VZCZCXRO6062
PP RUEHSK
DE RUEHC #0541/01 3271619
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231613Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3959
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2684
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY 1076
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5547
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0352
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 7037
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 120541
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
ASTANA AND KYIV FOR DTRO AND POL-MIL
MINSK FOR POL-MIL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREATY
1. (U) This is an action request for DTROs in Astana and
Kyiv, and for Pol-Mil in Minsk. Please see paragraph 4.
2. (SBU) Background: The START Treaty expires on December 5,
2009. The START follow-on treaty will be a strictly
bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia. There will
thus be a drastic, but not complete, reduction in message
traffic utilizing the Government to Government Communications
Links (GGCLs) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The U.S.
and its partner countries therefore need to discuss the
future of the GGCLs. Terminating the GGCL agreements with
Kazakhstan and Ukraine requires twelve months, notice, that
with Belarus ninety day's notice, but such decisions will
require policy guidance. (NOTE: the Agreement with Belarus
calls the GGCLS Continuous Communications Links - CCLs; the
agreements with Ukraine and Kazakhstan refer to them as
Secure Communications Links, and they will be referred to
this way in the demarche language).
3. (SBU) Background continued: The original agreements to
establish the GGCLs are based on both the INF and START
treaties. Even with the expiration of START, the INF Treaty
continues in force, and a small number of notifications are
required yearly. The GGCLs can be maintained in an efficient
and cost-effective manner, and there are significant
benefits, both practical and political in nature, to the U.S.
in maintaining direct, secure connections with Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus and in encouraging those countries to
maintain their current NRRC-like structures, which help them
to fulfill their obligations under other treaties. The US
NRRC needs to discuss with its counterparts whether they are
willing and able to maintain the current satellite-based
configuration, or whether they wish to explore alternatives,
such as an internet-based system similar to those in use for
the notifications required under the various Organization on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) treaty regimes.
The US NRRC acknowledges that the Presidential election
campaign now underway in Ukraine may make it difficult if not
impossible for the Ukraine to engage in any substantive talks
until well into the new year, but it does not want to request
talks with Kazakhstan and Belarus without making a
simultaneous request to Ukraine. The NRRC also believes that
a demarche at this time may help the Ukrainians to focus on
the steps they need to take to repair their GGL, which has
been down since August 24, 2009, and to either complete their
unfinished satellite-link infrastructure or develop a
reliable substitute.
4. (U) Action Request: The Department requests Embassy pass
to the appropriate National Centers and MFA the points below.
Points for Minsk are to be found at paragraph 5, Astana at
paragraph 6, and Kyiv at paragraph 7.
The U.S. NRRC also encourages DTRO representatives to attend
these discussions: please reply to contacts listed in para 8.
Please report contact information and any reaction to this
paper.
5. (SBU/Releasable to Belarus) Begin Points for Minsk:
- For fifteen years, our Continuous Communication Links
(CCLs) in 1994 have been valuable and productive in providing
bilateral notifications required under the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty. The CCLs, or Government to Government
Communications Links (GGCLs), as the United States usually
refers to them, have proven to be a reliable and secure means
of communication between our countries, in particular for
exchanging treaty-related notifications.
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on
December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in
STATE 00120541 002 OF 004
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREA
message traffic utilizing the CCLs, and we need to make
decisions soon about the future of the CCLs.
- The United States believes that the CCLs can be operated in
an efficient and cost-effective manner, and that there are
mutual benefits in maintaining direct, secure connections
between our nations.
- The CCLs have been the core around which our successful
national centers for security and confidence building
communications have developed. These centers now host not
only the CCLs to support START and INF notifications, but
also the network terminals to support Organization for
Security and Cooperation notifications.
- We have devoted years to improving the CCLs to the current
digital circuitry and state-of-the-art technology within a
framework of a highly skilled communications staff, watch
officers and engineers. Both sides of our CCL know how the
links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side,s
information-passing capabilities and competencies. The CCLs
provide a reliable and easy way for our two countries to
exchange classified information directly, and an established
backup capability for our senior officials to communicate
with the each other. They serve as an instrument of mutual
trust and cooperation between our respective governments.
- If the CCLs were discontinued, much of this expertise would
be lost. As such, we anticipate that discontinuation of
CCLs, and the ability for direct bilateral coordination of
our notification regimes, could have additional negative
impact to the infrastructure and operational capacity of our
national centers.
- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation
from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of
the United States' National Center, the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support
staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss the possibilities for
maintaining the CCLs after the December expiration of the
START Treaty. The Division Chief of the Department of
State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of
Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the
NRRC delegation.
- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February
1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions. We envision
one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues.
- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts
in Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
6. (SBU/Releasable to Kazakhstan) Begin Points for Astana:
- For fifteen years, since the inauguration of our Secure
Communication Links in 1994 to provide bilateral
notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, the United States and Kazakhstan, along with
our national centers, have enjoyed a valuable and productive
relationship. The Secure Communications Links, or
Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs), as the
United States usually refers to them, have proven to be a
very effective means of exchanging treaty-related
notifications and providing rapid, reliable and secure
communication between our countries.
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on
December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in
message traffic utilizing the Secure Communications Links,
and we need to make decisions soon about the future of the
links.
- The United States believes that the Secure Communications
Links can be operated in an efficient and cost-effective
manner, and that there are significant mutual benefits in
maintaining direct, secure connections between our nations.
STATE 00120541 003 OF 004
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREA
- The Secure Communications Links have been the core around
which our highly successful national centers for security and
confidence building communications have developed. These
centers now host not only the Secure Communications Links to
support START and INF notifications, but also the network
terminals to support Organization for Security and
Cooperation notifications.
- We have devoted years to improving the Secure
Communications Links to the current digital circuitry and
state-of-the-art technology within a framework of a highly
skilled communications staff, watch officers and engineers.
Both sides of our Secure Communications Link know how the
links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side's
information-passing capabilities and competencies. The
Secure Communications Links provide a reliable and easy way
for our two countries to exchange classified information
directly, and an established backup capability for senior
officials to communicate directly with the President, Foreign
Minister, and Minister of Defense in each country. They
serve as an instrument of mutual trust and cooperation
between our respective governments.
- If the Secure Communications Links were discontinued, much
of this expertise would be lost and much work would have to
be unnecessarily repeated if we sought to re-establish these
capabilities at a later time. As such, we anticipate that
discontinuation of Secure Communications Links, and direct
bilateral coordination of our notification regimes, could
have additional negative impact to the infrastructure and
operational capacity of our national centers.
- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation
from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of
the United States' National Center, the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support
staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss the maintaining of the
Secure Communications Links after the December expiration of
the START Treaty. The Division Chief of the Department of
State,s Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of
Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the
NRRC delegation.
- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February
1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions. We envision
one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues.
- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts
in Belarus and Ukraine.
End Points for Astana
7. (SBU/Releasable to Ukraine) Begin Points for Kyiv:
- For fifteen years, since the inauguration of our Secure
Communications Links in 1994 to provide bilateral
notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, the United States and Ukraine, and our national
centers, have enjoyed a valuable and productive relationship.
The Secure Communications Links, or Government to Government
Communications Links (GGCLs), as the United States usually
refers to them, have in the past proven to be an effective
means of exchanging treaty-related notifications and
providing rapid, reliable and secure communication between
our countries.
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on
December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in
message traffic utilizing the Secure Communications Links,
and we need to make decisions soon about the future of the
Secure Communications Links.
- The United States believes that the Secure Communications
Links can be operated in an efficient and cost-effective
manner, and that there are significant mutual benefits in
maintaining direct, secure connections between our nations.
STATE 00120541 004 OF 004
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREA
- The Secure Communications Links have been the core around
which our highly successful national centers for security and
confidence building communications have developed. These
centers now host not only the Secure Communications Links to
support START and INF notifications, but also the network
terminals to support OSCE notifications.
- We have devoted years to improving the Secure
Communications Links to the current high performance level
within a framework of a highly skilled communications staff,
watch officers and engineers. Both sides of our Secure
Communications Link know how the links work, how the other
end is staffed, and each side's information-passing
capabilities and competencies. The Secure Communications
Links have provided a reliable and easy way for our two
countries to exchange classified information directly, and
when current problems are resolved, they can once again
provide an established backup capability for senior officials
to communicate directly.
- If the Secure Communications Links were discontinued, much
of this expertise would be lost and much work would have to
be unnecessarily repeated if we sought to re-establish these
capabilities at a later time. As such, we anticipate that
discontinuation of the Secure Communications Links, and
direct bilateral coordination of our notification regimes,
could have additional negative impact to the infrastructure
and operational capacity of our national centers.
- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation
from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of
the United States, National Center, the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support
staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss maintaining the Secure
Communications Links after the December expiration of the
START Treaty. The Division Chief of the Department of
State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of
Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the
NRRC delegation.
- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February
1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions. We envision
one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues.
- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts
in Belarus and Kazakhstan.
End Points for Kyiv
8. (U) Points of contact for the consultations are NRRC
Senior Staff Officer Dennis Curry at (202) 647 1895 and Staff
Officer Kevin Stickney at (202) 647 0026. The NRRC
unclassified fax number is (202) 647 4892. Post assistance
is greatly appreciated.
CLINTON