Lobby Briefing: 11am Tuesday 20 November 2001
PM'S SPEECH
Asked about the Prime Minister's speech in Germany today, the Prime Minister's Official Spokesman (PMOS) said that he
was expected to develop some of the themes he had set out in his Party Conference speech and in his speech at the Lord
Mayor's Banquet last week.
AFGHANISTAN
Phonecalls/Update
The PMOS advised journalists that the Prime Minister had had a twenty-minute telephone conversation with President Bush
last night as part of their ongoing dialogue. He had also spoken to President Musharraf.
Asked for further details about the Prime Minister's conversation with President Bush, the PMOS said it had never been
our practice to give a detailed briefing of such phonecalls, and he did not intend to start now. Last night's
conversation had been part of an ongoing dialogue which the Prime Minister and President had been having from the
outset. Both had agreed that great progress had been made in the last ten days. However, there was obviously a lot more
to be done. They had reviewed the military, humanitarian and diplomatic tracks. Both had welcomed the fact that the
Brahimi-convened talks on setting up the interim broad-based government in Afghanistan looked likely to happen this
weekend. We expected Mr Brahimi to confirm today that a meeting of the different groups would take place later this
week, probably in Germany.
British Forces
Questioned about reports of a rift between the UK and US on the issue of deployment, the PMOS said that had journalists
listened to the Prime Minister's phonecall last night with President Bush, they would have seen just how baseless the
stories about divisions were. As Jack Straw had said today, there was a coalition. The US was in the lead for obvious
reasons. Our forces at Bagram were serving with US forces and were under Centcom command (under General Tommy Franks).
Discussions were continuing in relation to the question of exactly what 'follow-on' forces might have to be used. Those
discussions would continue and would address questions of where, who, how and when. These issues would be assessed and
decided in due course.
Put to him that he had said last week that the forces at Bagram airport were under British command, the PMOS explained
that the overall force there was under Centcom command, given that Centcom was carrying out the overall co-ordinating
role. Clearly there would be a senior British figure with our forces at Bagram. The two things were not inconsistent.
The idea that the two countries were pulling in different directions when their forces were actually operating together
on the ground together was nonsense. Asked how we would respond if we reached a situation where we were concerned about
the wellbeing of our troops but the American Commander on the ground was not, the PMOS suggested that journalists were
looking for difficulties which didn't exist. He pointed out that our forces would not have been deployed to Bagram had
it not been for Centcom's co-ordination of the whole operation and their subsequent decision that British troops should
be deployed there. Questioned as to how that decision had been reached, the PMOS said that different countries were
making known different assets to the US as part of their coalition role. It was for the US to draw those assets down and
use them as they saw fit - hence the deployment of British troops to Bagram.
Asked how long we could keep British troops on 48-hour standby, the PMOS said it could continue for some time, depending
on the situation. As we had said yesterday, the decision to shorten the notice to move was not of itself a decision to
deploy. It had been a recognition that, given the changing situation following the fall of Kabul and the significant
military advances, other issues had come to the fore and it had been important to have forces on a state of readiness to
be deployed as required. We did not make any apology for the fact that prior to making a decision as to whether to send
our forces into a fluid, difficult conflict situation, detailed discussions would be had with our allies, the situation
on the ground would be given full consideration and a detailed assessment about the environment into which they might be
deployed would be made. The safety of our forces was of course one of our paramount concerns. That would remain the case
- and quite rightly so.
Put to him that the UK and US were pursuing different objectives in that the UK appeared to see the reconstruction of
Afghanistan as a priority whereas the US was focussing on the capture of bin Laden, the PMOS said this was a false
caricature. He pointed out that a Reconstruction Conference regarding the future of Afghanistan was taking place in New
York today and was looking at some of the longer term issues, such as what measures might be taken to rebuild the
country. We had said from the outset that this was a different sort of conflict to any other in the past. There were
different tracks - the military, diplomatic and humanitarian - all of which were important. The military campaign was
continuing. In terms of the diplomatic track, talks were being convened under the auspices of the UN's Lakhdar Brahimi
later this week. Stephen Evans had now arrived in Kabul to establish a UK presence. He was due to meet Francesc Vendrell
today and would also be meeting Dr Abdullah Abdullah of the Northern Alliance. The humanitarian effort was also
continuing. All three tracks were progressing in parallel and all were interlinked. If progress was made on one, it
could open up opportunities on the other two fronts, which was something we had to grasp - as we were indeed doing.
Following the fall of Kabul, there had been widespread predictions that the city would turn into a blood bath. That had
not happened. Of course that was not to say the situation was not fluid or difficult. It was. Assessments therefore had
to be made relating to the situation at a given time.
Questioned about reports in today's papers claiming that our forces were under siege at Bagram, the PMOS said these
stories were absolute nonsense and to pretend this was some sort of 'Rourke's Drift' situation was ridiculous. The
forces there were carrying out their tasks. They had excellent relations with the people on the ground and did not feel
threatened in any way. To pretend otherwise was simply wrong. Asked if we were concerned that there were only a hundred
troops on the ground, the PMOS said that the forces had a specific job to do at Bagram - to secure the airport and
undertake reconnaissance work. We had already seen some of the advantages in their presence there, specifically the fact
that Mr Vendrell and Mr Evans had been able to get into the country and carry out their work. As we had acknowledged
throughout, this was a fluid situation. We did not have a book where you turned the page and found that the next chapter
had already been written. Of course we were alive to all the problems and difficulties. However, it was important not to
exaggerate, or indeed invent them.
Asked if he was implying that we had not announced further deployments because the situation in Afghanistan was
considered to be too unsafe at this stage or whether it was because there was a sense that additional troops might not
be required to undertake the tasks we had initially identified as necessary, the PMOS repeated that there was a
developing situation inside Afghanistan. Decisions would be made based on judgements reached at a particular time. There
was a shared recognition with the US that 'follow-on' forces might have to be deployed. Discussions were continuing
between coalition partners as to the questions which might flow from that. People should be reassured that we were not
rushing into anything and were taking the time necessary to get it right. We would certainly not be thanked were we to
rush into a potentially hostile, difficult environment which could result in negative consequences.
Questioned as to whether British forces at Bagram would be involved in the security operation in terms of making sure
that representatives from Afghanistan's tribal and ethnic groupings would be able to get to the UN-convened talks in
Germany later this week, the PMOS said that given that British forces were securing the airport to enable people to get
into the country, it would follow that people equally would be able to get out if necessary.
UN-Convened Meeting
Asked for further detail about the UN-convened meeting in Germany later this week, the PMOS said that it was for Mr
Brahimi to make an announcement. A lot of work had been taking place on the diplomatic track in parallel with the
military campaign. The diplomatic track had not started with fall of Mazar-i-Sharif. Discussions about the establishment
of a broad-based government had begun some time before that in an attempt to bring about some stability and help rebuild
Afghanistan. Talks were continuing as to how that process could be taken forward. We hoped an announcement would be made
today which would set out some sort of 'route map' as to where we might be going.
Asked who would represent the UK, the PMOS said that if our presence was thought to be helpful at the meeting,
representation could be arranged at different levels. However, in the end, what mattered was to bring the
representatives of the different tribes and ethnic groups inside Afghanistan around the table. It was not us who would
be forming a government - it was them. We could help bring about an agreement, but could not impose one. Questioned as
to whether British representatives at the UN could attend, and if so who, the PMOS said it was perfectly possible. He
pointed out that Robin Cooper, a senior FCO official, had been doing a lot of work on the diplomatic track there, but
underlined that our presence was not important when compared with the presence of the different ethnic groups.
TERMINAL FIVE
Asked why it had taken so long to announce the decision on Terminal Five, the PMOS said that Stephen Byers was making
statement to the House this afternoon where he would no doubt set out the background to his decision. Pressed further,
the PMOS said there were complex issues which had had to be considered. Mr Byers would no doubt want to mention the
whole issue of timetables and planning applications.
GIBRALTAR
Asked whether joint sovereignty might be considered an option to resolve the difficulty over Gibraltar and whether it
would be put to a referendum, the PMOS said that Jack Straw had made the position very clear this morning. This was a
process to resolve some of the issues that were causing difficulty for the people of Gibraltar - practical things such
as the number of telephone lines they were allowed to have. These problems were already being resolved as a result of
these talks. Our position remained absolutely as set out in 1969. There could be no change without consent. Any change
in the status of Gibraltar - and he was not indicating that any was planned - would require a referendum as a guarantee
that the people of Gibraltar would have a say about their future.
Put to him that Jack Straw had said this morning that any transfer of sovereignty from Britain would require a
referendum but did not specifically say that this would be so with joint sovereignty, the PMOS said that Mr Straw had
been making the point that there could be no change of sovereignty without the consent of the people of Gibraltar. Joint
sovereignty would obviously amount to a change. The PMOS added that this issue was not the focus of today's talks.