Cablegate: Panamanian Security Cooperation: Irreplaceable?

VZCZCXYZ0000

RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0704/01 2391750

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 261750Z AUG 08

FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2447

INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC

RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH

RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

RUEABND/DEA WASHDC

RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER WASHDC

RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RHMFISS/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T PANAMA 000704

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PM

SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN SECURITY COOPERATION: IRREPLACEABLE?

REF: A. REF A:PANAMA 00223

B. REF B:PANAMA 00467

C. REF C:PANAMA07 00940

D. REF D:PANAMA 00623

E. REF E:PANAMA 00669

Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Stephenson for Reason 1.4 (d)

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Summary

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1. (S/NF) Panama is one of the USG's most important law

enforcement and security partners in the Western Hemisphere.

Its importance is based on a combination of its strategic

location astride one of the world's most important lines of

communication, an enormous Panamanian flagged shipping fleet,

and the willingness of the Government of Panama (GOP) to

cooperate with various USG agencies. The fact that this

cooperation is dispersed among many different agencies makes

it difficult to understand the critical nature of our

partnership with Panama. Panamanian cooperation allows the

USG to: search Panamanian flagged ships in international

waters, listen to the phone calls of drug dealers and FARC

Fronts, make direct drug seizures, fly counter drug missions

over Panama's strategic waters, and conduct the annual

Panamax military exercise, SouthCom's largest and most

important security cooperation event in the region.

2. (S/NF) Panama's help is much more critical to us than it

is to Panama. Because the scope of this cooperation is not

fully visible, it risks being inadequately appreciated by

even the most seasoned experts in Panama and the U.S. The

counter-drug missions the GOP helps us with are not seen as a

priority among Panamanians, who see them as an American

affair, diverting resources from their own problems. The US

must remain engaged in Panama's law enforcement and security

efforts to maintain our critical cooperation across the

board, and to obtain the even better results which are within

reach. This cable seeks to inform Washington Panama watchers

and other stakeholders regarding the importance and value of

our extensive cooperation in law enforcement and security

matters. The nature of our programs essentially extends our

homeland security out from the U.S. border to Panama's. End

Summary.

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Direct Seizure Rate

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3. (S/NF) Panama has seized over 30 tons of cocaine in the

first eight months of 2008, following seizure of almost 60

tons last year. This represents the highest seizure rate in

the world by far. Panama is an important transshipment point

for cocaine heading to the US and Europe by sea, and land.

(Note: Due to Colombian Government efforts, there is very

little drug trafficking through Panama by air at this time.

End Note) Drug traffickers use go-fast boats to make short

hauls along the coast, working their way up through Central

America to Mexico, or take advantage of the Pan-American

Highway to ship drugs north. Almost all seizures have been

the result of information obtained through the Matador

intercept program (see below para 7), or U.S. intelligence

passed to the Panamanians. Almost all seizures are carried

out by a small number of specialized units, including the

Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) and the Panamanian

National Police's (PNP) Reverine Patrol and Action Unit

(UMOF).

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Special Units

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4. (S/NF) Panama's Sensitive Investigations Unit is

composed of 40 officers from the Panamanian Anti-Drug

Prosecutor's Office and the PNP. Their main task is to

further major, multi-lateral narcotics investigations in

coordination with international law enforcement partners.

They are vetted through background checks and polygraphs, and

receive extensive USG training and resources, provided

primarily by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the

Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), including salary

bonuses. They use a "task force" approach, sharing leads and

intelligence on a regular basis and in an effective fashion.

DHS' Immigration and Custom's Enforcement (ICE) recently

established its own vetted unit (staffed by ICE-vetted PNP

officials), and that has already produced its own successes.

5. (S/NF) The UMOF was established to patrol the rivers of

Panama's almost impenetrable Darien Province, where rivers

serve as roads. The unit has proven to be highly competent

and aggressive, and has made excellent use of NAS-provided

equipment, including two Donzi go-fast boats, to seize large

amounts of cocaine, including out at sea. The unit is a sign

of how effective resources given to the GOP can be in leading

directly to important drug seizures.

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Problems at Sea

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6. (S/NF) The UMOF's success only highlights one of the

major problem areas Post has encountered in Panama, the

ineffectiveness of the Panamanian National Maritime Service

(SMN). U.S. aircraft have identified the maritime drug

trafficking routes along Panama's coasts, but the SMN has

been ineffective at intercepting the go-fast boasts that

carry out this activity, despite over $12 million in U.S.

assistance, including two Donzi go-fast boats and four

Nortech interceptor boats. The SMN continues to suffer from

poor leadership and is likely plagued by internal corruption.

While it plays a major role in certain activities of

importance to the U.S. (prisoner transfers, High Value

Transits of the Canal, Panamax), the SMN has failed

demonstrably in recent years to effectively act upon maritime

counter-narcotics leads provided by the USG. While

frustrating for the agencies involved, it also demonstrates

that Panama could be seizing even more cocaine and disrupting

drug smuggling routes if a way can be found to engage with

the GOP as it attempts to reform the SMN as part of its

planned creation of a National Aero-Naval Service SENAN)

(Panamanian Coast Guard) as part of its planned security

reforms.

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Matador

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7. (S/NF) Post's NAS and DEA offices have developed an

extraordinarily successful Judicialized Telephone Intercept

Program ("Matador") in cooperation with the Panamanian

Anti-Drug Prosecutor's office, the Council of Public Security

and National Defense (CSPDN), and the Panamanian Supreme

Court. This extremely sensitive program, similar to U.S.

Title III programs, continues to develop real-time leads in

the fight against organized drug trafficking, and in

particular the illicit activities of the FARC. The

intercepts are also being used by the FBI to investigate the

involvement of the FARC in the kidnapping of AmCit Celio Juan

Padron in April 2008. The intercepts have allowed DEA to

develop an intricate understanding of the FARC presence and

activities in Panama, and to prepare a criminal case against

them. Major indictments against the FARC in these two cases

are expected in the coming months based on evidence obtained

through Matador. At present, close to 200 dirty cellular

lines are "intervened", each one following approval by the

Criminal Chamber of the Panamanian Supreme Court of a request

from the Panamanian Anti-Drug Prosecutor's Office. U.S. and

Panamanian law enforcement agencies expect a regular stream

of arrests and subsequent indictments from these efforts, as

information obtained via Matador is valid in U.S. federal

courts, as well as in local Panamanian courts. The success

of the program stems from excellent cooperation among the

Panamanian Supreme Court, the CSPDN, the Prosecutor's office,

and vetted elements of the Panamanian National Police (PNP).

Matador has benefited from DEA expertise and training, and

has counted on financial backing from NAS (over $1 million),

DEA, and the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at Post.

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FARC, or No FARC?

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8. (S/NF) While the GOP readily admits to Embassy contacts

that there is a small regular FARC presence in the thickly

forested and largely ungoverned Darien Province, GOP

officials shy away from talking about any FARC presence in

Panama publicly. Rather than use the terms "FARC" or

"terrorist," the GOP prefers "criminal elements" or "criminal

organizations," in keeping with their view that, as the FARC

comes under increasing pressure, a breakdown in central

command is manifesting itself in a rise in undisciplined

criminal actions. The GOP's historical position has been

that of "live and let live", whereby FARC units keep a low

profile, do not disturb Panamanians, and do not engage in

serious crime against Panamanians (kidnapping, murder), and

in turn they will not be disturbed by Panamanian forces. The

FARC presence in the Darien is not very large, but it now

appears likely that there is also a significant logistical

operation based in Panama City. The Panamanian authorities do

not have the capability to uproot the FARC presence from the

Darien or other parts of Panama at this time, and this has

been one of the reasons they have given in private for the

need to create a new stand alone Frontier Force (SENAFRONT)

(see Ref E). The FARC is not a major concern of the

Panamanian people, however, who see the Darien as very

remote, and are more focused on the day-to-day crime in their

neighborhoods. There is little political gain in taking on

the FARC publicly, and much to be lost. GOP may fear an

aggressive campaign against the FARC could lead to a showdown

in the Darien to which the GOP would, with current forces,

lose.

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Salas-Becker Agreement

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9. (S/NF) In February 2002, the U.S. and Panama signed the

Salas-Becker Agreement (SBA). This agreement remains one of

our most important drug fighting tools in the region. SBA has

three main components. Among other things, it allows the U.S.

Coast Guard (USCG) to patrol Panamanian waters with

Panamanian SMN officers aboard, to stop Panamanian registered

ships on the high seas (after a diplomatic protocol), and to

carry out drug interdiction flights over Panamanian waters

and land in Panamanian airports. It is an invaluable tool to

U.S. counter-narcotics efforts, and for that reason has faced

opposition by some in Panama. Panamanian National Assembly

President Pedro Miguel Gonzalez (presently under U.S. federal

indictment in connection with the 1992 murder of a U.S.

soldier) has threatened to challenge SBA in court, and some

Panamanians see it as aviolation of Panamanian sovereignty.

Nonetheless, the GOP has stood by the agreement, and, on

August 17, 4.2 tons of cocaine were seized on the Panamanian

flagged M/V Aganmenon 100 nautical miles south of Puerto

Rico, under the terms of the SBA.

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Ship-Rider Program

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10. (S/NF) One of the key aspects of SBA is the Ship-Rider

Program. This program allows Panamanian law enforcement

officers to serve as liaison officers aboard USCG cutters

that patrol in or near Panamanian territorial waters. These

officers are able to give orders to Panamanian vessels, and

request assistance from the crew of the USCG cutter. This

effectively turns the cutters into Panamanian vessels that

patrol Panamanian waters. The program has not been working as

effectively as previously because the SMN officers have not

been delegated the essential authority to take decisions on

their own, and must get clearance from their superiors.

Without these officers on board, however, it is not likely

that the GOP would be able to justify letting U.S. ships

patrol their waters. The GOP is also reluctant to allow

ship-riders on U.S. Navy vessels which are assigned to law

enforcement duties, preferring to put them on "civilian

vessels." The program can be improved, but given the amount

of narcotics trafficking going on in the territorial waters

of Panama, this is still an important tool for the USG.

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Boarding of Panama Flagged Vessels

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11. (S/NF) SBA also establishes a procedure by which the

USG can request from the GOP the right to board

Panamanian-flagged ships (one-third of all the ships in the

world are flagged in Panama) in international waters. If

drugs are found on-board, the GOP can cede jurisdiction of

the ship, drugs and crew to the USG, with the critical

exception of Panamanian citizens. To date all such requests

have been approved. While it is unclear whether Panama has

the legal right to cede jurisdiction over its citizens on the

open sea, the 2006 case of the M/V Perseus V, where eight

Panamanians were taken to the U.S. and tried and convicted

under SBA, has made it a political impossibility right now

(see Ref d). Also per Ref d, we have requested guidance from

the Department on how to respond to the GOP's Dip Note on the

status of the Panamanian sailors. The importance of the

Panamanian fleet makes SBA invaluable in attempts to

interdict drugs on the high seas, and Post is concerned this

case may make it more difficult for the GOP to fully

implement it.

12. (S/NF) Panama has also participated in the

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a potentially

important tool in the bid to prevent WMD proliferation. To

date no request to board a Panamanian flagged ship has been

made under the PSI.

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JIATF Tocumen Operations

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13. (S/NF) The Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) -

South operates P-3 aircraft out of Tocumen Airport in Panama

City under SBA. The planes are non-military, either USCG or

CBP, and must carry Panamanian law enforcement officials on

board, per SBA. SBA allows the planes to track traffic over

Panama and its waters, and to relay the orders of Panamanian

officials to suspect aircraft or seacraft. The planes may

operate out of Tocumen airport while conducting short joint

operations, normally lasting a week. The program has allowed

JIATF-South to map out the routes used by drug traffickers,

and to identify targets. This program also benefits the GOP,

whose National Air Service has only two functional

helicopters at this time. As noted above, the information

gathered has played a major role in seizures by the PNP and

the UMOF, along with seizures made in other countries. The

SMN has not been effective in using this information.

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CNIES

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14. (S/NF) JIATF-South currently benefits from Panama,s

participation in the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange

System (CNIES) program. CNIES uses Re-locatable Over the

Horizon RADAR (ROTHR) feeds to detect air tracks as aircraft

transit into or through Panamanian airspace. The Panamanian

National Air Service (SAN) is very proficient and aggressive

in sorting such air tracks to determine if they are

legitimate or illicit airborne activities. The ROTHR feeds

are real-time and are viewed at both the SAN Operations

Center and JIATF-South Operations Center. In addition to

providing a common operating picture, CNIES provides on-line

chat (w /simultaneous translation) capability between JIATF-S

and all participating countries. This chat capability allows

for coordination and information sharing in real time.

Without the SAN's ability to weed out legitimate flights from

the raw radar information, JIATF-South would not be able to

act on the information. While airborne trafficking is not a

major issue right now due to aggressive actions by the

Colombian government, the capability to detect air traffic

through Central America is a very valuable asset, which may

become even more important in the future, as traffickers

change tactics to try to stay one step ahead of law

enforcement agencies.

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Panamax

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15. (S/NF) Panama continues to co-host SouthCom's premier

event, "Fueras Aliadas PANAMAX." This Canal defense oriented

exercise has grown from three countries (Chile, Panama, and

the U.S.) in 2003, to over 20 countries this year. This

exercise has allowed the countries in the region who are

willing to join forces in the defense of the Canal to

practice their inter-operablity in real world naval exercises

where officers and vessels from all the participants work

together at every level to create a truly impressive model of

defense cooperation. Panama has now begun to integrate its

non-naval domestic security forces into the exercises by

practicing its response to lower level emergencies which

might precede a full scale international response. These

exercises known as Panamax Alpha, show Panama's resolve to

become a regional partner in the defense of the Canal, and

not just a passive observer.

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Third Border

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15. (S/NF) Panama is a choke point in the Americas, and

many travelers from South America must pass through Panama on

their way north. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is working to

build up Panama as a "third border", where people and goods

coming to the U.S. can be screened and, if necessary, stopped

before they reach the U.S. There are several programs that

fall into this category. NAS financed the construction of the

Guabala checkpoint about one mile from the Panama-Costa Rica

border crossing at a cost of almost $500,000. The post is

designed to stop illegal migrants, smugglers, and other

contraband before reaching to border, and so prevent passage

through Central America, and possibly to the U.S. DHS has

deployed Border Patrol agents on several occasions to provide

operational assistance to the Panamanian authorities, funded

by NAS. CBP is also working with the CSPDN and civil aviation

authorities to implement a the Advanced Passenger Information

System (APIS) in Panama, that would allow CBP to know who was

entering Panama, and prevent potential criminals or

terrorists from continuing on to the US. This project would

be funded under the Merida Initiative.

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CSI

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16. (S/NF) Panama is home to three of the most important

container ports in the Western Hemisphere, and the world's

second largest Free Trade Zone, in Colon. Many containers are

transferred in these ports for eventual shipment to U.S.

ports, making Panama a critical location for screening cargo

bound for the U.S. Panama has cooperated closely with ICE in

initiating a Container Security Initiative (CSI) in the three

major ports here. The CSI became operational in Panama in

September 2007, with a primary mission of deterring the entry

of WMD into the U.S. through containerized shipping. DHS has

installed two container scanners in Panamanian ports, and the

GOP is looking to purchase several more. ICE currently has

four CBP officers and one ICE agent stationed working with

the Panamanians on this.

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Turning Over Bad Guys

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17. (S/NF) Panama is one of the most obliging countries in

the region in terms of extraditing non Panamanian foreign

nationals. They not only have an Mutual Legal Assistance

Treaty (MLAT) with the U.S., which allows for a formal

extradition process, but have been willing to engage in other

more creative techniques. These have included: the direct

expulsion to the U.S. of people of interest to U.S. law

enforcement, under the pretext that they have lied on their

request for entry documents; and the use of Conditional

Release, under which the GOP releases to the U.S. a suspect

already under arrest in Panama on other charges. Under this

procedure, the suspect is "lent" to the U.S. for prosecution

on the condition that they will be returned for prosecution

in Panama at the end of their sentence. This procedure is

much faster than a formal extradition, and has proven so

successful, that DEA sometimes designs operations to bring

suspects to Panama so they can be arrested in Panama and

turned over to U.S. authorities quickly.

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Panama Express

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18. (S/NF) Panama Express refers to an agreement between

Panama and the U.S. whereby drug suspects caught by U.S.

ships in international waters can be brought to shore in

Panama for transshipment to the U.S. A similar agreement

exists with Guatemala. This agreement is critical to the work

of USG counter-narcotic operations which focus on stopping

drug shipments at sea. Suspects are allowed to "unofficially"

enter Panama, after which they are taken directly to a SAN

base, and then picked up by USG assets. Without this

agreement, USCG ships would need to go off station for long

periods of time, and burn large amounts of fuel in order to

bring the suspects to the U.S. The knowledge that these

suspects are going straight to the U.S. also increases their

disposition to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement

authorities.

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Police Cooperation

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20. (S) The day-to-day cooperation of the PNP and other

local law enforcement with the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies in non-drug cases, such as the Padron kidnapping,

has been excellent. The only problem has been a failure to

adequately safeguard information from release in the press.

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