VZCZCXRO2616
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #2922/01 3560949
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220949Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8363
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRIORITY
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0389
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 8544
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8043
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA PRIORITY 5157
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 1855
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/USFJ PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002922
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J, S/CT RHONDA SHORE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM PREL PGOV JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 109980
TOKYO 00002922 001.2 OF 003
1. (U) Per reftel, 2009 Country Report on Terrorism for Japan
provided in paragraph 2. Embassy point of contact is
Political Officer Jamie Roane (roanejo@state.gov,
roanejo@state.sgov.gov).
2. (U) Begin report text.
Japan
Japan bolstered border security and enhanced national
counterterrorism measures in coordination with the United
States. Japanese immigration officials strengthened their
capability to identify suspicious travelers upon entry into
Narita International Airport through fingerprinting and
facial recognition technology. Using the Biometric
Immigration Control System, officials denied entry to
travelers during 2009 for offenses such as prior deportation
and fake passports. In July, the Foreign Ministry's
International Counterterrorism Cooperation Division exchanged
diplomatic notes with U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) to extend the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) at
Narita International Airport for two additional years and to
remove "pilot" from the agreement. Japan's Immigration
Bureau, National Police Agency (NPA), and the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure, Tourism, and Travel coordinated with
the CBP on preventing terrorists and other high-risk
travelers from boarding commercial aircraft bound for the
United States. Japanese officials see the program as a
valuable tool to secure travel between Japan and the United
States and as an effective way to share information and
prevent suspected terrorists and improperly documented air
passengers from boarding U.S.-bound flights. In June, Japan
and the United States signed a Mutual Recognition Arrangement
in Brussels, aligning security standards in both countries'
trade partnership programs.
Japanese authorities collaborated with U.S. officials on
increasing U.S. access to database records and fingerprints
of known or suspected terrorists. As a Visa Waiver Program
country, Japan held discussions with U.S. counterparts to
widen database and biometric record exchanges on known and
suspected terrorists under Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-6. The Japanese government also educated travelers
on the Electronic System for Travel Authorization through
media spots and briefings to major domestic travel agencies.
Japan took steps to strengthen port and shipping security.
Under the CBP Container Security Initiative, Japanese
authorities worked with CBP officers at four Japanese ports
to review ship manifests and to screen suspicious containers
bound for the United States. In March, Japan installed
necessary equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, and
began screening containers under the pilot Megaports
Initiative Program. Japan also continued collaboration with
the United States on science and technology for homeland
security through the U.S.-Japan Framework Initiative for a
Safe and Secure Society.
The NPA and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA)
continued to monitor the activities of Aum Shinrikyo, renamed
Aleph, and splinter group Hikari no Wa, or "Circle of Light."
In January, PSIA successfully filed a request to maintain
surveillance of Aleph and Hikari no Wa for an additional
three years. PSIA has monitored Aum since 2000 under the
Organization Control Law, a measure that allows the Agency to
conduct on-site facility inspection and to obtain quarterly
operational reports from the cult. Both sects continued to
perpetuate the "dogma" and ideology of Aum founder and 1995
sarin gas attack mastermind Chizuo Matsumoto, aka Shoko
Asahara. PSIA inspections revealed that many original Aum
members continued to hold leadership position in the groups
and that facilities maintained portrait photos and video
TOKYO 00002922 002.2 OF 003
teachings of Asahara.
Japan reached beyond its borders to fight terrorism as well.
Japan is the second largest contributor to Iraq
reconstruction with $1.5 billion in grants, $3.5 billion in
concessionary loans, and $6.9 billion in debt relief. Japan
Air Self Defense Force transport aircraft operated out of
Kuwait in support of Iraqi Freedom but ended its mission in
December 2008. On Afghanistan, Japan remained an active
partner in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and a key
international contributor to Afghan stabilization and
reconstruction. Japan has pledged more than $2 billion in
reconstruction aid since 2002 and continued construction on
the 114 kilometer stretch of the southern ring road between
Kandahar and Herat. In November, Japan announced a new
5-year, $5 billion assistance package that included, among
other items, continued funding of Afghan National Police
salaries, job training initiatives, and employment programs
for former lower-echelon insurgents. The Japan Maritime Self
Defense Force continued to conduct refueling operations in
support of OEF in the Indian Ocean, but the new Japanese
administration, elected in August, has pledged to end the
mission when authorization expires in January 2010. In
April, Tokyo pledged $1 billion for assistance to Pakistan
over the next two years.
In December, Japan hosted the fifth annual
U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD)
Counterterrorism Consultations, as part of the broader TSD,
which aimed to coordinate regional activities. Japanese
officials chaired a specialist working group on border
security and counterradicalization and took part in
discussions on law enforcement capacity building and on ways
to prevent chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) attacks. The TSD Consultations followed a TSD
Counterradicalization Workshop Japan hosted in July.
Japan continued to assist counterterrorism capacity building
in neighboring countries through dialogue, seminars,
workshops, and training. In July, Japanese officials took
part in the third Japan-South Korea Counterterrorism
Consultations. Both sides explained their respective efforts
on capacity building assistance and explored the possibility
of joint CT cooperation. In August, Japan co-chaired the
Fourth Japan-ASEAN Counterterrorism Dialogue in Vietnam. In
December, Japanese officials took part in the first
Japan-Singapore Counterterrorism Dialogue. The Japanese
Counterterrorism Ambassador reaffirmed the necessity of
enhancing capacity building assistance to developing
countries, strengthening counterradicalization efforts, and
promoting secure trade in the APEC region. In March, Japan
hosted the Seminar on Promotion of Accession to International
Counterterrorism Conventions and Protocols for the sixth
consecutive year. Tokyo promoted information sharing and
provided implementation guidance to participants including
Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and several members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), among others.
Japan supported regional projects, such as counterterrorism
research in Malaysia and terrorist rehabilitation programs in
Indonesia, through the Japan-ASEAN Integrated Fund. Over the
past few years, Japan has invited roughly 60 teachers from 17
Indonesian provinces and 43 madrassahs for the purpose of
fostering "cultural understanding" and
opening inter-faith dialogue. Japan has expanded the pool of
visitors to include Yemen and the Philippines and is
considering Pakistan as well. Japanese officials also point
to the Japan Foundation's Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange
for Students and Youths program, an initiative by which Japan
invites emerging artists and leaders from the Asia-Pacific
region to stay in different residency programs and
institutions across Japan.
TOKYO 00002922 003.2 OF 003
Japan assisted third-country law enforcement personnel by
dispatching experts and accepting trainees. The Japanese
Coast Guard (JCG), for example, provided capacity building
services and training seminars to authorities from states
that border the Straits of Malacca, a locale for piracy.
Since 2002, Japan has provided training to Coast Guard
counterparts from the Philippines and has offered technical
assistance to support local police in Indonesia by, in part,
introducing the Japanese police box, or koban, system.
Beyond Southeast Asia, JCG members assisted local officials
in Oman and Yemen in addressing piracy concerns in waters off
the Horn of Africa.
Japan contributed to counterterrorism capacity building
through membership in multilateral fora. In July, Japan
joined G-8 counterparts in calls to bolster the role of the
United Nations, improve information sharing, strengthen the
security of land, sea, and air transportation, and support
the G-8 Counterterrorism Action Group. Teaming up with
international partners, Japan continued efforts to prevent,
detect, and respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism
through the U.S. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism. Japan also worked with the United States and
other partners through the Global Health Security Initiative
to address CBRN terrorism and other health threats.
Japan undertook measures to combat terrorist financing.
Japan cooperated on freezing assets of individuals and
entities listed under UN Security Council resolutions to help
stem the flow of terrorist financing to Al-Qa'ida and the
Taliban. Japan expanded the scope of business practices and
professions under the Law for Prevention of Transfer of
Criminal Proceeds, which requires specified business
operators, including financial institutions, to conduct
customer identification and submit suspicious transaction
reports. Under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law,
Japanese financial institutions must confirm the identity of
customers sending 100,000 yen or more overseas. For domestic
remittances, financial institutions must identify originators
of wire transfers over 100,000 yen. Japan's Banking Law also
levies administrative sanctions on financial institutions
that fail to comply with anti-money laundering and
counterterrorism financing measures. In addition, the
Financial Services Agency and the NPA's Financial
Intelligence Unit inspect financial institutions for
compliance with counterterrorism financing laws and
regulations.
In June, the Japanese Diet passed the Payment Services Act,
which addresses October 2008 Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) Mutual Evaluation recommendations pertaining to
customer due diligence and money transfer services. The
evaluation had noted several deficiencies, including the low
number of money laundering prosecutions, the absence of an
established mechanism for freezing terrorist assets that
covered domestic funds, and the absence of a requirement for
financial institutions to establish and maintain procedures,
policies, and internal controls to prevent illicit finance.
Japan's Financial Services Agency must still adopt
implementing rules. The Diet also amended Customs Act
secondary legislation, which addressed in part the FATF
recommendation pertaining to cross-border currency
declaration and disclosure. In November, the Deputy Prime
Minister said the government would begin a full-scale study
of introducing a unified taxpayer identification system,
which would help clarify the identity of parties to financial
transactions.
End Report Text
ROOS