Statement of William S. Cohen
to
The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
March 23, 2004
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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and Members of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
Commission to discuss counterterrorism efforts of the Defense Department and the Interagency during my tenure as
Secretary of Defense.
You have posed several questions, which I will address to the best of my ability, although I should note that in
preparing this statement I have not had access to any non-public records with regard to events that took place during
this period three to eight years ago and not all public records are easily accessible despite the internet. I have also
organized your questions and my responses in a manner that seems to be most responsive to your objective and that
reduces redundancies. You asked that my written testimony be "comprehensive." A truly comprehensive account would be
book length, at least, and require access to materials that are not available to me. This written testimony is already
longer than I anticipated, and while a few matters are discussed in detail, in most instances, I find it possible only
to summarize matters addressed by your questions.
U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Your first question asked about the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy and the role of the Defense Department in that
strategy during the second Clinton Administration.
While the second Clinton Administration's approach built on the first Administration's efforts, just as my approach
derived from my work on the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services committees, I would point to President Clinton's
December 5, 1996, announcement of the formation of his national security team for his second term. During that Oval
Office event, President Clinton listed the challenges on which we were to focus.
The very first item on the President's list was terrorism, followed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
A week into the new Administration, President Clinton came to the Pentagon to meet with me, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and the ten unified combatant commands, our top military commanders. Terrorism and the Quadrennial Defense Review
of the defense strategy and program were the top two topics on the agenda, which I highlighted at our subsequent press
conference by announcing that "We should plan on terrorism being not the wave of the future, but the wave of the
present."
In May 1997, I released the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD's first effort to define a long-term (15-year) strategy and
accompanying defense program to meet post-Cold War challenges and opportunities. In the QDR, I stated:
Increasingly capable and violent terrorists will continue to directly threaten the lives of American citizens and try to
undermine U.S. policies and alliances.
(W)hile we are dramatically safer than during the Cold War, the U.S. homeland is
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not free from external threats- . unconventional means of attack, such as terrorism, are no longer just threats to our
diplomats, military forces, and private Americans overseas, but will threaten Americans at home in the years to come.
The QDR formed the basis for all DOD strategy, programs and operations, including the Defense Strategy that I submitted
to the President and Congress in my first annual report in January 1998, which identified four trends threatening US
security. One of these four trends was the increased threat from violent, religiously-motivated terrorist groups:
Violent, religiously-motivated terrorist organizations have eclipsed more traditional, politically-motivated movements.
The latter often refrained from mass casualty operations for fear of alienating their constituencies and actors who
could advance their agendas or for lack of material and technical skill. Religious zealots rarely exhibit such restraint
and actively seek to maximize carnage. Also of concern are entrenched ethnic- and nationalist motivated terrorist
organizations, as well as the relatively new phenomenon of ad hoc terrorist groups domestically and abroad. Over the
next 15 years (the QDR's mandated horizon), terrorists will become even more sophisticated in their targeting,
propaganda, and political action operations. Terrorist state sponsors like Iran will continue to provide vital support
to a disparate mix of terrorist groups and movements.
Two of the other four trends also bear on terrorism, "failed states" and the "flow of potentially dangerous
technologies," about which the Defense Strategy stated:
In particular, the nexus of such lethal knowledge with the emergence of terrorist movements dedicated to massive
casualties represent a new paradigm for national security. Zealotry creates the will to carry out mass casualty
terrorist attacks;
proliferation provides the means.
The new Defense Strategy led to significant efforts across DOD and its component Military Departments and Defense
Agencies, and between DOD and other agencies, to address what we believed to be a growing terrorist threat against U.S.
personnel and interests abroad and U.S. citizens at home.
This increased focus within DOD was part of a broader effort in the interagency.
Building on Presidential Decision Directive 39 of 1995, the President announced major new counter-terrorism initiatives
and signed Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 in May 1998, which addressed combating terrorism and critical
infrastructure protection.
These presidential decisions create new structures within the government; generated a very significant interagency
effort, much expanded in scope and participation beyond prior interagency efforts; and provided significant increases in
funding for these efforts, many of which had already had their funding substantially increased. Other Presidential
actions included a series of memoranda of notification (MONs) specifically authorizing the killing or capturing an ever
widening circle of al Qaeda leadership and overt, covert and clandestine programs to keep nuclear and other dangerous
materials and weapons out of the hands of terrorists and to address the large numbers of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft
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missiles circulating in the world, including the many Stinger missiles the Reagan Administration provided to Islamic
fighters in Afghanistan during the 1980s.
We were especially concerned with terrorists gaining access to and using weapons of mass destruction: nuclear,
radiological, biological, or chemical weapons, possibly combined with attacks on information networks that could disrupt
our ability to prevent or respond to an attack, as well as attacks against aircraft and vehicle bombs. While,
historically, the vast majority of deaths caused by terrorists resulted from car/truck bombs, intelligence indicated
that various terrorist elements were seeking WMD to be able to inflict even larger casualties. We needed to protect
against both "traditional"
terrorist methods and what the intelligence indicated could be their new methods. Aum Shinrikyo had demonstrated that a
small but committed group could make chemical weapons and use them against a civilian population (more Japanese died in
Aum's two chemical attacks than did Americans in the two East Africa embassy bombings), and Aum had also made
significant efforts to acquire biological and nuclear capability. But other groups, particularly those motivated by an
anti-American Islamic extremism, also were reported by the intelligence community to be seeking such capabilities and
were of particular concern.
Beyond making counter-terrorism a top priority for the U.S., we actively worked to make it a priority for other
governments. Beginning with my first meetings with foreign officials, I emphasized the need for cooperation in
addressing terrorist threats and new forms of terrorism. Given the global nature of the threat, this effort to gain
international cooperation was done not just with senior officials from the Middle East and Europe, but with most foreign
officials, including those from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Canada, throughout my tenure.
A counter-terrorism strategy had to deal with the threat comprehensively, including:
- improving protection for our forces, diplomats and other Americans abroad;
- improving protection for Americans at home;
- securing nuclear, biological, chemical and other dangerous materials and technical knowledge about them in the former
Soviet Union and elsewhere;
- enhancing cooperation with countries where terrorists might be operating, transiting or conducting financial
activities so that their security and intelligence services can help us counter the threat; enhancing our intelligence
on the threat so as to be better able to defeat it; and - preparing to take military actions against terrorists when it
was feasible to do so.
The Clinton Administration undertook substantial effort on all of these fronts, sometimes with congressional support and
sometimes over congressional resistance. DOD was an active participant in these efforts, in some cases taking the lead
role and in other cases providing support to other elements of the government when they were the Lead Federal Agency.
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Role of DOD in Countering Terrorism at Home
There are many complex issues involved in enabling DOD effectively and legally to participate in prevention of,
preparation for, and response to terrorist acts in the U.S.
These issues range from doctrinal, organizational, training, equipping, personnel and other technical issues to
sensitive legal, policy, and public communications issues, since DOD is not the Lead Federal Agency for these matters
within the U.S. and Congress has long imposed legal limitations on what the Defense Department and the military can do
within the U.S.
While there are legal limitations on what the Department of Defense and the military can do within U.S. borders to
address the threat of terrorism against Americans at home, there are measures that DOD can and did undertake. These
include:
- raising awareness among the public and government officials of the threat;
- organizing and conducting exercises for the Interagency;
- providing training to other agencies at the Federal, State and local level; and ƒn
ƒ{ƒnƒnƒnassisting those agencies that are the Lead Federal Authorities for countering terrorism and consequence
management within the U.S. by helping them do planning, seconding personnel to them, and providing logistical and
materiel support.
A limited list of examples of such efforts undertaken by DOD from 1997 to 2000 to enhance protection of Americans at
home terrorist attacks include:
- In March 1997, I announced that the National Guard, with its unique federal and State dual function, would be given
new responsibilities and capabilities for assisting State and local authorities in preparing for and responding to
terrorist attacks in the U.S. This was implemented through a series of actions from 1997 through 2000.
- In April 1997, DOD began training local first responders (e.g., police, fire, and emergency medical personnel) in how
to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks. DOD provided initial training and equipment, and in some cases followon
training, to first responders in approximately 100 cities before turning the program over to the Justice Department in
2000.
- During the course of 1997 and 1998, DOD trained FEMA and FBI officials in the use of US Transportation Command assets
so that these Lead Federal Agencies for crisis response would be capable of rapid deployment of personnel and materiel
in responding to terrorist incidents or other disasters.
- During 1999, DOD undertook actions to improve its ability to respond immediately to certain high consequence terrorist
threats in the National Capital Region.
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- During 1999 and 2000, DOD and the Department of Energy undertook efforts to assist the FBI to acquire certain
specialized skills to be able to respond to certain high consequence terrorist threats.
- From 1997 to 2000, DOD organized and conducted numerous interagency exercises to improve the effectiveness of the
Federal Government, from field operatives to mid-level officials to the Principals, in responding to a wide variety of
threatened terrorist attacks and the effects of such terrorist attacks. Some exercises also included State and local
government officials to improve the effectiveness of Federal-State-local coordination in a crisis.
- From 1998 through 2000, DOD worked closely with the Department of Health and Human Services and others in addressing
the threat of terrorists using biological agents against the American people. This included research and development of
improved preventative and treatment measures, production and stockpiling of vaccines, and other measures.
- From 1997 to 2000, DOD provided significant assistance to Federal agencies leading efforts to protect critical
infrastructure and defend against attacks on U.S.
public and private sector computer networks, including seconding much of the personnel at the National Information
Protection Center and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office.
- During 1999, DOD requested but Congress rejected legislative authority to expand the types of logistical and other
support DOD can provide to US domestic agencies when the Attorney General declares a National Security Special Event
(i.e., an event or situation the AG determines at risk from terrorist attack).
- In October 1999, the President signed the Unified Command Plan (UCP-99), which formalized the creation of subordinate
commands to provide capabilities to prepare for and respond to various types of terrorist attacks in the US, including
attacks that might involve high-explosive, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons and information network
attacks. This included the creation of Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), responsible for preparing for and
responding to attacks in the US and assisting Lead Federal Agencies (FEMA and FBI) and States in their preparations and
response. It also included expansion of the Joint Task Force- Computer Network Defense & Attack. UCP-99 also created a roadmap to build these subordinate commands into a Homeland Security Command by the time
of the UCP-2001.
- In January 2001, I held my last press conference as Secretary for the purpose of releasing an updated version of my
report, Proliferation: Threat & Response, which was intended to educate and energize Congress, other officials and the public to this very real threat
and which began with my message that:
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At the dawn of the 21st Century, the United States now faces what could be called a Superpower Paradox. Our unrivaled
supremacy in the conventional military arena is prompting adversaries to seek unconventional, asymmetric means to strike
what they perceive as our Achilles heel.
(L)ooming on the horizon is the prospect that these terror weapons will increasingly find their way into the hands of
individuals and groups of fanatical terrorists or self-proclaimed apocalyptic prophets. The followers of Usama bin Laden
have, in fact, already trained with toxic chemicals.
Fears for the future are not hyperbole. Indeed, past may be prologue.
Iraq has used chemical weapons against Iran and its own people. Those behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing also
were gathering the ingredients for a chemical weapon that could have killed thousands here in the United States.
The race is on between our preparations and those of our adversaries.
There is not a moment to lose.
Force Protection
You asked about the role of force protection in DOD's counter-terrorism efforts. Force protection clearly was an
imperative as we addressed the threat posed by terrorists. DOD has an obligation to protect our men and women in uniform
to the extent possible. Our military personnel expect to go into harm's way, and we send them into harm's way on a
regular basis. But to the extent that threats can be anticipated and countered, DOD is obligated to do so. I reject any
viewpoint that force protection is a diversion from genuine counter-terrorism efforts.
As you know, in 1995 and 1996, attacks had been conducted against a Saudi National Guard facility where U.S. military
personnel were located and against U.S. Air Force barracks at Khobar Towers. In addition to our obligation to protect
our people, U.S.
national interests required us to deny these terrorists their objective of driving the U.S.
out of Arabia, which they believed was possible based on the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing that killed 241 Marines and
led President Reagan to abandon the Lebanon mission and withdraw U.S. forces.
The Iraq war has allowed a reconfiguration of U.S. forces in Southwest and Central Asia, including relocation of U.S.
forces from Saudi Arabia, but U.S. forces remain at risk.
This is partly due to the symbolic significance of attacks on U.S. forces, and partly due to the belief of terrorists
that such attacks can cause the U.S. to alter its policy and abandon its interests.
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Following Khobar, numerous measures to enhance force protection were undertaken. A few examples include:
- DOD created a focal point within the Joint Staff for counter-terrorism, the deputy director of operations for
combating terrorism (J-34). This office's responsibilities included force protection, development of anti-terrorism
tactics, techniques and procedures, oversight of anti-terrorism plans for every military base, and conduct of integrated
vulnerability assessments of military facilities. (The J-33, deputy director for current operations, retained
responsibility within the Joint Staff for military operations, including against terrorists.) - DOD implemented some six
dozen recommendations for changes that were made by a post-Khobar assessment team headed by a retired four-star general.
- Measures to standardize force protection measures across DOD and with other departments were implemented, this having
been identified as a problem that contributed to Khobar. Related to this, DOD and the State Department drafted and
signed a global MOU in December 1997, clarifying roles and responsibilities for each department in protecting US
personnel overseas and addressing deficiencies identified following Khobar.
- DOD measures taken to protect deployed forces against chemical and biological attacks by enemy nations also provided
protection against terrorist wielding such weapons.
These and other force protection measures are primarily defensive in nature.
Military Options, Plans, and Operations
With regard to offensive efforts, you asked a series of overlapping questions regarding military options, plans and
operations to target Bin Laden and al Qaeda; factors affecting decisions on using force against Bin Laden and al Qaeda;
planning for the use of special operations forces; and military actions considered or taken following the East Africa
and USS Cole attacks and the Millennium plots.
Afghanistan as a focal point for both policy and military thinking had become a back burner matter beginning in the
1980s. I cannot address what occurred before my arrival at DOD, but early in 1998 DOD did undertake military planning
activities related to Afghanistan and to al Qaeda-related targets outside of Afghanistan. Over the course of the next
three years, this planning continued, developing more refined plans against a better defined target set. These plans
were developed against the task given us that related to countering al Qaeda and capturing or killing Bin Laden and his
senior leadership.
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Following the August 1998 East Africa bombings, the ongoing flurry of non-specific threat warnings was supplemented by
more specific information, partly due to unilateral U.S. collection of an increased level of communications among al
Qaeda-affiliated elements and partly due to increased cooperation from foreign intelligence services.
During this time, U.S. intelligence community obtained actionable intelligence on a leadership conference that al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups planned to hold on a specific date at a specific location near Khost, Afghanistan. We
believed one purpose of the conference was to advance plans to conduct additional attacks against U.S. interests.
While we did not have a roster of who would attend this conference, the intelligence reports indicated it would include
senior leaders, quite possibly including Bin Laden.
Concurrently, the U.S. intelligence community obtained physical evidence from outside the al-Shifa facility in Sudan
that supported long-standing concerns regarding its potential role in Sudanese chemical weapon efforts that could be
exploited by al Qaeda.
The al-Shifa facility had been under surveillance for some time because of a variety of intelligence reports, including
HUMINT reports identifying it as a WMD-related facility, indirect links between the facility and Bin Laden and the Iraqi
chemical weapons program, and extraordinary security - including surface-to-air missiles - used to protect it during its
construction. The direct physical evidence from the scene obtained at that time convinced the U.S. intelligence
community that their suspicions were correct about the facility's chemical weapons role and that there was a risk of
chemical agents getting into the hands of al Qaeda, whose interest in obtaining such weapons was clear.
With actionable intelligence in hand, President Clinton made the decision to attack the al Qaeda leadership conference
with the intent to kill as many participants as possible.
Simultaneously with the attack on the al Qaeda leadership conference, we would attack and destroy the al-Shifa facility.
Because of the need for tactical surprise and because of the geographical realities of Afghanistan and Sudan being
remote from U.S. operating bases, professional military advice was to use sea-launched cruise missiles to attack the al
Qaeda leadership conference and the al-Shifa facility in Operation Infinite Reach.
The attacks killed dozens of terrorists at the destroyed training facilities, destroyed the al- Shifa facility, and
demonstrated that the terrorists were not immune to surprise attack regardless of their location. Intelligence and
public reports following Operation Infinite Reach showed considerable confusion among the terrorists as to how they had
been struck and from what direction. Some, for example, were convinced that we had launched B-1 bombers out of Central
Asia. While Western media reports did develop a generally accurate picture of the operation (although I have never seen
a fully accurate report in the media), we never publicly released operational details of the attack, preferring to leave
the terrorists to their confusion and the need to look over both shoulders at all times.
The intelligence community reported afterward that Bin Laden had been at the conference, but departed several hours
before our weapons struck their target. This did not come as a complete surprise given Bin Laden's strict operational
security practices, including by some accounts, that he remained in any given location only for a few hours 10 at a
time. The fact that he slipped away before the missiles arrived did not diminish my belief that the mission was well
worth having undertaken.
From that point onward, the U.S. actively sought to capture or kill Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders. The President
signed a series of six memoranda of notification (MONs), which are the legally required authorizations for covert
actions. This series of MONs steadily expanded the circle of al Qaeda leaders authorized to be killed or captured,
starting initially with Bin Laden and his inner circle and growing to include many others as we increased our
understanding of al Qaeda's organization and hierarchy.
For its part al Qaeda and affiliated groups were actively working to attack Americans and American interests. In the
weeks after the East Africa bombings, Egyptian Islamic Jihad - Ayman al-Zawahiri's group that cooperated with al Qaeda
in the late 1990s and, according to the State Department, merged with al Qaeda in June 2001 - conducted an operation to
blow up the U.S. Embassy in Tirana, but was thwarted by U.S. at the embassy gate.
Other planned attacks were very likely stymied as operatives were rolled up and other actions by U.S. and foreign
authorities disrupted terrorist plans. In the autumn of 1999, the intelligence community reported that anywhere from
five to fifteen attacks against U.S. interests were planned to occur during the Millennium celebrations, leading to the
most extensive U.S. counter-terrorism initiative ever conducted prior to September 11 to disrupt these planned terrorist
attacks.
We know that major attacks in both the U.S. and the Middle East were prevented. This includes capturing terrorists in
December 1999 who planned to attack the Los Angeles International Airport and planned to destroy the Raddison Hotel in
Amman, Jordan, largely occupied by American and Israeli tourists for the Millennium, using a bomb nearly seven times
larger than the one that destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In addition, the terrorists
captured in Jordan confessed to a plan to use chemical weapons in a crowded movie theater.
And in October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked while it was being serviced in port at Aden, Yemen, by explosives loaded
onto a service boat.
The U.S. was already pursuing Bin Laden and al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and around the world. The President had
authorized lethal force to be used if we ever had the opportunity to get Bin Laden or other al Qaeda leaders. This was
equally before and after the Millennium, before and after the USS Cole. We already had far more than sufficient
justification to eliminate Bin Laden and his leadership structure. We did not need the Millennium plots or the attack on
the USS Cole to undertake military action - we needed actionable intelligence that would give us a reasonable chance of
getting al Qaeda leaders. The President and the Principals determined that attacking al Qaeda's primitive facilities
rather than attacking al Qaeda leaders would have little value in setting back al Qaeda and would be counter-productive,
both by enhancing Bin Laden's position among anti-American Islamic elements and by undermining foreign intelligence and
other
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international support for our counter-terrorism effort - all of which had proved to be so crucial in averting hundreds
of American and other deaths from the Millennium and other terrorist plots.
It is my understanding that General Hugh Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already discussed
with the Commission the existence of more than a dozen military plans that were prepared for putting U.S. troops on the
ground to go after Bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda conspirators.
All military options for putting troops into Afghanistan had to address the serious challenges posed by what military
planners often refer to as the tyranny of distance.
Having to operate from staging facilities nearly a thousand miles away from their targets posed serious operational and
logistical challenges, requiring a larger footprint of forces to execute any ground mission in Afghanistan. More support
assets would be required, as would aerial refueling. Even if actionable intelligence ever became available, the quality
and reliability of the intelligence would affect the size of the force required, because less reliable information, as
had been characteristic of reporting out of Afghanistan, would dictate a larger force to help ensure mission success.
There would also be a significant probability of detection when conducting such an operation, further complicating
planning and execution. DOD was fully prepared to conduct a ground operation in Afghanistan if actionable intelligence
ever became available, and we had assets forward deployed that could support such a mission. But the operation had to be
planned so that it had a realistic chance of successfully accomplishing the mission, not merely to "do something."
Some have suggested that with actionable intelligence, a small special forces unit could have been dropped into
Afghanistan and have successfully carried out their mission with only a small military footprint. Merely "dropping" them
into Afghanistan would require substantial assets, as would getting them out - especially if they were detected before
reaching the target or encountered trouble while engaging the target.
Others have suggested that a small special forces unit could have been inserted without actionable intelligence into
Taliban-controlled Afghanstan in order to search for, find and capture or kill Bin Laden. The futility of this proposal
has been amply demonstrated by the fact that for well over two years the U.S. has had many thousands of troops (13,500
at present) backed by significant intelligence assets in Afghanistan (where hostile forces are marginalized, not in
control of the country) and yet we have been unable to locate much less capture Bin Laden.
We also had real experience with such matters. To a far greater extent than has ever been discussed publicly, from 1997
to 2000, we had special forces operating in the Serb section of Bosnia, Serbia proper and elsewhere actively hunting for
war criminals. We had some successes. But a number of high profile PIFWCs (persons indicted for war crimes) eluded us.
The simple fact is that someone who exercises good tradecraft is very difficult to locate and capture in enemy
territory. And this is particularly true when, as in Afghanistan, U.S. forces would be required to operate from nearly a
thousand miles
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away rather than, as in the Balkans, they operated mere tens of miles away and had the support of an enormous
intelligence apparatus in country. Bin Laden exercised very good operational security on par with or better than senior
Serb war criminals.
General Hugh Shelton, the senior military adviser to the President, me and other Principals, was serving as Commander in
Chief of the US Special Operations Command when I recommended that the President name him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
He had enormous experience in planning and carrying out special operations missions during a special forces career that
started in Vietnam. During the efforts to seize war criminals in the Balkans, on many occasions I witnessed him quickly
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of "snatch" plans presented to him by the relevant commander, who was not a special
operations officer, and give guidance for fixing weaknesses, developing alternative approaches or simply dropping
ill-conceived plans destined to fail.
I found General Shelton's military advice to be focused on military success, not risk aversion.
Let me also note for the record that few public officials have been more supportive of special forces than have I. I
wrote and pushed through to enactment the legislation creating the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and giving it
extraordinary authority, including special budget and procurement authority possessed by no other military command and
that in many respects made it a fifth service beside the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force. Rep. Dan Daniels
and Senator Sam Nunn participated in that effort, along with later efforts to increase resources devoted to USSOCOM. My
legislation also created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) and his organization to ensure that USSOCOM had an advocate in the Pentagon. All of
this was done in 1986 over the strenuous objections of the civilian and military DOD leadership of the day. When the DOD
leadership of the day balked at filling the ASD SOLIC position, not unlike 2001- 2003, I and some colleagues stopped
confirmation of other Pentagon positions until a nominee was named. When it became clear that the Secretary of Defense's
first candidate to be ASD SOLIC viewed his mandate from his superiors to be to strangle rather than support the new
organizations, I and others blocked his confirmation. DOD's response was to leave the position vacant, again not unlike
2001-2003, and so we passed legislation mandating that the Secretary of the Army, John Marsh, who supported my efforts,
would also serve as Acting ASD SOLIC until the position was filled. After becoming Secretary of Defense, I selected the
Commander of the USSOCOM to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the principal military adviser to the President and
to me, ensuring that a deep knowledge and appreciation of special forces, their capabilities and how best to use them
were in place at the very top of the Defense Department and informing all decisions on military planning and operations.
At the other end of the spectrum, it has also been suggested that we should have waged war in Afghanistan and militarily
toppled the Taliban. Prior to September 11, it is my judgment that no President could have won U.S. public or
congressional support for invading Afghanistan, much less support from Afghanistan's neighbors whose active cooperation
would have been required for us to conduct such a war. After September 11,
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Pakistan, Uzbekistan and other neighboring countries allowed us to stage large military forces on their soil and
provided other support that enabled us to wage war on Afghanistan and drive the Taliban from power. But before September
11, they clearly were not willing to provide such support, as evidenced by the refusal of some of them to cooperate
against al Qaeda despite repeated and presidential-level pressure, or in other cases with their insistence that such
cooperation remain covert.
Congressional action made securing Pakistan's cooperation even more difficult when sanctions were imposed, following its
nuclear test and military coup. These sanctions served to restrain the Administration's hands and reduce our leverage
with Pakistani authorities. Similarly, our military cooperative efforts with Uzbekistan and other countries were
congressionally constrained.
As I have mentioned, President Clinton and his entire national security team devoted an extraordinary amount of time and
effort to coping with the threat. We were able to achieve significant, albeit unheralded, successes in preventing the
loss of lives here and abroad. In addition, I would note that the Hart-Rudman Commission, on which Congressman Hamilton
served, issued a clarion call to action. Congress also created a number of subcommittees with jurisdiction to focus upon
the threat of domestic and international terrorism. Yet, it is my judgment that at no time was there any realistic
prospect that Congress or the American people would have supported a decision to invade Afghanistan or that our allies
or countries in the region would have supported such a decision.
The Lack of Actionable Intelligence.
The lack of actionable intelligence was the missing element in our comprehensive effort to capture or kill Bin Laden and
al Qaeda leadership.
The war against Iraq has highlighted the challenge of obtaining reliable intelligence against a so-called "hard target."
While some charge that the Bush Administration exaggerated or manipulated the available intelligence, the fact is that
all responsible officials from the Clinton and Bush administrations and, I believe, most Members of Congress genuinely
believed that Saddam Hussein had active WMD programs. While it is too early to declare that belief to be entirely wrong,
I think we all have been surprised by the inability to find meaningful evidence of such active WMD programs.
As difficult an intelligence target as Saddam's Iraq was, Islamic terrorist groups present a much harder target. No U.N.
inspectors were walking into terrorist offices, interrogating terrorist officials or collecting hundreds of thousands of
pages of terrorist documents, as they did with in Iraq. In ways that we cannot discuss here, the fact that Iraq was far
less isolated internationally than the Taliban allowed us to exploit opportunities in Iraq that did not exist in
Afghanistan to collect information.
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To give you a sense of the difficulty of developing intelligence against terrorist targets, consider the al-Shifa
facility in Sudan that we destroyed in 1998 because of the intelligence community's assessment that it was associated
with terrorist efforts to obtain chemical weapons. At the time, the intelligence community at the highest level
repeatedly assured us that "it never gets better than this" in terms of confidence in an intelligence conclusion
regarding a hard target. There was a good reason for this confidence, including multiple, reinforcing elements of
information ranging from links that the organization that built the facility had both with Bin Laden and with the
leadership of the Iraqi chemical weapons program; extraordinary security when the facility was constructed; physical
evidence from the site; and other information from HUMINT and technical sources. Given what we knew regarding
terrorists' interest in acquiring and using chemical weapons against Americans, and given the intelligence assessment
provided us regarding the al-Shifa facility, I continue to believe that destroying it was the right decision. But
perfection is not to be attained in this world, and nowhere is this more true than in the field of intelligence
collection and analysis.
Now consider that information about the whereabouts of Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders never came close to the
reliability and confidence of the information we had on al-Shifa. The information on Bin Laden and other al Qaeda
leaders was often from sources of questionable credibility, frequently fragmentary and packaged in inference, and
ultimately of dubious reliability. It is unlikely that anyone who questioned the decision to destroy the al-Shifa
facility would ever have supported military action based on the intelligence that was available regarding Bin Laden and
other al Qaeda leaders.
In assessing intelligence on Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, Principals also had to factor in their experience
with the quality of intelligence on similar matters. To cite just one example, in April 1999, the intelligence community
reported that Imad Mugniyah (wanted for numerous terrorist attacks dating back to the Beirut bombings, killing more
Americans than any other terrorist prior to September 11) would transit through a certain foreign airport on a specific
flight. When the individual de-planed, however, U.S.
personnel on the scene determined that he was not Mugniyah nor any other person of interest. This is one of several
instances in which action, sometimes lethal action with significant collateral damage, was considered based on dubious
intelligence regarding the identity of the targeted individuals. The military gun was cocked for an extended period, but
only once was the intelligence adequate to pull the trigger and launch strikes in an attempt to kill Bin Laden or any
other al Qaeda leader.
In the summer of 2000, field activities brought forward a demonstration project for landbased wide-area surveillance in
Afghanistan and a concept for combining this with UAV surveillance. These offered the possibility of obtaining
actionable intelligence, which continued to be the missing element in efforts to capture or kill Bin Laden and other al
Qaeda leadership. DOD and interagency addressed and resolved technical and other issues for the UAV program, and the
program moved forward with trial operations over Afghanistan conducted over several weeks in the fall of 2000 to
determine if the modified Predator UAV could be successfully flown from an austere operating base over
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mountains into hostile Afghan airspace while it was remotely controlled via satellite by operators thousands of miles
away on another continent and provide useful information.
Some of these test flights produced unexpectedly good results before seasonal weather forced suspension of flights. This
success led in late 2000 to plans to begin operational deployments in spring 2001 when weather permitted and to use the
intervening months to integrate lethal missile capability onto the UAV. Despite the technical and other challenges
involved, Hellfire-C missiles were integrated onto the Predator UAV and a successful series of in-flight missile firings
from the Predator against a static target were conducted near Nellis Air Force Base on February 16 and 21, 2001, a few
weeks after the change in Administration. It was my expectation that the reconnaissance UAV would be airborne again over
Afghanistan as soon as weather conditions permitted in the spring of 2001, followed by the armed UAV as soon as it was
mission ready. This turned out not to be the case, reportedly for a combination of operational and policy reasons, but I
am not in a position to address the reasons for this.
Capture versus Kill; "Law Enforcement versus War"
Some seek to portray counter-terrorism as a choice between law enforcement and the exercise of military power. Likewise,
some argue that a preference to capture terrorists alive reflects a law enforcement preference rather than a military
approach to counterterrorism.
Both of these views are fallacious.
Effective counter-terrorism requires effective use of all national capabilities - law enforcement, diplomatic,
intelligence, militaryand other capabilities - which are not alternatives, one to be chosen to the exclusion of the
others. This was the basis for President Clinton's counter-terrorism campaign in both the first and second
administrations. It is the basis of President Bush's counter-terrorism campaign, as he articulated it on September 11.
No counter-terrorism effort will be 100% effective, but an effort premised on a false dichotomy of law enforcement
versus war will be far less effective than an integrated effort. Yet for reasons that are inexplicable, this false
choice continues to be expressed by certain critics on both left and right.
Fundamental to all aspects of counter-terrorism is acquiring adequate and timely intelligence; therefore, it is
generally more advantageous to capture than kill.
Intelligence, sometimes critically important intelligence, can be obtained from a living detainee while, as the saying
goes, dead men tell no tales. There is a reason we have over 600 detainees at Guantanamo and elsewhere. According to the
Bush Administration, intelligence is a substantial part of the mission at Guantanmo, and important information is being
obtained from detainees that gives us a better understanding of the al Qaeda network and helps us to counter them.
According to a New York Times article this past weekend interviewing the chief U.S.
interrogator, information acquired from detainees has resulted in terrorist cells being broken, a better understanding
of al Qaeda's efforts to obtain chemical and biological weapons, andal Qaeda fundraising and recruitment methods.
Surely, no one would advocate that Khalid Sheik Mohammed and others should have been killed rather than
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captured, given the information that has been obtained from them. The reason reports last week about the possible
impending capture of Aymad al-Zawahiri generated excitement was not only because he would be removed from involvement in
any further terrorist actions but equally, if not more importantly, because of the information he might yield if
captured.
Why would terrorists provide us with intelligence about their operations? Experience demonstrates that such individuals
often do so unintentionally, whether through bravado, threats, or simple ignorance of what information might be
important to us. Repeatedly, detained terrorists have given us critical information that has enabled us to disrupt
terrorist plans, capture other terrorists, and better combat terrorist networks.
Accordingly, when there is a choice between capturing and interrogating or killing and interring, the former is clearly
more advantageous to us. But if circumstances arise where we are able to kill known terrorists but are unable to capture
them, then we should not hesitate to use lethal force out of self defense. President Clinton's series of MONs to kill al
Qaeda and other terrorist leaders made this clear. It was clear in our military strikes to kill as many as possible at
what the intelligence community reported was a conference of senior leaders of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups
occurring at a specific place and time in August 1998. And it was precisely what we were prepared to do on the few other
occasions when the intelligence community had preliminary indications that it might be able to provide actionable
intelligence to support a military strike. US military forces were "spun up" to be ready to strike, but in each of those
instances, the intelligence community concluded that it lacked actionable intelligence, much to the disappointment of
Administration leaders and to our forces in the field, who often did not know what information had caused them to be
"spun up" nor that the information proved to be inadequate on those occasions.
The decision to use force against a site at which Bin Laden might be located required weighing the probability of
successfully getting Bin Laden because he was at the site against the probability that we would undermine our Bin Laden
effort because he was not at the site.
Had we destroyed a compound and its inhabitants based on flawed or inadequate intelligence, international cooperation in
tracking and seizing al Qaeda operatives would have very likely diminished significantly. Such cooperation proved
essential in rolling up al Qaeda cells and preventing planned terrorist attacks following the August 1998 East Africa
bombings. Such cooperation also provided the potential for acquiring information that would facilitate the capturing or
killing of Bin Laden and al Qaeda leadership.
DOD Priorities in Addressing Multiple Threats to America
You asked about the priority of counter-terrorism efforts against Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda in Defense Department
military planning, relative to other threats confronting the U.S.
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DOD is responsible for military preparations and operations to address the full range of threats to and pursuit of
American national interests. By law, Congress has added other responsibilities to these, such as drug interdiction.
During my tenure at DOD, no matter had a higher priority than countering the threat posed to America, our people and our
interests by international terrorists. No issue consumed more personal attention by me, many other senior colleagues in
DOD, and I believe other Principals. I personally made sure that it also was front and center for defence ministers,
foreign ministers, prime ministers and presidents of the nearly 100 countries with which I dealt and whose cooperation
could help in countering this threat.
As your question implies, it is important to understand that the U.S. faced then and faces today numerous threats to our
national interests and to our national territory that DOD and other agencies must also address. Some of these other
threats put at risk the lives of thousands to millions of Americans and millions of persons in allied countries. It
would not have been responsible to have given less attention than we did to these other critical security issues.
Likewise, DOD must ensure the capabilities and readiness of our Armed Forces are effective to meet both current and
future threats. During my time in office, DOD:
- conducted numerous military operations;
- reversed a decade of decline in the defense budget that started in the first Bush Administration;
- ended the procurement holiday by restructuring the defense program to produce a 47% increase in the defense
procurement budget, which had steadily declined from the middle of the Reagan Administration to 1996;
- accelerated the transformation of our Armed Forces, providing for dramatically enhanced military capabilities as
demonstrated in the wars against Serbia and Afghanistan;
- developed a national missile defense system, elements of which will be deployed later this year, capable of defending
the U.S. homeland against the kind of nuclear missile threat that North Korea can pose.
- undertook military activities to gain military support from more countries, reduce threats, and improve our ability to
respond to threats, including enlarging NATO, building cooperative military programs with countries in Eastern Europe,
Central Asia and South America;
- eliminated vast stockpiles of Russian nuclear, chemical and biological weapons that risked diversion to terrorists or
enemy states;
- wrote and revised numerous deliberative war plans;
- transformed the business operations of the Department of Defense, to the extent permitted by Congress.
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Significant Military Operations.
In January 1997, U.S. and allied forces had just entered their second year in Bosnia in an environment that remained
extremely challenging and dangerous, both to U.S. political objectives and to our troops. The Bosnian Serb regime
headquartered in Pale, closely aligned with the Serb authorities in Belgrade and Serb paramilitary groups, aggressively
committed and incited violence against Bosniak Muslims, Croats and NATO forces;
displaced Bosniak Muslims; and pursued a strategic plan to undermine the Dayton Accords and effectively to gain control
of Bosnia.
A number of factors led Belgrade and Pale Serbs to conclude that they had a realistic chance to succeed in their
objectives based on: the geography of the situation, in which Bosnia Serb territory wrapped itself around much of
Bosniak Muslim territory; the close links between the Pale Serbs and organized crime, which provided both economic and
violent influence; and the lethargy of European-led civil reconstruction efforts, which some Europeans seemed to view as
lifetime appointments rather than urgent requirements. During the course of the succeeding few years, through
considerable effort and attention, an alternative Bosnian Serb regime, independent of Belgrade, was established in Banja
Luka and largely displaced the influence of the Pale Serbs. This enabled political progress under the Dayton Accords,
which - notwithstanding the sclerotic reconstruction efforts, the leadership deficiencies of the Bosniak Muslims, the
continued tensions between the three Bosnian parties, and other issues - enabled Bosnia to become a muddling but stable
success. Because U.S. forces and policy were in the line of fire when the second Administration started, Bosnia did
command the attention of Principals and Deputies, as well as interagency groups specifically focused on the Balkans.
As Bosnia attained stability, Belgrade turned its attention to Kosovo, unleashing Serb paramilitaries and Serb forces on
an ethnic cleansing campaign that displaced a million Albanian Kosovars and created refugee crisis for neighboring
countries. One of Milosevic's objectives was to destabilize the fragile government in multi-ethnic Macedonia and
possibly cause Greece to enter the fray, which in turn would have created pressure on Turkey and Bulgaria to do the
same. It was for these reasons that President George H.W. Bush first warned Milosevic that a military move against
Kosovo would result in war with the U.S. At the same time, violent Islamic terrorists sought to use the chaotic
situation to establish a foothold in the region and, having been thwarted in Bosnia, found opportunity with the collapse
of order in Albania. Egyptian Islamic Jihad and possibly others operated in Albania, and the U.S. successfully thwarted
an attempted truck bombing of our embassy in Tirana.
Adhering to an allied approach to the war against Serbia did compel Principals to devote significant attention
maintaining alliance cohesion, but it was necessary for two practical reasons. First, allied territory was needed to
fight the largest air campaign since World War II. And secondly, looking to the long term, full allied support was
necessary if we were to adhere to our plan of the U.S. carrying the vast majority of the war effort (over 80% by most
measures) and the allies carrying the vast majority of the post-war effort.
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During the war, we determined that the U.S. would contribute no more than 15% of the post-war stabilization force, while
coalition partners would be required to contribute at least 85%; the U.S. would exercise strategic and ultimate control
over the occupation, but coalition partners would bear the burden at subordinate levels for most of Kosovo; and
coalition partners would bear the bulk of reconstruction costs. After the war, we successfully adhered to this plan, but
only because we had maintained allied cohesion during the war. The wisdom of this is apparent in hindsight, looking both
at the recent flare-up in violence in Kosovo and at the events in Iraq. But during the war it did require focused
attention from Principals who continually worked foreign counterparts , although the Deputies and interagency Balkan
specialists carried most of the weight for post-war occupation issues once the Helsinki negotiations with Russia were
completed.
Following the war against Serbia over Kosovo, Milosevic prepared for a possible blitzgrieg military action against
Montenegro, which while federated with Serbia in a rump Yugoslavia was exercising increasing independence from Belgrade.
The US European Command developed plans to defeat a Serb military move against Montenegro, which Milosevic would have
used to reignite conflict in Bosnia. Concurrent with this, Milosevic sought to stage manage an election process to
bolster his political position after his failure in Kosovo. But the process became a real contest, and effective support
to the democratic opposition led to Milosevic's ouster and then to his imprisonment in The Hague. This action prevented
the fifth Balkan war of the decade, bringing to an end a series of wars that had killed hundreds of thousands, flooded
Europe with millions of refugees, and threatened European stability and security at the very time that the collapse of
the Soviet Union had created the opportunity to build (to quote President Bush Sr.) "a Europe whole and free" - an
opportunity that we seized by supporting the enlargement of NATO and the European Union. Principals and Deputies
actively guided this closing phase of the Balkan wars.
At the same time as the war against Serbia was being conducted, skirmishes broke out at sea between North Korea and
South Korea, with dozens killed and ships destroyed.
Tensions and the risk of war that could produce millions of Korean and tens of thousands of American casualties spiked
above their normal hair-trigger levels.
I would note that there were very few instances in which I met with NATO counterparts, including during the many
meetings held during the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, that I did not focus their attention on the threat posed by
terrorists and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Likewise with Russia. While I was in Moscow, an apartment
block was bombed reportedly by terrorists. I directed that a bilateral military intelligence dialogue be initiated, with
a primary focus on extremist Islamic terrorists who posed a threat to both countries. Our policy dialogue with Russia
sought to turn their attention from their false security concern of NATO enlargement to the real security concern of how
best to address the terrorist threat, as well as the long-term threat they were creating for themselves and for us by
allowing nuclear and missile technology to go to Iran and others.
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The U.S. war in Afghanistan could not have been fought as it has been without the cooperation of formerly Soviet Central
Asian states, which was based partly on U.S.
military engagement, training and support conducted during the late 1990s, despite congressional limitations. Moreover,
Central Asian support for the war in Afghanistan was dependent on Russian acquiescence, which also was based in part on
the close cooperation with the Russian military during the 1990s, including American and Russian troops and commanders
working side by side in military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The U.S. also conducted ongoing military operations in Iraq throughout my tenure. Iraq was effectively contained during
this period through the combination of:
- enforcement of the Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones and the Southern No-Drive Zone,
- use of the no-fly/no-drive enforcement operations to continually attrit Iraqi air defenses and related command and
control and other military capabilities through regular air strikes, ranging in size from one to over 80 targets per
strike;
- maritime interdiction operations;
- international sanctions;
- Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, which destroyed missile production and WMD facilities, killed key leadership of
Iraq's missile program, killed 1400 Special Republican Guard and Republican Guard forces, destroyed Special Republican
Guard and Republican Guard headquarters and other assets, and destroyed command and control and intelligence facilities;
- establishment of a near continuous deployments of U.S. ground forces in Kuwait, which continually improved and
demonstrated U.S. ability to rapidly deploy ground forces from the U.S. to Iraq's border;
- significant enhancement of U.S. military facilities and capabilities in Kuwait, Qatar and other GCC countries,
increasing U.S. capabilities against Iraq;
- re-write of war plans.
The effort to enhance U.S. military capabilities in the Gulf region and to develop and maintain support within GCC
countries for ongoing U.S. operations against Iraq and for capabilities enhancement did require my regular personal
attention. Other Principals, too, devoted considerable attention to Iraq-related issues to ensure that Iraq remained
contained and to manage issues related to our military operations against Iraq.
Other Priority International Matters
Several other dangerous situations arose during these years that also warranted Principals' attention. Among others,
these included the Kargil crisis that threatened to escalate into a general war between Pakistan and India, with the
very real possibility of a nuclear war that could kill hundreds of thousands or more; the escalation of cross-Straits
tensions that also threatened to erupt into warfare between China and Taiwan; hostilities between North and South Korea
that had the potential to escalate, as discussed below;
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and North Korea development and testing of long-range missiles, capable of delivering nuclear weapons not only to allied
territory but also to U.S. territory. All of these put at risk vital U.S. security interests and most of them directly
threatened U.S. lives, necessitating attention by the President and the Principals.
Numerous other non-operational matters, but having operational consequences, also merited my and other Principals'
attention during this period, among them:
- Negotiations to remake NATO to meet the new security challenges, including the Alliance's new strategic concept and
command structures, led not only to NATO allies bearing the vast majority of post-war responsibilities in Kosovo but
laid the basis for them to undertake significant responsibilities in post-war Afghanistan and Iraq.
- Engaging Russia over its place in the new security architecture.
- Adoption of essentially a new defense treaty with Japan through the new Defense Guidelines, dropping the Cold War
orientation of the alliance and remaking it to meet security requirements of the new century;
- Bringing China into the WTO and other international institutions that will mutually benefit both our countries and
help to constrain unconstructive or dangerous Chinese behavior.
Deliberative Military Planning
Numerous deliberative war plans were also written or re-written. This included major plans regarding the nuclear SIOP
and associated plans, China, Iraq, Iran, and Korea and other plans regarding such matters as Cuba. Some of these plans
were revised multiple times. In addition, significant planning was done for withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Balkans
and their dispatch to other theaters should that ever be required.
Also, presidential decision directives and presidentially approved contingency planning guidance were written requiring
non-DOD agencies develop capabilities and deliberative plans for their roles in post-conflict situations, such as we see
in Iraq, although my understanding is that these directives did not survive the Clinton Administration.
To discuss one in more detail, we re-wrote the war plan for the Korean Peninsula and instituted many changes to be able
to execute it, as well as developed additional military plans for contingencies such as the collapse of the North Korean
government. Previous operational plans had failed to properly address the likelihood of North Korean use of chemical
weapons and possibly other WMD. Properly addressing this aspect of the threat required intensive and wide-ranging
efforts by DOD. The operational plan revision also needed to take advantage of the transformation of U.S. military
capabilities during the 1990s, as well as the need to ensure decisive action at the opening of a conflict and conflict
termination on decisive terms rather than restoration of the status quo ante.
This effort was made more urgent by Kim Jong Il's reconfiguration of the North Korean military, moving forces forward to
the area adjacent the DMZ, from which North Korean 22 artillery could rain up to 500,000 shells per hour on half of
South Korea's population and economy, including Seoul, and on tens of thousands of US forces and dependents;
deploying hundreds of missiles capable of delivery conventional, chemical or other weapons to southernmost South Korea
or to Japan; exercising more coordinated air and ground operations; and enhancing North Korea's large special operations
forces for insertion in rear areas in South Korea and Japan.
North Korea's military realignment appeared designed to support a strategy for launching war with little to no warning;
rapidly seize northern areas of South Korea; disrupt the US ability to fight from rear areas and to flow forces into the
peninsula; and, when its advance on the peninsula slowed, to sue for peace under the threat of nuclear attack on South
Korea or Japan.
In 1999-2000, North Korean training exercises were at record high levels and, learning from U.S. combat operations in
the Balkans and Iraq, North Korean military modified facilities, dispersed forces and expanded camouflage, concealment
and deception efforts.
In June 1999, following several known North Korean submarine raids into South Korean waters, the first hostilities since
the Korean War broke out, with North Korean and South Korean naval vessels firing on each other, resulting in two North
Korean vessels destroyed and several dozen North Korean forces killed.
In short, the threat of war in Northeast Asia was very real during this period and remains so today. Such a war would
put at risk vital American interests, tens of thousands of American lives, and millions of Korean lives, among others,
assuming North Korea did not use nuclear weapons; the death toll would be much higher if it did. This risk of war
justifiably warranted significant attention of myself and other Principals, just as it does Secretary Rumsfeld and his
colleagues.
Conclusion
I have attempted to set forth some of the major initiatives under taken by the Department of Defense to counter the
threat of terrorism during the time I was privileged to serve at the Pentagon.
As I noted, many of those initiatives proved successful in saving the lives of many of our citizens both here and
abroad.
On many occasions the Administration was able to secure the cooperation of Congress and others in the pursuit of its
goals. In a number of cases, it did not.
For example, some in Congress, the media and "policy community" accused those of us focused on the terrorist threat of
being alarmist and of exaggerating the threat in order to boost our budgets. Countering the threat of terrorism was "the
latest gravy train,"
according to one expert quoted by US News & World Report. The belief that we were indulging in cynical hyperbole resulted in several legislative actions.
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- We found tens to hundreds of millions of dollars cut from the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, forcing
Administration officials to spend significant time and energy to restore funds to secure and eliminate dangerous
materials that terrorists were seeking in order to inflict attack Americans.
- Congress blocked cooperation with countries whose support was critical in counter-terrorism efforts, such as banning
military cooperation with Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country that is a key battleground in the campaign
against Islamic extremists, and banning any meaningful cooperation with Pakistan, the front-line state in the global war
on terrorism.
- Congressional committees rejected requests for legislative authority for DOD to provide certain support to domestic
agencies to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack in the U.S.
In an effort to help remove doubt and complacency about the growing threat, working with congressional leadership, I
appointed a panel in 1998 led by former Senators Rudman and Hart and including Vice Chairman Hamilton, former Speaker
Gingrich, retired senior military commanders and others. The Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, on its
own and without direction from the Administration, validated the reality of the threat to the American homeland from
terrorism, including terrorists armed with WMD. In releasing the Commission's first report, long before September 11,
Vice Chairman Hamilton stated well the fundamental issue:
What comes across to me in this report more than any other single fact is that the commission believes that Americans
are going to be less secure than they believe themselves to be. So I think what we're trying to say in this report is
that we've lived in a very secure time. We're very fortunate for that, but we are going to be confronted with a lot of
challenges to our national security that Americans do not believe we're going to be subjected to, and that's really what
comes out of this report for me more than any other single thing. (Emphasis added.) Vice Chairman Hamilton's remarks
resonated with me because I recalled that at my very first press conference as Secretary of Defense, I was asked "what
is your greatest concern as you look toward to the future?" and my response was essentially the same as Lee Hamilton's:
My greatest concern is that we be able to persuade the American people that having a viable, sustainable national
security policy is important, even when there is no clearly identifiable enemy on the horizon. We still live in a very
dangerous, disorderly world. And in many cases, we face dangers that are comparable to those we faced in the past;
namely, the proliferation of missile technology, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of
terrorism.
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I believe that we have been complacent as a society. We have failed to fully comprehend the gathering storm. Even now
after September 11, it is far from clear that our society truly appreciates the gravity of the threat we face or is yet
willing to do what is necessary to counter it. Even after September 11, and after anthrax and ricin attacks in the U.S.,
I remain concerned that the controversy over not finding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will lead to the erroneous
assumption that all the talk about the dangers of WMD is just another exercise in the cynical exploitation of fear.
After all, it is commonly noted, there have been no attacks since 9/11. This is a dangerous delusion. The enemy is not
only coming, he has been here. He is already amongst us. He will continue to try to examine our weaknesses, exploit the
crevices in our security, and destroy our way of living as well as our lives.
As you can deduce from my statement, I believe that the Clinton Administration far more than any Administration prior to
September 11 understood the threat that terrorists pose to our country and took far greater and more comprehensive
action to counter it than any previous administration. But notwithstanding all this, the U.S. was hit in a devastating
way. Clearly neither the first Bush Administration, nor the two Clinton Administrations, nor the current Bush
Administration did all that we and they needed to do to prevent the rise and spread of violent Islamic extremists and to
prevent them from reaching our shores with instruments of mass death.
Nor do I believe that even today, with a global war on terrorism being waged, are we doing all we need to do to prevent
the further spread of violent Islamic extremists and to prevent them from reaching our shores with mass death.
I don't pretend to hold the keys to the kingdom of wisdom on what needs to be done in the future. All of us who have
held high office must remain accountable for our actions while holding the public trust. It is my hope that the
Commission through its work will focus as well on the fault lines that run through our democratic system as we struggle
to cope with a challenge of unprecedented proportions.
At a minimum, I think it important to:
- Develop a meaningful, in-depth public discussion - among our citizens not just our elected officials - regarding what
compromises on privacy are we willing to accept in order to remain safe and free. The current debate over access to
personal data for aviation security purposes is not encouraging. We must elevate public discussion on these matters, and
do our best to remove them from electoral manipulation at least until we truly understand the issues and choices. We
need to reconcile the role technology will play in our lives for good and ill and try to insure that we remain its
master and not its slave. This balance will not be easily struck or eagerly embraced, but it must be done;
- Consider establishing a domestic intelligence organization, distinct from law enforcement and subject to appropriate
control, regulation and oversight;
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- Secure and eliminate on an accelerated basis fissile nuclear material and chemical and biological weapon agents that
pose a risk of diversion. This will require a more cooperative approach with Russia than the U.S. currently has
achieved;
- Re-energize America's engagement in Middle East. I believe that if the road to peace in the Middle East runs through
Baghdad, then success in Baghdad may very well run through Jerusalem. The unabated violence there can only serve to
remain a breeding ground for even more savagery and nihilism in the future. This effort should not await the counting of
ballots in November;
- Finally, we need to persuade free people the world over that the war on terror cannot be waged by America alone. As
recent events demonstrate, religious extremists and fanatics do not recognize geographical boundaries. There are no rear
lines, no pockets of tranquility, no safe harbors for innocent civilians. We are all on the front lines today. A virus
or a bomb born in a distant laboratory or factory is but a plane ride away from any place on the planet.
It's a time for sober reflection and the charting of a responsible course of action. There's very little time to lose.
ENDS