INDEPENDENT NEWS

Cablegate: Macedonia: Rumored Plans for Constitutional

Published: Tue 8 Jul 2008 01:57 PM
VZCZCXRO1896
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHSQ #0438 1901357
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 081357Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7503
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0362
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
S E C R E T SKOPJE 000438
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P (U/S BURNS) AND EUR A/S FRIED FROM AMBASSADOR
MILOVANOVIC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: RUMORED PLANS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGES AND CONCENTRATION OF POLITICAL POWER MAY THREATEN
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
REF: SKOPJE 436
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).
1. (U) This is a request for policy guidance (see paragraph
5).
2. (S/NF) According to a wide range of credible sources, PM
Gruevski's VMRO-led coalition plans to amend the constitution
to allow for indirect election, by parliament, of the
President (head of state). VMRO's new coalition partner,
eAlbanian DUI, has indicated to us that it would support such
an amendment. Such an action would end direct popular
election for the office of the President, one of the few
checks and balances on government in this young democracy.
This has been a long-standing goal of Gruevski's, and with
his new 82-seat governing majority (reftel), he now has the
means to achieve it through a constitutional amendment.
3. (S/NF) Limiting the President's independence through
indirect elections would clear the way for a system in which
the party in government could act without the possibility of
dissenting views from the President, undermining democracy in
Macedonia. It would give the ruling party control over
appointment of the Chief of Defense Staff in the Ministry of
Defense (MOD), weakening the civilian-military separation of
power in the MOD. It also would give the ruling party
additional influence over the appointment of Macedonia's
ambassadors, further concentrating power in the government.
4. (S/NF) The change from a direct to indirect election of
the President would be retrogressive and harmful to
democratic development in Macedonia. Although the
constitutional powers of the President are limited, the
traditional independence of that office has had an important
tempering effect on government policies and attitudes. In
recent months, the most notable example of this moderating
influence relates to the name dispute. President
Crvenkovski's more flexible position related to the name
negotiations, coupled with his statesmanship on the issue,
was critical in persuading the government to accept the
pre-Bucharest Nimetz proposal, and helped moderate public
opinion on the issue. Removing a directly elected President
and further limiting his/her independence would clear the way
for a mono-party system that could act without regard to
minority political views.
5. (S/NF) POLICY GUIDANCE REQUEST: We request the Department
instruct us to use the considerable influence the USG enjoys
here to persuade PM Gruevski and his coalition partners to
refrain from pursuing any action to amend the constitution to
allow for parliamentary election of the president, and to ask
other influential domestic and international actors to
discourage it as well. We would convey that message
privately.
Milovanovic
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