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DE RUEHNO #0265/01 2071545
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADBBE674 MSI1794-695)
P 251545Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2107
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000265
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C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO EZ GG KV MK PL RS UNMIK
Classified By: Charge dAffaires Richard G. Olson, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY. Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer July 22 in Brussels
and later informally briefed PermReps, delivering a warning in both meetings about the dangers of continued delay in
UNMIK reconfiguration and EULEX deployment throughout Kosovo and calling attention to the need for immediate progress in
deescalating the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to reverse the deterioration on the ground. In their private meeting, the SYG
expressed concern about the potential for a divisive debate within the Alliance in December over whether to grant
Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and Georgia in light of what he saw as unwavering German and French opposition.
He floated the idea, which he said German Chancellor Merkel has hinted at, of agreeing in December to extend MAP to the
two countries in 2010, assuming continue progress in their reforms (and "unless something horrible happens"). Fried said
such a decision would give perverse incentives to Russia to instigate "something horrible," e.g., a war. Fried also told
the SYG and PermReps the U.S. is willing to listen to details about Russian President Medvedevs proposal for a new
security architecture for Euro-Atlantic relations, but for now the proposal recalled Soviet proposals from the 1970s.
Fried briefed the SYG on progress in U.S.-Polish missile defense talks and the SYG expressed concern about the
deterioration in atmospherica between Macedonia and Greece over the name issue. END SUMMARY.
SYG SEEKS TO AVOID TRAIN WRECK OVER MAP IN DECEMBER
2. (C) In a July 22 meeting at NATO HQ in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told Assistant
Secretary Fried he saw the need for an "inventive" strategy in the run up to the December decision of NATO Foreign
Ministers on whether to grant Membership Action Plan to Ukraine and Georgia. He said he did not see Germany or France
softening their opposition to a positive decision in December and wanted to prevent an Alliance-splitting debate. The
SYG added that whatever the decision, it needed to keep Russia under pressure and should not link MAP to progress in the
frozen conflicts since such a linkage would only give Russia an incentive to further inflame the conflicts. The SYG
noted that German Chancellor Merkel had floated the idea of deciding in December that Ukraine and Georgia would get MAP
in 2010, "unless something terrible happened," an approach he thought would keep pressure on Russia while preserving
Allied unity.
3. (C) Fried agreed that any link between MAP and progress in the frozen conflicts only gave Russia incentives to cause
problems and noted that the current Friends of Georgia framework is flawed since Russia is a member of the group, and
thus a facilitator in efforts to resolve the conflict while at the same time a party to the conflict. Regarding the
proposal to decide in December to grant Ukraine and Georgia MAP in 2010, Fried said this approach could give a perverse
incentive to Russia to stimulate something "horrible," and Russia might calculate that it would be better to provoke a
conflict sooner rather than later in Georgia. The SYG said he would have to give the idea more thought, and cautioned
that simply increasing the pressure on Germany would not change its position. He also pleaded with Fried to tell
Georgian President Saakashvili not to pull any surprises during the North Atlantic Councils September 4-5 visit to
Georgia.
FRIED: "GOLDEN HOUR" IN KOSOVO PASSING AS EUROPE DITHERS
4. (C) On Kosovo, Fried said he was worried about paralysis in the negotiations between UN and EU over reconfiguration
from UNMIK to EULEX. This continued dithering risked wasting the "golden hour" when NATO and the EU have maximum
leverage over a moderate government in Kosovo and the situation on the ground is still stable. He did not want to look
back on this time in several years as a missed opportunity before Kosovar politics become radicalized and violent in
response to frustrations with the Wests inaction. There is currently no plan for getting EULEX into the north, or to
fully re-establish the border crossings in the north, and he worried that time was wasting while the UN and EU
bureaucracies dithered over minute details. He also warned that the phrase "status neutral" being used by some
international organizations was dangerous since it led down a path to giving equal legitimacy to illegal Serb parallel
institutions (often dominated by radical Serbian elements and simple thugs) and the Kosovo government. He told the SYG
he
hoped NATO would never use the term.
5. (C) The SYG replied that he would never use the term "status neutral" publicly but there were still members of the
Alliance who had not recognized Kosovo. He said he was worried about the plan UNSRSG Zannier announced at the July 18
"Friends of Kosovo" meeting to raise the UN flag over the Mitrovica courthouse, phase in European judges and staff, and
then eventually raise the EU flag. The SYG was concerned because Zannier said he had not consulted the Kosovo government
about this plan, even though they might well support it. The SYG commented that he intended to ask NATO Military
Authorities to try to "find a way around" the impasse that prevented the North Atlantic Council from approving a revised
OPLAN for KFOR so the negotiations would not hit the same blockage when they resume.
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, DECREASE OF OIL SHIPMENTS TO CZECH REPUBLIC
6. (C) Fried noted that Russian President Medvedevs proposal for a new security architecture for Euro-Atlantic security
recalled Soviet era proposals. The U.S. did not know what exactly the Russians were proposing; perhaps neither did the
Russians. The SYG said PermReps would have a discussion that afternoon on the issue and it was on the agenda for an
upcoming NATO-Russia Council meeting. The SYG said the Alliance needed to be careful since after the NRC Russian
Ambassador Rogozin may publicly tout the fact that NATO was discussing Medvedevs proposals.
7. (C) Fried reported that the Czechs had asked the U.S. to be low-key in its response to Russias reducing of its oil
shipments to the Czech Republic shortly after the signing of the U.S.-Czech agreement on missile defense. Russia barely
denied that the cutback was politically motivated, which was worrisome, Fried said. When Russia cut the oil supplies to
the Ukraine in 2006 Russia denied it was politically motivated and they were embarrassed by the outcry in Europe. But
now they merely go through the motions of denial of political motivations of use of oil for political leverage. Such
pressure tactics were becoming "the new normal." The SYG commented that many European governments still deny that the
use of oil as a political tool was part of Russian foreign policy.
U.S.-POLISH MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS
8. (C) In response to a question from the SYG, Fried reported on his July 21 meeting with Polish PM Sikorski on missile
defense, saying that the Poles were asking for the stationing of U.S. Patriot batteries in Poland. The U.S. had proposed
rotational, rather than permanent, U.S. deployments of Patriots, but the Poles wanted more. The U.S. would look at what
other offers it might make, but would not likely give a guarantee of permanent basing of Patriots. Fried said he had
told the Poles that if Patriot missiles were the main outstanding issue, it would be helpful to resolve all secondary
matters and focus attention on the Patriot issue. He thought the two sides now had offered enough to sign a deal: a
strategic partnership, a willingness to develop creative financing for PAC acquisitions or other purposes, and
rotational deployment of Patriot missiles. The SYG said he had warned the Poles not to undermine Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty by asking for more and more from the U.S. on a bilateral basis as part of the missile defense
agreement.
MACEDONIA
9. (C) The SYG expressed concerns about recent Macedonian actions, such as PM Gruevskis public letter to PM Karamanlis,
that were dimming prospects for an agreement on the name issue. Fried noted that the Greeks also shared the blame for
the deterioration in the negotiations. He said Gruevski had told him he sent the letter to Karamanlis as a way of
pushing back against the Greeks inserting extraneous (historical) issues into the negotiations. Fried said he had
cautioned Gruevski that while the Macedonian reaction was understandable, it was nevertheless an unhelpful way to push
back against the Greeks. Macedonia needed to keep its eye on the goal of reaching agreement on the name issue. The SYG
noted that Gruevski had also just sent a letter to European Commission President Barroso with the same complaints.
BRIEFING TO NATO PERM REPS
10. (C) On July 23, Fried informally discussed Kosovo with NATO Permanent Representatives, expressing frustration with
the lack of movement on UNMIKs reconfiguration and the EULEX UN, EU DELAY IN KOSOVO AND OF POLITICAL DRIFT IN
GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ CONFLICT
deployment. Characterizing the situation as urgent, Fried warned that we were in danger of losing the opportunity of
relative peace and stability in Kosovo while the EU and the UN dither over the draft MOU. He said that despite the UN
SYGs order for UNMIK reconfiguration last month, nothing had actually happened and that issues such as use of office
space were holding up an agreement between the UN and EU. "This is the golden moment, and we are wasting it," he said.
He further pushed that EULEX should deploy to the north as soon as possible and that while dialogue with Serbia could
continue, no one should seek permission or hand a veto on EULEX deployment to Belgrade. Further delays in EULEXs
deployment would only thrust KFOR into the role of first responder. Fried urged Allies to press the EU and the UN to
find a way forward.
11. (C) Allies who spoke on Kosovo - Spain, Italy, and Belgium - acknowledged that delay served no one, but said that
other important issues such as privileges and immunities were also delaying the transition. Spain noted that the new UN
representative for Kosovo, Lamberto Zannier, had only just met with EU reps for the first time and that the transition
phase had only just begun. Allies endorsed Frieds points on continued engagement with Serbia and remarked that all EU
colleagues are clear on no veto for Belgrade. Fried agreed with Allies and recognized the importance of resolving other
issues such as privileges and immunities, but emphasized that the situation could become more difficult if there is
continued delay.
12. (C) Fried briefed Permanent Representatives on the current deteriorating situation in Abkhazia, Georgia as a result
of increasing rhetoric and violence from both sides. Saying the U.S. feared a "hot August," Fried said there was an
increased resolve in Washington to try to find a way forward through the Western Friends of Georgia which would include
engagement with the Abkhaz. Commending German Foreign Minister Steinmeier and the German-led initiatives, Fried said he
was cautiously optimistic that engagement with the Abkhaz could open up a new process for achieving stability and give
Sokhumi other options than relying on Moscow. Fried told the Allies, however, that Russia might overplay its hand by
either slowing or blocking the process - in which case Russia should have to pay a political price - and might lead to
an unstable situation by the fall. Fried concluded by saying that the U.S. is actively working with Germany and was
looking forward to next weeks Friends of Georgia meeting in Berlin.
13. (C) Fried responded to Canadian questions about Georgian efforts to declare Russias peacekeeping presence illegal by
saying that the U.S. had actively discouraged such a move since it would not change the situation on the ground and it
would do more harm than good. In response to a Canadian question regarding Medvedevs proposals for a new Euro-Atlantic
security architecture, Fried described the proposal as being "back in the 1970s" and that while the U.S. was willing to
listen to details and engage on constructive proposals, it would not support anything that would subordinate NATO to
other organizations or undermine the CFE. Fried was supported by the Spanish and Italian PermReps who said that in
reality there was nothing to the Russian proposal.
14. (U) Assistant Secretary Fried cleared this message.
OLSON