Colombia-Again Perched at the Edge of the Slippery Slope
[Notice to the Media: On COHA's staff are researchers who have met with Colombia's president, national
security advisor, as well as several of the country's guerrilla leaders.]
Colombia-- Again Perched at the Edge of the Slippery Slope
· End of negotiations marks a pivotal moment for Bogotá and Washington
· "Terrorism" now becomes a dangerous word
Now that President Pastrana has issued an ultimatum giving the FARC guerrillas 48 hours to vacate the 16,000 sq. mile
refuge that he granted them three years ago to expedite negotiations, it is imperative that Washington does nothing to
enflame the current situation. Regardless of which side is to blame for this most recent breakdown in the long and
troubled negotiations, it is incontestable that Pastrana genuinely has sought peace, that the FARC often has been
obdurate as well as evasive in its demands, and that the Colombian president has been unable to deliver on his pledge to
break links between rightist elements of the Colombian military and the extremist AUC paramilitaries (classified as
"terrorists" by the State Department) who Pastrana acknowledges is responsible for 80 per cent of the country's gory
human rights record.
Another important fact that Pastrana has acknowledged is that, even if the guerillas demobilize after successful
negotiations, the Colombian authorities would be unable to guarantee the personal security of any former guerrilla who
decides to reenter civil society. The FARC bitterly recalls that after other guerrilla movements signed agreements in
the 1980s with the government, and proceeded to lay down their arms after they demobilized and returned to civilian
life, scores of them were assassinated, including many of the candidates of the political party which they earlier had
formed.
Now that negotiations have, at least temporarily, halted, the main danger resulting from the impasse between Colombian
authorities and the country's guerrilla forces is posed by the increasingly operational role being played by the
"terrorist" factor as a function of Bogotá as well as Washington strategy. Just as the drug war replaced the Cold War as
the ideological mainspring for U.S. regional policymakers, Washington and Bogotá officials increasingly are referring to
the guerrillas as "terrorists," which could serve as a rationale to escalate their military action against the rebel
forces. This could effectively erode the firewall between the anti-drug and the anti-guerrilla wars that has long been
recognized by the U.S., even as it implemented last year's $1.3 billion dollar contribution to Bogotá's Plan Colombia,
which was mainly military in nature. These funds have been allocated to the anti-drug war and not against the
guerrillas.
In the wake of the U.S.-led anti-Al Qaeda and anti-Taliban war "targeted against terrorism," the real danger is that the
Bush Administration will unwisely decide to transfer its anti-terrorism momentum and odium to Colombia's guerrillas in
combating the first of a series of hemispheric dominos which could later include Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the reviving
guerrilla threat in Peru, and ultimately, in Cuba. The last-named country could particularly be in U.S. cross hairs if
the White House were to grant a recess appointment to Otto Reich to be assistant secretary of state for inter-American
affairs, a controversial figure who is mainly noted for his rabid anti-Havana phobia.
Ends