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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5519
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1033
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1590
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5635
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 7056
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 8010
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2412
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 002576
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: ELAB PGOV PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: EXTREMISM IN SOUTHERN PUNJAB AND NORTHERN SINDH
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (SBU) Summary: Though the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) continue
to grab headlines for terrorist violence, poor and underdeveloped regions in the rest of "settled" Pakistan are
increasingly the recruiting and training ground for extremism and militancy. Areas such as the Southern Punjab's
Seraiki-speaking belt and interior northern Sindh are mired in choking poverty and underdevelopment. This lack of
prosperity is coupled with a rising number of disaffected youth who have a window to the outside world through
television and the internet, but no prospects for social mobility. Moreover Pakistanis in these areas have lost their
traditional patronage structure, be it the religious Sufi Pirs or the landlords, who once protected the basic needs of
their citizens and delivered simple justice. In such places, as well as parts of urban Karachi and Quetta, religious
extremists, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), find fertile ground to spread their ideology and recruit new militants. End
Summary.
BROKEN AGRICULTURE & FAILING EDUCATION
---------------------------------------
2. (C) Both Southern Punjab and Northern Sindh are still mainly agricultural societies with few other viable industries.
Traditionally, the economies of these areas have been dominated by large landowners who outsource their farming to
tenant farmers. Additionally, the highest rates of bonded labor in Pakistan are found in these regions, with most of
such labor concentrated in agriculture, brick kilns, and carpet weaving. With the old agricultural system failing and
"modern" farming taking hold, farming alone can no longer support the region's labor pool.
3. (C) As farming disappears as a source of income for the populace, government education systems fail to prepare their
students for anything else. Public schools are yielding young graduates who can not find jobs, even when they move to
large cities such as Lahore and Karachi. Many young high school and college graduates are frustrated because the years
they spend in government schools do not provide them any employable skills. This common occurrence is reflected in the
story of Ajmal Kasab, the sole surviving Mumbai attacker, who by his own admission graduated from a Southern Punjab
government school and unsuccessfully looked for jobs in Lahore. He ended up pursuing unskilled labor, then petty crime,
and ultimately was lured to LeT with promises of money and adventure. Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director of the Center for
Research and Security Studies (CRSS), described the extremism in Southern Punjab not as "talibanization" but rather as a
battle between haves and have-nots. He stressed that the education system had to be rationalized so that it led to real
job opportunities, otherwise jobless youth would find a source of income in militant organizations. Those that actually
graduate from public high schools are in the upper echelon of have-nots; illiteracy rates are high, and even primary
school enrollment low, in these areas.
4. (U) Unlike in the recent past, the poor and jobless youth are no longer cut off from the outside world. Increasingly
free media and internet access show these disaffected youth the wealth and corruption that exist outside their immediate
circles. Also, newly rich local merchants who benefit from corruption, along with lavish foreign-financed madrassas,
stand in stark contrast to the meager existence of this disaffected generation.
TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP VACUUM & EXTREME IDEOLOGY GROWTH
--------------------------------------------- -----------
5. (SBU) Several academic studies, including a recent look at the connection between poverty and militancy by the
Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, have found that while poverty alone is not sufficient to give rise to extremism, it
is a contributing factor pushing people towards militancy, provided an enabling environment exists. Poverty has long
existed in Pakistan well beyond southern Punjab and northern Sindh; however, recent changes to the power structures and
ideologies in both regions have provided the conducive environment for militancy to take hold.
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6. (C) Traditionally, landlords and religious Sufi Pirs (who were often the same individual) lived among their
communities and were largely protective patrons. Tenant farmers and Sufi devotees, while poor, could count on their
leaders to deliver basic justice, food, and protection against corrupt police or other government functionaries.
Peasants tolerated a feudal system because it also provided them protection through their individual benefactors. In the
last several decades, exploitative landlords have increasingly moved to big cities and Pirs no longer deliver community
uplift. The breakdown of the traditional systems - similar to the breakdown and corruption within the FATA's malik
system - has left the populace without a social welfare net or any real access to justice.
7. (C) Many have claimed that a region so steeped in Sufi mysticism could not fall prey to militancy. To a certain
extent peaceful Barelvi ideology and Sufism can act as a bulwark against extremism; however, Sufi and Barelvi leaders
alone can not fight poverty, underdevelopment, and bad governance. Additionally, the new generation of Sufi leadership
has not been able to articulate its religious doctrine to the region's disaffected youth. In contrast, since the Zia
ul-Haq regime, the growth of Deobandi and Salafi madrassas and religious institutions in Southern Punjab has been
exponential. The gap in Barelvi and Sufi welfare services is now filled by well-heeled, foreign-financed Deobandi
madrassas. Poor Barelvi families often are forced to send their children to Deobandi madrassas to receive food,
boarding, and monthly stipends. According to defense analyst Aisha Siddiqa, the number of Deobandi madrassas increased
140% between 1988 (1320) and 2000 (3152). These religious seminaries and their accompanying evangelical wings have
worked on converting communities to Salafism and neutralizing resistance to more rabid interpretations of Islam.
Secondly, madrassa students are indoctrinated about jihad at these institutions, which can lead them to joining any
number of militant groups on their own. Lastly, according to Siddiqa, the madrassas can act as transit points where kids
from government schools are shown the social mobility that can accompany militancy and are offered a doctrinal
justification for militant action.
ACTIVE MILITANT RECRUITMENT
----------------------------
8. (C) Across Southern Punjab and increasingly in Quetta and Karachi, Pakistani militant groups openly recruit young men
with promises of a better life, adventure, money, and a way to express their frustration against the status quo. The
social fabric of northern Sindh is also breaking down in similar ways, which could allow more extremist influence in the
future. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), have graffiti emblazoned on buildings and schools openly inviting young
recruits to join up. Often militant groups invite young disaffected men to come visit them for a few days and show them
a better life, plying them with money and other perks before sending them home to "think" about their options. Many of
these young men are jobless government school graduates, while others are recruited from madrassas. Most join militant
groups without the knowledge of their families. There are several active militant groups based in Punjab which have vast
networks across Pakistan, and also have developed recent ties with the Taliban. Pakistani military and intelligence
agencies have funded many of these groups in the past, and the extent of current establishment support is unclear.
Regardless of government support, analysts argue that the majority of current militant funding comes from foreign and
domestic donors, as well as criminal activities such as extortion and kidnapping.
MILITANT GROUPS
---------------
9. (C) The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) was formed in 1985 in Jhang, Punjab by anti-Shia clerics. This banned terrorist
organization is focused on sectarian violence and the group was originally supported by Zia-ul-Haq's government in a
move to counter Shia Iran's influence in Pakistan. The funding for SSP comes from both external and local sources such
as the trader-merchant class in Jhang. SSP was responsible for the rise in sectarian violence in the 1980s and 1990s.
SSP advocates Deobandi ideology and has served as the basic
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ideological and militant birthing ground for other militant groups. The group was linked with the 1997 attack on former
prime minister Nawaz Sharif, and they take credit for killing several Shia doctors in Karachi in 2001. Recently, the SSP
has resurged in Southern Punjab and has links with other militant outfits. Qari Hussain, the most feared deputy of
Tehreek Taliban Pakistan's (TTP) recently killed leader, Baitullah Mehsud, came out of SSP and many of the TTP's foot
soldiers are from SSP ranks. (Note. The SSP is also believed to be behind the violence against Christians in Punjab in
late August and early September 2009. End Note.)
10. (C) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) grew out of SSP and was founded in Bhakkar, South Punjab. The Deobandi organization was
initially focused on the elimination of Shias, but after 9/11 its attention shifted to fighting the war on terror
against the United States. According to Siddiqa, LeJ was the first militant group to send recruits to Al-Qaeda, through
LeJ's contacts with wealthy Arabs who visited Southern Punjab. LeJ has strong connections with prominent terrorists,
including Khaled Sheikh Mohammad and Abu Musab al Zarqawi. The LeJ and Taliban currently have linked networks that allow
the Taliban to carry out terrorist attacks in Punjab with LeJ assistance. According to Amir Rana, Director of Pakistan
Institute of Peace Studies, LeJ also has powerful networks in Karachi and Quetta.
11. (C) Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) is another SSP breakaway Deobandi organization that was started by Masood Azhar of
Bahawalpur after he returned from India in 2000. (Note: Azhar was arrested in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in
1993, was exchanged by the Indian government for passengers hijacked to Afghanistan on an Indian Airlines flight in
1999, and subsequently returned to Pakistan with the help of Afghanistan's then-Taliban government and Pakistan's
intelligence agencies. End Note.) JeM has had a long-standing relationship with intelligence agencies, and according to
Rana, it is the only militant outfit still under Inter-Service Intelligence's (ISI) protective umbrella. JeM continues
to be dedicated to the Kashmir fight; however, the group maintains ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Umar Saeed Sheikh,
Daniel Pearl's convicted murderer, was also part of JeM.
12. (C) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is an organization based in the Central Punjab city of Muridke, but has spread across
Southern Punjab as well. It is ideologically Wahhabi, making it different from its militant Deobandi cousins. LeT, and
its subsequent cover charitable organization Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), attract a broad range of supporters, including women,
through their welfare work in the Seraiki belt, earthquake-affected Azad Jammu-Kashmir, and among Swat's internally
displaced population. The Mumbai attacks were masterminded by LeT operatives and they continue to focus on militancy
against India. The group was created and trained by Pakistani intelligence services to fight a proxy war against India.
According to Rana, LeT leadership has ideological and operational disagreements with TTP and does not allow its
militants to attack the Pakistani government.
13. (C) Since the 1980s, there has been a history of Punjabi extremists fighting and training alongside Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, Rabbani, and now the Taliban in Afghanistan. Siddiqa estimates 5000-9000 Punjabi youth are fighting currently
in the FATA and Afghanistan. CRSS's Gul argues that TTP has strong network links with radical groups such as SSP and
LeJ, and many Taliban leaders have studied at madrassas in Southern Punjab. Rana explained that the TTP are capitalizing
on the pool of militant recruits already indoctrinated by JeM, LeT, and LeJ in these areas, but the actual arms training
takes place in the NWFP and FATA. The Taliban is using the Punjabi militant network to carry out many of the terrorist
attacks in Islamabad, Lahore, and other settled areas of Pakistan. FATA parliamentarians claim that many of the Taliban
fighters in their agencies are actually Seraiki, and that much of the training comes from existing Punjabi militant
commanders.
14. (C) Comment: Aisha Siddiqa, who herself is from Southern Punjab, maintains that the message of militancy is quite
potent, especially in terms of the dreams it sells young disillusioned village boys. Dismantling not just the
infrastructure but also the potent message of militancy is a
ISLAMABAD 00002576 004 OF 004
complicated problem. Punjab and Sindh represent the heart of Pakistan and deploying the military in these areas, as was
done in Swat and FATA, is politically untenable and practically impossible. In the immediate future, the Pakistani
government must dismantle both public and state support for militant groups. Many of these networks exist in the open,
and until the message against them is clear, average people will continue to be drawn to them. The harder and
longer-term solution is to offer real alternatives to disaffected potential recruits. Although the actual number of
militant recruits is a small percentage of the population, the sympathy for such groups runs deep. New industries and
real economic development would reinvigorate these regions. More importantly, relevant education, including vocational
training, that offers people a better future and social mobility will be the best disincentive to joining militant
groups. In terms of access to justice and ideology, traditional Sufi bulwarks against extremism and new social welfare
nets need to give citizens confidence that their futures are secure. Pakistan's challenge is to offer alternate and
positive dreams to the disillusioned and frustrated youth. We should anticipate and mitigate backlash from the feudals,
who are accustomed to having an ignorant and weak peasant class to tend their fields. In order to prevent traditional
secular and religious powers in these areas from subverting needed reforms, they will have to believe that reforms are
needed to forestall a revolution. End Comment.
PATTERSON