VZCZCXRO9054
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1018/01 3651455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 311455Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1009
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0593
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0987
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0081
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0101
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0198
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0133
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0105
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0059
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0518
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0038
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0566
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0572
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1181
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0454
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0055
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001018
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG, AND INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2020
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL PINR GV MO
SUBJECT: GUINEA LATEST: DADIS AND BEYOND?
REF: A. RABAT 1009
B. RABAT 0988
RABAT 00001018 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on
December 30 that despite Dadis Camara's apparent desire to
depart Morocco (Ref A), he is in no condition to travel and
will not be able to resume control of the country. Minister
of National Defense Sekouba Konate and an assistant, Mr. Bah,
along with Minister of Communications Idrissa Cherif have
been in Rabat to visit Dadis, but Konate planned to return to
Guinea by December 31, possibly to present to the Guinean
people a case for his assumption of power in place of Dadis.
The next ten days would be telling and potentially chaotic
for the country, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, but with the
assistance of the international community, Konate should be
able to control the army and avert violence that could have
regional implications. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on December
30 that Dadis Camara was in no condition to travel and would
not be able to control Guinea again. XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that Dadis Camara still had a bullet in his head, suffered from impaired
vision and speech, and was not fully aware of his
surroundings. XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that he had not
seen Dadis; according to him only Konate and Bah were allowed
into his room. Regarding earlier news reports that Dadis was
preparing to speak to the Guinean people, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that if Dadis could speak to the media, he certainly would
have by now. Evidently Dadis also suffered from heart
problems unrelated to the gunshot wounds.
3. (S/NF) Konate evidently was not in the best of health,
either, and sought medical consultation while here in Rabat.
Reportedly a heavy drinker, Konate suffered from liver
problems consistent with his intake of large amounts of
alcohol. On December 30, senior Moroccan military officials
separately questioned Konate's fitness to lead, calling him
weak.
4. (S/NF) For XXXXXXXXXXXX, Konate's travel to Rabat allowed him to return to Guinea and report on the basis of his
first-hand knowledge that Dadis was unable to continue in his role as leader of Guinea, paving the way for Konate to
assume power for a transitional period. Were Konate to attempt to take control without having undertaken the trip to
Rabat to see Dadis, he would have been perceived as a traitor to Dadis and have no legitimacy before the Guinean people
and army. Konate would then have Cherif and Claude Pivi, another CNDD leader, arrested, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.
5. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX went on to say that Cherif
was behind demonstrations being planned for Conakry,
while Pivi, who was from the same ethnic group as Dadis,
might organize supporters on an ethnic basis and incite
clashes with other groups. Given that ethnic and national
boundaries are not coterminous, this could affect neighboring
countries and plunge the entire region into chaos (Ref B),
asserted XXXXXXXXXXXX. With the help of the United States
and European countries, Konate would be able to take power
and control the army, which lacked discipline and had too many
crooks and militias, but XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify what sort of
assistance from the international community would be
necessary.
6. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX urged intervention, both to
keep Dadis out of Guinea and to support an effort by Konate
to take power in the country, in order to forestall
devastating ethnic violence. His argument that Dadis would
RABAT 00001018 002.2 OF 002
have made a public statement by now if he could have is
compelling, while his comment that Konate would have other
CNDD leaders arrested suggests that the fate of Guinea does
not depend on Dadis alone. Dadis has amassed militias and
enjoys some popular support (Ref B), and for XXXXXXXXXXXX
his return would undoubtedly lead to violence and unrest.
His continued absence, however, might not preclude it.
End Comment.
7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
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