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OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHC #6396/01 3160131
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 120124Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5267
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0169
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8614
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 5757
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1412
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4599
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5730
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7709
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0287
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7144
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2989
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1210
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 116396
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
GENENVA FOR CD DEL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CDG MCAP NASA PARM PREL RS TSPA UNPUOS
SUBJECT: NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA ON U.S.-RUSSIA SPACE
SECURITY DIALOGUE
REF: A. A) STATE 54933
B. B) MOSCOW 1474
C. C) 05 STATE 89792
D. D) 07 MOSCOW 1002
E. E) UNVIEVIENNA324
F. F) STATE 58525
STATE 00116396 001.2 OF 007
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 7 below.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: A U.S. non-paper dated May 28, 2009, was
transmitted to Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inviting
Russia to discuss the February 10, 2009, Iridium-Cosmos
collision, and expressing the United States' interest in
resuming the pursuit of bilateral talks on transparency and
confidence-building measures (TCBMs) with Russia. In an
aide-memoire from Russia dated September 29, 2009, Russia
responded positively to the U.S. non-paper, and expressed its
desire to resume dialogues between Russian and U.S. experts
on space-related issues. Russia subsequently proposed a
meeting on November 14, 2009, in Geneva. Washington would
like to counter-propose to conduct two half-day meetings on
January 20-21, 2010, in Paris. This would allow both the
U.S. and Russia sufficient time for preparations. Washington
would also like to propose the addition of several items to
the proposed agenda, as well as to request responses in
advance of the meeting to the questions posed by the USG
during the June 8, 2009, meeting on the margins of the UN
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. END SUMMARY.
3. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On June 2, 2009, the Russian MFA
Department for Security and Disarmament (DVBR) responded
positively to the U.S. non-paper dated May 28, 2009, which
invited Russia to discuss the February 10, 2009, collision of
an Iridium communications satellite and an inoperable Russian
military spacecraft (Ref A). The U.S. non-paper also noted
interest in resuming the pursuit of bilateral U.S.-Russia
pragmatic and voluntary transparency and confidence-building
measures (TCBMs) (Ref B). Previous U.S.-Russian dialogues on
space security issues were held in Washington, D.C., in April
2005 and in Paris in January 2007 (Refs C and D).
4. (SBU) During a June 8 meeting in Vienna on the margins of
the annual meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS), Brigadier General Susan Helms,
Director of Plans and Policy, J-5, United States Strategic
Command, briefed the Russian COPUOS delegation on the
collision and led a discussion on the opportunity for
bilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia on
space TCBMs (Ref E). At that time, the U.S. handed over a
list of questions for consideration by the Russian Federation
(found in paragraph 7 of Ref F). At the end of this meeting,
Russia suggested the need for a specialized experts meeting
on the topic.
5. (SBU) The U.S. received an aide-memoire from Russia dated
September 29, 2009, expressing its desire to resume the
dialogue between Russian and U.S. experts on space-related
issues (paragraph 11). This aide-memoire also proposed
several agenda items for the dialogue. Since receiving this
aide-memoire, a Russian embassy official relayed Moscow's
proposal that a dialogue take place on November 14, 2009, in
Geneva, Switzerland.
6. (SBU) The U.S. non-paper (paragraph 8) provides a
counter-proposal to their November 14 date and venue that
will allow the USG sufficient time for preparations. It is
important that this dialogue take place before the Scientific
and Technical Subcommittee meeting of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, scheduled during February 8-19,
2010, so that the U.S. and Russia have the opportunity to
coordinate positions prior to the discussion of the COPUOS
agenda item on the "Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space
STATE 00116396 002.2 OF 007
Activities." The U.S. interagency delegation for the space
security dialogue will include representatives from NASA, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, United States Strategic Command, and the Department of
State. END BACKGROUND.
7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy is requested to pass the
U.S. non-paper (contained in paragraph 8 below) and draft
agenda (contained in paragraph 9) to appropriate host
government officials at the MFA and to provide copies to the
Ministry of Defense and the Russian Space Agency (Roskosmos).
Embassy may draw upon and handover the contingency talking
points in paragraph 10 and is asked to report its delivery
and any GoR reaction at the time of delivery. END ACTION
REQUEST.
8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. NON-PAPER:
Non-Paper
November 11, 2009
The United States is pleased to respond to the Russian
Federation's Aide-Memoire of September 29, 2009, proposing a
meeting between U.S. and Russian experts on space-related
issues, and Moscow's subsequent proposal for a November 14
meeting in Geneva relayed by the Russian Federation's Embassy
in Washington, D.C.
The United States is pleased that the Russian Federation has
expressed a willingness to resume this important dialogue.
As Russia's Aide-Memoire notes, it - and for that matter, the
United States - will require adequate time for careful
preparation and to ensure participation by appropriate
experts. Therefore, the United States would counter-propose
to hold two half-day meetings on January 20-21, 2010, in
Paris, France. We propose that the United States host the
first half-day of discussions on January 20 at the U.S.
Embassy, and that Russia host the second half-day on January
21 at its Embassy.
The United States has reviewed Russia's proposed agenda items
and generally agrees with its proposals, but with the
addition of three new agenda items. First, the United States
believes it is important for each of us to exchange
perspectives regarding the challenges to our shared national
security interests in a congested, complex, and potentially
contested space domain. Second, the United States proposes
an agenda item to explore the continuity of our respective
positions on the "long term sustainability of outer space
activities," to be discussed at the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space in February 2010. Third, the United States
proposes an agenda item to discuss opportunities for expanded
U.S.-Russian space cooperation related to problems regarding
cross-cutting/multi-agency issues such as additional measures
to enhance spaceflight safety.
To ensure the most complete review of the agenda, the United
States believes this meeting should include appropriate
interagency government experts, including experts from our
respective military space forces as well as from civilian
space agencies.
In order to facilitate our space security dialogue, the
United States would appreciate receiving in advance of the
meeting Russia's answers to our questions (attached at Annex
B to the U.S.-proposed agenda) posed on June 8, 2009, during
our bilateral discussions in Vienna on the margins of the UN
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), in
which Brigadier General Susan Helms, Director of Plans and
Policy, J-5, United States Strategic Command, briefed the
Russian COPUOS delegation on the Iridium-Cosmos collision and
led a discussion on the opportunity for bilateral cooperation
between the United States and Russia on space transparency
and confidence-building measures.
As we prepare for this prospective meeting, the United States
STATE 00116396 003.2 OF 007
believes it would be useful for us to take without delay two
pragmatic steps to enhance spaceflight safety.
The first step is the identification of specific points of
contact for transmitting and receiving timely exchanges of
satellite collision hazard warnings through the direct
communication between our two governments. When a country's
satellite and a space object (e.g., debris) are projected to
pass each other within a distance of one kilometer or less in
low earth orbit or five kilometers or less in geostationary
orbit, the U.S. Government attempts to so notify either the
governmental or commercial satellite operator(s) to ensure
flight safety. As the time of the closest conjunction nears,
more analysis is accomplished to see if the distance of
closest approach has changed due to orbital dynamics effects,
for example, gravitational forces. The U.S. Government will
provide updates as they become available.
In this regard, the United States wishes to inform Russia
that the U.S. Government Point of Contact for exchanges of
collision hazard warnings is the Mission Commander of the
U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The JSpOC
Mission Commander can be contacted at:
Telefax: 1 (805) 605-3507
Email: JSpOCSSAConjunctionAssessment@vandenberg.af.m il
Telephone: 1 (805) 605-3514
The United States requests similar contact information for
the Russian government's Point of Contact.
As a second pragmatic step, the United States proposes that
familiarization visits by U.S. and Russian military space
operators should proceed as soon as possible in accordance
with the strategic framework for military-to-military
engagement established between the Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the General Staff of the
Russian Armed Forces on July 6, 2009. The United States
believes that the highest priority should be given to
scheduling reciprocal visits by satellite movement control
specialists. The U.S. point of contact for these visits is:
USSTRATCOM/J5, Plans and Policy
Telephone: 1 (402) 232-6603
Telefax: 1 (402) 294-1035
The United States looks forward to receiving Moscow's
response to our proposed dates and venue for resuming this
timely dialogue and welcomes Russia's thoughts on the
U.S.-proposed agenda.
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER.
9. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF THE U.S.-PROPOSED AGENDA:
PROPOSED AGENDA FOR U.S.-RUSSIA SPACE SECURITY DIALOGUE
DAY ONE (U.S. Host):
1. Introductions
2. U.S. and Russian perspectives on challenges - including
threats - to shared national security interests in outer space
3. Russian and U.S. views regarding the use of outer space
in support of national security interests
4. Approaches to ensuring the safety of outer space
activities
a. Russia's responses to U.S. questions provided on June 8,
2009 (Annex A)
b. U.S. and Russian perspectives on the "long term
sustainability of outer space activities," an agenda item of
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee
STATE 00116396 004.2 OF 007
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
5. Opportunities for expanded U.S.-Russian space cooperation
related to problems regarding cross-cutting/multi-agency
issues
a. U.S. and Russian views on additional measures to enhance
spaceflight safety
b. Other matters
DAY TWO (Russia Host):
6. Russia's proposals for transparency and
confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space (Annex B)
a. Russian proposals
b. U.S. perspectives
c. Options for implementation of mutually-agreed TCBMs on a
bilateral basis
7. Discussions on outer space TCBM matters in the UN General
Assembly's First Committee
a. Review of past attempts to co-sponsor a TCBM Resolution in
the 62nd and 63rd sessions of the General Assembly
b. The opportunity for U.S.-Russian collaboration at the 65th
session of the General Assembly
8. Russian and U.S. perspectives regarding the European
Union's draft "Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities"
Annex A: Questions provided to the Russian Federation by the
United States on June 8, 2009
a. What space surveillance and space situational awareness
capabilities does Russia currently operate/utilize?
b. What are Russia's future plans for its space situational
awareness capabilities?
c. Your March 5, 2009, non-paper mentioned the importance of
transparency and confidence-building measures in space
activities, such as the sharing of data related to orbital
parameters of space vehicles. To promote spaceflight safety,
the U.S. already shares orbital parameters freely on the
space-track.org website to 37,000 registered users from 110
nations.
i. Does Russia intend to share data in a similar manner or
only bilaterally?
ii. Does Russia intend to share information on all satellites
or only collision debris data?
iii. What data would Russia be willing to share (two-line
element sets, maneuver plans, debris field data, pre-launch
parameters, etc.)?
d. Your non-paper also stated that Russia would like
"consultations regarding ambiguous situations of concern for
spacefaring nations."
i. What types of concerns would be considered in this
category? Would these situations include emergency
notification of a potential conjunction, loss of control of a
satellite that is drifting, or orbital debris information?
ii. How would Russia like to bring such ambiguous situations
to the attention of spacefaring nations? Through what
channels (e.g., UN, diplomatic, military-to-military
channels)?
e. The U.S. intends to monitor and assess potential
collisions for all 800 maneuverable satellites against all
other satellites, looking for possible conjunctions. Would
Russia like to be notified of any possible conjunctions with
your satellites that we predict? Through what channels
(e.g., UN, diplomatic, military-to-military channels)?
f. Since all spacefaring nations are concerned with
preventing more collisions in space, do you agree that we
should focus most closely on this topic area at the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space? Do you also agree that
other multilateral fora (e.g., Conference on Disarmament, UN
General Assembly First Committee) are the most appropriate
STATE 00116396 005.2 OF 007
venues for substantive discussions on other transparency and
confidence-building measures that could help ensure
predictability, enhance stability, and reduce the likelihood
of misunderstanding in the conduct of space activities?
g. The U.S. and Russia are the most capable nations at
tracking space objects and are in the best position to
predict conjunctions that could have significant impact on
all users of space. What is Russia doing to predict possible
conjunctions? Does it intend to notify owner/operators of
possible conjunctions?
h. Is Russia willing to engage in bilateral discussions,
military-to-military technical information exchanges, and/or
visits regarding space data sharing?
Annex B: Russia's proposals for Transparency and Confidence
Building Measures for Outer Space Activities - as noted in
Paragraph 10 of Russia's July 13, 2009, submission to the UN
Secretary General. (UN General Assembly document
A/64/138/Add.1 of September 19, 2009)
(a) Exchange of information on:
(i) The main directions of States' outer space policy;
(ii) Major outer space research and use programs;
(iii) Orbital parameters of outer space objects;
(iv) Foreseeable dangerous situations in space;
(b) Familiarization visits:
(i) Expert visits, including visits to space launch sites,
flight command and control centers and other facilities of
outer space infrastructure;
(ii) Invitation of observers to launches of spacecraft;
(iii) Demonstrations of rocket and space technologies;
(c) Notification of:
(i) Planned spacecraft launches;
(ii) Scheduled spacecraft maneuvers which could result in
dangerous proximity to spacecraft of other States;
(iii) The beginning of descent from orbit of unguided space
objects and the predicted impact areas on Earth;
(iv) The return from orbit into the atmosphere of a guided
spacecraft;
(v) The return of a spacecraft with a nuclear source of
power on board, in the case of malfunction and danger of
radioactive materials descending to Earth;
(d) Consultations:
(i) To clarify the information provided on outer space
research and use programs;
(ii) On ambiguous situations, as well as on other issues of
concern;
(iii) To discuss the implementation of agreed transparency
and confidence building measures in outer space activities;
(e) Thematic workshops on various outer space research and
use issues, organized on a bilateral or multilateral basis,
with the participation of scientists, diplomats, military and
technical experts.
END TEXT OF PROPOSED AGENDA.
10. (SBU) BEGIN CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS:
-- The U.S. regrets that it is unable to accept Russia's
proposal for a meeting on November 14, 2009, in Geneva. A
meeting in late January would allow for better preparation
and ensure the participation of appropriate U.S. experts.
-- In addition, a meeting late January would enable our
delegations to explore the continuity of our respective
positions on the "long term sustainability of outer space
activities," prior to the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, which convenes on February 9, 2010.
-- U.S. participants in the proposed meeting would include
STATE 00116396 006.2 OF 007
experts from the U.S. Department of State (including the
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and the
Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science), the U.S.
Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States
Strategic Command, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
-- The U.S. delegation would be headed by Mr. Frank Rose, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Policy and
Verification Operations.
END CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS.
11. (SBU) BEGIN RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE:
AIDE-MEMOIRE
Moscow
September 29, 2009
The Russian side has carefully studied the ideas and
proposals contained in the U.S. Aide-Memoire of May 28, 2009
(received from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on June 2, 2009),
as well as those set forth at the meeting of Russian and U.S.
experts in Vienna on June 8, 2009.
We agree with the U.S. side that the intensive development of
outer space activities is outstripping the development of the
infrastructure for monitoring near-Earth orbits. As a result,
the technical resources that countries have at their disposal
do not allow them to continuously follow all launched
spacecraft and to predict the occurrence of hazardous
situations in outer space, including potential collisions of
satellites with fragments of space junk or with each other.
Such situations are particularly dangerous for manned space
flights, especially for the International Space Station. The
collision that occurred between Russian and U.S. satellites
on February 10, 2009, is a serious warning of the possibility
that such incidents could happen in the future. We agree that
lessons must be learned from this, and we reaffirm our
willingness to resume the dialogue between Russian and U.S.
experts on space-related issues.
Apart from the issues set forth in the U.S. Aide-Memoire of
May 28, 2009, we would consider it useful to discuss the
following subjects at the meeting of experts;
1. The two sides' views regarding the use of outer space;
2. The two sides' conceptual approaches to ensuring the
safety of outer space activities;
3. transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in
outer space;
4. Russian proposals for TCBMs presented in the report of the
UN Secretary General (UN General Assembly document A/62/114
of August 3, 2007);
5. the new Russian proposal for TCBMs - international
exchange of information on predicted hazardous situations in
outer space; the conditions required for its implementation;
6. interaction between Russia and the U.S. on TCBM-related
matters at sessions of the UN General Assembly;
7. the possibility and advisability of drafting a UN document
on TCBMs based on our countries' proposals;
8. Russian and U.S. approaches to the EU's proposal for
developing a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
At present we are studying the U.S. side's questions
regarding a possible exchange of information on the situation
in outer space, which were conveyed to us in Vienna during
the fifty-second (2009) session of the UN Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We have in mind a discussion of
these matters in the course of further contacts.
The Russian side hopes for the U.S. side's constructive
response to these ideas and, as a first step, proposes
setting a tentative timeframe, a possible agenda, and a place
to hold a new meeting of Russian and U.S. experts. We would
like to receive the U.S. side's proposals concerning this
matter, taking into account the time required for careful
preparation of a meeting.
STATE 00116396 007.2 OF 007
END RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE.
12. (U) The Department thanks the Embassy for their
assistance. Please slug responses for ISN/MDSP-RBuenneke,
OES/SAT-DTurner, and EUR/PRA-MHardiman.
CLINTON