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DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/15/08
INDEX:
(1) Japanese diplomacy left in the lurch (Asahi)
(2) Japan should offer due contributions to North Korea's
denuclearization (Asahi)
(3) Inside story on delisting of North Korea: Secret deal to delist
the North on Oct. 10 suspected; President made decision after
judging that the North showed cooperative stance (Sankei)
(4) U.S. removal of DPRK from terror blacklist creates ripple effect
on Japan-U.S. alliance (Yomiuri)
(5) Three weeks since Aso cabinet inaugurated; Kantei staff members
set in full motion (Sankei)
(6) Rocky road ahead of post-Kyoto Protocol framework: Can Japan's
proposal obtain support at cabinet-preparatory meeting for COP14?
(Asahi)
(7) TOP HEADLINES
(8) EDITORIALS
(9) Prime Minister's schedule, October 13 (Nikkei)
Prime Minister's schedule, October 14 (Nikkei)
ARTICLES:
(1) Japanese diplomacy left in the lurch
ASAHI (Page 1) (Full)
October 15, 2008
Prime Minister Aso on October 11 was told by U.S. President Bush
that the U.S. would remove North Korea from its list of state
sponsors of terrorism. He was out of town on business at the time.
He was not with a secretary, who is temporarily dispatched from the
Foreign Ministry, or an interpreter. He replied to the call from the
president, using the cell-phone of a secretary dispatched from the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The delisting of
North Korea that day was absolutely a bolt out of the blue for the
Japanese government.
The telephone conversation between the two leaders lasted for about
10 minutes from 11:30 p.m. on the afternoon of the 11th (Japan
time). Secretary of State Rice had signed a paper to endorse the
decision to remove that nation from the blacklist about three hours
before that phone call. President Bush's phone call came 30 minutes
before the formal announcement of the decision was made.
Aso was staying in Hamamatsu City in order to attend the national
convention of members of the Japan Junior Chamber to be held on the
12th. A certain senior Foreign Ministry official stated: "There will
be no removal today. The U.S. cannot possibly do that without
telling Japan beforehand."
Aides to the prime minister became busy around 11:00 p.m. When the
prime minister was having chats with previous JC chairmen at a hotel
lounge, his secretary's cell phone rang. It was a call from the
Foreign Ministry, asking whether there was a telephone that could be
TOKYO 00002875 002 OF 011
connected to a phone call from President Bush. The secretary had to
tell them the number of his own cell phone.
When he was told that President Bush was calling, the prime minister
excused himself from the drinking party and went to another room
through the backdoor of the lounge. Telephone conversations between
chiefs of states are usually held at places with secure facilities,
such as the Kantei, with the presence of a senior Foreign Ministry
official in charge or a special interpreter. However, the telephone
conversation that day took place with a speaker attached to the cell
phone and a government official present serving as an interpreter,
while taking notes. A person who was present at the telephone
conversation said, "Since we did not expect such a phone call, we
were in a flurry. Since there happened to be two officials who had a
good command of English, there were no problems." Winding up the
telephone talks with the president, the prime minister went back to
the party in the lounge.
(2) Japan should offer due contributions to North Korea's
denuclearization
ASAHI (Page 8) (Full)
October 13, 2008
By Hajime Izumi, professor at Shizuoka Prefectural University
The U.S. delisted North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. The
U.S. must have come to this judgment that continuing the
negotiations on the North Korea nuclear issue was indispensable,
even if it meant the Bush administration would have to make
concessions to the North. North Korea then agreed to allow experts
to access to all declared nuclear facilities, but mutual consent
will be needed for undeclared sites. Washington certainly yielded
with concessions to Pyongyang.
I visited Washington in late September. While staying there for
about one week, I met officials and policymakers in the Bush
administration to exchange views. Around that time, it was reported
that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il was suffering serious health
problems. Through the discussions, I keenly felt that it would be
extremely undesirable from the viewpoint of the U.S. for Kim to
become incapacitated.
The Bush administration fears that if Kim became unable to make
policy decisions, Pyongyang might terminate its nuclear negotiations
with the U.S. Seeing North Korea resuming operation of its Yongbyon
reactor in September, the U.S. was even more wary of such a
possibility.
In response to Washington's delisting, North Korea has resumed steps
to disable its nuclear reactor. With this development, prospects are
in sight for the second phase of the disabling of existing nuclear
facilities to be on the threshold of completion by the end of the
year.
After hearing the news that Washington had de-listed North Korea,
views could be heard in Japan deploring that the nation had lost
influential leverage to use in resolving the issue of North Korea's
past abductions of Japanese nationals. People are worried about
future developments in negotiations on the abduction issue. But it
is necessary to cool-headedly recognize the following two points.
TOKYO 00002875 003 OF 011
The first point is that even during the period when the U.S.
included North Korea's insincere attitude in dealing with the
abduction issue among the reasons for its recognition of North Korea
as a state sponsor of terrorism, there was no progress on the
abduction issue. This shows that the delisting will not have a
negative impact on Japan's efforts to resolve the abduction issue.
The second point is that the U.S. Senate approved on Sept. 22 a bill
amending the North Korean Human Rights Act. The bill includes a
provision mandating North Korea to seriously address the abduction
issue. By amending the law, the special envoy for human rights was
empowered, with the position's status upgraded to the rank of
ambassador. A part-time position was also promoted to a full-time
position. The amended law also requires approval from the U.S.
Senate for appointments to the post, involving the Congress more in
the selection of a special envoy.
The North Korean Human Rights Act will remain in force after the
Bush administration leaves office. The legislation guarantees the
U.S. will continue to work on North Korea to take action in
resolving the abduction issue. We should not forget the U.S.
commitment to helping Japan settle the issue.
For the next administration, no matter who becomes president, Barack
Obama or John McCain, the first priority task to tackle in dealing
with North Korea's nuclear program will be removing to outside the
country some 8000 spent fuel rods from which about 8 kilograms of
plutonium can be extracted.
If the rods are left in North Korea, that country could produce one
or two nuclear weapons. There is even the possibility that the
products might be sold to terrorists.
The spent fuel also could enable the North to conduct several
nuclear tests through which it might master the technology needed to
produce a miniaturized nuclear weapon. In such a case, once the DPRK
can produce a miniaturized warhead, its possession of nuclear-armed
missiles would take on a touch of being a real possibility. North
Korea already has deployed Nodong missiles with a range that covers
all of Japan. If Nodong missiles are replaced by nuclear-tipped
missiles, Japan will be exposed to a serious military threat.
If fuel rods are removed from North Korea, Japan's safety will be
largely ensured. It is estimated that 300 million dollars, or
approximately 30 billion yen, would be needed for this task. To
carry out this feat would surely contribute to Japan's security, I
think Japan should be willing to foot the bill.
The Japanese government has persisted with the stance of not
offering energy and economic aid to North Korea before progress is
made on the abduction issue. The U.S., China, South Korea, and
Russia have already extended energy aid worth approximately 150
million dollars, or about 15 billion yen, but Japan has offered
nothing to the North.
Removing fuel rods from North Korea is not assistance to North Korea
but a means of reducing the nuclear threat to Japan.
Needless to say, Japan should continue efforts to move negotiations
on the abduction issue forward. But the security issue should be
considered separately from the abduction issue. It is conceivable
that Japan will be pressed to take such a stance once the
TOKYO 00002875 004 OF 011
denuclearization process is on the right track, as a result of the
delisting decision.
(3) Inside story on delisting of North Korea: Secret deal to delist
the North on Oct. 10 suspected; President made decision after
judging that the North showed cooperative stance
SANKEI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly)
October 15, 2008
By Takashi Arimoto, Washington, and Makiko Takita, Foreign News
Department
A rumor is afoot among members of the Six-Party Talks that there was
a secret deal between Washington and Pyongyang for the United States
to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism on Oct. 10.
There is no doubt that the United States rushed to delist the North
in an effort to avoid a deterioration of the situation, such as
another nuclear test by North Korea. However, Japan, in view of its
abduction issue, objected to the delisting, saying that leaving an
ambiguous situation would end up creating problems in the future.
The matter has exposed once again a gap in views between the United
States and Japan over the North Korean situation. The newspaper
probed into what took place behind the scenes.
The U.S. Department of State initially informed the press corps that
it would hold a press conference at 9:30 a.m. Oct. 11 (10:30 p.m.
Oct. 11, Japan time). The event was soon changed to 11 a.m.
(midnight Oct. 12, Japan time). That was because priority was given
to allow President George W. Bush time to inform Prime Minister Taro
Aso of the decision to delist the North and seek his understanding
over the phone.
Around 8:00 p.m. Oct. 11, Japan time, U.S. Ambassador to Japan J.
Thomas Schieffer informed the Japanese government with a sense of
urgency that President Bush would like to talk to the prime minister
on the phone. The hours generally coincided with the time when
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed a document to remove
North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
According to a diplomatic source, the U.S. government had initially
made arrangements to announce the delisting on Oct. 10. The U.S.
plan was derailed by resistance coming from the Japanese government.
In his telephone conversation with Secretary Rice on the morning of
Oct. 10 (night of Oct. 10, Japan time), Foreign Minister Hirofumi
Nakasone sought a cautious decision, saying that a draft agreement
on verification, put together by Assistant Secretary of State (for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs) Christopher Hill during his trip to
North Korea earlier this month, contained some points that need to
be confirmed.
"We will continue talks"
Before delisting the North, President Bush ordered Secretary Rice
and others to obtain Japan's understanding. The President was aware
of Japan's concern over the delisting via direct reports from
Ambassador Schieffer. Speculation spread temporarily that given
Japan's reluctance, the delisting would not take place on the
weekend. Aboard the Air Force One for Florida on the afternoon of
Oct. 10, White House Press Secretary Dana Perino, too, said: "We
will continue talks with other Six-Party members."
TOKYO 00002875 005 OF 011
Developments began to unfold from the evening through the night of
Oct. 10 (morning of Oct. 11, Japan time). According to a U.S.
government source, President Bush decided to delist the North after
reaching the conclusion through additional exchanges of views via a
New York channel -- a liaison route with North Korea with which the
U.S. has no diplomatic ties -- that North Korea was exhibiting a
posture to cooperate on the verification process. Secretary Rice
informed the two presidential candidates -- Republican Senator John
McCain and Democratic Senator Barack Obama -- of the President's
decision to delist the North.
A Six-Party Talks source made this comment about the announcement on
the weekend: "To North Korea, Oct. 10, which marks the foundation
day of the Korean Workers Party, carries great significance. There
seems to have been a secret deal between the United States and North
Korea on announcing the delisting on Oct. 10." The Washington Post
mainly ascribed the delisting to widespread speculation that the
North might conduct a second nuclear test.
President Bush's series of words and actions point to the stance of
placing high priority on relations with Japan. But in the end, the
President accepted the policy course chosen by Secretary Rice and
Assistant Secretary Hill who ultimately wanted to achieve diplomatic
results by disabling the North's nuclear facilities.
Rice did not show up at press conference
Bearing the brunt of criticism from Japan which opposed the
delisting, Assistance Secretary Hill at one point lashed out at a
senior Foreign Ministry official: "Japan has been objecting to the
delisting. Why don't you make your own list of state sponsors of
terrorism? In such a case, can you designate Iran (a major oil
exporter to Japan) (as a state sponsor of terrorism) ahead of other
countries?"
When he met in May a delegate to the United States that included
members of the Association of the Families of Victims of Kidnapped
by North Korea, Hill also said emotionally: "There is an Iran Air
office near the U.S. Embassy Tokyo. In Iran, U.S. diplomats were
held hostage. An old friend of mine was one of them. He still
suffers from mental anguish from the experience. What do you think
of that?"
There is concern in the United States that the decision to delist
the North would adversely affect its relations with Japan.
In the Oct. 11 press conference on the delisting, Special Envoy for
the Six-Party Talks Sung Kim urged North Korea to take action to
resolve the abduction issue, while indicating, "We have continued
intensive talks with all participants (in the Six-Party Talks),
especially with Japan." Neither Secretary Rice nor Assistance
Secretary Hill showed up at the news conference.
(4) U.S. removal of DPRK from terror blacklist creates ripple effect
on Japan-U.S. alliance
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full)
October 15, 2008
The U.S. government's removal of North Korea from the list of states
sponsoring terrorism is having a lasting effect on Japan, since the
timing was unexpected. Voices of concern about the impact on the
TOKYO 00002875 006 OF 011
Japan-U.S. alliance are being raised one after another, with even
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama
saying, "It revealed that the United States does not necessarily
attach too much importance to Japan."
Foreign Minister Nakasone, speaking in the Upper House Budget
Committee on Oct. 14, rebutted such views: "It is not true that the
United States carried out a decision without regard for our wishes."
He intends to make another appeal on such issues as the importance
of the abduction issue when he meets Secretary Rice in Abu Dhabi on
Oct. 18.
So far, Japan has been tossed back and forth as the U.S. and North
Korea engaged in diplomatic tactics. At the time of the nuclear
crisis of 1993, there was even talk within the Clinton
administration of air-striking North Korea, but with the signing of
the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK in 1994, the
second Clinton administration strengthened its conciliatory posture
toward that country, and then Secretary of State Albright even
visited Pyongyang. The U.S. greatly swung back and forth. There was
no progress on missiles, an issue of concern to Japan.
During the first term of the Bush administration, the
neoconservatives, who wanted regime change in North Korea, were
influential, and a hard-line stance stood out. But during the second
term, the hard-line stance petered out when the administration
became mired in Iraq policy. There was a strong impression that
results on the North Korean front were being sped up.
During this period, not only was the abduction issue left
unresolved, North Korea proceeded to deploy mid-range ballistic
missiles, and the security environment around Japan continued to
worsen. The Tokyo Foundation, in a recently announced set of
security proposals, pointed out: "North Korea over the past 10 years
has improved its missile capabilities and has come close to the
stage of being able to use them to launch nuclear weapons. The scale
of destruction would be exponentially greater than before."
Japan's basic strategy of comprehensively resolving the nuclear,
missile, and abduction issues has as its greatest aim to make sure
that the United States and China - powers that have the strongest
influence on North Korea - will not be able to ignore the abduction
issue. In that sense, at the point when the abduction issue was
folded into the framework of the Six-Party Talks, Japan's strategy
was halfway toward reaching its goal.
The U.S. government has stressed that sanctions against North Korea
still remain, and urged Japan not to exaggerate the importance of
the delisting steps. The U.S. also stressed that there has been no
change in the importance of resolving the abduction issue. It is
true that once its name was removed from the terror blacklist, North
Korea announced that it was resuming the work of disabling its
nuclear facility, and there has been a bit of progress on the
abduction front.
However, the psychological impact of the delisting cannot be
underestimated. A top official at the Foreign Ministry lamented
yesterday: "The U.S. does not realize that very much." If confidence
is shaken in the Japan-U.S. relationship, the threat from North
Korea can only grow. It is therefore urgent that trust be rebuilt
between the two countries.
TOKYO 00002875 007 OF 011
(5) Three weeks since Aso cabinet inaugurated; Kantei staff members
set in full motion
SANKEI (Page 4) (Full)
October 13, 2008
Three weeks will soon pass since the cabinet of Prime Minister Taro
Aso was inaugurated. The Aso cabinet was initially deemed a
caretaker government to prepare for a general election. Aso,
however, has taken a stance of forgoing the dissolution of the House
of Representatives and the calling of a snap election. The Prime
Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) staff members, whom Aso
picked on his own, will go into action on a full scale. The Sankei
Shimbun has looked into Aso's policy image based on his selection of
people to staff the Kantei.
Surprise appointment of Kawamura as chief cabinet secretary
The appointment of Takeo Kawamura as chief cabinet secretary was
seen as a surprise. Kawamura is a Lower House member elected in the
Yamaguchi No. 3 district. He is now serving his six-term in the
Diet. It is unusual for a prime minister to pick his chief aide from
another faction. Kawamura belongs to the Ibuki faction. Aso and
Kawamura share only thing in common: they both belong to the
educational policy clique in the Diet. The main reasons for Aso
having appointed Kawamura are his personal channels to the
opposition camp and his strong election base, allowing him to stay
in Tokyo during the election campaign, according to a person close
to Aso. However, one cabinet member pointed out: "Former Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, who is a longtime ally of Aso, proposed
Kawamura. Abe and Kawamura hail from the same prefecture
(Yamaguchi).
Aso picked Jun Matsumoto and Yoshitaka Konoike to serve as deputy
chief cabinet secretaries for political affairs. Matsumoto, who is a
Lower House member elected in the Kanagawa No. 1 district, is now
serving his third term in the Diet. Konoike, an Upper House member
elected in Hyogo Prefecture, is in his third term in the Diet.
Matsumoto is the closest aide to Aso. It is said that Aso listens to
Matsumoto's opinions in a serious manner. The prime minister often
has dinner with him.
Aso and Konoike have known each other since they were members of the
Japan Junior Chamber of Commerce (JJC). The two at one time have
headed the JJC.
Aso appointed former National Police Agency Director General Iwao
Uruma as deputy chief cabinet secretary for administrative affairs
in place of Masahito Futahashi, former administrative vice minister
for the defunct Home Affairs Ministry. The post had been served by
officials from the former Health and Welfare Ministry and the former
Home Affairs Ministry. The appointment of a NPA official is an
exceptional case, following Hiromori Kawashima as deputy chief
cabinet secretary in the Tanaka and Miki cabinets. A source
connected to the Kantei said: "The prime minister highly evaluated
Uruma's effort to deal with such difficult issues as North Korea's
abductions of Japanese nationals."
Increase in secretaries unprecedented
The increase in the number of secretaries to the prime minister is a
major distinction. The secretaries to the prime ministerial used to
TOKYO 00002875 008 OF 011
be made up of one veteran secretary for political affairs and four
secretaries for administrative affairs coming from the Finance
Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry, and the National Police Agency. Aso has now
picked an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications as a secretary.
Masakatsu Okamoto, former vice minister for policy coordination of
the MIAC, served as director general of the Local Allocation Tax
Division during Aso's tenure as minister for MIAC. It is said that
Okamoto gained Aso's confidence during that time. Aso also picked
Shunichi Yamaguchi, a Lower House member elected in the Tokushima
No. 2 district and former postal rebel, secretary to the prime
minister on revitalization of the local economy, as well as former
Kitakyushu Mayor Koichi Sueyoshi as cabinet secretariat counsellor.
Aso also added two assistant deputy chief cabinet secretaries -- one
for internal affairs and the other for foreign policy -- who are at
the same level as administrative vice ministers. Chikao Kawai was
replaced in less than two months by Keiichi Hayashi, then deputy
vice-minister of the Foreign Ministry's Minister's Secretariat due
to differences in foreign policies of former Prime Minister Yasuo
Fukuda and Prime Minister Aso, according to some political
observers.
An aide to Aso said: "The prime minister was very fussy in selecting
on his own the Kantei staff members." They are known as "Team Aso."
The Kantei lineup thus was completely changed. Compared with the
former Fukuda cabinet, the Aso cabinet's unity appears to be solid.
A veteran LDP lawmaker commented: "I wonder if the Kantei staff
members are all yes-men" Some in the LDP are concerned about the
possibility of return of the likes of the former Abe cabinet, which
was ridiculed for being a "cabinet of good friends."
Lineup of Kantei staff members
Prime Minister Aso
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura
Deputy chief cabinet secretaries: Matsumoto
Konoike
Uruma
Special advisors to the prime minister: Kyoko Nakayama (on the
abduction issue)
Shunichi Yamaguchi (on revitalization of local economy)
Assistant deputy chief cabinet secretaries: Susumu Fukuda (Finance
Ministry)
Keiichi Hayashi (Foreign Ministry)
Kyoji Yanagisawa (Defense Ministry)
Secretaries to the prime minister Ichiro Muramatsu (Aso office)
Masakatsu Okamoto (ex-Home Affairs Ministry)
Masatsugu Asakawa (Finance Ministry)
Kazuyuki Yamazaki (Foreign Ministry)
Tadao Yanase (METI)
Nobuyuki Muroki (NPA)
(6) Rocky road ahead of post-Kyoto Protocol framework: Can Japan's
proposal obtain support at cabinet-preparatory meeting for COP14?
ASAHI (Page 6) (Full)
October 11, 2008
A cabinet-level preparatory meeting for the 14th session of the
TOKYO 00002875 009 OF 011
Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention (COP14)
to be held in Poznan, Poland is set to be held on October 13-14. The
Japanese government wants to stir up discussions on a framework
designed to cut greenhouse gas emissions that would replace the
Kyoto Protocol with a new proposal for mandating key developing
countries, such as China and India, to set emissions reduction
goals.
The new proposal divides developing countries, which currently have
no obligations to cut carbon emissions, depending on the stages of
their economic development. Key developing countries will be asked
to set efficiency goals with binding power -- one to be achieved by
main industry sectors and the other to be achieved by those nations'
economies as a whole. Remaining developing countries will be sought
to submit action programs and to verify emissions reduction efforts
on a regular basis.
A certain Foreign Ministry officials proudly noted, "Japan has come
up with a proposal, which no other country has been willing to
articulate. You can't possibly stop global warming under the present
conditions, in which none of the key developing countries have any
obligations to make efforts to cut carbon emissions."
China, which was made the target of the Japanese proposal, submitted
a paper insisting that dividing developing countries into more
detailed categories runs counter to the treaty. It is determined to
oppose the proposal. It is also against the sector-specific
approach, which Japan advocates, saying that such an approach should
be for the sake of technology transfers from industrialized
countries to developing countries and that it is unacceptable for
such an approach to lead to setting reductions targets.
Japan had also proposed that developing countries that are members
of the OECD, such as South Korea, and countries with large GDPs,
such as Singapore, should be categorized as developing countries. In
response, South Korea and South Africa have come up with a proposal
for a system of internationally approving developing countries'
efforts to cut carbon emissions by registering their activities with
the UN. Their proposal is noteworthy of attention as a new move.
Singapore is also insisting that it should be allowed to make a
voluntary pledge for emissions cuts, with consideration given to its
conditions, such as that it is a small country and has high
population density.
Japan during the COP14 meeting intends to call on all countries to
agree on the long-term target of at least halving the total carbon
emissions by the world by 2050, as agreed upon at the G-8 in
Hokkaido. However, developing countries are insisting that
industrialized countries should cut 25 PERCENT -40 PERCENT by 2020
and 80 PERCENT -95 PERCENT by 2050.
The goal the EU has put up is that industrialized countries should
cut emissions 30 PERCENT by 2020. Its stance regarding the
post-Kyoto framework is that it is necessary for developing
countries to take action to cut carbon emissions, Based on that
stance, it has proposed a plan to compensate developing countries
for their emissions reduction efforts, according to the degree of
achievements. Its proposal does not include punishments, either.
However, it has no new proposals. The U.S., where the Bush
administration is in the closing days, has made only an abstract
proposal that more discussions should be pursued on what the shared
vision is.
TOKYO 00002875 010 OF 011
Japan has clearly confronted key developing countries with a
distinctive proposal. Environment Minister Saito did not take part
in the preparatory meeting because of Diet deliberations. How many
countries will agree on Japan's proposal is unclear.
(7) TOP HEADLINES
Asahi:
NHK plans to return 10 PERCENT of subscription fees to viewers
starting in fiscal 2012
Mainichi, Yomiuri and Nikkei:
U.S. to inject 25 trillion yen into financial institutions,
including nine major banks
Tokyo Shimbun: Hachioji health office detects dichlorvos 30,000
times the residue standard in beans from China
Akahata:
Medical insurance premiums to be withheld from pension benefits for
6.25 million aged 75 and older today
(8) EDITORIALS
Asahi:
(1) Stock prices bounce back
(2) Death of MSDF member: Organization must be improved
Mainichi:
(1) Professional baseball world must not dampen high spirits of
youths
(2) Newspaper week: Door to information must be open
Yomiuri:
(1) Stock market rebound not end of crisis
(2) Newspaper week: Newspapers must continue to serve as compass of
times
Nikkei:
(1) Emergency concerted action must be highly effective
Tokyo Shimbun:
(1) Counties around world must reconfirm unity in taking steps to
stabilize financial markets
(2) Japanese doctor abducted in Ethiopia: Safety must come first
Akahata:
(1) U.S.-triggered financial crisis must not take toll on people
(9) Prime Minister's schedule, October 13
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
October 15, 2008
09:49
Walked around his private residence in Kamiyama-cho.
16:00
Me with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura, Pubic Relations
Headquarters Chairman Furuya at LDP headquarters. Had photo session
for and taped message for public relations.
TOKYO 00002875 011 OF 011
18:29
Met again with Kawamura and Furuya.
18:43
Met with Finance Minister Nakagawa and Kawamura.
19:47
Met with secretaries at Imperial Hotel.
22:49
Returned to his private residence.
Prime Minister's schedule, October 14
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
October 15, 2008
07:32
Met at Kantei with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Konoike.
08:36
Attended cabinet meeting in Diet building.
09:01
Attended Upper House Budget Committee session.
12:03
Met at Kantei with Economic and Fiscal Minister Yosano and Chief
Cabinet Secretary Kawamura.
13:00
Attended Upper House Budget Committee session.
16:50
Met with Finance Minister Nakagawa and Kawamura.
17:27
Met at Kantei with Special Advisor Yamaguchi, followed by Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary Uruma.
18:28
Met with BOJ Gov. Shirakawa.
19:08
Met with Uruma, followed by Foreign Ministry Economic Affairs Bureau
chief Otabe and Finance Ministry International Bureau chief Tamaki.
21:08
Met with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto and Assistant
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yamaguchi at the bar Majiri in
Roppongi.
23:20
Returned to his private residence.
SCHIEFFER