VZCZCXYZ0018
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #5856 0531551
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221547Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 015856
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2035
TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS TU IR
SUBJECT: (S) TURKISH FIRMS ENGAGED IN MILITARY
MATERIEL-RELATED DEALS WITH IRAN
Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Stephanie Miley
1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Ankara. Please
see paragraph 7.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
2. (S) The U.S. has information about several transactions
involving Turkish firms planning to export and import from
Iran arms and related material controlled by the Wassenaar
Arrangement. Specifically, Iran is interested in procuring
Full Metal Jacket (FMJ) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40
mm automatic grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines
(for M16 assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm
composite magazines from Turkey. In addition, we understand
that a Turkish firm may also be pursuing a deal to import
plastic explosives and nitrocellulose from Iran.
3. (S) The U.S. wants to provide this information to Turkish
officials, request that they investigate this activity and
use all available means to prevent these firms from exporting
and importing such arms to and from Iran. In addition to any
domestic Turkish authorities that may apply, these activities
may also be in violation of both United Nations Security
Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 and U.S. domestic authorities.
4. (S) UNSCR 1747: UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory
any "arms or related materiel." It also requires all states
to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether
or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.
The procurement of plastic explosives from Iran would violate
UNSCR 1747.
5. (S) The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
(INKSNA): INKSNA authorizes sanctions against any foreign
person that transfers to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria
goods, services, or technology controlled by multilateral
control lists (e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile
Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, or Wassenaar
Arrangement); of the same kind as those on multilateral
control lists, but falling below the control list parameters,
when it is determined that such goods, services, and
technologies have the potential to make a material
contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic missile systems;
on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that
are not on multilateral lists; or with the potential of
making a material contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic
missile systems. Accordingly, the U.S. is concerned that if
the Turkish firms proceed with transferring the grenade
launchers, bullets, and ammunition magazines, we would be
required to report this to the U.S. Congress and the Turkish
firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions.
6. (S) The U.S. is also concerned about the potential exports
to Iran because one of the items may be of U.S. origin.
According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers
from the United States in 1995. However, we do not know
definitively if any of these are among the 40 mm grenade
launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran. We note,
however, that if any U.S.-origin defense equipment (including
technical data) is re-transferred to Iran, that would violate
Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a
consequence, Turkey could lose its country eligibility under
the AECA to purchase or lease defense articles, including
Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or
to receive credits or guarantees relating to any purchase or
lease.
-------------------------
ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES
-------------------------
7. (S) Post is requested to approach GOT officials to pursue
the following objectives and to deliver the talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 8 below as appropriate:
-- Thank Turkish officials for Turkey's continued cooperation
and support in preventing the transfer of arms or related
material to and from Iran;
-- Inform the GOT that we are very concerned that Turkish
firms may be exporting to and importing from Iran arms and
related material;
-- Note that the export of Wassenaar Arrangement controlled
items to Iran could require a report to the U.S. Congress
under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
(INKSNA) and may result in sanctions being imposed on the
entities and individuals involved;
-- Point out that the import of arms or related material from
Iran would violate UNSCR 1747, which prohibits Iran from
supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any
"arms or related materiel" and requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals;
-- Emphasize this is not the time for business as usual with
Iran;
-- Remind the GOT that both the DIO and Parchin were
designated for an asset freeze under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747,
respectively, and were sanctioned by the U.S. under Executive
Order (E.O.) 13382;
-- Strongly urge the GOT to use available legal authorities,
including appropriate domestic laws and authorities related
to implementing UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, to immediately
terminate these deals and freeze any assets of DIO;
-- Note that Iran has a long history of providing arms and
other military equipment to terrorist groups and that these
items could easily end up in the hands of al-Qaida, Hamas,
Hizballah, and the Taliban;
--------------
TALKING POINTS
--------------
8. (S//REL TURKEY) Begin talking points:
-- We appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
cooperation and support in preventing the transfer of
military equipment and related materiel to and from Iran.
-- In the spirit of this cooperation, we want to share with
you some additional information about Turkish firms involved
in dealings concerning arms and related materiel with Iran.
---------------
EXPORTS TO IRAN
---------------
-- We have information that the Turkish firms Mercan Tanitim
Dis Ticaret ve Muhendislik Ltd. and Makina ve Kimya
Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) may sign a contract to export
military material to Iran.
-- The items covered by the contract include: FMJ (Full Metal
Jacket) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 mm automatic
grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines (for M16
assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm composite
magazines, all of which are specified on the Wassenaar
Arrangement Munitions List.
-- In addition, according to the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm
grenade launchers from the United States in 1995. We do not
know, definitively, if any of these were among the 40 mm
grenade launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran.
-- We should note, however, that if any U.S.-origin defense
equipment (including technical data) is re-transferred to
Iran, that transfer would violate Section 3 of the U.S. Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). As a consequence, Turkey could
lose its country eligibility under the AECA to purchase or
lease defense articles. This could potentially include
Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or
the ability to receive credits or guarantees relating to any
purchase or lease.
-----------------
IMPORTS FROM IRAN
-----------------
-- In addition to our information related to the export of
arms material to Iran, we also understand some of the same
Turkish firms involved in the exports are interested in
procuring arms material from Iran.
-- Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Mercan
Tanitim was pursuing a deal with MKEK to import 2,000 kg of
Composition A-4 military plastic explosives produced by
Parchin Chemical Industries, an Iranian government military
company and an element of the Defense Industries Organization
(DIO).
-- We further understand that in September 2009, the Turkish
companies Kolorkim Kimya San and Mercan Tanitim were
considering a deal to import nitrocellulose (NC) from Iran.
NC is a dual-use material that serves as a major component in
smokeless gunpowder.
-- As a subordinate of DIO, Parchin acts on behalf of DIO,
importing and exporting chemical goods throughout the world.
In April 2007, Parchin Chemical Industries was identified as
the final recipient of sodium perchlorate monohydrate, a
chemical precursor for solid propellant oxidizer, possibly to
be used for ballistic missiles.
-- As you know, DIO is one of seven Iranian nuclear-related
entities designated for an asset freeze in the Annex to UNSCR
1737. In addition to being listed in the Annex for UNSCR
1737, DIO was sanctioned previously by the United States for
WMD- or missile-related activities under the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (ISNA), the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, and the Export
Administration Act.
-- We would further note that Parchin Chemical Industries has
been designated for an asset freeze under UNSCR 1747 and U.S.
E.O. 13382 in July 2008 as a consequence of its work on
behalf of Iran's ballistic missile program. We, therefore,
urge you, per UNSCR 1747, to freeze any assets of Parchin
Chemical Industries that may come under Turkish jurisdiction.
-- We would like to inform you that Turkish firms engaged in
business with entities designated under E.O. 13382 are
eligible for sanctions if such activities are not halted.
-- Given the UN Security Council's grave concern over Iran's
nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, we urge you
to encourage all Turkish firms to avoid any affiliation with
this company.
-- Iran, a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism, has a
long history of providing arms and other military equipment
to terrorist groups and other non-state actors, including in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. We are concerned that the
materials being negotiated for transfer by the Turkish
companies in question could be diverted by Iran to such
groups.
-- Iran has long supplied non-state actors, including
terrorist groups such as Hizballah, with arms and other
military equipment. The terrorist applications of small arms
and light weapons (SA/LW) are obvious, but Iran has also
supplied terrorists with larger weapons systems that threaten
regional security and stability.
-- Failure to prevent these sales could result in the
re-transfer of military material and explosives by Iran to
groups like al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban.
This would harm the Turkish government's reputation as a NATO
ally and demonstrated opponent of terrorism, and would
reflect badly on the Turkish business community.
-- These transactions could also be damaging to our bilateral
relationship as these items can be used to kill and severely
injure Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere
in the region.
-- Turkey is also required to prevent the transfers from Iran
as noted in UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, which prohibits Iran
from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory
any "arms or related materiel." All states are required to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether
or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.
-- We believe the arms and explosives acquisitions being
pursued by Mercan Tanitim and MKEK with Iranian entities
would clearly violate this provision of UNSCR 1747, and that
the Kolorkim and Mercan Tanitim deal involving the transfer
of nitrocellulose may as well.
-- Action to prevent such transfers would clearly demonstrate
Turkey's commitment to the full and effective implementation
of UNSCR 1747. Such action would also remove the possibility
that these firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the
Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).
-- We strongly urge you to investigate this information and
prevent any transfers being contemplated by the entities
involved by using authorities available under Turkish
domestic law.
-- Please share with us the results of your investigation at
your earliest convenience.
END POINTS
---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
---------------------
9. (U) Post is requested to please report results of its
efforts as soon as possible.
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POINTS OF CONTACT
-----------------
10. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are
Margaret T. Mitchell and Michael Rolleri of ISN/CATR, and
Matthew Hardiman, EUR/PRA.
CLINTON