VZCZCXRO2736
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0342/01 2261138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141138Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7167
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000342
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - KANEDA AND BAIN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS PHUM LY QA SU UN CD
SUBJECT: FORMIN DENIES ATTACKING SUDAN AND SEIZING
PROPERTY, CONFIRMS CHAD OPEN TO "VERIFICATION"
REF: A. NJAMENA 336
B. NDJAMENA 334
C. NDJAMENA 311
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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Chadian Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat told
Ambassador August 13 that no/no Chadian military units had
attacked Sudanese villages in recent weeks; that the GOC had
not/not seized any Sudanese properties in Chad, but had
prohibited the reopening of the Sudanese School in Ndjamena
for security reasons; and that Chad was willing to let
third-counties "verify" its compliance with commitments on
assistance to Sudanese rebels on Chad territory. Faki
indicated that Libyan bilateral efforts to normalize
Chad-Sudan relations were taking precedence over the Dakar
Accord process, that Ahmat Soubiane would be welcomed back to
Chad when his current activities in Tripoli and perhaps
Khartoum were finished, and that the GOC had welcomed 3,000
ex-rebels to Chad in 2009. The FORMIN also reiterated that
UNICEF was welcome to visit any military installation at any
time.
2. (SBU) Faki's denial of Chadian military incursions into
Sudan and his remarks on the Sudanese School in Ndjamana are
consistent with other views here on these subjects (REFS A
and B). We got the impression that the GOC was souring on the
Dakar Accord process and cottoning to Libya's renewed
interest and investment in the bilateral relationship and its
effort to see Chad-Sudan relations normalized (SEPTEL). We
will continue to monitor (and mentor) the GOC on TIP
compliance.
3. (SBU) Given Faki's repetition of Chad's willingness to
have others "verify" its compliance with commitments to end
support to Sudanese rebels on its territory, we should think
about making a concrete proposal on this issue. The Libyans
have been talking to the GOC about "verification" and
MINURCAT SRSG Angelo told us last week (REF A) that he could
support "verification" by providing transport and security to
verifiers. We should consider crafting a concrete proposal
if we want to move forward on "verification." END SUMMARY.
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CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS
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4. (SBU) The FORMIN discounted all Sudanese claims that
Chadian National Army (ANT) had crossed the border and raided
Sudanese villages in recent weeks. He stated that he had
instructed Chad's Ambassador to the UN to respond in kind to
Sudan's accusatory letter to the Security Council. Faki said
that Sudan utilized such propaganda either to justify, or
alternately to draw attention away from, Sudanese military
activity in the border area. He underscored that Chad troops
had no intention of crossing the border, unlike Sudan whose
military had infiltrated villages in eastern Chad.
5. (SBU) Faki said unequivocally that the GOC had not/not
seized any Sudanese properties in Chad. He said there was
one school in N'Djamena that the GOC had decided not to allow
to reopen, because the GOC had its doubts about the true role
of the "teachers" the GOS provided. He added that another
Sudanese school existed in Abeche, but that it had not
functioned for a long time. Faki emphasized that the GOC had
not seized anything, "not even one paper" of Sudanese
property despite Sudanese aggression against Chad. Faki
complained that the contents of the Chad Embassy in Khartoum,
looted in May 2008, had never been returned to the GOC.
6. (SBU) Faki confirmed that Chad was willing to let
third-counties "verify" its compliance with commitments on
assistance to Sudanese rebels on Chad territory (REF C). Faki
noted that a meeting of the Dakar Contact Group was still
possible at the end of September, after Ramadan, in Khartoum,
but said that there still had been no Sudanese invitation to
such an event. Faki added that Tripoli was increasingly
active in trying to normalize Chad-Sudan relations, including
through the Chad-Libya Mixed Commission, at meetings
NDJAMENA 00000342 002 OF 002
following the AU summit, and a proposed end-of-August
conference in Tripoli on "Conflict in Africa."
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CHAD-CHAD REBEL GROUPS
----------------------
7. (SBU) On GOC views of the Chad rebel groups, Faki said
that the situation was consistent with the normal quiet
period of the rainy season. Faki said that Soubiane had
returned from Khartoum and gone to Tripoli for meetings with
The Guide, among others, but would definitively return to
Chad. The FORMIN stated that there were substantive
discussions with other rebel groups at the moment and that
the GOC would not shut the door on additional returns. Faki
noted that the GOC counted nearly 3,000 rebels who had
deserted the rebellion and returned to Chad since January of
this year.
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GOC AND TIP
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8. (SBU) Faki commented that the GOC was open to UNICEF
visits to military installations for assessment of child
soldiers. He emphasized that UNICEF was free to visit any
GOC military installation at any time. (NOTE: UNICEF ResRep
told us separately August 13 that he had yet to receive any
GOC permission for these visits. END NOTE.)
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COMMENT
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9. (SBU) Faki's denial of Chadian military incursions into
Sudan and his remarks on the Sudanese School in Ndjamana are
consistent with other views here on these subjects (REFS A
and B). We got the impression that the GOC was souring on the
Dakar Accord process and cottoning to Libya's renewed
interest and investment in the bilateral relationship and its
effort to see Chad-Sudan relations normalized (SEPTEL). We
will continue to monitor (and mentor) the GOC on TIP
compliance.
10. (SBU) Given Faki's repetition of Chad's willingness to
have others "verify" its compliance with commitments to end
support to Sudanese rebels on its territory, we should think
about making a concrete proposal on this issue. The Libyans
have been talking to the GOC about "verification" and
MINURCAT SRSG Angelo told us last week (REF A) that he could
support "verification" by providing transport and security to
verifiers. We should consider crafting a concrete proposal
if we want to move forward on "verification." END COMMENT.
11. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO