VZCZCXRO0918
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0276/01 1891217
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071217Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6312
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1700
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1513
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000276
SIPDIS
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, STATE FOR AF/C, AF/SPG,
AF/RSA, AND IO OFFICES
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPKO PREF PHUM UN EU SUDAN LY CT CD
SUBJECT: SRSG SEEKS CHANGES TO MINURCAT MANDATE TO PREPARE -- FOR
EXPANDED UN PKO TO REPLACE EUFOR IN CHAD, CAR.
REF: 08 NDJAMENA 163
NDJAMENA 00000276 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE: SEE PARA 10.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member Chiefs of
Mission July 3 on the upcoming report of the UNSYG on the UN Mission
to Chad and CAR. He requested that UNSC member Chiefs of Mission
alert capitals and PermReps of the changes he is requesting to
MINURCAT's mandate. He would like (a) to see the number of Chadian
gendarmes trained doubled to 1700; (b) that the SRSG play a more
active role in the Dakar Accord implementation process, and (c) to
replace EUFOR with an expanded UN PKO composed of three elements, a
military element of 2,000, a "Formed Police Unit" element of 1,200,
and a Chadian gendarme element of 1,700; and that the MINURCAT role
in CAR not be ignored or reduced. He also objected to what he
called inaccurate mention of the JEM in the text of the report.
3. (SBU) We think all four of the SRSG's recommendations deserve
USG consideration and support. SRSG understanding of Chadian
realities has enabled him to provide exemplary leadership to
MINURCAT and to collaborate usefully and productively with both the
GOC and EUFOR on the ground in Chad. He has been particularly
effective at building confidence within the Government of Chad
regarding the international community's peacekeeping and
humanitarian efforts in Chad. END SUMMARY.
4. (SBU) SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member Chiefs of Mission
July 3 on the upcoming "report of the Secretary General on the
United Nation's Mission in Chad and the Northeastern Central African
Republic." Present were COMs of the United States, France, China,
Libya, and South Africa. He said that he was seeking changes in
MINURCAT's mandate, which will be coming up for renewal soon, to
enable MINURCAT to become an expanded UN PKO capable of replacing
EUFOR when its mandate ends in early 2009. He described the
Mission's progress as generally satisfactory, especially regarding
its relationships with the Chadian government and with EUFOR.
5. (SBU) SRSG identified four areas in which he would like to see
changes to the MINURCAT mandate. First, he would like to double the
number of Chadian gendarmes and police trained and mentored to
1,700. Second, he would like to be authorized to play a more active
role in the implementation process of the Dakar Accord. Third, he
would like to see EUFOR replaced (when its mandate ends in March
2009) by a UN peacekeeping mission that would have three elements: a
military element numbering about 2,000; a "Formed Police Unit"
element numbering about 1,200, and a Chadian gendarme element of
1,700. Fourth, he was concerned that MINURCAT's role in the CAR not
be reduced or altered. SRSG also mentioned that he wanted to remove
what he considered erroneous mention of the JEM involvement in the
June Chadian armed rebel attack on eastern Chad.
6. (SBU) SRSG explained that the "Formed Police Unit" was an
essential element in an expanded UN PKO to succeed EUFOR in eastern
Chad. The current EU-UN joint PKO effort lacked this element, which
would provide an expanded UN PKO with a "flexible response"
capability, permitting it to better calibrate is response to threats
of different degrees of menace. He cited the recent incident at Goz
Beida in which EUFOR troops acted to protect humanitarian workers
from armed rebel depredations as an example of a situation in which
a heavily armed gendarme presence might have obviated a military
response.
7. (SBU) During the course of the briefing, the French Ambassador
mentioned that he understood that the CEMAC had decided to ask the
UN to authorize MINURCAT to include military observers along the
Chadian-Sudanese border in MINURCAT's renewed mandate. Neither the
French Ambassador nor the SRSG had any further information on any
possible CEMAC action in this regard. SRSG has long maintained that
he believes that MINURCAT could implement a military observation
operation along the troubled Chad-Sudan border, if provided with
adequate additional resources (See REFTEL).
8. (SBU) COMMENT: We think all four of the SRSG's recommendations
have merit and deserve USG consideration and support. We continue
to believe that Angelo's understanding of Chadian realities has
enabled him to provide exemplary leadership to MINURCAT and to
collaborate usefully and productively with EUFOR on the ground in
Chad. He has been particularly effective at building confidence
within the Government of Chad regarding the international
community's peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Chad.
9. (SBU) We are particularly concerned that there be a follow-on UN
PKO to replace EUFOR after the latter's departure, which is foreseen
to begin in early 2009 and we think that such a force should be
structured along the lines SRSG proposes, composed of three
different security elements, which reflects the realities on the
ground in Chad. Finally, we share SRSG's concern that the report
NDJAMENA 00000276 002.2 OF 002
not address contentious political issues based on limited knowledge
of political terrain here and we agree that what both Angelo and we
regard as inaccurate mention of JEM in the report may undermine
MINURCAT's credibility with the GOC and jeopardize GOC future
support for an expanded UN PKO to replace EUFOR. END COMMENT.
10. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: That the Department and USUN consider
supporting changes to MINURCAT's mandate along the lines of the four
provisions SRSG discussed and support removal of mention of JEM from
the report.
NIGRO