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RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBR #1038/01 2321825
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201825Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4905
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1595
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0173
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0319
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001038
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, T AND ISN. NSC FOR SAMORE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: KNUP PARM PREL NPT IAEA MNUC BR
SUBJECT: VISIT OF WMD COORDINATOR SAMORE TO BRASILIA
REF: BRASILIA 725
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4
1. (C) SUMMARY. NSC WMD Coordinator Gary Samore visited Brasilia August 6-7 to hold discussions with senior Brazilian
officials on North Korea, Iran and strengthening international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Samore
approached the Brazilians as potential partners in nonproliferation efforts, pointing out that Brazil's decision to
forego its own nuclear weapons option and concentrate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy gave it high credibility as a
counter example to Iran. Brazilian interlocutors were receptive to Samore's message and believed that President Obama's
Prague speech was important and opened the way for further dialogue; however, they preferred to focus on the importnace
of nuclear weapons states (NWS) disarming rather than engage on nonproliferation. The GOB responded positively to
proposals for a nuclear security summit and for consultations on the 2010 NPT revcon. Presidential Foreign Policy
Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia sounded a hopeful note by saying that the Administration's approach to disarmament would be
helpful to Brazil in addressing the question of signing an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA and that he thought a
solution could be reached. Prof. Garcia agreed to Samore's proposal that a U.S. team of experts would visit Brazil to
discuss implementation of the Additional Protocol. The visit provided important clarification of the roles of various
GOB agencies on nonproliferation issues. Although there was no indication that Brazil is prepared immediately to play a
more positive role on key nonproliferation issues, Samore's visit opened the way to a more robust dialogue that would be
important to eventually encouraging Brazil to adopt a more constructive approach. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Samore's discussions included meetings with the Ministries of External Relations (MRE) and Defense (MOD), the
Presidency and the Office for Institutional Security, newly designated to oversee security at nuclear installations. His
meetings on nuclear energy will be reported septel. While responsibilities for energy are relatively clear cut, Brazil
is still developing its nuclear policy formulation process with the MRE Under Secretary for Political Affairs playing a
coordinating role. Samore's meeting at the MOD confirmed that protecting Brazil's enrichment program from greater
oversight will remain a component of Brazilian policy. All GOB agencies, however, welcomed the opportunity for further
dialogue with USG counterparts.
North Korea
3. (C) Samore raised North Korea with Ministry for External Relations Under Secretary Roberto Jaguaribe who pointed out
that working with the North Koreans was often difficult because they always stick to their script. Jaguaribe said he
believed the six party talks were the only way to proceed, but urged the USG to also seek increased bilateral dialogue
with the DPRK. Samore,s statement that he did not see much short term prospect for North Korea curtailing its nuclear
program led to a lengthy discourse from Jaguaribe on the inefficacy of sanctions and the importance of dialogue,
particularly via the six party process as this would bring the United States, Russia and China together.
Iran
4. (C) Samore encouraged Brazil to use its relatively good relations with Iran to encourage a constructive approach to
the international community. Despite offers of dialogue from Washington, Iran had not responded and had not halted
enrichment activities. If Iran does not respond soon, the U.S. will have no choice but to turn to sanctions. Foreign
Minister Celso Amorim urged engagement with Iran and placing Iran,s nuclear ambitions in the context of the larger
Middle East situation. He recommended that a way should be found not to make Iran give up its enrichment activities, but
to avoid enriched uranium being used for weapons. Jaguaribe said that Brazil had advised the Iranian government to
respond to President Obama,s proposals constructively and believed that Iran,s internal problems might lead to a more
constructive approach to the international community. At the same time, both Amorim and Jaguaribe raised Israel,s
nuclear program as a primary reason for Iranian behavior. Presidential Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia went further, citing
Israeli disarmament as a precondition for addressing Iranian proliferation. Garcia offered Brazilian assistance in
promoting dialogue with both Iran and North Korea, but he would not commit to urging Iran to suspend enrichment activity
to allow time for dialogue on the issue.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
5. (C) Samore cited the adoption of an Additional Protocol to the NPT as an area in which Brazil can add to its
leadership role in the area of nonproliferation. He pointed out that many countries, including the United States, had
concerns about protecting proprietary technology and had been able to work out arrangements with the IAEA that allowed
them to sign APs. MRE Director for Sensitive Technologies Santiago Mourao said that of the resistance in Brazil to an AP
has come from the MOD, which supervises Brazilian enrichment operations run by the Brazilian navy as part of its nuclear
propulsion program. MOD Chief of Staff Murilo Barbosa argued that an AP for Brazil was not necessary, because Brazil
already belonged to other nonproliferation regimes and maintained that Brazil,s defense strategy (which he helped write)
prevented further discussion. Barbosa also pointed out, as evidence of why an AP is not needed, that Brazil (because of
navy ownership of enrichment) is the only NNWS with a military facility under safeguards. During Samore,s visit to Rio
de Janeiro, Nuclear Energy Commission President Goncalves said that his organization had prepared documents8 on the AP but declined to discuss them absent a political decision to consider an AP. Mourao stated that
steps toward NWS disarmament would be a precondition for Brazil to consider an AP. Garcia was slightly more positive on
this point when he told Samore that the Administration,s new openness to disarmament would be helpful. think we can reach a solution,8 he said. Defense Minister Jobim did not evince such optimism but agreed that there was
scope for work on possible technical solutions to Brazil,s concerns. As a follow up to the discussions, Brazilian
officials agreed to host a visit by U.S. experts to discuss the Additional Protocol.
Other Issues: NPT RevCon, Nuclear Safety, PSI, Fuel Bank, Nuclear Suppliers Group
6. (C) In each of Samore,s meetings, the Brazilian side praised President Obama,s Prague speech as opening
the way to a more successful NPT revcon in 2010. Amorim expressed interest in discussing the revcon agenda with the P5
and urged greater consultations with the NNWS. Similarly, Amorim and Under Secretary for Political Affairs Machado
pushed for an increased Brazilian role in FMCT negotiations and supported U.S.-Brazil bilateral consultations on
disarmament (without mentioning nonproliferation). Brazilian responses to the proposed Nuclear Security Summit were
positive, though non-committal. Institutional Security Director Felix reacted positively to future discussions on
critical infrastructure protection, a new responsibility of his office. Similarly, Machado expressed interest in
learning more about the PSI and agreed to U.S. proposal for expert talks on PSI, but gave no indication that Brazil was
prepared to join PSI. The Brazilian side indicated it would join consensus in support of IAEA Director General El
Baradei,s proposal for a nuclear fuel bank but expressed reservations about discouraging enrichment that could affect
Brazil,s nuclear industry. The Brazilian side also said they could with8 the proposed Australian language for the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines for transfers of ENR.
7. (C) COMMENT. Post regards the Samore visit as producing opportunities for further dialogue on nonproliferation
issues. Samore's Brazilian contacts expressed themselves to be open to further discussions and were pleased to be
approached as an important partner on global issues. That said, it is clear that Brazil's positions will not change in
the short term. Brazil will still champion the NNWS and highlight disarmament over proliferation and will prefer to cite
Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy rather than focus on the dangers of proliferation in the Middle East. While
further dialogue may not produce rapid improvments in these positions, it will be key for developing a long-term
relationship in which Brazil becomes a more important global stability partner.
8. (U) This cable has been cleared by WMD Coordinator Samore. KUBISKE