VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNY #0670/01 3511324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161324Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7219
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0226
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1073
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 2490
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1523
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3070
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0548
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3351
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 4407
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/USDAO LONDON UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHTC/USDAO THE HAGUE NL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1537
RUEHNY/ODC OSLO NO
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000670
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP PREL PGOV NO
SUBJECT: LESSON LEARNED FROM NORWEGIAN DECISION TO BUY JSF
REF: A. A: OSLO 629 B. B: OSLO 585 C. C: OSLO 522
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C) Summary. After an extensive, coordinated USG effort, the Norwegian Government decided to buy F-35s in the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) program, instead of the Saab Gripen. This first foreign JSF sale is an important step for the
program as it will likely have a domino effect on other potential purchasers. The sale was not an easy one, however, and
we outline a number of lessons learned that may prove helpful as other countries make their choice. End Summary.
The Tale
--------
2. (C) The country team has been living and breathing JSF for over a year, following a road to success that was full of
heart-stopping ups and downs. A quick recap of key events includes:
--In 2007, the GON announced criteria for Future Combat Aircraft competition to include aircraft capability, life cycle
costs and industrial participation. --In April 2008, the two remaining competitors (US F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and
Swedish Saab JAS-39NG Gripen) delivered responses to MOD,s Request for Binding Information (RBI). Saab immediately
claimed that the Gripen would be half the price of the JSF.
--Over the spring and summer, Saab,s promotion of its industrial package was intensive and covered every province of
Norway. Norwegian Labor Party leaders admitted to Embassy that they received frequent calls from local mayors in favor
of the Gripen.
--A sudden onslaught of negative press during this same time prompted us to meet with Lockheed Martin to better
understand their media strategy and to discuss the best way to counter myths and disinformation about the JSF.
--Embassy and Lockheed Martin efforts to counter disinformation reaped some apparent success (ref B).
--In the fall of 08, we invited a number of USG officials to visit Oslo to make the public case on why the F-35 is an
excellent choice, and the private case on why the choice of aircraft will have an impact on the bilateral relationship
(see refs A,B).
-- The delivery of Norway,s first C-130J transport aircraft in November 2008, which followed intense USAF efforts to
rush this vital capability to Norway (and came directly from the USAF production line), allowed us to make the
(unstated) point that we are good allies and reliable partners.
--On November 20, the GON announced the decision to buy the F-35s, using unusually strong language (for domestic
political reasons) to say the Gripen was uncompetitive.
3. (C) Following the announcement, the Ambassador met with Deputy Defense Minister Espen Barth-Eide. In a very relaxed
meeting, Barth-Eide thanked us for sticking to defending our plane, rather than attacking the Gripen. He praised the
GON,s bottom-up process that focused on the criteria. Noting that while some politicians would have like to have chosen
the Gripen, the overwhelming technical success of the F-35 in the ministry,s four scenarios made such a choice
impossible. He complained about Saab,s, but not the GOS, reaction to the decision. For example, the GON had never
promised them 24 hours notice of the decision (which would have been illegal under Norwegian insider trading laws).
Commenting on the press coverage of the JSF, Barth-Eide said that Aftenposten (the paper of record) had off the deep end8 with its open anti-JSF campaign of disinformation.
4. (C) Looking ahead, Barth-Eide said we were now on the same side and it would be very helpful if the USG were to:
--publicly stress the strength of the F-35 and the viability of the JSF program. --confirm there was no USG political
pressure to buy the plane. --note the low price of the F-35 is due to the scale of the JSF program (more than 3200
aircraft) and the timing of the Norwegian buy in 2016, when full-scale production of the aircraft will be in full swing.
--arrange visits by U.S. officials to emphasize the above. --encourage US companies to enhance the Industrial
Participation package (the one area that Gripen clearly dominated).
5. (C) Barth-Eide stressed that Norway,s role as the second to buy into the program (following the US) was an important
bellwether and would have a positive impact on other governments, decisions. He noted that having a socialist government
like Norway,s chose the JSF is an even more powerful symbol than if a right-wing government of another country had gone
first. While the GON will not actively lobby on behalf of JSF with other governments, it is in the GON interest that
other partners buy into the program. He expects the Danes will ask for the GON data analysis and the GON will try to
accommodate that within the limits of confidentiality.
The Lessons Learned
-------------------
6. (C) While many of the issues in this effort were unique to Norway, some lessons learned may be applicable elsewhere.
The main ones include:
--Get the whole country team involved. The active involvement of the Ambassador and DCM, ODC, DAO, Pol/Econ, FCS, and
Public Affairs offices ensured that the fighter plane decision was an Embassy priority. This was necessary to convince
Lockheed Martin and Washington officials that it was important to devote time and resources on Norway,s decision.
--Working with Lockheed Martinto determine which aspects of the purchase to highlight. In Norway the capabilities of the
JSF vs. the Gripen were the strongest suit, and Embassy and Lockheed Martin efforts focused on discussions of why the
JSF,s capabilities were the best match for Norway,s needs, especially in the High North. This focus played to the JSF,s
strengths and eventually proved to be the decisive factor, despite perceived weaknesses in other areas such as the
industrial package.
--Jointly develop a press strategy with Lockheed Martin and collectively determine the role the Embassy will play in
this strategy.
--Use the Ambassador to give numerous on-the-record interviews but also to have off-the-record in-depth discussions with
editorial boards on the purchase.
--Be constantly available to the media to discuss the technical merits of the aircraft, and be assertive in refuting
disinformation. In Norway, there were many self-proclaimed experts talking about the F-35 and making wildly inaccurate
statements on everything from its lack of ability to its exorbitant price. It was important to counter these assertions
and our ODC chief gave more than 20 separate interviews.
--Create opportunities to talk about the aircraft. The Ambassador hosted a luncheon for retired senior military and
think-tankers during which an extensive presentation on the capability of the F-35 was given. This enabled our host
nation advocates to actively contribute to the public dialogue from their respective positions of authority. Embassy
also coordinated with Lockheed Martin for attendance at all relevant airshows and roundtable discussions. The fighter
competition was consistently a part of our informal discussions with MFA, MOD and influential think tanks.
--Talk about the impact on the relationship carefully. Deciding our line on this was critical, given Norwegian
sensitivities. We needed to avoid any appearance of undue pressuring (which was construed as Norway in its sovereign decision-making process), but we couldn,t let stand the view that the choice didn,t matter for
the relationship. We opted for the JSF will maximize the relationship8 as our main public line. In private, we were much more forceful.
--Reach out to other USG agencies and experts to encourage their participation in the process and leverage their tools
to support the effort. In this process also ensure the same messages are delivered in DC to the partner Embassy as are
delivered overseas to the Host Nation government. WHITNEY