VZCZCXRO3726
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0571/01 0461050
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151050Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5605
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000571
SIPDIS
E.O. 12598: DECL: 02/15/2020
TAGS PGOV, KJUS, KCOR, PREL, EAID, AF
SUBJECT: NEW CIV-MIL EFFORT TO INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR OF CRIMINAL AND
CORRUPT AFGHAN OFFICIALS
Classified by Acting Deputy Ambassador Joseph A. Mussomeli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C//REL ISAF) Summary: The first Nexus-Corruption Leadership Board, co-chaired by Coordinating Director for
Development and Economic Affairs, Ambassador Wayne, and ISAF J2 (Intel), Major General Flynn, met on February 4 to
consider possible courses of action (“COAs”) that U.S. military and Embassy personnel may employ against criminal and
corrupt Afghan officials in an effort to change their behavior. These recommendations were developed through the joint
effort of the Embassy’s Nexus-Corruption Coordination committee (NCC) and ISAF’s Anti-Corruption Task Force (ACTF). The
Leadership Board approved three recommendations: (1) to apply a set of minimum COAs against high-profile corrupt
officials to signal a change in U.S. policy on corruption; (2) to begin a series of high-level demarches to persuade the
Karzai government to follow through on promises to tackle corruption; and (3) to consider at the next Leadership Board
meeting recommendations on applying appropriate COAs, including possible law enforcement actions, against three
prominent Afghan malign actors in southern Afghanistan: Abdul Razziq, Ahmed Wali Karzai, Asadullah Sherzad. End Summary.
2. (C//REL ISAF) The purpose of the NCC is to develop policy recommendations on ways to reduce and combat official
corruption and “nexus” criminal activities (i.e., insurgency, narcotics and criminality). The membership of the NCC
includes representatives from U.S. law enforcement agencies, U.S. Treasury, and a cleared American from ISAF. ISAF’s
ACTF works in partnership with the NCC and the international community (e.g., the UK and the UN) to develop policy
goals, prioritize policy towards important malign actors (i.e., corrupt/criminal Afghan officials), and determine
appropriate courses of action to change their behavior.
Board Considers Courses of Action (COA) Policy
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3. (C//REL ISAF) In the first meeting of the Leadership Board, co-chairs Ambassador Wayne and MG Flynn approved the
concept of applying non-law enforcement COAs to corrupt officials on a case-by-case basis. Possible COAs can run the
spectrum from refusing to appear in a picture with a corrupt official, to cutting off USG funded assistance, to seizing
ill-gotten assets, to applying Presidential Proclamation 7750, which prevents the corrupt official and his/her family
from obtaining U.S. visas. No COAs are intended to preclude or replace prosecutions when appropriate, but to serve as
tools to be considered to alter illicit behavior in addition to prosecution, or when prosecution is not possible or has
a low likelihood of success. The policy also provides that no COA is recommended that will hinder, prevent, or interfere
with an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. However, in many cases, the proposed measure may be as or more
effective than law enforcement actions in influencing the conduct of officials involved in corruption or nexus-related
activities, particularly at the local level.
4. (C//REL ISAF) Ambassador Wayne and MG Flynn also agreed to the recommendation to develop a “basket” of minimum COAs
that would be applied as a default to all corrupt officials that are prioritized as persons of interest by NCC and/or
ACTF. These minimum COAs include: (1) no public meetings with the official (and no photos), and no high-profile public
visits from CODELs and other dignitaries; (2) no giving or receiving of gifts; and (3) restrictions on opportunities for
corrupt officials to participate in U.S.-funded training, travel, and speaking engagements. Applying minimum COAs is
designed to help change perceptions held by parts of the Afghan public that the U.S. supports, explicitly or implicitly,
known corrupt officials.
Positive Incentives for Positive Acts
-------------------------------------
5. (C//REL ISAF) The COA policy approved by the Leadership Board also provides for positive incentives for Afghan
officials who have demonstrated that they are not corrupt, who facilitate U.S. efforts and are positive influences in a
given province or district. Examples of positive courses of action include recognition for a notable activity, project
funding, consideration for training opportunities, media opportunities, etc.
Board Will Consider Application of COAs at Next Meeting
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6. (C//REL ISAF) The meeting decided that ACTF and NCC will meet prior to the next Leadership Board meeting (convened
monthly) to consider intel and law enforcement files assembled on three powerful officials operating in the south of the
country who are believed to be corrupt: ABP Commander at Weesh Chaman border crossing Colonel Abdul Razziq, Ahmed Wali
Karzai, and Chief of Police Asadullah Sherzad. ACTF and NCC will make a joint policy recommendation on how these
officials should be addressed, taking into consideration second and third order effects and the input of military and
civilian experts in the field. Ambassador Wayne and MG Flynn will review the
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recommendations at the next Leadership Board meeting, and their decision will be reported septel. They will also
consider recommendations on a series of high-level demarches intended to encourage President Karzai to honor his public
commitment to fight corruption. (Note: Work on formulating these recommendations is underway. End Note)
Background: NCC, the ACTF, and the Leadership Board
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7. (C//REL ISAF) The NCC learns of corrupt and criminal actions through regular field reporting, law enforcement and
intel activities, policy meetings, and from international partners. The National Level Civ-Mil Anti-Corruption,
Counternarcotics, and Illicit Finance Working Groups also refer information to, receive referrals from, and coordinate
actions with the NCC. When incriminating information is obtained about an Afghan official of national prominence, or
whose actions have a destabilizing effect on the U.S. mission, the NCC considers possible COAs in cooperation with
ISAF’s ACTF. NCC members include working level representatives from FBI, DEA, DOJ, POL, SIGAR, Afghan Threat Finance
Cell (AFTC), RAO, and Treasury, as well as other U.S. agencies. Cleared Americans from ISAF, IJC J2, CJIATF-NEXUS and
targeting staff are also invited to participate.
8. (C//REL ISAF) As described above, the NCC will make recommendations to the Leadership Board, comprised of
General-level officers from the Embassy and ISAF. Currently, the Leadership Board meetings are co-chaired by CDDEA
Ambassador Wayne or Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone and ISAF J2 MG Flynn. The Leadership Board will review recommendations
on nexus-related or corruption issues involving situations that could negatively impact the U.S. relationship with key
government officials or ministries. At its discretion, the Leadership Board may forward a case up to the Leadership
Team, consisting of the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/Commander ISAF, or their designated
representatives. The Leadership Team will review any nexus-corruption report involving a prominent official or having
implications that would negatively impact the U.S. relationship with key government officials or ministries. At any
time, the Leadership Team may convene meetings to discuss sensitive cases or to review Leadership Board decisions and
recommendations as part of the weekly Principals Meeting.
Comment
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9. (C//REL ISAF) Recognizing the major limitations of law enforcement actions in Afghanistan at this time (due to lack
of capacity and lack of political will), this civ-mil effort will use pragmatic courses of action to end tacit American
support for corrupt Afghan officials and to attempt to change the illicit behavior of officials and influential Afghans.
Given the fluidity of developments on the ground (e.g., rumors of Ahmed Wali Karzai’s appointment as Ambassador to Saudi
Arabia or Oman, and Abdul Razziq’s initiative to form an anti-corruption task force in Spin Boldak), the time is right
to determine an appropriate policy for dealing with such officials. End comment.
EIKENBERRY