U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Clifford A. Hart, Jr., Director, Office of Taiwan Coordination
Remarks to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference
Denver, Colorado
September 12, 2006
Vice Chairman Coffman, Vice Minister Ko, distinguished guests, it is a privilege to speak to you today. I would like to
thank the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council for again hosting this important annual event. It is invigorating to be
surrounded by friends who share a common interest in ensuring Taiwan has the capabilities to safeguard its future and
fulfill its obligations to protect regional stability.
As always when discussing U.S. policy toward Taiwan, it is important to review core principles. First, we must not
forget that the stakes are high: while unlikely, war in the Taiwan Strait is not impossible. China refuses to renounce
the use of force against Taiwan, even as any such use of force would be a disaster for people on both sides of the
Strait, the region, and America itself. The United States therefore has an abiding interest in the preservation of peace
and stability there. President Bush has made clear his commitment to the longstanding touchstones of our one China
policy, the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Taiwan Relations Act. Precisely to defend the peace, America
does not support Taiwan independence and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. We urge all
parties to avoid confrontational or provocative acts, and we believe the future of Taiwan should be resolved peacefully.
In this context, we continue to call on Beijing to reach out to Taiwan's elected leaders in a flexible and sincere
spirit with a view to promoting genuine dialogue. We also call on Beijing to demonstrate more military transparency, to
cease its arms buildup opposite Taiwan, and to reduce its armed threat to Taiwan. At the same time, we assign special
importance to President Chen's June 8, 2006, public reaffirmation of his commitments that Taiwan will not declare
independence, change the national name, push for sovereignty themes in the constitution, or promote a referendum to
change the status quo.
We are all too painfully aware that the P.R.C. continues to channel a substantial portion of its remarkable economic
gains into a military build-up targeted against Taiwan. As the Department of Defense's annual Chinese military power
report makes clear, this build-up risks disrupting the status quo as the PLA's rapid military expansion is creating a
capabilities gap that is widening with the deployment of every new missile, fighter aircraft, submarine, warship, and
tank.
In law and policy, the United States stands behind its commitment to make available defense articles and services to
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Indeed, in response to Beijing's military build-up,
Washington in this decade has substantially boosted its defense cooperation with Taipei and taken steps to maintain its
own capabilities should the President choose to respond militarily to any use of force or coercion against Taiwan.
President Bush five years ago made a ground-breaking commitment to sell Taiwan several advanced defensive weapons
systems that it had requested. Even as I speak, two KIDD-class destroyers – a part of the package the President
approved – are sailing from the United States to join Taiwan's fleet.
Perhaps because America has moved with speed to meet the new challenge, many of Taiwan's friends in the United States
regret that Taipei has failed to respond in kind. Fortunately, I am pleased to speak to you at a time when there appears
to be growing recognition among the people of Taiwan that they need to do more. In this regard, however, they are
dependent on their leaders from across the political spectrum to undertake serious deliberations on the threat and agree
on how to allocate taxpayers' dollars to meet it. This in turn can only happen if those leaders place national security
above partisan politics and responsibly articulate the diverse views that are bound to exist in any democracy. Speaking
from our own experience, these deliberations must result in action, requiring a serious willingness of political parties
to compromise and bury differences in the interest of peace, prosperity, and security.
Because the American people share a direct interest in the success of this process, the impatience one sometimes hears
from Taiwan's American friends is not unreasonable. Such concerns do not threaten the traditional friendly ties between
the Taiwan and American peoples; these rest on unusually strong and deep fundamentals. Nevertheless, optimal cooperation
between our peoples depends on a serious, mature effort in Taipei to meet Taiwan's security needs. Leaders who aspire to
represent the Taiwan people in dealings with the American people should appreciate that their positions right now on
core national security issues cannot help but inform the sort of relationship they will have with Washington in years to
come.
I hasten to add that I am optimistic about the way ahead. It's important that we bear in mind just what is going on in
Taiwan. First, even with different parties controlling the legislature and the executive, Taiwan already commits nearly
2.5% of its GDP to the armed forces. That's less than in the past and than we think is necessary, but, in an economy the
size of Taiwan's, it's substantial. Taiwan has also been making important strides in the more effective use of its
military capabilities, and we are hopeful that trend will continue. Finally, we are pleased that the ruling and
opposition coalitions are at last agreed in principle on the need to increase the defense budget.
On that final point, the Taiwan legislature's consideration of the 2007 defense budget this fall will give us an
indication of how well-founded our optimism is. It's one thing for both coalitions to call for increases in the budget
to 2.85% of GDP in 2007 and 3% in 2008. It's quite another for them to approve the components of a budget that add up to
those percentages, especially when there may be sharp differences on some major – and expensive – weapon systems.
At the end of the day, what will be most important to the United States is not that Taiwan has approved funding for any
given package of arms – whether homemade or imported – but that Taiwan's leaders engage in a serious deliberation on
security and exercise wisdom and political courage in agreeing to fund urgently needed increases in Taiwan's
self-defense capabilities. America fully respects the prerogative of the Taiwan people – exercised through their
leaders – to decide how much to spend on defense and how to spend it. In a democratic political system like Taiwan's,
there's no single correct answer out there for how exactly to structure the response to a military threat. The one thing
that is sure, however, is that failure to rise above the political fray to arrive at the best possible answer under the
circumstances will represent a singular failure in leadership.
For its part, the United States remains committed to fulfilling President Bush's 2001 decision to sell Taiwan certain
defensive weapon systems it requested. At the same time, my government has made clear its view that urgent needs have
emerged requiring immediate funding. We believe in particular that Taipei should move now to invest in hardening
critical infrastructure and building adequate war reserve stocks to ensure the sustainability of its forces. In the
ideal, Taiwan will appropriate enough of its wealth to purchase all that it needs. Since the real world normally
operates short of the ideal, however, for us a big question is how Taipei will allocate its defense dollars if it has to
make tough choices among competing requirements.
Decades from now, people on both sides of the Strait will thank the people of Taiwan for the decisions they are making
right now on national security. Weakness can spark conflict as readily as aggression. As the People's Republic of China
continues its aggressive build-up of forces targeted against Taiwan, it falls to the democratic people of Taiwan to make
reasonable, prudent commitments to meet the challenge, emphasizing defensive military systems and strategies that
reinforce predictability and stability.
At the end of the day, Taiwan's democracy gives it advantages that make it the natural guardian not only of the island's
security but of peace in the Strait. It was to this in part that President Bush referred when he praised Taiwan's
democracy during his speech at Kyoto last November. As the President said, by embracing freedom at all levels, Taiwan
has delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and democratic Chinese society. In so doing, it has set a
hopeful example for the region and the world. Given these advantages, and my country's rock solid support for Taiwan's
security, I am optimistic about the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait over the long term. I will
be even more optimistic if Taiwan's political leaders can make the tough decisions needed now to address pressing
issues.
With that thought, I'd like to thank our distinguished guests from Taiwan for making the long journey to participate in
this conference. And I'd like to salute all participants from both sides, who, I am confident, share my concern for
Taiwan's self-defense and the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Thank you.
Released on September 12, 2006
ENDS