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DE RUEHKO #0229/01 0352309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 042309Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9212
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1026
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8685
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2501
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5726
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9181
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2957
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9638
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9005
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 000229
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/04/10
INDEX:
(1) U.S. assistant secretary of state meets with Ozawa to search for
breakthrough in Futenma relocation issue (Sankei)
(2) "Japan@the World" column: How to draw up a blueprint for a new
alliance (Asahi)
(3) Editorial: U.S. defense strategy calls for deepening Japan-U.S.
alliance (Nikkei)
(4) U.S. Ambassador Roos, Hokkaido governor participate in summit of
female mayors (Hokkaido Shimbun)
(5) Foreign Minister Okada to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21 (Nikkei)
(6) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Mainichi)
ARTICLES:
(1) U.S. assistant secretary of state meets with Ozawa to search for
breakthrough in Futenma relocation issue
SANKEI (Page 3) (Full)
February 3, 2010
As if to coincide with the release of the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) by the U.S. Department of Defense, the governments of Japan
and the U.S. have shifted into full gear in their effort to deepen
the bilateral alliance. On Feb. 2, they held a Japan-U.S. Security
Subcommittee (SSC) meeting of bureau director-level foreign affairs
and defense officials. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell had a personal talk with
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa and
tried to find ways to mend the strains caused by the U.S. Marine
Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture)
relocation issue. However, with the Hatoyama administration
continuing to drift over its security policy, a breakthrough in the
situation is nowhere in sight.
On the afternoon of the 2nd after attending the SSC talks, Campbell
told Ozawa in the DPJ secretary general's office in the Diet
building, "We have reaffirmed our intentions to further strengthen
the bilateral alliance. This alliance serves as the linchpin of the
U.S. policy toward Asia." It is unusual for senior U.S. officials to
visit the Diet. By doing so, Campbell, a leading Japan hand in the
Obama administration, is apparently determined to save the face of
Ozawa, the most influential figure in the Hatoyama administration.
The meeting, which was held behind closed doors apart from the
opening statements, lasted for an hour. A briefing after the talks
was also cancelled at the request of Ozawa. Ozawa politely saw
Campbell off at the Lower House entrance. Campbell told the press
corps with a smile, "Nice talks."
There is no doubt that the Futenma issue was brought up in the
talks. The U.S. side is apparently unhappy about the inconsistency
of Japanese ministers' views on the issue and believes that Ozawa is
the only one who will be able to find a way out of the current
situation. Campbell probably made the courtesy call on Ozawa with
the aim of figuring out what he is up to.
TOKYO 00000229 002 OF 009
The QDR specifically mentions the need to implement the Japan-U.S.
agreement, including the agreement on the relocation of the Futenma
facilities to an area near the coast of Camp Schwab (in Henoko, Nago
City, Okinawa Prefecture), calling on the Japanese government to
steadily implement the existing plan. Campbell during the SSC
conveyed the U.S. government's stance to the Japanese side and
stressed to the press corps: "We have clearly conveyed our view that
the existing plan is the best option. We would like to work closely
so as to move forward on this issue."
However, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has entirely relegated the
effort to find a relocation site to the ruling parties' Okinawa base
issue review committee to work out. The committee is also going
astray with the three ruling parties failing to reach an agreement.
The panel held a meeting on the evening of Feb. 2. Participants
agreed to dispatch an inspection team consisting of government and
ruling party officials to Guam, which the SDP insists is a candidate
relocation site, in mid-February. However, the U.S. side is
reluctant to allow the inspection team to make the visit. It is now
certain that the submission of a proposal for a relocation site by
each party slated for January will be delayed until late February or
later.
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada mentioned the possibility of
continuing to use Futenma Air Station, provoking a backlash from the
SDP. This has also halted the talks on the issue. Following the
SDP's opposition to the idea of continuing to use the current site,
the prime minister on the evening of the 2nd told the press corps:
"This whole issue originated from the idea of Futenma relocation. It
will not be a solution if we go back to the beginning. The foreign
minister understands that." However, the foreign minister at a press
conference on the evening of the 2nd once again said, "If worst
comes to the worst, Futenma Air Station will remain at the same
site." The fire continues to smolder.
The perceptions of cabinet ministers not only on the relocation
issue but also on security issues are diverse. A senior Defense
Ministry official said with a sigh: "In the present administration,
there are no politicians who can map out a strategy that Japan
should adopt based on the QDR."
(2) "Japan@the World" column: How to draw up a blueprint for a new
alliance
ASAHI (Pages 1, 15) (Slightly abridged)
February 4, 2010
Yoichi Funabashi, chief editor
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the
Japan-U.S. security treaty in 1960, the Japanese and U.S.
governments have declared that they will "deepen" the Japan-U.S.
alliance. They would like to come up with a blueprint for a new
alliance by the time U.S. President Barack Obama visits Japan in
November.
However, the Hatoyama administration has scrapped the Futenma Air
Station relocation plan agreed upon between the two governments in
2006 and begun to consider an alternative plan. As a result, the
Japan-U.S. relationship is in disarray.
TOKYO 00000229 003 OF 009
Opinion in the U.S. of the Hatoyama administration is harsh. An
editorial in The New York Times on Jan. 28 expressed concern that
"there are signs that many of the leaders of Japan's new
administration and its postwar generation do not understand the
irreplaceable value of the Japan-U.S. security partnership."
However, on the other hand, there is a growing opinion that the U.S.
should avoid forcing the Hatoyama administration into a corner. The
same editorial counseled the Obama administration to be "patient,"
asserting that, "The Obama administration should look for a solution
to the Futenma relocation and encourage the Hatoyama administration,
so that it can declare with confidence that it is capable of
conducting equal diplomacy with the U.S." It is important to deal
with the base issues in the context of developing a blueprint for a
new alliance.
How, then, should the new alliance blueprint be drawn up?
Stabilizing relations with a rapidly rising China will be the main
issue. While China is not a threat right now, there is no guarantee
that it will not be one in the future. China's peaceful rise so far
owes much to its leaders' prudence and "patience."
However, if China becomes more powerful economically and militarily,
such "patience" may be weakened. The Western countries have begun to
express their uneasiness and even alarm with China's recent
"conceited" attitude in the areas of economics and finance, human
rights, and global warming.
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, who played a major
role in the "redefinition" of the Japan-U.S. security alliance in
the 1990s, argues strongly for "buying insurance by engaging China"
when dealing with this country. The functions of the Japan-U.S.
alliance will be most important in such a situation. Nye asserts
that a real alliance consists of deterrence in peacetime and
preparedness for contingencies.
The main source of tension is China's naval buildup and the
projection of such military power in Asia and the Pacific. Japan and
the U.S. should consider creating a multilateral framework with the
Asian neighbors, including China, for maritime stability in the
South China Sea and East China Sea. This can start with cooperation
among Japan, the U.S., Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
other countries in dealing with the threat posed by pirates in the
South China Sea.
The "redefinition" of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the 21st Century
will consist of the "transformation" from an alliance "against" to
an alliance "for." Japan should aim at consolidating its relations
with China; realizing policy dialogues among Japan, the U.S., and
China; and building "maritime peace" with the Japan-U.S.-China
relationship as the axis. It is only through such "transformation"
of the Japan-U.S. alliance that stability in China and Asia can be
achieved.
Along with the role of the alliance, the management of the alliance
also needs to be "redefined." I would like to discuss here the
following principles: mutual benefit, complementarity, and
cooperation.
The principle of mutual benefit means the "sharing of obligations"
TOKYO 00000229 004 OF 009
in responding to "common threats and issues." Here, the important
thing is that the obligation and cost should be more or less
proportionate on both sides. So far, the Japan-U.S. alliance has
consisted mainly of the U.S.'s defense of Japan and Japan's
provision of military bases. This structure can be sustained into
the future by reducing the excessive burden on Okinawa.
The principle of complementarity means that the two sides will
combine their strengths in order for the alliance as a whole to
realize its full potential. Japan is good at civilian power, while
military power is the U.S.'s forte. Humanitarian aid and disaster
relief, building and maintenance of peace, development for nation
building, prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear
disarmament, breaking away from dependence on oil, and environmental
conservation and working toward a low carbon society are promising
areas in which Japan can make contributions. To be sure,
complementarity does not denote a complete division of labor. The
alliance will remain a military alliance. Here, it will be important
for Japan to maintain and develop its economic and technological
power and its international competitiveness, which form the basis of
its civilian power.
The principle of cooperation means enhancing the reliability of the
common tasks and operations of the two countries in support of the
alliance and building broader-based human resources for the
alliance. Intelligence sharing, joint flight exercises, and joint
administration of military bases by the two countries should be
considered.
The Japan-U.S. alliance was built on the pledge by a victorious and
a vanquished country in World War II not to go to war ever again and
on "trust and reconciliation." The fact that these two countries
with different languages and culture have been able to develop such
a profound relationship of trust following the war is almost a
miracle in contemporary history.
It seems that the desire to be free from dependence on the U.S. and
to seek moral solidarity with Asia is a latent force in the
sentiments of the leaders of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and
the Japanese people. However, security policy should not be affected
by sentimentalism. The essence of security policymaking lies in
conducting rational and strategic policy debate based on national
interests while skillfully controlling nationalist sentiments in the
process. The exercise of self-restraint on both sides to suppress
nationalism is also a hidden function of an alliance.
The Obama administration has proposed a security strategy for
multilateral defense of the global commons, including navigation in
international waters and cyber space.
There are moves in the U.S. Department of Defense toward setting up
a Pacific command for humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Prime
Minister Hatoyama's "yuai boat" concept has elements in common with
the multilateral medical assistance network promoted by the Obama
administration. Now is the time for the DPJ to open up new frontiers
in the Japan-U.S. alliance in a different way from the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). If the DPJ and LDP are able to build
consensus across party borders on Japan-U.S. security policy, the
50th year of the security treaty will indeed be of great historic
significance.
(3) Editorial: U.S. defense strategy calls for deepening Japan-U.S.
TOKYO 00000229 005 OF 009
alliance
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
February 4, 2010
The Department of Defense (DOD) has released its Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) for 2010, which sets the guidelines for DOD security
policy for the next four years. The 2010 QDR focuses on the variety
of new threats the nation faces and calls for its allies in the Asia
Pacific region, including Japan and South Korea, to play an expanded
role. The allies should study the contents of the threats and
jointly address the threats as a matter of course.
The hard battle in Afghanistan probably can be cited as the most
influential factor that has caused the U.S. to alter its strategy
over the past four years. Emerging countries have gathered strength,
non-state forces have gained influence, and weapons of mass
destruction have spread further throughout the world. There is also
the danger of military action in cyberspace.
It is necessary to deal effectively with such diversified threats;
otherwise, security will be undermined on a global scale. Therefore,
it is quite natural for the DOD to spotlight new threats in the
QDR.
Previous QDRs envisioned a strategy to deal with two large-scale
conflicts in the Middle East and Asia simultaneously, but this
two-front strategy was removed from the 2010 QDR. The U.S. probably
judged that it would be appropriate to eliminate this strategy from
a realistic point of view. However, this strategy had some deterrent
effect on North Korea's moves, so its elimination is not desirable
from the standpoint of Japan.
Probably with the aim of making up for the removal of the two-front
strategy, the QDR promised to enhance its deterrence capability with
nuclear and conventional weapons for Japan, South Korea, and other
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of this is to
strengthen relations with its allies.
In the case of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the U.S. should have
proposed in the QDR that defense cooperation between Japan and the
U.S. should be strengthened by means of Japan taking measures to
enable the Self-Defense Force to exercise the right to collective
self-defense. But this idea is not practical in the current
Japan-U.S. relationship under the Hatoyama administration.
Almost at the same time as the release of the QDR, Japan and the
U.S. held a high-level meeting of the Security Subcommittee composed
of their senior foreign and defense officials in Tokyo. As a result
of the Hatoyama administration's decision to put off making a
decision on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air
Station until the end of May, Japan and the U.S. remain unable to
arrange a meeting between Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and
President Barack Obama. Given this, strategic dialogue has been
carried out by working-level officials of the two countries.
Between Japan and the U.S., deliberations were carried out between
working-level officials until 10 years ago. Although the Hatoyama
administration has advocated shifting the decision-making
responsibility to politicians, the Japan-U.S. alliance has returned
to the so-called "working-level alliance" of 10 years ago. Foreign
Minister Katsuya Okada has emphasized the importance of his talks
TOKYO 00000229 006 OF 009
with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Hawaii, but the two sides
have yet to establish a deep relationship of trust.
If the U.S. proposal for an expanded role to be played by its allies
is translated into action, it will inevitably become a major
challenge for the Hatoyama administration.
(4) U.S. Ambassador Roos, Hokkaido governor participate in summit of
female mayors
HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN ONLINE (Full)
09:11, February 4, 2010
The "national summit of female mayors" that opened in the town of
Higashikagura in Kamikawa Subprefecture moved its venue to Sapporo
City on Feb. 3. Seven female mayors, including Mayor Keiko Kawano of
Higashikagura exchanged views with Governor Harumi Takahashi (of
Hokkaido), Sapporo Mayor Fumio Ueda, and other officials. U.S.
Ambassador to Japan John Roos, who was on an inspection tour to see
the Sapporo Snow Festival and other sites, made an unscheduled
appearance and livened up the atmosphere at the summit.
In a speech, Governor Takahashi said: "There are only three female
governors and seven female mayors in the country. This number is
very small, but let us work together." During the informal meeting,
Roos asked: "How is the female mayors' summit going?" He talked to
each of the mayors, and the mayors all advertised their towns
enthusiastically.
The summit will close on Feb. 4 after adopting an appeal at a hotel
in the town of Toyako in Iburi Subprefecture, which was the venue
for the G-8 Hokkaido-Toyako Summit.
(5) Foreign Minister Okada to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
February 4, 2010
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada yesterday started making arrangements
to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21 with an eye to holding talks with
his Australian counterpart Stephen Smith. The purpose of his trip to
Australia is to lay the groundwork for a meeting of the two
countries' foreign and defense ministers (2-plus-2), which will be
held as early as this summer. Okada and Smith are expected to
confirm that the two countries will accelerate talks for the
conclusion of an economic partnership agreement (EPA). They are also
expected to exchange views on Japan's research whaling.
(6) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full)
February 1, 2010
Questions & Answers
(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female)
Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet?
T P M F
Yes 50 (55) 53 48
No 38 (34) 37 39
Not interested 12 (12) 10 14
TOKYO 00000229 007 OF 009
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why?
T P M F
Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 7
(6) 6 8
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership
2 (2) 2 3
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policies
13 (9) 12 13
Because the nature of politics is likely to change 78 (82) 80 76
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why?
T P M F
Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 3
(5) 4 3
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership
41 (42) 37 45
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policies 32
(32) 35 29
Because the nature of politics is unlikely to change 23 (20) 24 23
Q: Which political party do you support?
T P M F
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 30 (35) 33 28
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 16 (16) 17 14
New Komeito (NK) 4 (4) 2 6
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (2) 3 3
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1 (2) 2 0
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 1 (1) 1 0
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 4 (4) 4 4
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) -- (0) -- --
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 0 0
Other political parties 1 (1) 1 0
None 39 (33) 35 43
Q: What do you think DPJ Secretary General Ozawa should do if
Tomohiro Ishikawa, one of his former secretaries and currently a DPJ
lawmaker seated in the House of Representatives, is prosecuted over
his fund management organization's unreported land purchase? Do you
think he should resign from his party post to take responsibility?
T P M F
Yes 76 75 78
No 18 22 15
Q: Some lawmakers in the DPJ are criticizing the prosecutors'
investigation over the case. Do you think the prosecutors'
investigation is appropriate?
T P M F
Yes 71 71 71
No 21 23 19
Q: Concerning this case, Prime Minister Hatoyama told DPJ Secretary
General Ozawa to "please fight" and also said he hoped Mr. Ishikawa
would not be indicted. Do you think these Hatoyama remarks are
problematic?
T P M F
TOKYO 00000229 008 OF 009
Yes 65 62 67
No 29 35 25
Q: Prime Minister Hatoyama's fund management organization is alleged
to have falsified reports on political donations. In this case, a
former state-funded secretary of Prime Minister Hatoyama has been
prosecuted on the charge of violating the Political Funds Control
Law. Do you think Prime Minister Hatoyama should resign to take
responsibility for this case?
T P M F
Yes 33 (40) 34 33
No 60 (54) 63 57
Q: In this case, it is clear that a total of more than 1.2 billion
yen was provided to Prime Minister Hatoyama by his mother for eight
years. Prime Minister Hatoyama explained, "My former secretary
handled that, and I didn't know anything about it." Do you believe
this explanation?
T P M F
Yes 25 27 23
No 68 69 68
Q: The government's budget for next fiscal year incorporates its
policy-based plans to provide child allowances and make high school
education free of charge. Meanwhile, the government will issue
deficit-covering bonds at a record-high level of 44 trillion yen. Do
you approve of this budget?
T P M F
Yes 31 34 29
No 61 61 60
Q: The recent mayoral election in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture,
ended in the victory of a candidate opposed to relocating the U.S.
military's Futenma airfield facility to the Henoko area of the city,
and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano indicated that there is no need
for the government to ask for local consent for its decision
concerning where to relocate Futenma airfield. What do you think
about this?
T P M F
This is a problem 73 71 74
This is not a problem 19 25 14
Q: What do you think the Hatoyama government should do about the
Futenma relocation issue. Pick the response that is closest to your
opinion.
T P M F
Relocate Futenma airfield out of Okinawa Prefecture or Japan 48 (51)
47 50
Look for another site in Okinawa Prefecture for Futenma relocation
26 (15) 27 25
Relocate Futenma airfield to Henoko 16 (25) 20 12
Q: If an election for the House of Councillors were to be held now,
which political party or which political party's candidate would you
vote for in your proportional representation bloc?
T P M F
TOKYO 00000229 009 OF 009
DPJ 35 40 32
LDP 20 21 19
NK 5 3 7
JCP 4 4 4
SDP 2 3 2
PNP 1 2 0
YP 6 7 5
RC 0 0 1
Other political parties 15 14 15
(Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that
the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "No answer" omitted. Figures in
parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted Dec.
19-20.
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Jan. 30-31 over the
telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit
sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,662 households with one or more
eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,050
persons (63 PERCENT ).
ROOS