Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative
James Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Testimony Before the
House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Washington, DC June 28, 2001
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss with you the status of
Plan Colombia and to describe for you the Department of State's programs envisioned under the Administration's proposed
Andean Regional Initiative, or ARI.
First, I'd like to provide you background on the origin of the President's Initiative. In July 2000, Congress approved a
$1.3 billion supplemental appropriation to carry out enhanced counternarcotics activities in the Andean region. Of that
amount, approximately $1 billion in Function 150 funding through the State Department was the U.S. contribution to what
has become known as Plan Colombia, a comprehensive, integrated, Colombian action plan to address Colombia's complex and
interrelated problems. The initial two-year phase of Plan Colombia focused on the southern part of the country. It began
with an intensive counternarcotics push into southern Colombia, along with the expansion of programs aimed at social
action and institutional strengthening, and alternative development. Plan Colombia is now well underway and showing good
results. In addition to stemming the flow of narcotics entering the U.S., our assistance is intended to support
institutional and judicial reform, as well as economic advancement, in one of this hemisphere's oldest democracies.
Members of Congress, the NGO community, and other interested observers had previously expressed concerns regarding
aspects of U.S. Government support to Plan Colombia. Those concerns focused particularly on three areas: that we did not
consult widely enough in putting together our support package; that we focused too much on security and law enforcement
and not enough on development and institutional reform; and that our assistance was too heavily oriented toward Colombia
as compared to the rest of the region.
The Administration has taken to heart those concerns in formulating the President's proposed Andean Regional Initiative
(ARI). ARI is the product of extensive consultations with the staffs of committees and Members of Congress, with the
governments of the region, and with other potential donor countries and international financial institutions. ARI
addresses the three issues that lie at the heart of the challenges facing the region: democracy, development, and drugs.
ARI balances the need to address the continuing challenges in Colombia with the competing priority of working with the
rest of the region to prevent a further spreading of Colombia's problems or backsliding in areas where progress already
has been made.
The President has proposed $882 million in Function 150 programs for the ARI. $731 million of the $882 million in ARI is
for the Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) funding of the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). The ARI also includes funding for relevant Economic Support Funds (ESF), Developmental
Assistance (DA), and Child Survival and Disease (CSD) programs, plus a small amount of Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
The ARI covers programs in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and those areas and programs in Panama and
Brazil most affected by the region's problems and those where our assistance can best make a difference. In addition to
being balanced geographically, our budget will likewise be balanced programmatically. About 50% of the ARI budget will
be devoted to programs focused on development and support for democratic institutions. Integral to ARI as well are the
economic development and job creation afforded by expanded trade opportunities. The Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) can help the entire region through increased investment and job creation. More immediately, renewal and
enhancement of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) can provide real alternatives to drug production and trafficking
for farmers and workers desperate for the means to support their families.
Our support to Plan Colombia was the first step in responding to the crisis underway in Colombia. The Andean Regional
Initiative is the next stage of a long-term effort to address the threat of narcotics and the underlying causes of the
narcotics industry and violence in Colombia, while assisting Colombia's neighbors to ward off those same dangers in
their own countries. Their success is vital to our own national interests in promoting the spread of strong democratic
institutions, the enhancement of trade and investment opportunities for U.S. businesses and workers, and the reduction
of narcotics production and trafficking that threaten our society.
My USAID colleague will describe in detail the status of our alternative development projects. However, I want to point
out that alternative development is an integral part of our plan for weeding out illicit coca and poppy cultivation in
the Andes. We have had large alternative development programs in Bolivia and Peru for many years, and they have been
quite successful, combining with aggressive eradication and interdiction programs to produce significant declines in the
coca crops of those countries. Colombia is trying to replicate that success in Plan Colombia, combining a substantially
expanded alternative development program with aerial eradication and interdiction activities in southern Colombia,
currently the largest concentration of coca cultivation in the world.
I am pleased to report that the Department is moving quickly to implement our support to Plan Colombia. Below, I will
discuss delivery of helicopters, aerial spray aircraft, and other equipment which is proceeding smoothly. I will also
describe our support for the Colombian Government's aerial spraying program.
I'd then like to discuss the proposal we have submitted in our FY 2002 budget request for INL's $731 million Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), as part of the larger $882 million ARI. This initiative addresses holistically - providing
assistance for social and economic development as well as for counternarcotics and security efforts - the narcotics
scourge throughout the Andean region. We are hopeful that this macro- approach will eliminate the "balloon effect" which
we observe when programs are developed country by country.
Finally, I will note our support for the ATPA.
STATUS OF SPENDING ON PLAN COLOMBIA
In less than one year, the Department has "committed" approximately 75% of the $1.018 billion two-year Plan Colombia
Supplemental. By "committed," we mean that we have contracted for equipment or services, signed reimbursable agreements
with other agencies or bureaus within the Department, and contributed to the UN. Taken together, these "commitments"
total more than $760 million of the Supplemental.
The Administration is finalizing the Congressionally- mandated bi-annual report on the Supplemental.
STATUS OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES
Turning now to our equipment deliveries, I can say that they have proceeded smoothly, generally adhering to the
anticipated schedules. Some have even been accelerated from their original estimates. As of June 22, 2001, the status of
UH- 60, UH-1N, Huey-II and spray planes is as follows:
COLAR and CNP Black Hawks: A contract was signed with Sikorsky on December 15th for 14 Black Hawks for the Colombian
Army (COLAR) and two helicopters for the Colombian National Police (CNP). Specifications for the aircraft configuration
were based on SOUTHCOM recommendations with input from respective Colombian organizations. Arrangements are being made
for next month's delivery of the two CNP aircraft and the first COLAR aircraft. Remaining deliveries will be made in
increments through December of this year. The contract includes one year of contractor logistics support (CLS). We
expect to extend this contract pending availability of FY 2002 funding.
COLAR UH-1Ns: The UH-1Ns supplied to Colombia earlier continue to provide air mobility support to the troops of the
Counterdrug Brigade.
CNP Huey-IIs: INL and the CNP agreed to use the $20.6 million CNP Huey-II and $5 million CNP aircraft upgrade budget
lines from the Supplemental to modify nine additional aircraft to desired specifications and retrofit 22 of the earlier
produced Huey-IIs to include additional options, such as floor armor and passive infrared (IR) countermeasures. A
delivery order has been issued for four modifications to be accomplished by U.S. Helicopter (completion expected
approximately August/September), and the other five modifications will be done by CNP in-country with kits furnished by
INL. (Note: 25 Huey-II helicopters have been delivered to the CNP from previous FY 1998 and FY 1999 funding.)
COLAR Huey-IIs: SOUTHCOM presented their recommendations on the configuration of the COLAR Huey-IIs on February 22nd. An
interagency team then selected a configuration that includes a passive IR engine exhaust system, floor armor, M60D door
guns, secure radios, and a radar altimeter, along with other standard equipment. We estimate that 25 Huey-IIs modified
to this standard, along with individual crew equipment (NVGs, survival vests, helmets, etc.) and some spares will be
possible within the $60 million line item of the Supplemental Appropriation. We have established a contract delivery
order for the accomplishment of the initial 20 modifications, with options for additional aircraft. Work is in progress
on these aircraft and we believe that aircraft deliveries to Colombia can begin by approximately January 2002.
Additional OV-10D Spray Planes: Three aircraft are currently undergoing refurbishment/modification at Patrick Air Force
Base and are expected to be completed in August of this year.
Additional Ayres Turbo-Thrush Spray Planes: A contract is in place for nine additional agricultural spray planes. The
first aircraft should be delivered in August, with the balance phased in through February 2002.
AERIAL SPRAYING
Plan Colombia-related aerial spray operations began on December 19, 2000, in the southern department of Caqueta and
moved into neighboring Putumayo on December 22. Operations later shifted to the northern and eastern parts of the
country.
Some allege that the glyphosate used in the spray program results in health side-effects to exposed populations. First,
let me stress that glyphosate is one of the least harmful herbicides available on the world market. Glyphosate has been
the subject of an exhaustive body of scientific literature which has shown that it is not a health risk to humans, and
is extremely environment-friendly. It is used throughout the United States and over 100 other countries and has been
rigorously tested for safety for animals and humans. Nonetheless, we feel compelled to probe assertions that it is
making people sick. At the request of Congress, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, with assistance from our regional EPA
representative in Embassy Lima, is sponsoring two studies on the issue. The first dealt with the individuals who
reported reactions to the spraying. The final report is not yet complete but the physicians who reviewed those cases
found them to be inconsistent with glyphosate exposure. In fact, many of the cases were reported prior to any exposure
from the spray program. The second study is getting underway and will compare populations before and after their areas
are sprayed to see if any differences could be attributable to spraying. The Center for Disease Control is assisting in
designing an appropriate sampling methodology for this study.
The timing of spray operations in Putumayo was based on a number of factors. Some were operational concerns, such as
seasonal weather conditions. The timing of operations was also meant to discourage the return of an itinerant labor pool
(coca leaf pickers or "raspachines") who generally spend the December holidays at their homes in other parts of the
country. Importantly, the timing also corresponded with efforts to recruit communities to enroll in development
programs. While the intent of the Colombian Government to conduct eradication in southern Colombia was well publicized,
coca growing communities in the region initially showed little interest in participating in development programs,
preferring instead to continue their illicit activity. Only after those initial spray efforts in Putumayo, which
demonstrated the Government of Colombia's resolve to address the growing problem of coca cultivation in the region, did
these communities express real interest in abandoning their illegal activities in exchange for assistance. Funding was
already in place for these programs at the time spray operations began and, as each community signed up for the program,
the process began to tailor community-specific assistance packages.
Many safeguards are built into the selection of spray targets and further improvements are constantly being made to the
system. And while the Department of State does not select the spray locations, (those decisions are made by the
Government of Colombia), the Department, through the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of U.S. Embassy Bogota, does
consult on the selection and supports the Colombian National Police (CNP) efforts.
According to Colombian law, an Inter-Institutional Technical Committee (ITC) of Colombian Government officials
determines what areas of the country may or may not be sprayed. The CNP generates quarterly estimates of the illicit
coca crop by flying over coca growing regions on at least a quarterly basis to search for new growth and to generate an
estimate of the illicit coca crop. This information is reviewed for accuracy by technical/environmental auditors and is
passed on to the ITC. The Directorate of Dangerous Drugs (DNE) chairs the ITC, which includes representatives from the
Anti-Narcotics Police, Ministry of the Environment, the National Institute of Health, the National Institute of
Agriculture, the National Plan for Alternative Development (PLANTE), regional environmental agencies, and
technical/environmental auditors. The CNP notifies the NAS Aviation Office of all decisions as to which areas may not be
sprayed. Spray operations are then coordinated and conducted in approved areas only.
Generally, reconnaissance flights are conducted over areas identified by the CNP in their quarterly coca crop estimates.
With the use of SATLOC, an aircraft-mounted global positioning system, these flights identify the precise geographical
coordinates where coca is being grown. Areas with large concentrations of coca are then plotted, and a computer program
sets up precise flight lines, calibrated for the width of the spray swath of the spray plane to be used. Once the
Government of Colombia has approved spraying in a given area, spray pilots then fly down those prescribed flight lines
and spray the coca located there.
Also, every effort is made to protect legitimate farming operations from possible damage from the aerial spray program.
The spray aircraft apply glyphosate at low altitude against predetermined fields, identified by earlier reconnaissance.
The planes carry computerized GPS monitoring equipment that records their position and the use of the spray equipment.
This system serves to verify that glyphosate is being accurately applied to intended areas. After spraying, combined
U.S.-Colombian teams also visit randomly chosen fields, security permitting, to verify that the treated plants were
indeed coca. To further aid in the identification of fields not subject to aerial eradication, the government of
Colombia is currently working to produce a comprehensive digitized map indicating exempted areas.
Furthermore, the Government of Colombia maintains a system to compensate farmers for damages caused by the program. Over
the past few months, we have encouraged the Colombian Government to streamline the process and efforts have begun to
better educate the public about that option.
Recent field visits encountered evidence that coca growers in southern Colombia are using dangerous chemicals, such as
paraquat. That is a concern to us as it presents a very real risk to the people of the region. The traffickers' utter
disregard for human health and environmental security that pervades the illegal drug industry goes beyond the obvious
examples of poisoning millions of drug consumers with their illegal products. It includes the clear cutting of rain
forest; the contamination of soil and watersheds with acids and chemical salts; and the exposure of their workers and
themselves to potentially deadly chemicals -- all in the name of profit.
For example, the expansion of coca cultivation, production, and trafficking in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia has resulted
in the destruction of, at an absolute minimum, 2.4 million hectares of the fragile tropical forest in the Andean region
over the last 20 years. In addition, the very act of refining raw coca leaves into finished cocaine creates significant
environmental damage because of the irresponsible disposal of large amounts of toxic chemicals used in the process. A
study conducted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1993 of cocaine production in the Chapare region of
Bolivia showed that production of one kilo of cocaine base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric
acid, ten kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate, and one liter of concentrated
ammonia. Processors discard these poisonous waste products indiscriminately, often dumping them into the nearest
waterway, where the extent of damage is greatly increased. They also may dump these chemicals on the ground, where as
point sources, they may infiltrate through the soil to groundwater. A report from the National Agrarian University in
Lima, Peru estimated that as much as 600 million liters of so- called precursor chemicals are used annually in South
America for cocaine production. This translates to more than two metric tons of chemical waste generated for each
hectare of coca processed to produce cocaine.
These environmental concerns are another reason why we must continue in our efforts to help the governments of the
Andean region in their ongoing struggle against the narcotics industry.
INL'S PROPOSED ANDEAN COUNTERDRUG INITIATIVE (ACI)
The Andean region represents a significant challenge and opportunity for U.S. foreign policy in the next few years.
Important U.S. national interests are at stake. Democracy is under pressure in all of the countries of the Andes.
Economic development is slow and progress towards liberalization is inconsistent. The Andes produces virtually all of
the world's cocaine, and an increasing amount of heroin; thus representing a direct threat to our public health and
national security. All of these problems are inter-related. Sluggish economies produce political unrest that threatens
democracy and provides ready manpower for narcotics traffickers and illegal armed groups. Weak democratic institutions,
corruption and political instability discourage investment, contribute to slow economic growth and provide fertile
ground for drug traffickers and other outlaw groups to flourish. The drug trade has a corrupting influence that
undermines democratic institutions, fuels illegal armed groups, and distorts the economy, discouraging legitimate
investment. None of the region's problems can be addressed in isolation.
Of the $882 million Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) request, $731 million is for INL's Andean Counterdrug Initiative
(ACI). Our goals in the Andes are to:
-- Promote and support democracy and democratic institutions; -- Foster sustainable economic development and trade
liberalization; and -- Significantly reduce the supply of illegal drugs to the U.S. at the source.
Just as Plan Colombia represented an improved approach by considering drug trafficking as part of Colombia's larger
crisis, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative benefits from its appreciation of the illegal drug industry as part of
something bigger. Drug trafficking is a problem that does not respect national borders and that both feeds and feeds
upon the other social and economic difficulties with which the Andean region is struggling.
No nation in the region is free of trafficking or the attendant ills of other crime forms and corruption. To combat
these ills, we propose a regional versus Colombia-centric policy and a comprehensive and integrated package that brings
together democracy and development as well as drug initiatives.
For this reason, we plan to allocate almost one-half of the requested $731 million for this initiative to countries
other than Colombia. In so doing, we intend to bolster the successful efforts and tremendous progress we have made in
counternarcotics in countries such as Peru and Bolivia, while preventing the further expansion of the drug trafficking
problem into other countries of the region, such as Brazil, Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador.
In addition to ensuring regional balance, the ACI also spans all three of our stated goals --counternarcotics, economic
development, and support for democratic institutions. The full ARI budget of $882 million breaks into an approximately
50/50 split between counternarcotics and alternative development/institution-building programs. Its ACI component ($731
million) breaks into a 60/40 (counternarcotics vs. development/democracy) split. $293 million of the ACI budget will be
devoted to programs focused on alternative development and support for democratic institutions.
All of Colombia's neighbors are worried about the possibility of "spillover," specifically that the pressure applied by
the Government of Colombia (GOC) in southern Colombia will result in the flight of refugees, guerrillas, paramilitaries,
and/or narcotics traffickers across porous borders into other countries. We will work with the countries of the region
to strengthen their capacity to cope with potential outflows. In Peru and Bolivia, we will work with those governments
to continue their reductions in coca through a combination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development. In
all countries, we will work to strengthen democracy and local institutions in order to attack trafficking networks which
move precursors, money, fraudulent documents, and people.
Since we believe Plan Colombia will result in major disruption of the cocaine industry, ACI's regional approach becomes
even more of an imperative. Traffickers will undoubtedly try to relocate as their operations in southern Colombia are
disrupted. We believe they will first try to migrate to other areas inside Colombia, then try to return to traditional
growing areas in Peru and Bolivia. But if those options are forestalled, they may well seek to move more cultivation,
processing and/or trafficking routes into other countries such as Ecuador, Brazil, or Venezuela.
The nations of the region are already heavily committed in all three of the major areas of concern: democratization,
economic development, and counternarcotics. All devote significant percentages of their annual budgets to these areas
and are willing to work with us in the design and integration of successful programs. Exact figures are impossible to
come by, but the nations of the region in total are committing billions of dollars to economic development,
democratization, and counternarcotics efforts. For example, Ecuador has established a Northern Border Initiative to
promote better security and development in the region bordering Colombia. Brazil has launched Operation Cobra, a law
enforcement effort concentrated in the Dog's Head region bordering Colombia. Bolivia has been attacking drug production
through its Dignity Plan and is developing a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy. Colombia continues to pursue its
commitments under Plan Colombia. Panama has taken concrete steps to improve security and development in the Darien
region. The new Peruvian Government has made reform of democratic institutions a national priority and continues to
pursue aggressively the counternarcotics missions. In Venezuela, local authorities have cooperated admirably on drug
interdiction, exemplified by last year's record multi-ton seizure during Operation Orinoco.
Programs to provide humanitarian relief for displaced persons, to help small farmers and low-level coca workers find
legitimate alternatives to the drug trade, and to strengthen governance, the rule of law, and human rights will also be
incorporated into the ACI.
ATPA RENEWAL
Renewal of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) is perhaps the single largest short-term contribution to economic
growth and prosperity in the Andes. By renewing the Act and expanding its benefits, we can continue to provide economic
alternatives to narcotics trafficking in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. The Act has already succeeded in doing so
without adverse economic impact for the United States. The original justification for the legislation still stands, but
it expires at the end of the year, and should clearly be renewed at the earliest possible date. ATPA renewal would serve
to strengthen the credibility of democratically-elected governments in the region and provide them with a clear
demonstration of the benefits of continuing to cooperate on counternarcotics. It would also halt a potentially crippling
exodus of U.S. industries that relocated to the region when ATPA was established.
I appreciate the opportunity you have given me to speak to you today, and I look forward to responding to questions
which Members of the Committee may have.
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