VZCZCXRO9742
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHFN #0477 2671759
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231759Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2221
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS FREETOWN 000477
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/CC, AF/W, AF/EX, S/CT, CA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC PINR PTER SL
SUBJECT: EAC DISCUSSES RECENT ATTACKS IN YEMEN AND PAKISTAN
AND CURRENT SECURITY POSTURE
1. (SBU) On September 23, 2008, the Embassy Emergency Action
Committee (EAC) convened to discuss the recent attacks
against the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen on September 17,
2008 and the Marriott in Islamabad, Pakistan on September 20,
2008. Present were the Charge, DAO, ARSO, CON, USAID, A/POL,
and PAO.
2. (SBU) The ARSO briefed the EAC on the above mentioned
attacks and went over the current security posture of post.
The EAC reviewed the security procedures and expressed
concern that there is only one access road to and from the
Embassy. The road is narrow and riddled with pot holes and
the derbies that wash down from the slope of the hill on one
side. The opposite side has an eight (8) foot cinder block
wall that covers the complete length of the road up to the
front area of the Embassy. The wall is the rear boundary to
the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT)
compound. The concern was that this access road is an
extreme choke point where there is a steep hill on one side
and a cinder wall on the other. In the event of an emergency
turning around or backing out could not be done in an
expedited manner. There is a section of the IMATT wall that
has a vehicle gate leading into the IMATT compound. The EAC
requested that the RSO contact the IMATT security personnel
and see if a possible emergency egress route be instituted,
and review other security concerns and procedures.
3. (U) The EAC concluded that the current normal security
posture is adequate. ARSO, however, reminded EAC members of
the importance of being security conscious at all times and
stressed staff to remain vigilant, to include reporting all
possible surveillance activity and to practice operational
security. The ARSO also spoke with the Local Guard Force
(LGF) Commander, Surveillance Detection (SD) Coordinator, and
the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) liaison and reminded them of
the same and to reiterate this their team members.
FEDZER