VZCZCXRO3602
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0436/01 0341358
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031358Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5365
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000436
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS PREL, IR, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN’S OUTLOOK ON IRAN: A KARZAI INSIDER’S
VIEW
KABUL 00000436 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: D/Ambassador Ricciardone; Reasons (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: President Karzai’s Chief of Staff and former Ambassador to Iran, Omar Daudzai, offered the Palace’s
outlook on Iran’s role in Afghanistan. Daudzai suggested that Karzai could provide “an open door” for the United States
to engage Iran, at such time as the U.S. may judge this useful. Daudzai had found in Iran that paradoxically, the
Iranian people hate foreigners, except for Americans; but that the Iranian revolution survives on its animosity towards
the United States. He said that the Iranians no longer deny their support for the Taliban. While there is room for
“indirect” U.S.-Afghan cooperation on Afghanistan, Daudzai cautioned that at best the Iranians would only “tolerate” our
presence in Afghanistan. End Summary.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
We Can Help Open the Door to Iran
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (S) At a meeting within the GIRoA with COS Daudzai, D/Amb. Ricciardone asked for Afghanistan’s outlook on the
anti-coalition Jundullah organization (Septel), and Karzai’s and Daudzai’s assessments of Afghanistan’s interests with
Iran. Daudzai confirmed February 2, that only he and President Karzai had any substantial political engagement with the
Iranian government. Karzai does pay close attention to Iran, Daudzai said, and he suggested that Karzai could help “open
a door” for the United States to engage Iran “perhaps after Ahmadinejad leaves the scene,” or at any time the USG may
judge useful. He explained that Karzai had maintained excellent relations with Iran and Khatami personally, and that
Karzai had obtained the former Iranian president’s support for Daudzai’s appointment as Afghan Ambassador to Tehran.
Relations had become more complicated with Ahmadinejad’s election. Daudzai went on to serve about a year and a half in
Tehran, from 2004-2005.
3. (S) D/Amb. Ricciardone posited that, while President Obama and Secretary Clinton had made clear the United States’
willingness to discuss our differences with the Iranians, Iran evidently is not ready to engage with us. Even though we
believe that many Iranians desire more normal relations with the United States, the Iranian government appears out of
touch with its people, in particular an increasingly angry middle class.
4. (S) Daudzai related that after the first and only time he was “summoned to the MFA” for a complaint on alleged GIRoA
support for Jundullah (Septel), and his categorical denial later proved true, he developed excellent relations with
Iranian officials. Nonetheless, living in Tehran had been “challenging”. At first, Iranian intelligence shadowed
Daudzai’s every move; after he told the Iranians that he was annoyed that he was being followed, the Iranians became
more subtle in their approach. He was astonished that while there were no Sunni mosques in Tehran, an estimated 30 to 40
percent of its population was Sunni (combining Iranian and Afghan Sunnis residing there). He established an informal
mosque in the basement of the Afghan Embassy, an act that drew much appreciation from the Sunni population.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Iranian People Dislike Foreigners, Except Americans
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (S) Reflecting on his time in Tehran, Daudzai said he had reached two main conclusions: 1) “Common” Iranians hate
foreigners, except for Americans, whom they “miss”. To illustrate, he said that even his wife’s doctor told her, “Please
tell the Americans to bring their soldiers to our country next.” 2) paradoxically, the Iranian revolution lives on its
animosity towards the United States. If this animosity ends, then the revolution will end. The national leadership knows
this and thus do all they can to sustain “the revolution.” While Daudzai did not foresee that the Iranian revolution
would end under Ahmadinejad’s tenure, he predicted that Ahmadinejad’s influence over the remainder of his term would
wane. Therefore, he said, it was opportune to now start “preparing the ground” for U.S. relations with Iran under a
better leader who would replace Ahmadinejad even though the Supreme Leader really “calls the shots.” Daudzai said that
Iran’s “real” Foreign Minister is not Motaki, but rather Ali Akbar Velayati, who reports to the Supreme Leader.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Two Sides of Iranian Influence in Afghanistan
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (S) Daudzai said Iran’s influence in Afghanistan, like
KABUL 00000436 002.2 OF 002
Pakistan’s, has been both helpful and hurtful. (Last year, Daudzai had acknowledged that Iran paid limited amounts of
money to the Palace only episodically and unpredictably. He contrasted this with sustained U.S. financial support to
Afghanistan with far more than the Iranians’ occasional cash payment.) Iran and Pakistan each had supported their own
favored Afghan Mujahedin groups against the Soviets, largely along religious affiliations. Likewise, in the current
conflict, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were each supporting their “preferred” Taliban groups. This time, however,
Iran’s support was driven by “a war of objectives” not religious sympathies: Iran would even support Sunni Taliban to
counter Western influence in Afghanistan, so long as the Taliban factions they supported were not affiliated with Mullah
Omar.
7. (S) Daudzai said that two years ago when he raised with the Iranians their support for Afghan Taliban, they had
flatly denied any involvement. However, over the past half year, the Iranians, including their Ambassador in Kabul, no
longer deny this assertion -- now they remain silent, he said. Daudzai attributed the Iranian change in posture to their
awareness that the GIRoA has evidence of Iranian support for some Taliban elements.
8. (S) Daudzai said that on occasion, young Afghan males are allowed to cross into Iran, where they are recruited and
trained before returning to Afghanistan to fight against the GIRoA and Coalition Forces. The Iranians also recruit
Afghan university students and graduates. Daudzai said that approximately 7,000 Afghans hold Iranian university degrees,
including three of President Karzai’s cabinet picks, who “fortunately” Parliament did not confirm. He claimed that Iran
is also offering three-year visas to Afghans who deposit USD 100,000 in an Iranian bank account.
9. (S) According to Daudzai, Iran grooms thousands of Afghan religious scholars. After completing their education in
Iran, they return to Afghanistan to work in Madrassas, where they continue to receive “support packages” from Iran. The
support package included a monthly salary. Daudzai claimed that a man named Ibrahim directed this program from the
Supreme Leader’s office. He also asserted that in addition to financing Afghan religious leaders, Iran had provided
salary support for some GIRoA deputy ministers and other officials, including “one or two even in the Palace.” Daudzai
claimed that some of these officials had been relieved of their duties because “you can’t be an honest Afghan if you
receive a (Iran) package.”
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.S.-Iranian Convergence of Interests is Complicated
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10. (S) Daudzai opined that there could be room for indirect, but not direct, cooperation between Iran and the U.S.
regarding Afghanistan. Iran at best would “tolerate” the U.S. participation in an area of common interest here, he said.
He would reflect further on the subject and would look forward to continuing the conversation. Eikenberry