UN Security Council Resolution 1540: The U.S. Perspective
Andrew Semmel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
Nonproliferation
Remarks at Conference on Global Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism: United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
Chatham House, London, England
October 12, 2004
Thank you very much.
It is a genuine pleasure to be here among such distinguished panelists and guests. I very much regret that I was unable
to be here yesterday to participate in the full conference agenda. Let me first thank Chatham House for organizing this
timely and focused look at ways to strengthen international efforts to prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) is the latest in a series of internationally-directed,
concrete measures aimed at preventing WMD proliferation and, most particularly, preventing and countering terrorist
acquisition and use of these deadly weapons.
As the original sponsor of UNSCR 1540, the United States took a leading role in the international community in
developing and adding this tool to our collective "toolbox" of measures to prevent proliferation. My remarks today offer
a look back at the conditions prompting the call for UNSCR 1540 and our priorities in negotiating the resolution. I will
also look forward at how the United States hopes Resolution 1540 will contribute to more effective and more robust
responses to terrorist efforts to acquire WMD.
A Layered Nonproliferation Defense
Over the years, while working with others, we have built a complex nonproliferation regime to deal with diverse
proliferation threats. With each "layer" or initiative added, the regime has sought to adapt to new challenges presented
by advances in technology, evolving security dynamics, and other events. The first line of nonproliferation defense are
the global nonproliferation treaties--the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Biological
Weapons Convention. They have served us well for decades by creating widely-accepted norms against WMD acquisition,
stockpiling, and proliferation and they continue to advance dialogue and cooperation among nations. However, we have
learned hard lessons with North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. These treaties have established strong global norms, but
their ability to prevent WMD acquisition is only as strong as States Parties' willingness to comply with their
treaty-based obligations and the resolve of compliant parties to hold others to their obligations.
The multilateral export control regimes--the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control
Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement--are a second, important layer of our nonproliferation defense. Each
of these export control regimes plays a critical role in identifying key WMD and missile-related material, technology
and appropriate approaches to control access to such items. In the case of the Zangger, NSG, and Australia Group, these
limited membership export control regimes have given greater specificity to items of concern under the NPT and CWC and
have broadened the materials or technologies controlled. However, recent experience--such as the clandestine A.Q. Khan
nuclear trafficking network--make clear that having strong supplier state commitments and solid control lists do not
automatically translate into prevention of illicit exports. Proliferators have adapted and often stayed one step ahead
of preventors and prevention. We, too, must adapt and stay one step ahead of them. Proliferators have become adept at
circumventing export controls through falsification of end use information, end user documentation, or cargo manifests;
illicit suppliers and shippers collude and use transport routes and transshipment points in countries that lack strong
controls and enforcement mechanisms.
In addition to nonproliferation treaties and regimes, the United States and other countries have engaged in a variety
of ad hoc bilateral dialogues, partnerships with key like-minded states, and other measures to enhance national controls
over sensitive technologies and to reduce, secure, or eliminate sources of sensitive materials and technology. While
seeking positive solutions, we have not shied away from use of sanctions and other punitive measures to achieve
nonproliferation goals.
In general, this "layered nonproliferation defense" has worked well, where implemented, to impede and slow efforts of
state and non-state actors to acquire WMD. But progress has been spotty and even frustrating, since not all states are
willing or able to take seriously the appeal for stronger nonproliferation measures. Though countries can agree
generally on the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction, rarely can they agree on concrete responses.
In the wake of 9/11, global nonproliferation took on increased urgency spurred by the tangible information gathered in
the tragedy's aftermath about the ambitions of terrorists and terrorist organizations to acquire and use weapons of mass
destruction. This clear nexus of terrorists seeking WMD created an imperative to evaluate whether existing tools were
sufficient to address the growing threat.
Over the three years since 9/11, the United States has looked through fresh eyes at the nonproliferation "toolbox."
After a frank review, we assessed that the nonproliferation architecture assembled over the past three decades needed to
be reinforced and fortified by new measures. We did not identify any "quick fixes" or simple solutions for this threat.
We recognized starkly that, when it comes to the WMD threat and its correlation with terrorism, time is not on our side.
We simply did not believe that we had the luxury of our predecessors for negotiation crossing many months or years to
arrive at a solution to this danger.
Against this backdrop, President Bush in the fall of 2003 called on the United Nations Security Council to adopt an
anti-proliferation resolution. He urged that it require states to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and related materials; to enact and enforce strict export controls; and to secure sensitive material within
their borders. In February of this year, in the wake of revelations about the A.Q. Khan network, President Bush reissued
this call in a speech at the U.S. National Defense University. He also outlined a number of additional proposals to
strengthen nonproliferation efforts--seven in all. Intersecting with this focus on terrorism was a growing awareness of
the Khan network. Companies within countries were building specialized components for exports to countries seeking
nuclear weapons. In specific cases, the government was not aware of the company's activities nor did it have controls in
place that would enable it to halt the exports.
Building UNSCR 1540
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is rooted in the Security Council's groundbreaking 1992 Presidential Statement.
That statement constituted the Council's first recognition that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a
threat to international peace and security.
Resolution 1540 builds on UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Passed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, resolution 1373 requires states to put in place measures to ensure their banks do not finance terrorist
activities, they do not allow terrorist travel, and their territories do not support training for a next terrorist
attack. UNSCR 1373 foreshadowed 1540, in that it highlighted the importance of controlling the flow of critical
technologies across borders. Resolution 1540 takes this call to a new level, requiring that states establish and enforce
legal barriers to acquisition of WMD whether by terrorists or by states.
The crux of UNSCR 1540 requires states to ensure that they have the infrastructure in place to address the threat posed
by non-state actor involvement in any aspect of WMD proliferation. It decides that states shall not support non-state
actors involved in such activities and that states shall enact and enforce the necessary laws to prevent these
activities on their territories. It requires states to monitor and control sensitive technologies, materials, and
equipment that exist in, are manufactured by, or transit their territories. The aim is to prevent terrorists from
acquiring them, but also, as we saw with A.Q. Khan, to prevent non-state actor involvement in trafficking of materials,
equipment and technology, as well as transshipment and financing.
Ensuring that states adopt effective controls and enforcement over sensitive items is not a new endeavor. The United
States and many other countries have been trumpeting the importance of strong and effective laws and enforcement
measures for many years in a variety of settings. Significant strides have been made in elevating awareness about the
importance of strong controls and in taking decisive action to put in place measures that keep deadly technologies out
of the wrong hands. Yet a clear gap remained between the global consensus about the threat of WMD proliferation and
concrete action on the ground. If I may use a baseball metaphor, there has been much wind-up but not much pitch and very
little follow-through.
While not a proliferation panacea, UNSCR 1540 helps close this gap--more pitch and follow through. It makes strong
national controls and enforcement a requirement rather than an option. Rather than engaging in protracted, multiyear
treaty negotiations, the Security Council responded relatively quickly to lay out some basic requirements to address the
threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is a necessary
requirement, because terrorists or those that sponsor them exploit opportunities where they exist. Prevention is only as
strong as the weakest link in the chain. Proliferators, like those involved in the Khan network, have shown their
cunning in using not the quickest or most cost-effective routes to ply their dangerous trade, but in seeking the path of
least resistance. UNSCR 1540 seeks to meet proliferators' lethal flexibility with the firm resolve of states to cut off
the path to proliferation. It places a premium on establishment of legal and regulatory measures at the national level.
It seeks to build capacity from the bottom up rather than attempting to impose it from above.
During the negotiation of UNSCR 1540, the United States worked hard to maintain a high standard of accountability in
what the resolution requires. Our aim was not to burden countries with additional obligations; we acted from the
awareness that lax controls over WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials could be catastrophic for all. The
structuring of the resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter reflects this sober reality. The United States wanted
the resolution to address the WMD threat in as comprehensive a manner as possible and to reinforce existing
nonproliferation treaties and regimes. Though the preoccupation of many nations on terrorist acquisition of WMD is
reflected in the resolution's text, the resolution maintains a broader thrust that WMD proliferation writ large should
be stopped.
Resolution 1540 also reflects the steady progression of national and international efforts to define and address the
challenge of WMD terrorism in the post 9/11 environment. Virtually every multilateral body and regional organization
that deals with nonproliferation or terrorism has examined this issue since 9/11. Numerous course corrections have been
adopted. The multilateral nonproliferation regimes have reviewed their control lists to identify and restrict supply of
items of use to terrorists or terrorist organizations. The International Atomic Energy Agency's Illicit Trafficking
Database Program has new relevance as we look for connections between smugglers with nuclear or radioactive material and
terrorists, and the Agency has developed innovative approaches to help member states account for and secure nuclear and
radiological materials.
New initiatives have been launched, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), one of the most successful
counterproliferation initiatives in recent memory. The PSI brings together countries in partnership to defeat the
trafficking of deadly weapons and technologies involving state or non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI and
1540 are complementary. Paragraph ten of the resolution reflects this symbiosis. The October 2003 seizure of the BBC
China traveling to Libya with a cargo hold full of centrifuges is a dramatic example of cooperative action to prevent
WMD proliferation, which 1540 promotes as both necessary and essential.
Many states worked to shape resolution 1540's emphasis on proliferation as a serious threat to peace and security that
requires concerted action of all responsible states. States need to have the necessary legal and regulatory
infrastructure in place and they need to enforce it. 1540 also reflects the growing consensus that cooperation among
states is not only useful, but is essential to preventing proliferation. This is particularly important in preventing
illicit trafficking in WMD, an area of cooperation that is embodied by the PSI. The consensus adoption of UNSCR 1540 in
April signals an important recognition that every nation has a responsibility in this endeavor and must redouble their
efforts to ensure that terrorists do not succeed in their deadly quest. It reaffirms the truism that since all states
have a stake in combating use of weapons of mass destruction, all states should play a part in preventing their
acquisition.
Looking Forward--Implementation of 1540
Resolution 1540 is the result of a tedious, sometimes contentious, but ultimately successful negotiation among many
countries, and consensus agreement on a way forward. It preserves the core priority articulated by President Bush: the
international community needs to take concrete action; states must put in place effective controls and enforcement so
that non-state actors will not acquire deadly technologies that they would then turn on civilized nations. We are
determined to work closely with other countries to ensure they establish effective national controls and enforcement
measures.
We also expect that states will take seriously paragraph four of the resolution and submit comprehensive reports to the
1540 Committee on their efforts to comply with the resolution's operative elements. These reports will be an important
tool in understanding the scope of the challenge before us and how best it can be addressed. We live in an era of global
economies and growing interdependence. No state will remain unaffected by WMD proliferation; none of us is stronger than
the weakest link. It is in all our interests to be a frank and open about our capabilities to respond to proliferation
threats. Each states' critical review of its own laws and regulations will help locate gaps. This process may facilitate
an understanding of "best practices" by countries. The Nonproliferation Committee's review of these reports will help
match assistance with the needs of member states. As President Bush has noted, the United States is prepared to assist
where it can.
The United States has compiled a Report that provides a comprehensive accounting on the range of U.S. laws, programs,
and initiatives to address proliferation. A multi-agency effort, our report provides detailed information on U.S.
efforts to implement the resolution. The report also includes detailed reporting on our efforts to assist other states,
support existing nonproliferation treaties, and establish cooperation among states to prevent illicit trafficking. These
are key aspects of 1540 that ought not be overlooked. The U.S. report is a snapshot in time--albeit a long one at 62
pages in length--but offers a valuable resource for those interested in knowing how the United States Government has
approached this particular problem. We are scheduled to submit our report to the 1540 Committee in New York today.
The Nonproliferation Committee in New York is working to assemble a panel of experts to review country reports. Though
1540 has been structured under Chapter VII, we do not envision "enforcement" as a role for the Committee. We believe
that there is strong international support for this resolution and that states will comply with 1540's provisions
without the need for Council action. If asked, the United States will work with states on a bilateral basis, or in
partnership with other states, to assist them in fulfilling their responsibilities under 1540. This includes identifying
what countries require assistance and how best that assistance can be provided. We of course will revisit this view if
it becomes evident that countries are not taking their 1540 obligations seriously or are ignoring their responsibility
to put in place the legal and regulatory infrastructure required under the resolution.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that the clear intent of terrorists and terrorist organizations to acquire WMD and their
known disregard for innocent lives adds great urgency to an already grave security imperative. The international
community cannot rest on its nonproliferation laurels. It must be as creative, agile, and aggressive in preventing
proliferation as the proliferators themselves--whether state or non-state actors--are about acquiring WMD. This is a
race we cannot afford to lose. Preferably, our game plan should be multilateral, multinational, multiyear, and
multidimensional. It should include diplomacy, law enforcement, economic incentives and disincentives, border security
measures, and where necessary the use of force. It should run the full gamut of persuasion and coercion, as appropriate.
It should flexible and adaptive.
No one state nor any single approach can solve this global problem. To the contrary, a single state supplying critical
materials or technologies could defeat the efforts of us all. Success requires collaboration, a long-term commitment,
clear-eyed vigilance, a multiplicity of tools, as well as a serious commitment to defeat this modern scourge. There must
be commitment but there must also be follow-through in the form of enforcement. There may yet be time to prevent
terrorists and those who sponsor them from acquiring deadly capabilities. We strenuously hope this is the case. We look
forward to working with other countries in implementing the resolution and building a stronger, tighter, and more
effective set of nonproliferation tools to keep the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most
dangerous individuals.
Thank you very much.
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