after all, that abducts
innocent people. It has abducted them from Japan. And so the United States has not been silent on the humanitarian
issues. This is actually noted in the resolution itself. It is a very sad existence for the people of North Korea who
are always on the edge of starvation and but for the international community would have starved. It's a regime that has
been extremely repressive of its own people. And that shouldn't be forgotten.
I do believe if we can denuclearize the Korean peninsula, perhaps there is some possibility for an opening up of that
regime more, opening it up to the international system and perhaps life will get better for North Koreans because it's
the 21st Century and it's unfortunate the population would have to live in that way.
QUESTION: Dr. Rice, how satisfied are you so far with the Chinese response? I mean apparently they're stopping trucks
on the border. But do you expect them to go as far as stopping (inaudible)? And how far do you expect them go?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, on food, I mean none of us want to see humanitarian assistance denied to the North Korean people,
food aid. The United States does not believe in the use of food as a weapon. And given these people, the sad state of
the North Korean people, I would sincerely hope that food aid can get in. One of the problems is that North Korea so
lacks transparency in how food aid gets distributed, and so food donations have been downed because these people don't
know what happens to the food when they sent it in.
In terms of fuel oil and other aspects, hey, I think we have to allow here some recognition that states may know best
how to use their own leverage with North Korea. And -- the United States is not all-knowing about how to deal with North
Korea. And what we are -- what we do know is that everybody ought to be doing everything they can to convince the north
that they are on the wrong path and that this path is only going to lead to isolation and deprivation.
But I'm not coming out with a list for South Korea or for China to say you must do this, you must do that, you must do
that. All of us have obligations under 1718. They are very powerful obligations. They are Chapter 7 obligations. The
very fact that China has signed on to Chapter 7 obligations says to me that China takes this very, very seriously. I do
not think that they would have put at risk their relationship with the North by signing onto Chapter 7 resolutions if
they didn't intend to bring pressure on the North to change its ways. So these are consultations. It's not a set of
dictates from the United States on how to do this.
QUESTION: Going back to the joint statement of the East after the September -- last year's September six-party talks,
it clearly stated that the United States affirmed that they would not -- they didn't have any intention of attacking
North Korea. Does it still stand or are you tilting towards the stance that all options are open now that North Korea
took different approach?
SECRETARY RICE: It stands. We don't have any intention to attack or invade North Korea. Why would we? One has to ask
why would that be in the U.S. interest or the interest -- it's only in the interest of North Korea to appear that
somehow they are under threat from the United States in order to have a rationale for pursuing their isolated and
hostile policies. And so we're not going to give them a platform to do that. It's one reason that they are determined
that there should be bilateral negotiations. It's because they don't want to face the United States and Japan and China
and South Korea and Russia all together. They'd rather just deal with the United States. And if they break an agreement,
as they did in the '90s, then it's just the United States that they broke the agreement with. We need to stay united as
the five parties of the six-party talks, and I think we will make progress here, but it requires that we all use our
respective leverages in order to bring the North Koreans to a different place.
All right, thank you very much.
2006/T24-4
Released on October 19, 2006
ENDS