Cablegate: Unamid Deployment in Greater Detail

Published: Mon 1 Dec 2008 03:26 PM
DE RUEHKH #1726/01 3361526
O 011526Z DEC 08
E.O. 12958: N/A
1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID climbed to 50.3 percent of its authorized
total force strength last week and expects to reach its goal of 60
percent by end of the year, as reported in Ref A. Most
troop-contributing countries (TCCs) anticipated to arrive in the
coming months have not provided load lists to DPKO, so their
equipment and hence their deployment will be delayed. UNAMID asked
that the US put pressure on TCCs to finalize purchases and prepare
their load lists. There are only three out of nineteen anticipated
Formed Police Units (FPUs) currently deployed, as the additional
proposed units are experiencing equipment and capability shortfalls.
UNAMID hopes that the "Friends of UNAMID" group of donor countries
including the US might help fill these gaps. End summary.
2. (SBU) As reported in Ref A, CDA Fernandez, PolCouns, and Poloff
spoke with Colonel Noddy Stafford, Chief of Military Plans UNAMID,
Lt Col Tim House, DPKO liaison, Commander Victor Luis Hernandez, FPU
Advisor/Coordinator for UNAMID, and Adeyemi Ogunjemilusi, Deputy
Police Commissioner November 18-19 to discuss UNAMID deployment
issues. This cable provides additional detail on deployment
figures. Stafford said that UNAMID military force strength now
stands at 9,815 (up from last week's total of 9,281) military
boots-on-the-ground or 50.3 percent of the mission's total
authorized force strength. Stafford believes they will have 9,837
personnel deployed by the end of the month. In order to reach 60
percent deployment by the end of the year, UNAMID expects to
complete the deployment of the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions and
bring the former AMIS battalions up to full battalion strength when
they rotate in December. Hernandez reported that Formed Police Unit
(FPU) strength still stands at three units (420 staff); combined
with unarmed civilian police officers ("civpols") the total number
of police stands at 1995.
3. (SBU) Stafford expects the following increase in personnel by the
end of the year:
Country: No. Unit
Pakistan: 106 Hospital
Pakistan 335 Engineering Co.
Ethiopia 443 Infantry Battalion
Ethiopia 300 Multi-role Logistics Co.
Ethiopia 125 Transportation Sector Reconnaissance Co.
Egypt 120 Remainder of Battalion
Rwanda 120 Remainder of Battalion
Rwanda 262 Remainder of Battalion
FPU (Formed Police Unit) Status, Goals, and Challenges
--------------------------------------------- ---------
4. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi reported to the CDA that UNAMID is satisfied
with the current FPUs (1 in El Fasher and 2 in Nyala) and that they
are running well. UNAMID struck water at two wells in Nyala which
will provide each unit their own integral water supply. While the
Indonesian FPU officers in El Fasher are still on light duties as
they construct their camp and await equipment, they are escorting
women gathering firewood outside Zam Zam IDP camps and regularly
patrolling inside the camp. The Nepalese currently located in the
Nyala Super camp are still undergoing camp preparation.
5. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi said a goal of the FPUs is to build 83
community police cenvers ,CPCs) in|he mos4 ieevily(poru|ateeQJImtarngl`y0Fcpleced PgRsnq@$ID\)(cAmS"to!uwQgQ$vlm~c}s j2omQgkclptn0dNnevS`q!;o.\m1m,\~e :w$rbr*1&"Cfe"4yQF#exist, but do not yet fully meet UN standards. Ogunjemilusi also
wants to put 50 gender-based crime desks in camps, but lacks the
resources for this initiative as well. He reported anecdotal
evidence that installing lighting and patrolling is already
mitigating some crime in the camps and hoped to find the funds for
more lighting. FPUs continue to recruit local volunteers to learn
police basics and these volunteers are extending the reach of the
FPUs. However, volunteers must continually be monitored to ensure
civil rights and humane practices are respected. Ogunjemilusi also
reported that IDPs are fickle in their attitude toward FPUs. Some
days it seems that IDPS are pleased with the presence of the FPUs;
other days the IDPs are not as receptive. Relations between IDPs and
local, Sudanese police are often tense.
6. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi requested that the Friends-of-UNAMID increase
their support to the FPUs, and that UNAMID better manage FPU
expectations. Because of miscommunication, troops arrive expecting
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to be fully equipped, uniformed, and provided a salary. While FPUs
cost approximately US$8 million each, there are additional needs for
more vehicles (including maintenance packages), communication
equipment, tents, investigation kits, and capacity building
training. There are other smaller but critical needs as well -
needed to equip the community police - which would greatly enhance
the FPU programs and which the Friends of UNAMID or other donors
might be willing to provide: vests, reflective jackets,
flashlights, and identification cards.
7. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi said he can only support police units within
100 km of the major cities of Nyala, El Fasher, and El Geneina as
equipment delivery outside this radius is impossible. A further
challenge is how to synchronize deployment of the additional 16 FPUs
scheduled to arrive. With the current slippage of arrival dates and
equipment, Ogunjemilusi does not believe he will see more than ten
FPUs on the ground next year and is concerned that the failure of
each country to communicate deployment dates and equipment lists
will hinder the smooth deployment of arriving units.
8. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi also briefed the CDA on the UNAMID goal of
providing training to GoS police. He finds that like the IDPs,
their attitude towards the FPUs fluctuates. While they state their
desire for training is serious, they will not start without the full
construction of new training facilities. Local police also state
they intend to conduct joint patrols, but will not do so unless they
receive reflective jackets. Ogunjemilusi characterizes GoS
expectations as, "Give us weapons, train us on weapons, provide a
salary, and don't allow the community police volunteers to become
pro-rebel militia".
9. (SBU) While Ogunjemilusi would like to sponsor Human Rights
training for all GoS police up to the senior management level,
UNAMID lacks the capacity to do so. He opines outsourcing in a
separate country may be the most effective mechanism, but many
Sudanese are suspicious, viewing training outside the country as a
method of "brainwashing police to perform intelligence functions".
Equipment Movement
10. (SBU) Movement of equipment is progressing, with 91 containers
being transported last week. Equipment moves from Port Sudan on new
trucks to El Obeid, where it is transferred to older vehicles that
will be "less of a financial burden if lost or hijacked." Ethiopian
contingent-owned equipment (COE) is just beginning to move. The
1,000 Ethiopians are ready to deploy, but must await the arrival of
their equipment. The same is true for the Rwandans and Senegalese
who are scheduled to deploy 1,318 troops by the end of the year, but
their COE is not scheduled to arrive until January. Stafford is
concerned that demand may soon outpace the contractors'
11. (SBU) An emerging problem is that of units not able to deploy as
previously agreed due to lack of capacity to acquire and prepare
their equipment for shipment. Senegal, Tanzania and Burkina Faso
all pledged troops, received advanced training, and UNAMID
tentatively scheduled their equipment movement. However, these
countries have not provided their load lists and cargo readiness
dates, primarily because they have not yet purchased their own
required equipment. A better flow of information is required to
avoid shipment delays, conflict of movement, and duplication of
plans. To circumvent this problem, Stafford and House plan to meet
soon with Thai officials to discuss plans and details of their
deployment schedule and brief them on particulars of their site.
Stafford said the current goal of deployment by March 30 will slip
if countries are not pressured to uphold their commitments. When
countries miss their target dates for shipping COE, the entire
logistics chain is affected.
12. (SBU) Currently Canada is providing 104 Armored Personnel
Carriers (APCs) divided between the Nigerian, Senegalese, and
Rwandan Battalions. However this support could end soon and the
battalions are expected to provide their own APCs. There have been
significant obstacles in making this happen. The Nigerian battalion
has some APCs but no maintenance package, so as equipment breaks
down, it remains inoperable. Rwanda has a contract for 20 APCs to
be manufactured in China that were due last October. The Chinese
have yet to produce the vehicles and the manufacture date has pushed
back to January 2009. Given a four month lag time between
acceptance and delivery, the Rwandans will not receive their
equipment until April at the earliest. Senegal reported a "fiscal
problem" with their APC supplier, suggesting they do not have the
funds to procure their APCs. Canada has been approached to extend
KHARTOUM 00001726 003 OF 003
the usage of their equipment and provide maintenance through the end
of June, 2009. While they have been sympathetic and appear
supportive, according to their Charge in Khartoum, final resolution
has not been reached.
Future Plans
13. (SBU) UNAMID plans to close two redundant camps, Malha in Sector
North and Saortony in Sector South, before June, 2009 as they do not
fit into current IDP needs. Both camps are old AMIS camps in areas
dominated by hills, so they are indefensible from a security
perspective. They are also located far from IDP concentrations.
14. (SBU) While UNAMID hopes the security situation will improve,
they are prepared for future Phase V contingencies. Stafford
explained the three parts of UNAMID's contingency evacuation plan to
CDA Fernandez. First, UNAMID would re-deploy 25 per cent of its
personnel outside Sudan including unarmed police, military
observers, staff officers and non-essential civilians. Second,
UNAMID would consolidate personnel to 12-13 battalion locations
abandoning 19 camps. FPUs would remain in place. Third, complete
evacuation would take place to Entebbe, Uganda. Stafford noted that
Entebbe is also the evacuation point for UNMIS, so if both units
must evacuate simultaneously, a strong measure of coordination and
synchronicity will be required (and it would be a major challenge
for Entebbe to support the massive influx of UN and humanitarian
personnel). UNAMID hopes to have advanced warning of any
deteriorating security situation and be allowed two months to
redeploy, however Stafford said the plan is to be able to move out
in as little as ten days.
15. (SBU) Equipment and training gaps remain which need to be
addressed, especially for the FPUs. The proposals for equipment
donation to the FPUs and community police programs by the Friends of
UNAMID or other donors deserve our attention and support. The UN,
the USG, and others need to pressure the TCCs to procure equipment
in a timely fashion and establish a liaison mechanism for relaying
deployment data to UNAMID. UNAMID specifically requested that
Senegal, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso provide their load lists to the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) within the next two
to four weeks to allow UNAMID to plan these shipments accordingly.
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