After 911 - Multilateralism for a Global Era
After September 11: American Foreign Policy and the Multilateral Agenda
"Multilateralism for a Global Era"
By Ambassador Richard N. Haass Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Conference: "After September 11: American Foreign Policy and the Multilateral
Agenda" Wednesday, November 14, 2001, 1430-1530 Woman's Democratic Club Conference Center 1526 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Debates over the role of multilateralism have been a recurring element in discussions of our foreign policy since the
country's founding in the 18th century. At their core, these debates have hinged upon how we answer a basic, enduring
question: how should the United States work with others to foster a world conducive to our interests and values.
How Americans have answered that question helped define the failures and successes of U.S. foreign policy in the last
century. Following the First World War, the failure to sustain multilateral cooperation helped pave the way to the Great
Depression and the Second World War. Following the Second World War, American success in forging new multilateral
arrangements like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and the Bretton Woods system, helped sustain our relationships with allies, our prosperity, and our
strength through the long decades of the Cold War.
The debate over multilateralism took on new urgency in the wake of the Soviet Union's demise. Ironically,
multilateralism risked becoming a victim of its own success. Victory in the Cold War called into question the continued
relevance of the multilateral institutions like NATO that had served us so well when we confronted a qualitatively
different set of international challenges. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, the United States became and has
since remained the world's preeminent nation-state in all measures of power and without a "peer competitor" in sight.
For some, multilateralism's necessity seemed diminished.
During the past decade, Americans thus searched to find the appropriate role for multilateralism. We worked with our
partners abroad to begin revising the multilateral institutions of the Cold War era to ensure their relevance in the
future, for instance, by expanding NATO and strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE.) Likewise, we worked to extend and deepen cooperation in new domains with the creation of North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and to
integrate new partners -- and even former adversaries -- into these multilateral arrangements.
We have learned from this decade of experience. Today, at the dawn of a new century, the Bush Administration is forging
a hard-headed multilateralism suited to the demands of this global era, one that will both promote our values and
interests now and help structure an international environment to sustain them well into the future.
Fundamentals matter. A successful foreign policy begins by comprehending both the realities of power -- its potential
and its limitations -- and the nature of an era's challenges and opportunities. We have not yet coined a catchy word or
phrase to describe this period of international relations. Nevertheless, we recognize that many of the defining features
of this increasingly globalized era are intrinsically transnational. Equally important, they often defy the efforts of
any single country to solve alone -- even a country as powerful as the United States.
Just consider some of the important foreign policy tasks before us:
* Stymieing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that threaten to wreck havoc upon civilization; * Promoting
world trade and a robust international financial architecture essential for our continued prosperity; * Combating the
spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases that not only pose health threats, but destroy societies, devastate
economies, and destabilize entire regions; * Maintaining around the globe forward momentum for good governance, rule of
law, and democracy that expands the sphere of individual freedom and development; * Integrating new countries and
peoples into the global economic order so that they can reap its rewards instead of being left behind; and * Coping with
state failures that endanger in this world of increasing interconnections and unprecedented mobility not only their
neighbors, but also -- as we have tragically seen in the case of Afghanistan -- American lives and our way of life.
This, of course, brings me to our preeminent national security challenge -- international terrorism. As the events of
September 11th tragically reminded us, international terrorism is globalization run amok. Al-Qaida and its cousin
terrorist networks have twisted the benefits and conveniences of an increasingly open, integrated, globalized world to
serve their destructive agenda. And they have demonstrated that globalization, despite its enormous benefits, brings new
vulnerabilities to the United States as well.
We should take Usama bin Laden, his minions, and their Taliban supporters at their word. They seek to drive the United
States out of the Middle East so that they can topple regimes throughout the region and destroy Israel; then they aspire
to impose their rule. They consider the United Nations a "tool of crime." They cannot abide by the personal freedoms we
take for granted -- freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the freedom of women to be educated. They will continue
their indiscriminate slaughter of innocents of all races, creeds, and nationalities until they achieve their objectives
or they are stopped.
We will stop them. Our campaign against international terrorism does not represent some sort of "clash of
civilizations." Instead, it is a clash between civilization and those who would destroy it.
We understand that the campaign will be long and difficult. To destroy terrorist networks root and branch, we will
employ the full spectrum of the tools of statecraft -- diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, public information,
economic, and military. And we recognize that expansive multilateral cooperation offers the best hope of triumphing over
the international terrorist scourge. As President Bush stressed last week: "The defeat of terror requires an
international coalition of unprecedented scope and cooperation." Indeed, such cooperation provides the foundation for
the campaign against terrorism's success not just today, but in the years ahead.
Multilateral cooperation is essential to success on the three major fronts in the campaign against terrorism: first, the
predominantly military front now in Afghanistan; second, the humanitarian, political, and economic front of Afghan
reconstruction; and, third, the broad front against terrorism with a global reach that will involve carefully tailored
policies exploiting all the tools of statecraft.
The first front: the destruction of the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and the removal of the Taliban regime that has
aided and harbored those responsible for the September 11th attacks as well as other terrorist acts. A little more than
5 weeks ago, we began our military campaign in Afghanistan. We could not wage this sustained campaign by ourselves. We
need basing and overflight rights for our forces operating in the region. We also need critical intelligence above and
beyond satellite photos and communications intercepts, intelligence involving human contact -- that which only those on
the ground can provide. Our allies are also supporting the campaign by providing essential logistical support, increased
security at American facilities worldwide, and their own forces to backfill when ours have to be redeployed. With each
passing day, more countries offer forces to join our military operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban and in favor
of securing liberated areas. Coalition members and international organizations are also offering much needed diplomatic
and economic support to the frontline states in the region to ensure their stability and security in these difficult
times. The Taliban's retreat marks success not just for the Afghan opposition or us, but also for the entire
international coalition.
The second front: our commitment to the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan so that it will never again
be a safe haven for the likes of Usama bin Laden, a source for drugs or refugees, or a threat to its region. Our
combined humanitarian, political, and economic efforts on this front are all rooted in multilateral cooperation.
Before the current crisis, the United States was already the world's largest contributor of humanitarian aid to the
Afghan people, who have been starved by the Taliban -- sometimes through deliberate policies, such as harassing and
forcing out Western aid workers. Now, we have redoubled our efforts. At each stage, we have worked closely with the
countries in the region and international organizations such as the World Food Program and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to address the Afghans' full range of humanitarian needs.
We are also now heavily engaged in the multilateral efforts to found a transitional government to replace the Taliban,
one that will represent the interests of all the people of Afghanistan and move the country toward a stable, peaceful
future. I can personally attest that our approach is multilateral to the core. As the U.S. Coordinator for Afghanistan's
future, I am in regular contact with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, his special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, and the
representatives of nearly every country interested in Afghanistan's fate. On Monday at the United Nations, for instance,
I participated in discussions of Afghanistan's future within the 6+2 Group, comprising Afghanistan's six immediate
neighbors as well as the United States and Russia. And we are working closely as well with our European and Asian allies
and our partners in the region to help the Afghan opposition to establish a transitional government framework.
The economic reconstruction of Afghanistan must move in step with the political. Here too our approach is fundamentally
multilateral. The United States is now working with other donors to create a group to support the long-term
reconstruction of Afghanistan. We hope that such a group will harness the international community's resources and
channel them to build the economic foundations for a more stable Afghanistan.
The third front: as President Bush has repeatedly stressed, "Afghanistan is the beginning of our efforts in the
world.... [But] we will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have
been defeated." Once again, our strategy is multilateral. We began the campaign on this, the broadest front, even before
our operations in Afghanistan. We must remember that al-Qaida cells exist in over 60 countries around the world --
including our own. Combating other terrorist groups with global reach -- as well as their supporters wherever and
whoever they may be -- demands that we work cooperatively with our coalition partners to maximize the effectiveness of
our efforts -- be they diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, strategic information, or military.
These efforts have already had impact. We are working aggressively with other countries to choke off terrorists'
financial lifelines, both by fully implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and by freezing the assets of those
individuals and entities listed in Executive Order 13244. Over 150 nations have joined us in these efforts, together
blocking tens of millions of dollars in potential terrorist assets. Similarly, intelligence sharing and law enforcement
cooperation has led to numerous arrests and new leads around the world. Just yesterday, for example, Spanish authorities
arrested nine suspected terrorists. Success in Afghanistan is likely to provide further impetus to these efforts.
The challenge of terrorism is not transitory. Neither can be our response. We must be prepared to use the full range of
tools of statecraft -- from law enforcement and diplomacy to intelligence and military operations -- now and in the
future. We must therefore begin creating the machinery to fight, in President Bush's words, "terrorism in general." We
must work to establish the frameworks for cooperation that will make us and our partners less vulnerable to terrorism in
the future and better able to fight it when it does appear. We have already taken the first steps in this direction, for
instance, by helping create a new counterterrorism subgroup to the G-8. But we have only just begun.
Considered together, our efforts on these three fronts in the campaign against terrorism -- our current operations in
Afghanistan, our efforts to ensure a better future for the Afghan people, and our fight against terrorism with a global
reach -- all highlight how multilateral cooperation does not have to constrain us. Rather, such cooperation can be a
true force multiplier, enabling us to leverage our assets in combination with others'.
When we step back from and reflect upon the campaign against terrorism, it is possible to discern basic principles to
guide our approach to multilateralism in the coming years.
First and foremost, American leadership is fundamental. Without it, multilateral initiatives can go astray -- or worse.
We must be resolute and confident once we have embarked upon a policy. Yet leadership demands, President Bush has
emphasized on many occasions, a sense of humility. Leadership thus requires genuine consultation. We must respect the
values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. We will need their support not just today and tomorrow, but
in months and years to come.
In forming multilateral initiatives in this era, we should not be shackled by the memories of past animosities or
prickly relations. Ultimately, we are interested in results. We thus must continue to try to integrate countries like
Russia, China, and India into our efforts to create a better future.
We cannot expect every nation to make the same commitment to a coalition. Differences in capabilities, location, foreign
policy outlook, and domestic concerns make this impracticable. Instead, we should expect our coalitions to be dynamic
and embrace the benefits of the division of labor. Some multilateral efforts will become embedded in more formal
institutional structures, but others will change through time as the particular challenges wax, wane, and evolve. Even
in the campaign against terrorism we have, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld says, not "a single coalition," but
"revolving coalitions that will evolve and change over time depending on the activity and the circumstance of the
country."
Our desire to work cooperatively with others does not mean, however, a willingness to agree to unsound efforts just
because they are popular. Empty or ineffective but high-profile agreements do not make for a sound foreign policy. As we
know from our own history, majorities are not always right. We also cannot forget that the United States has unique
global responsibilities. And if we are to meet them effectively, we may not always be able to go along with measures
that many or even most others support. We are willing to listen, learn, and modify policies when we hear compelling
arguments. But we all recognize that even the closest of friends will sometimes disagree on what constitutes the best
policy.
We have, moreover, demonstrated that we can and will act alone when necessary. Our right to self-defense is
unquestioned. Secretary of State Powell has repeatedly underscored this fact to prevent any misunderstanding. As he
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October, "There are no arrangements within this coalition which
in any way, shape, fashion or form constrain the President and the exercise of his constitutional responsibilities to
defend the United States of America and to defend the people of the United States."
By the same token, we do not take lightly the costs to ourselves and to others when we forego participation in some
multilateral initiative. In the future, we will give consultations every reasonable chance to produce an acceptable
compromise. But if we conclude that agreement is beyond reach, we will explain why and do our best to put forth
alternatives.
In sum, multilateralism is not an end in itself, but it is often a necessary means to our ends. A commitment to
multilateralism need not constrain our options -- done right, it expands them.
The campaign against terrorism embodies these basic principles. However, we need not -- indeed we must not -- limit our
multilateralism to counterterrorism. We must confront a series of transnational challenges including the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and the trafficking in humans and drugs that we cannot tackle by
ourselves. This will require that we work with others to reinvigorate our traditional alliances, recast relationships
with former adversaries, and integrate more countries and peoples into a mutually beneficial international order. So
even while the campaign against terrorism must be our top national security priority, it cannot be our only one.
The most basic challenge facing American foreign policy, therefore, is to continue in the midst of this immediate and
pressing crisis to make progress across the full spectrum of issues that will affect our future. We must continue to
strive to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that are necessary to sustain a world consistent
with U.S. values and interests.
This is a demanding task. Some might ask whether is too demanding. How in the midst of a major conflict can we expect to
do it?
We have done it before. We did it during the Second World War when Americans helped found the United Nations and the
Bretton Woods system. And we did it again during the Korean War. Fifty years ago this month, for instance, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson led an American delegation to Paris to discuss with our allies how to add sinew and muscle to the
skeleton of NATO, how to reintegrate their former mortal enemy Germany into the West, how to fortify the still fragile
democracies of Europe so that they could be self-sustaining and prosperous when Marshall Plan support ended, and how to
build upon the success of the Schuman Plan and foster further political and economic integration in Europe.
Today we are reaping the rewards of such investments made 50 years ago as our allies come to our aid when our homeland
has been attacked. Witness NATO's unprecedented invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, Australia's invocation of
Article 4 of the Australia, New Zealand, & United States (ANZUS) Treaty, and how both have matched words with deeds. Witness Japan's historic support for the
campaign against terrorism. Witness our Western Hemispheric neighbors' invocation of the Rio Treaty and their commitment
to combat terrorism in our backyard. Symbolizing this solidarity and how an attack against one is an attack against all,
today NATO AWACs manned by Germans, Danes, Belgians, and other nationalities fly overhead protecting American airspace.
Such are the benefits of consistent, forward-looking, and realistic multilateralism.
Our challenge is to stay true to this tradition of hard-headed multilateralism. We need to resist the temptation of
unilateralism, which only in special circumstances can be effective in this globalized world. At the same time, we need
to resist going along to get along -- that's soft-headed multilateralism. Like Goldilocks, we need to get it just right.
Hard-headed multilateralism is not an alternative to leadership, but its manifestation.
ENDS