The Appeal On international Responsibilities
The first step in the peace process in the island ceylon, in what was agreed to be a step by step process, commenced
with the signing of a ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the Sri Lanka Authority (GOSL) and the Tamil Eelam Authority
(LTTE) on the 22nd of February 2002.
A cessation of hostilities coupled with the imperative need to create conditions of normalcy was the corner stones of
the CFA. In this regard the preamble to the CFA states as follows:
"The GOSL and LTTE recognize the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions
for all inhabitants affected by the conflict."
Under Article 2 of the agreement captioned "Measures to restore normalcy," the GOSL agreed to several important
conditions. Namely, to vacate all school buildings and return them for the intended use; the return of all other public
buildings to their intended use; to review the security measures and set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely
populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population; to
lift all restrictions on day and night fishing except in certain designated areas.
To date, the GOSL is yet to comply with these provisions despite three and a half years having lapsed since the signing
of the CFA. As a result, hundreds of thousands of civilians are unable to resettle and continue to languish as refugees
in camps under miserable condition, and are unable to freely pursue their livelihood.
Despite the parties agreeing to a step-by-step process of which the CFA being the first, the LTTE agreed to proceed to
the next step of face-to-face talks, even though the GOSL had failed to fully implement these crucial provisions of the
CFA regarding the restoration of conditions of normalcy to the war affected.
Even when formal talks were to commence, it was agreed to set up an interim administration for the war-affected
NorthEast as a forerunner to negotiations on a final lasting solution to the conflict. The envisaged interim
administration was to find solutions to the burning day-to-day existential problems faced by the hundreds of thousands
of suffering people of the NorthEast, and addresses the enormous task of resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction
and development. However despite this understanding, on a suggestion made by the then UNF government citing certain
political difficulties that it faced, the LTTE agreed to a compromise formula of setting up of Joint Task Forces, which
eventually gave way to Sub-Committees instead of the original interim administration.
Despite these Sub-Committees functioning for several months, the GOSL failed to expeditiously implement the decisions
that were taken, and on some occasions took up positions that effectively made them defunct.
This unsatisfactory affairs coupled with the GOSL organizing in Washington DC, USA a donor conference that marginalized
the Tamil Nation by the exclusion of the LTTE, led to in April 2003, without withdrawing from the negotiation process,
to suspend its participation in the peace talks. The LTTE continued to be in contact with the facilitator, the
Government of Norway, and through the facilitator with the government.
In consequence thereof, the LTTE put forward proposals in writing for the setting up of an Interim Self Governing
Authority (ISGA). On 31 October 2003 simultaneously, the LTTE requested that dates be fixed for the commencement of
talks on these said proposals. It should be noted that this was the first time the LTTE had submitted written proposals
in the course of a peace process.
On 4 November 2003, within four days of the LTTE's ISGA proposals release, the Kumaratunge regime dissolve the UNF
government which enjoyed a majority in parliament, the Ministries of Defense, Interior and Media, which were directly
linked to the peace process, and assigned the said portfolios either to herself or to her nominees from within her own
The action of the Kumaratunge regime resulted in the facilitator, the Norwegian Government suspending its role in
November 2003 in view of lack of clarity in regard to who was responsible for the peace process. The ensuing stalemate
resulted in the dismissal of the UNF government, the dissolution of parliament and the installation of a new Government
after the General Elections held in April 2004. the Kumaratunge headed UPFA which was an hard-line alliance of (PA) and
the (JVP). That they continues to campaign against the island peace process in well known to world.
The alliance resulted in the hardening of the position against the ISGA proposals and against the peace process. The
inability to take the peace process forward was clearly attributable to this situation. It is significant to note that
the main opposition party, the(UNP), had urged the government to commence talks on the ISGA proposals and had publicly
stated that it will support any agreement that was arrived at between the government and the LTTE after such discussion.
The LTTE had repeatedly stated that it was eagerly awaiting the recommencement of talks on the basis of the ISGA
proposals, and that when the talks commence, in regard to the ISGA could also be discussed.
The lack of clarity, the contradictions within the coalition partners, and the government's inability apart from making
pious pronouncements to take definite action to commence talks were the main stumbling blocks to the recommencement of
the peace process. It is pertinent to point out that, in the context of the LTTE's request for dates to be fixed to
commence talks when it submitted its ISGA proposals on 31 October 2003, talks would have recommenced in November 2003
itself but for the actions taken by the President on 4 November. This most unsatisfactory stalemate continues to date.
In the meantime, the disarming of paramilitary forces as mandated by the Article 1.8 of the CFA by the GOSL did not take
place. On the contrary, the Sri Lankan forces have been protecting and promoting new paramilitary forces. This has
resulted in killings and grave incidents that are seriously jeopardizing the CFA. These incidents continue to date.
It was at a time where there seemed very little hope of the resumption of negotiations, and the CFA itself becoming
increasingly unstable that the tsunami struck with approximately two-thirds of the total casualties and over 60% of the
destruction being sustained in the NorthEast. The result was a serious humanitarian crisis for a people which had
suffered immensely during the last two decades of war that had already destroyed the entire infrastructure and economy
of the NorthEast.
Despite the tremendous human tragedy that the tsunami created, it was hoped that something positive would come out of
the catastrophe. The international community correctly recognized that the tsunami had created some space for the GOSL
and the LTTE to work together - space that previously did not exist.
The international community proposed that a joint mechanism involving the GOSL and the LTTE be created for the
NorthEast, which would contribute to the creation of conducive environment for the resumption of the peace process.
After much procrastination the GOSL agreed to conclude the Post-Tsunami Operations Management Structure (P-TOMS)
agreement, which had the explicit backing of the international community.
The concluding of the P-TOMS, which was a simple administrative mechanism with very limited powers to handle relief work
in a 2 km area from the seacoast, resulted in the JVP leaving the UPFA government. Consequently, the JVP resorted to
petitioning the Supreme Court, which by granting a preliminary injunction against some key provisions of the P-TOMS
agreement has effectively made it defunct. It has been nearly nine months since the tsunami struck the NorthEast, and
the suffering of the affected people continues unabated. It must be seriously noted that the P-TOMS agreement has no
significance as far as the Tamil people's political aspirations vis-vis a solution to the Eelam Tamil nation demand is
Recently, since the announcement that presidential elections will be held before the end of 2005, the ruling party has
elected Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse as its candidate. In a bid to rally support for his candidature the Prime
Minister has concluded hard-line MOU with the JVP and the JHU, these unfair act has been on the basis of the following:
1. The rejection of concepts of power sharing, federalism and self-determination
3. Upholding of the unitary structure
5. Refusal to recognize the areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking people
7. The complete rejection of the ISGA proposals
9. Abandoning of the P-TOMS agreement
11. A complete overhaul of the CFA, and
13. A reassessment of the Government of Norway's role as facilitator.
There can be no doubt in anyone's mind that the cumulative effect of these policies will be to shut the door on any
possibility of finding a negotiated solution to the national question.
Political events since the commencement of the peace process have amply demonstrated yet again that the Sri Lankan
neither has the will nor the ability to engage the Tamil Nation in a collaborate effort, whether it is to address the
urgent humanitarian needs of the people or the larger peace process. Instead of negotiating with the LTTE in good faith,
the Sri Lanka continues to undermine the collective will of the Eelam Tamil.
This situation places the Tamil people in a state of utter desperation. The Tamil people earnestly desire a peaceful
resolution of the Tamil national question in a manner commensurate with the suffering they have long endured, and which
satisfies their legitimate aspirations in a just and durable manner.
The regarding such a just and fair resolution to the in island ceylon Nation, the appeal urge the international
community to recognises the Eelam Tamil self-determination or Reversion to Sovereignty. the appeal to the international
community's to use their duties and good offices to Restore Rights and justice.