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O R 031643Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1471
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000077
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR GR MK TU CY IR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TO DROUTSAS: SHOW WASHINGTON YOUR STUFF
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (S) SUMMARY. In a January 30 meeting with Alternate Foreign
Minister Dimitri Droutsas just prior to his first trip to the U.S.,
Ambassador Speckhard focused him on resolving challenges close to
home and advised him to show Washington he was not just a diplomat
but a political decision maker with whom we could work. He told
Droutsas frankly that bold moves to tackle longstanding regional
problems could strengthen the case for a meeting between PM
Papandreou and President Obama, given the long queue of leaders
seeking to travel to Washington. On Macedonia, he counseled
Droutsas to prepare to discuss specifics with Washington
counterparts; on Cyprus, he urged him to identify how Greece can
help promote a solution in the interest of all and to be more
positive in public; on Turkey, he discussed PM Papandreou's recent
letter to Turkish PM Erdogan, and Greek views on the future of the
relationship, including willingness to take the continental shelf
dispute to the ICJ. Droutsas emphasized that he hoped Washington
had taken note of the positive direction of Greek-Turkish
relations, and Papandreou's personal efforts thus far. He was
disappointed in Talat's recent proposal which he characterized as a
step backwards in the Cyprus process. Describing Papandreou's
approach toward both Turkey and Macedonia, he explained that he is
trying to lay the groundwork and build the personal ties necessary
to change relationships that have become entrenched in bitter
disputes. Turkey is Greece's top foreign policy priority at
present, and while Greece's message to Macedonia prior to the
December EU Council meeting was "we're ready if you are," Greece
did not sense a real effort by Macedonia to find a solution. END
SUMMARY.
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SHOW WASHINGTON YOU'RE READY TO WORK TOGETHER
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2. (S) The Ambassador met with Alt/FM Droutsas in advance of his
February 2 meetings in Washington with the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary. While delivering a strong message that we welcomed PM
Papandreou's interest in strengthening our partnership and playing
a greater role in meeting international challenges, he counseled
that the most important contribution Greece could make would be to
resolve some of the challenges close to home. Show Washington you
are a political decision maker able to lead, and somebody with whom
we can work together practically to solve problems, the Ambassador
said, not just a diplomat who can explain positions. The
Ambassador stated that there are many supporters at State and the
White House recommending a PM visit to Washington, but given the
long queue of leaders wanting to come there were some others asking
"why Greece, why now." Bold moves in tackling longstanding
regional problems would make the case for a visit even stronger.
Droutsas, describing Papandreou's approach toward both Turkey and
Macedonia, explained that the PM is trying to build the personal
ties and lay the groundwork necessary to overcome the bitter
disputes that have become entrenched over the past two decades.
Even though these issues may seem inconsequential to Washington in
the face of greater world challenges, Droutsas noted, the PM has
been working hard to make progress and deserves a great deal of
credit for only four months in office.
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Macedonia Name
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ATHENS 00000077 002 OF 003
4. (S) The Ambassador told Droutsas that Washington was interested
in substance, and that the Deputy Secretary was prepared to talk
specifics about what Greece was willing to accept. The U.S. had
been listening, the Ambassador said, and believed the main elements
of the deal were a geographic qualifier, a general acceptance of
erga omnes in the international context, and leaving identity
outside the agreement (and not to be recalled at some point in the
EU accession process).
5. (C) Droutsas complimented his previous meetings with Macedonian
FM Milososki as friendly and warm, and said that he had invited
Milososki to Athens following their most recent talks. Droutsas
pledged his full support to the UN process, and highlighted his
invitation to UN negotiator Nimetz to visit Athens. Looking back
at the December 2009 EU Council meeting that punted the decision on
naming a date for Macedonian EU accession talks, Droutsas shared
his impression that PM Gruevski had believed mistakenly that
last-minute pressure within the EU from select states would cause
Greece to fold. Greece's message to Macedonia prior to the meeting
had been "we are ready if you are," but Athens had seen no real
effort by Skopje to work on details. Droutsas stated that if he
had one message to pass to Skopje, it would be to avoid public
statements that harm the bilateral atmosphere, and create a hostile
press climate in Greece that limits the government's course of
action.
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Cyprus
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6. (S) The Ambassador told Droutsas to expect Washington to press
him on Cyprus and encouraged him not to respond by blaming
everything on Turkey, and offer what Greece could do to promote a
solution in the interest of everyone. The Ambassador encouraged
Greece to be more positive in public in order to help generate the
necessary public support for the difficult negotiations. Droutsas
believed that the last proposal by Turkish Cypriot leader Talat was
seriously disruptive to the process and had been a setback. With
these types of "antics" it would be hard to get the progress
needed, he said. He agreed that the public dynamics were not
helpful, in particular that some Greek Cypriots have started to
accept the idea of a permanent partition as preferable to what they
thought would be a poor agreement. President Christofias had
Greece's full support, Droutsas underscored, and deserved much
credit for keeping the process moving in the face of such
difficulties. Droutsas conveyed the Greek impression that the
talks were not going near as well as reported. He said that he had
told this to UN SYG Ban prior to Ban's recent trip to Cyprus, while
also assuring him that Greece fully supported the UN process and
welcomed the Secretary General's involvement and would support any
initiative the SYG undertook.
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Turkey
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7. (C) Greek-Turkish relations are at the top of PM Papandreou's
priority list, Droutsas told the Ambassador. He pointed to
intensive engagement that began with the PM's October 8, 2009 trip
to Istanbul - 4 days after his election - where he met with PM
Erdogan, and continued with the exchange of detailed letters by
ATHENS 00000077 003 OF 003
both Prime Ministers on bilateral relations, and commitments for
future high-level travel to capitals. Droutsas pointed to his
3.5-hour dinner with Turkish FM Davutoglu in London on the margins
of the London Conference as a sign of their warm relationship and
seriousness of purpose, and said that he had reiterated PM
Papandreou's invitation to PM Erdogan to visit Athens, which he
anticipates will happen by the end of June. He also informed the
Ambassador that Davutoglu invited him to Ankara, which he intends
to follow up on in the future.
8. (C) The challenge, Droutsas noted, was how to proceed in
practical terms, now that the political willingness appears to be
in place. Greece hopes to replicate some successful processes from
the 1999-2004 Papandreou-Cem rapprochement to take joint steps on
issues of mutual concern such as climate change, the Middle East,
and Iran, while continuing high-level consultations on more
sensitive areas of the relationship. Greece supports exploratory
bilateral talks aimed at delimiting the continental shelf in the
Aegean. These talks should proceed with a set timetable, and if a
satisfactory agreement cannot be reached by a specific date, they
should agree to take jointly the issue of continental shelf
delineation to the International Court of Justice for resolution.
9. (C) Droutsas was pleased that thus far, coverage by the Greek
media of Papandreou's initiatives has been relatively positive. He
attributed this to the methodical, step-by-step approach by
Papandreou to the problem, and judged that changing public opinion
was a key ingredient in the future success of any initiatives
between Greece and Turkey.
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Foreign Policy Priorities
------------------------------
10. (C) Droutsas was clear: the PM had placed changing
Greek-Turkish relations at the top of the foreign policy priority
list. He assured that this did not mean that Greece was not
working hard to resolve the Macedonia name issue - one had only to
note the number of Prime Ministerial and Ministerial-level
engagements to see the effort - but he hoped Washington would
recognize the bold steps the PM was taking on Turkey and realize
the significance of this initiative. The PM was going to great
lengths to fundamentally and permanently improve the relationship.
They were picking up where Papandreou and Cem had left off in 2004
and had been energetic in pushing the process forward in only a few
months in office. With the opposition New Democracy party now
reorganized following its October defeat and its leader Samaras
likely to look toward foreign policy as an area to criticize the
government, they were expecting more challenges ahead. Managing
Greek domestic politics while moving the foreign policy ball
forward was understandably a key component of success. This will
be a delicate process with some political risk, and Droutsas asked
for Washington's support and understanding.
Speckhard