VZCZCXRO0303
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0028 0161021
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161021Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7583
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000028
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MARR SU LY CD
SUBJECT: RUSHING TO RAPPROCHEMENT: BASSOLE SAYS CHAD-SUDAN
PEACE IMMINENT, GOS-JEM DARFUR DEAL NEXT UP
REF: A. NDJAMENA 021
B. NDJAMENA 011
C. NDJAMENA 004
D. NDJAMENA 003
1. (SBU) Visiting Chief Joint Mediator Bassole told me late
Jan 14 that he was deeply involved in the final stages of
negotiations between the GOC and the GOS for a definitive
peace deal -- the denouement could be written agreements
signed as early as this weekend -- and that he was at the
same time trying to "integrate" the Chad-Sudan rapprochement
with a GOS-JEM deal that could pave the way for real progress
on Darfur at Doha.
2. (SBU) The CJM said he had been working for several days
closely with Chad Pres Deby and his FORMIN, with Sudan lead
negotiator Dr Ghazi, and with JEM's Khalil Ibrahim to
facilitate implementation of both pieces of his diplomatic
action plan. Bassole said he wanted to "informally but
effectively" expand his role as mediator for Sudan to
mediator for Chad and Sudan, based on the looming
rapprochement between the two countries, and on the upcoming
isolation of JEM. He said that he would leave one of his team
in Chad, loosely attached to MINURCAT, to give him continued
contact with Deby and the GOS, and another team member here
to give him similar continuous contact with JEM.
3. (SBU) The CJM praised Deby's role in particular in the
current negotiations, calling him a "good and trustworthy
interlocutor." Bassole said that Deby had assured him that
the GOC had given the JEM a firm deadline -- an "official
notification" -- of Jan 21 to leave Chad. Bassole said he
wanted to give JEM a "way out of its upcoming isolation" by
facilitating a GOS-JEM deal. The CJM said that on the
GOS-JEM piece he was aiming at a tete-a-tete between Ghazi
and Khalil to reach at least preliminary agreement on "the
conditions for a cease fire;" on JEM participation in Sudan
elections; and on the "Status of Darfur" issue.
4. (SBU) If he were to achieve a "private" JEM-GOS deal --
he kept using the English word, "deal" in this regard -- in
advance of the next Doha sessions, that could set the stage
for "constructive" JEM participation at Doha by giving JEM
confidence that it was the GOS's privileged negotiating
partner, even though it would not be the only Darfur actor at
the table or tables in Doha. The key "private" agreement
between JEM and the GOS would be on a cease fire, at least
"the conditions for a cease fire to be agreed at Doha."
5. (SBU) With an eventual cease fire, concrete progress
could be made, especially on a UN-run DDR program. Bassole
stressed he was trying to build GOS-JEM mutual trust by
facilitating their agreement on "the big issues" so that JEM
could go to Doha and feel confident that its interests were
protected even as it participated -- apparently as one of
many Darfur actors -- in discussion of the "little issues"
there.
6. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO