VZCZCXRO0848
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #3327/01 2512127
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 082106Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 3359
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA-ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD// PRIORITY
ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 093327
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/15
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE
SUBJECT: FSC FALL 2009 OPENING OF ROUND GUIDANCE
REF: USOSCE 00182
Classified by: Donna A. Phelan, VCI/CCA Acting Offic...
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Cyber Security
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22.(SBU) Cyber security has gained significant traction
in the OSCE and Washington expects FSC delegations to
push for a deliverable on this issue for the Athens
Ministerial in December. U.S. reps at the March 2009
workshop on cyber security steered discussions as much
as possible toward defense, mitigation, remedial
measures, and reducing vulnerabilities, noting that the
same defensive strategies are required regardless of the
source of an attack. U.S. policy remains that hackers
and cyber criminals, not states, are the most urgent
STATE 00093327 007 OF 008
cyber threat. USDel should continue to oppose Russian
arguments for arms control-like constraints on
information technology and offensive capabilities.
USDel should continue to stress that the most value can
come from exchanges on defensive measures and/or
strategies, mitigation, and remediation.
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